Syria: a civil war (closed)

[Dayuhan]

From what little I have seen of the North Korean populace, there is little indicator that they are dissatisfied (currently) with their situation. When one controls information, one can control the populace. So, I suspect in many ways your question is moot, as insurgent causation is a mix of governmental policy and action as perceived by the populace. Currently North Korean popular perceptions appear to be largely acceptive of their fate. I suspect this will change in Korea as the populace there becomes more informed, and at that point, yes, I believe that such approaches will be insturmental to thier ultimate revolution of governance as well.

I think the North Korean populace is plenty dissatisfied. I also think they are very very scared, and for good reason.

Popular non-violence is often met with governmental violence. But governments do not fare well in the court of public opinion when such clashes occur. We all know of Kent State for this very reason. We all appreciate the power of a lone Chinese citizen standing and staring down a Chinese tank.

Remember how the Tiananmen incident ended up, please. The power of the lone citizen standing in front of the tank didn't amount to much when the order to fire was given and followed. Maybe the government didn't fare will in the court of public opinion, but the government is still there and very much in power. The demonstrators are not there, and many of them are dead. That's what happens when non-violent methods are brought to bear against a government with the will and capacity to violently suppress them.

I would appreciate it if we could, for the sake of accuracy, cease referring to "a populace", "the populace", "their populace" and all other constructions that treat a population as a unitary entity that acts and thinks as one. It's rarely if ever the case.

I'm still waiting for a specific recommendation for a policy response to the situation in Syria...

[Bob's World]

Yes, most Westerners "think" the North Korean populace (oops, too vague?) is "plenty dissatisfied". Certainly we would be if we were all transported to that nation and asked to live under that government. Their populace, however, was not transported there, has little awareness of how things are elsewhere, and we really have few accurate measures of how they actually feel about their situation.

You miss the point of the power of the image transmitted around the globe of the man facing the tank if you only measure it by the immediate tactical effect on Chinese reaction to reisistance. The strategic effect is what I speak of, on a global scale, and such things take time. Even revolutions are really little more than rapid periods of action within a much longer, slower process of cultural, social, political evolution. China is changing and the government there has no more ability to stop that there than governments do anywhere. Governments who persist too long in such efforts typically fall. Fear is indeed a powerful tool in keeping a populace in line, but at some point action overcomes fear. Every government knows they are little more than a lone man with a six shooter holding back the mob. This works until it doesn't work, at which point the mob wins (minus 3-6 who sacrifice for the whole).

As to what the President would focus on in his conversation with Assad? That is hardly worth speculating on here. The key is that he understand the dymanic at work and that he works to convince Assad that his Cost/Benefit equaition has changed, and that by changing his approaches from what "worked" (suppressed, not cured) for his father will he the son exceed his father as the one who leads Syria to a new future, rather than merely being one of a long line of leaders dedicated to holding Syria to an increasingly obsolete past.

[carl]

From what little I have seen of the North Korean populace, there is little indicator that they are dissatisfied (currently) with their situation.

I don't know exactly what to think about a statement like this. It leaves me slack jawed in amazement. What it reminds me of most are the various journalists and other notables who visited the USSR in the 30s and reported back to everybody how good things were there. Please go to Human Rights Watch or the blog freekorea.us and read just a little bit.

By way of analogy, if the inmates of a super max prison were never allowed visitation or contact with anyone outside the walls, it still would be safe to say they didn't like things much.

(I wish I could have expressed myself less vigorously but I couldn't think how.)

[Bob's World]

People are not born, live and die in prison. It will always be the bad place they were sent to by "the man," who also prevents them from going back to where they want to be.

The vast majority of North Koreans were born there, and I suspect, have a very skewed perspective of what things are like elsewhere; addionally, I suspect they also are told that things that are obviously bad are the fault of others outside the state. To compare their situation to my own and judge them to be on the verge of revolt is to totally discount the critical truth about insurgency: It is not poor conditions, or lack of government services that creates an insurgent populace; it is how the popualace FEELS about their situation and who the blame that creates an insurgent populace.

It is just like the US to go by these reports you cite to launch some humanitarian relief intervention to liberate the people of North Korea from their oppression, only to soon find ourselves "slack-jawed with amazement" when we find ourselves neck deep in a resistance insurgency against our presence.

I hope things are better some day for the people of North Korea, and I suspect some day they will be. But I do not presume to translate that into an assessment that this is a populace prepared to revolt, or that they would be pleased for someone to come and save them from their plight. Both might be true, but we have no accurate assessment to base that upon.

