Syria: a civil war (closed)

[Dayuhan]

... I'm not necessarily averse to action. I'm not even necessarily and at all time averse to a bit of meddling. Before we contemplate action, commitment, and involvement,though, we need to get some things straight, especially when meddling is proposed.

We need to know our goal: what exactly do we want to achieve, and why?

We need to know and realistically assess the proposed method of achieving that goal, in detail.

We need to assess our commitment: what resources are we actually willing to commit, and do we have a realistic probability of success within those constraints? Is this goal something we want, or something we need? Do we have the political will to chew what we bite off? If we don't, better not bite it, because we'll likely end up choking on it.

We need to realistically assess the leverage we can and are willing to bring to bear, and its ability to achieve the desired goal.

We need to anticipate, to the best of our ability, the actions of those whose interests diverge from ours, and assess the leverage they can bring against us.

We need to assess the potential for unintended adverse consequences.

If those assessments come up unfavorably, or if we can only make them come up favorably by exaggerating our own capacity and will and underestimating those of our rivals, action may not be the smartest thing. Doing nothing, or very limited involvement, may not always be the most viscerally appealing course, but it's better than sticking your dick in a rat trap, diving into quicksand in an impulsive attempt to rescue someone, or sending forces out to achieve tasks that they are not equipped or trained to accomplish and that we are not willing to support to the extent needed for any level of success.

"Influence" isn't an abstract thing: either it's based on tangible carrots and sticks or it doesn't exist. If we don't know what the carrots and sticks are, the other guy won't know either, and he'll decline to be influenced. Any proposal based on the use of influence has to describe and assess exactly what carrots and sticks are to be used and how, just as a plan for military action has to be built around the capacities and constraints of the available forces.

[Bill Moore]

Ken,

I actually agree with most of your responses, and I'm not sure when that personal transition took place. It started when I wondered I why I was in countries in helping dictators strengthen their militaries to oppress their own people in the name of fighting communism to free the oppressed. I joined the military, specifically Special Forces to fight communism, to save the world from this evil ideology and I really believed in the cause. I still believe in the anti-communist crusade, but in hindsight realize we made some stupid deals with the devil to achieve a temporary strategic advantage over the communists. There is no doubt in my mind that communism was evil, it resulted in the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed socieities and economies, etc., but shouldn't have given us license to be stupid. In some regards we lost our moral compass during the Cold War.

Fast shift forward to the 90s when we no longer had a boogy man to fight, we shifted to what some called global reconstruction efforts post Cold War, where we focused on peace operations, fighting the drug trade, still fighting terrorism (it wasn't new in the 90s, and it sure as hell wasn't new on 9/11), humanitarian assistance etc. We pushed multinational operations, trying to get other nations to "share" the burden of reconstruction. We enabled regional responses to security challenges, most which of course were largely funded by and led by the U.S.. I think our intentions for the most part were good, but were they really in the national interest? The people shaping popular thinking in the beltway then were pushing the importance of globalism, the End of History, integrating the disconnected economies (read developing world) into the larger global economic system, etc. It was very much about aggressive meddling diplomacy backed by military action.

9/11 gave reason to some of the opinion shapers to (such as CNAS) to accelerate our meddling, while others (more level headed in my view) wanted to limit GWOT to finding and killing terrorists that were a threat to us (not the rest of the world), not reforming global society in hopes of some permanet cure for terrorism by addressing underlying issues. We were naive enough to call this Smart Power, though little has changed. Sadly little of what we're doing can actually be tied to national defense (outside of the CIA and Special Operations), but instead it can be tied to supporting the idealism of a few (such as the great minds in CNAS) who promote that it is "our" responsibility to meddle and transform these poor countries, to fix their economies, to transform their incorrect political views, etc. Eventually they'll catch on that these are hostile acts and we're actually developing tomorrow's enemies who actually will be a threat to our Nation.

I'm actually beginning to think as a nation we have going collectively mad, and that this budget crisis may actually save us from ourselves in the long run. I'm still an idealist in many respects, but have learned the importance of moderation, listening to those who we want to help (who may not want the help we want to push on them), and the importance of keeping real threats to our nation as top priority, which doesn't mean during on the lights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is a great job for the UN, State Department and USAID.

[Ken White]

That and a few HAH landings to jiggle the vertebra...

There is no doubt in my mind that communism was evil, it resulted in the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed socieities and economies, etc., but shouldn't have given us license to be stupid. In some regards we lost our moral compass during the Cold War.

Yes to all that! In our defense, the whole world sort of lost it during the 60s; the world was changing, too few realized it, even fewer realized the extreme breadth and depth of the changes. We had a generation of moral and ethical floundering coupled with uncertainty on how to react and all that overlaid by the world's governing elites and many in Academe futilely trying to keep things from changing. I see hopeful glimmers that maybe we collectively are finally realizing we've been in a very different world for over 20 year and have not adapted well to that -- and that failure to adapt needs to be rectified. Things are looking up, only slightly but any up is better than more down...

Fast shift forward to the 90s when we no longer had a boogy man to fight...It was very much about aggressive meddling diplomacy backed by military action.

Yep. Bad news is that the system almost seemed to require a boogy man. It didn't, really but those who benefited from threats invented some to justify their existence -- or improve their lot.

The CoComs ended up with way too much power by default, not by design, the US government got redesigned by several Presidents who had inherited the WW II induced 'do something even if it's wrong' mantra and who were concerned more about their 'legacy' and their political party than they were about the nation -- in that they were ably assisted by a Congress that redesigned some programs to buy votes, pamper the middle class and insure long encumbency for them and success for their party. None of those folks were totally bad, most meant well -- but those factors had far too much influence on everything they did...

The result is a system that seems to require crises and meddling.

Sadly little of what we're doing can actually be tied to national defense (outside of the CIA and Special Operations), but instead it can be tied to supporting the idealism of a few (such as the great minds in CNAS) who promote that it is "our" responsibility to meddle and transform these poor countries, to fix their economies, to transform their incorrect political views, etc. Eventually they'll catch on that these are hostile acts and we're actually developing tomorrow's enemies who actually will be a threat to our Nation.

True dat. The 'Think Tanks' are a significant part of the problem as they, too must have crises of one sort or another to justify their existence.

I agree that some in the CIA and SOF are doing productive stuff -- but as you know, I also believe some are being badly misused. Losing the bubble is not restricted to inside the beltway...

I'm actually beginning to think as a nation we have going collectively mad, and that this budget crisis may actually save us from ourselves in the long run. I'm still an idealist in many respects, but have learned the importance of moderation, listening to those who we want to help (who may not want the help we want to push on them), and the importance of keeping real threats to our nation as top priority, which doesn't mean during on the lights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is a great job for the UN, State Department and USAID.

Not mad, we've just managed to dumb ourselves down to a significant degree and the so-called governing elite crowd who think they have all the answers are a part of that -- they do not want an educated, informed populace. Those kind of folks are way too much trouble to govern...

We might continue to slide until an existential threat appears and I don't think a mere budget crisis is enough to slow that slide significantly. Still, as I said, I see small but hopeful signs and I know we generally rally pretty well. Let's hope we do not continue to slide down too rapidly or too much to rally when that threat eventually appears. And it will. The kids'll handle it. They always have...

[jcustis]

If those assessments come up unfavorably, or if we can only make them come up favorably by exaggerating our own capacity and will and underestimating those of our rivals, action may not be the smartest thing.

This, sadly, is where we and other states selfishly, myopically, and stubbornly, get it wrong all the time, even when we do a fair to good job at all the other stuff.

[davidbfpo]

It appears that Russia and Turkey will not follow the joint call for Assad to step down:

“We do not share the point of view of the United States and Europe in regard to President Bashar al-Assad,” the foreign ministry spokesman, Alexander Lukashevich, said. The Interfax news agency quoted ministry sources as saying that Mr Assad had done “quite a lot” on promised reforms, and that the pledge to stop military operations was an “important move”.

In a serious blow, Turkey also refused to join the calls for Mr Assad to go, saying the opposition was not yet united. Turkey, once a key ally of Mr Assad, had previously suggested it might be on the verge of turning against him definitively.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...d-to-quit.html

[davidbfpo]

Just a thought. Why not increase Western broadcasting to the region? The UK is stupidly reducing public funding to the BBC World Service, which IIRC uses transmitters in Cyprus.

I noted remarks yesterday that no decision has been made by the EU on stopping purchases of Syrian oil & gas (I didn't realise they had their own exports).

Is it possible to have a 'Boycott Syria' campaign? A ban on allowing Syrian Airlines flights into the EU, reducing diplomatic representation and a slowdown in international financial institutions.

[Bob's World]

It appears that Russia and Turkey will not follow the joint call for Assad to step down:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...d-to-quit.html

I have to side with Russia and Turkey on this one. My fear is that those who work in the bubble of the White House are coming to believe that because they proclaimed that Mubarak and Qaddafi must step down, that that is why those leaders made or will make their decision on that topic. So that now they need merely utter those magic words and Assad will also "obey."

This is the same kind of thinking that got the senior leadership at DoD to believe that it was our surge of troops, or Clear-Hold-Build operations in Iraq that led to the that country turning the corner on stability a couple years ago.

Cause and effect. We are getting into a bad habit of drinking our own Kool-Aid.

Yes influence is a mix of tangible and intangible things. This is what the conversation must be about between our leadership and Mr. Assad if we indeed decide we have vital national interests at stake in how the situation in Syria develops. The goal for the US should be as simple as greater stability and enhanced US influence in a region/populace where we have not made many friends over the past 60 years. We should see the opportunity to make small, but important gains.

Whether or not Mr. Assad stays or goes is a matter between him and the people of Syria. Period. We need to STFU on that topic, in private or public. It makes us look like A-holes and cheapens our image, and thus influence, as a nation when we take such extreme positions that are so far outside our lane, and our interests to promote.

Call for each side to adopt less violent tactics? Sure.

Recommend focusing discussions between reps of the populace and the government on broad areas that historically the major drivers of such unrest?
(Legitimacy, Justice, Respect, Hope per my published model as a start point, but other areas as well). Sure.

Assad can no more kill or buy his way out of trouble than the US can order the problem to go away from afar. There are actions we can and should encourage; similarly there are actions we can and should discourage.

To go in with a starting position that "Assad must go" is no way to get to that discussion, and only serves to make Russia and Turkey look like the reasonable ones (And if no thinks that Turkey does not think that they deserve, and ultimately will, reestablish control over Syria they are missing the big picture. Anything either of those two countries promotes will definitely be crafted to advance their interests as they define them. We could learn a thing or two from old empires who have both risen and fallen in recent history).

[Dayuhan]

Yes influence is a mix of tangible and intangible things.

I'm curious about this construct of "intangible influence". How exactly does that work? If it isn't tangible, how does it influence anyone?

This is what the conversation must be about between our leadership and Mr. Assad if we indeed decide we have vital national interests at stake in how the situation in Syria develops. The goal for the US should be as simple as greater stability and enhanced US influence in a region/populace where we have not made many friends over the past 60 years. We should see the opportunity to make small, but important gains.

So what's the proposed conversation going to be about? Certainly not about our goals, about which Mr Assad doesn't give a damn. What would you want to say to him, and why do you think he'd listen? Not as if he likes us, trusts us, or would believe anything we say...

Whether or not Mr. Assad stays or goes is a matter between him and the people of Syria.

Certainly so, but if we urge reform or try to promote reform under the existing government, we are taking sides on that issue just as surely as if we demand that he step down. If we do that we communicate clearly that we are content with the current government and that we believe it can change and that it should stay in place. Either way, we're involved and taking sides.

Call for each side to adopt less violent tactics? Sure.

Recommend focusing discussions between reps of the populace and the government on broad areas that historically the major drivers of such unrest?
(Legitimacy, Justice, Respect, Hope per my published model as a start point, but other areas as well). Sure.

Assad can no more kill or buy his way out of trouble than the US can order the problem to go away from afar. There are actions we can and should encourage; similarly there are actions we can and should discourage.

I see much talk of calling and recommending and encouraging and discouraging here, but very little about what we can actually do to support the calls, recommendations, encouragement and discouragement. Without supporting action it's just words. Those words will not have any influence on Mr Assad unless they are backed up by credible carrots and sticks, and they won't win us points with the populaces of Syria or the Middle East either: they can recognize hollow talk as well as anyone.

At this point I don't see external pressure having any real influence on what's happening in Syria. Sanctions are not going to pull Assad off his road; he's committed to it and he's not going to reverse course. The only things I can see really changing the game would be internal. If the armed forces or a significant portion of them dump Assad and switch sides, that would be a game-changer, but there's little public evidence to suggest that's imminent.

The "we think Assad should step down" statement might be a message in open code to anyone thinking of staging a coup... but us outsiders wouldn't know about that.

[Rex Brynen]

My fear is that those who work in the bubble of the White House are coming to believe that because they proclaimed that Mubarak and Qaddafi must step down, that that is why those leaders made or will make their decision on that topic. So that now they need merely utter those magic words and Assad will also "obey."

You're kidding, right? Do you really think that State and CIA sit at their desks playing video games all day, and don't brief seniors? That's odd, because I certainly know folks who get dragged over the White House first thing in the morning to do precisely that.

There are no illusions that calling on Assad to go will change the situation in and of itself. However, calling on him to go:

1) strengthens the momentum of the protests
2) more generally helps position the US in the region vis-a-vis democratization/the Arab Spring/etc
3) reinforces the earlier move made Saudi Arabia

We can debate whether that is the right call--I think it was. However, there's no evidence that it was taken in a bubble (and if so, it was a pretty large bubble, since the entire EU did the same thing).

[Bill Moore]

1) strengthens the momentum of the protests
2) more generally helps position the US in the region vis-a-vis democratization/the Arab Spring/etc
3) reinforces the earlier move made Saudi Arabia

Rex, this appears to be logical at the superficial level, but dig just a little deeper and these positions lose cool points quickly.

1) Our public statements convince the activists we'll help, so the protests do gain momentum, and while we haplessly watch several more get killed. Over time the relatives/friends of victims blame the U.S. for sending signals and then failing to act. Much like the Shi'a and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq after Desert Storm. Rise up and throw Saddam out, and we'll sit here and watch you get slaughtered.

2) If my 1) happends, then your point 2) is dead in the water.

3) Saudi doesn't defend human rights, it defends it interests and its interests are limiting Iranian influence in the region.

[Dayuhan]

Saudi doesn't defend human rights, it defends it interests and its interests are limiting Iranian influence in the region.

They lack our altruism, sir.

[Fuchs]

Such a call cuddles the domestic sense of importance, relevance and power - that's already almost all about it.

[davidbfpo]

A comment on the Open Democracy website, which concludes:

In the final analysis, sanctions are unlikely to produce the desired effect in time. Assad’s killing machine will continue to target civilians, but sanctions will suck the economic and political oxygen out of the regime.

And ends with:

Most important of all, sanctions will demonstrate that western countries are serious about ending the brutal crackdown on the protests.

It also adds in some detail on Syrian oil and its impact.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/islam-q...t-syria-option

[Bob's World]

Just to tack onto Bill's point regarding the Saudis and interests. Those are the interests of a few men, a ruling family; not the interests of the populace or nation of Saudi Arabia. The larger interests are subjugated to the self-serving ones.

Rex, yes the White House receives briefs; and then colors that information in the context of the group-think within the bubble they live in (Just as we all do here on SWJ, btw, ) . I suspect it is the same intel people who briefed Bush have been briefing Obama. You can see where that pulled the President off some aspects of the ideological platform he ran on (perhaps we should give all the candidates the "real brief" at a certain point in the process earlier than we currently do only after one has won). But the Obama White House has a reputation for being particularly singular in ideological focus and perspective. I couldn't confirm that, but the nature of decisions, messages, and approaches to all manner of problems tend to validate that perspective.

[Fuchs]

Rex, yes the White House receives briefs; and then colors that information in the context of the group-think within the bubble they live in (Just as we all do here on SWJ, btw, ) .

Hey, speak for yourself.

I still pretend that I'm almost immune to group pressure and group think!

[Rex Brynen]

1) Our public statements convince the activists we'll help, so the protests do gain momentum, and while we haplessly watch several more get killed. Over time the relatives/friends of victims blame the U.S. for sending signals and then failing to act. Much like the Shi'a and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq after Desert Storm. Rise up and throw Saddam out, and we'll sit here and watch you get slaughtered.

2) If my 1) happends, then your point 2) is dead in the water.

3) Saudi doesn't defend human rights, it defends it interests and its interests are limiting Iranian influence in the region.

Syrian activists are well aware of the likely limits of US action, yet strongly supported (and indeed called for) both the call for Bashar to go, and the intensification of sanctions. Syrians certainly don't think the US will "act" in an interventionist sense.

As to the Saudis, no one in Syria thinks they're acting in the name of human rights (although the Sunni sectarian component to their Syria policy is, at present, not insignificant--and many Saudis few that as "human rights"). However, that in no way lessens the impact of increasingly strong GCC support for the Syrian protests. Saudi motives are relevant--Saudi actions are.

[davidbfpo]

Two weeks ago I posted:

I noted remarks yesterday that no decision has been made by the EU on stopping purchases of Syrian oil & gas (I didn't realise they had their own exports).

Well now it is indicated at an EU meeting something has been achieved, according to our Foreign Minister, sanctions that are:

Very significant..No new deals can be agreed on that (oil sales) after today into the European Union and that is 95 percent of their crude oil.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ns-agreed.html

(Added) The Independent has some more detail:

the detail of the agreement however, which includes an Italian amendment that allows companies to continue to trade with Syria under existing contracts until 15 November. Because oil industry agreements usually allow for 30- or 60-day payment periods, European oil firms could well be funding the Assad administration into 2012. The EU buys as much 95 per cent of Syria's oil. France, Germany and Italy are the biggest buyers.

The EU also banned European banks from opening credit lines for oil sales, and prohibited insurance companies from insuring the cargoes.

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...e-2348391.html



My reading is that means no new contracts, hardly 'significant'. The EU has agreed to the lowest impact possible policy.

[davidbfpo]

A NYT story, which is based on some IMHO very thin evidence:

Regional nations can assist the Syrian people and government in the implementation of essential reforms and the resolution of their problems

Mr. Ahmadinejad said in an interview in Tehran, according to his official Web site. Other press accounts of the interview with a Portuguese television station quoted him as also saying:

A military solution is never the right solution..

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/wo..._r=1&ref=world

[davidbfpo]

A bleak assessment by IISS, in a Strategic Comment, which ends with:

Reports suggested that the Assad regime initially reacted to Gadhafi's death by stepping up its brutal repression of protests. So the country could be in for a period of increasing violence. While the opposition may feel that too much blood has been shed for it to back down, its activists have failed so far to gather the momentum or cross-class consensus that would be required to challenge the government’s unity. The prospects of Syria emerging from conflict appear bleak.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...-war-in-syria/

Some of the recent footage appears to show artillery and tanks firing on buildings, but still the opposition protest, invariably after Friday prayers. As before I rely on this website for updates:http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/...detention.html

[Bob's World]

Assad is clinging to a dream of a past that no longer exists. The populace dreams of a future that does not yet exist. In the middle there can only be compromise and evolution, or suppression and revolution.

Whatever the US does, or does not do, sends a message to the leaders and populaces of the region that are all in some stage of similar instability.

Certainly Western manipulations, over the past 100 years in particular, have served to disrupt and supplant the natural evolutionary processes of governance across this region in ways that we will perhaps never fully appreciate, but that contribute significantly, if not primarily, to the pent up popular energy exploding across the region this year, and to the surge of terrorism against Western targets since the waning days of the Cold War.

Does this role, this responsibility, somehow create a duty? Perhaps a moral one, but such duties are unenforceable and easily ignored in the world of flexible situational morality that surrounds such policy decisions.

If we selfishly put our own interests first (and that is what wise states do, but hopefully with a growing appreciation that now more than ever how the affected populaces feel about those actions matters), we will understand these events in Syria and elsewhere across the region for what they are and understand that there is a tremendous opportunity for the US to reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US if we act appropriately. This is an opportunity that never existed in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and certainly the nature of our engagement in either of those two countries has never been designed "appropriately" to maximize such effects either. In fact, they have in large part done the opposite. Can we learn from those experiences?

Like the US, Assad is don't what his instincts tell him he must do to survive, and like the US he is acting out boldly, violently, and inappropriately. He too misjudges the nature and the depth of this problem. He too rationalizes away his causal responsibility for getting into the mess he finds himself in today. But it is not too late for him in his country, or the US in her foreign policy, to turn this around. And the Saudis, government and populace, watch to see which way this falls as they plot their respective moves....

Step one is to recognize a problem for what it is and to take responsibility. In many ways that is the hardest step of all. Assad and Obama as individuals could both fall for making that proper step, but both of their nations would move forward in significant ways. Syria will be around for another 1000 years, Assad forgets he is just playing a critical, yet short role in the history of his country. He has an opportunity to either be the leader who forced old ways to drag on another decade or two, to be the leader who's vision and leadership lifted Syria into that new millennium. So far he is failing the test of history.

These events are a cross roads for the US as well, and decisions made will determine if we are as successful in the emerging era as we were in the era leading up to this period of transition. Certainly we have every opportunity to achieve even greater success in the future, but that will require us to be able to release ourselves from our own understanding of the nature and effects of our Cold War actions, both prior too, and subsequent to the Soviet collapse.

Meanwhile the drama continues to play out and the stakes are high, and whatever the US does or does not do in Syria, it will have much larger impact for the US on what it will be faced with everywhere else. This is not about foolish concepts of "responsibility to protect populaces" or duties to preserve existing governments; this is about having a vision for who we are and who we want to be, and an honest perception of who we are, and acting accordingly. There is no risk free option on the table, it really just comes down to understanding the situation and ourselves, and acting accordingly.

Like Assad, we must shift from seeking to defeat threats to one of seeking to resolve problems. We'll see.