[carl]

Mr. Jones:

Nobody judged the North Koreans to be on the verge of revolt. I stated it was evident that very many of them were, to put it mildly, unhappy. You then converted that into something about whether they were on the verge of revolt, and for good measure threw in something about an expedition to liberate them from their oppression. Where did that come from?!

You missed the point of the analogy. I used super max prisons for a reason. Life in a super max is so terrible that how the inmate ended up there is immaterial, or it is for the purposes of the analogy.

I may seem to be belaboring a minor point (I can just see somebody using that quote now...), but this isn't a minor point. It is hard to take seriously an argument by somebody who can make such astounding statements about North Korea. Please, take a little time to read the North Korea reporting by Human Rights Watch or just about anybody else who covers that hellish place.

To get back to my original question, let's say for the sake of argument that many of the North Korean people were dissatisfied with things and wanted their gov to change. If that were the case, would your formula work?

[Dayuhan]

Yes, most Westerners "think" the North Korean populace (oops, too vague?) is "plenty dissatisfied". Certainly we would be if we were all transported to that nation and asked to live under that government. Their populace, however, was not transported there, has little awareness of how things are elsewhere, and we really have few accurate measures of how they actually feel about their situation.

How about this measure:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...soners-amnesty

North Korea holds 200,000 political prisoners, says Amnesty

Report by human rights group cites ex-inmates and defectors' accounts of torture and executions in series of camps

North Korea's political prison camps have expanded substantially over the last decade and hold 200,000 people...

Weren't you telling me, not so long ago, that Saudi arrests of dissidents (on a far smaller scale) were evidence that "the Saudi populace" was in a state of insurgency? I'm sure there's a portion of the North Korean populace that really believes the State line and is content with their daily cockroach and 4 grains of rice. There's probably a portion that vigorously supports the state (probably those that are getting a rat and a half-cup of rice as the daily ration, and thus feeling immensely privileged). There's also apparently a few hundred thousand that are troublesome enough to lock up, and that suggests that there are a whole bunch more who are a long way from happy but are understandably reluctant to be locked up. Life in North Korea outside the camps is bad enough that I wouldn't want to speculate on what it's like inside.

You miss the point of the power of the image transmitted around the globe of the man facing the tank if you only measure it by the immediate tactical effect on Chinese reaction to reisistance. The strategic effect is what I speak of, on a global scale, and such things take time. Even revolutions are really little more than rapid periods of action within a much longer, slower process of cultural, social, political evolution. China is changing and the government there has no more ability to stop that there than governments do anywhere. Governments who persist too long in such efforts typically fall. Fear is indeed a powerful tool in keeping a populace in line, but at some point action overcomes fear. Every government knows they are little more than a lone man with a six shooter holding back the mob. This works until it doesn't work, at which point the mob wins (minus 3-6 who sacrifice for the whole).

Sooner or later you have to back off from the grand global scale and deal with the specific conditions that prevail in specific situations... if we don't, there's really very little to discuss. The fact is that non-violent resistance failed at Tiananmen, and it's failing in Syria today. Unless a substantial portion of Assad's armed forces switches sides - and there's very little sign that it's likely - this is unlikely to be resolved on the side of the portion of the populace that's protesting.

As to what the President would focus on in his conversation with Assad? That is hardly worth speculating on here.

That's not what I asked about. I asked about policy options re Syria under current conditions, not about our conversation with Assad.

The key is that he understand the dymanic at work and that he works to convince Assad that his Cost/Benefit equaition has changed, and that by changing his approaches from what "worked" (suppressed, not cured) for his father will he the son exceed his father as the one who leads Syria to a new future, rather than merely being one of a long line of leaders dedicated to holding Syria to an increasingly obsolete past.

What good does it do to "understand the dynamic at work" if that understanding doesn't lead to practical, viable policy options? You say you understand the dynamic, so what policy options does that understanding lead to?

I do not believe that we are going to "convince" Assad of anything. Why would he listen to us? We're pursuing our interests, he's pursuing his. They are very different. He also doesn't like or trust us, and he's well aware that we are not going to back up our words with action.

Declaring that we want to keep Assad in power and persuade him to pursue enlightened reform is not going to win friends among the rebellious Syrians, who want him gone and don't believe (justifiably) that he will ever produce more than nominal reform.

[Bob's World]

Saudi despotism vs. North Korean despotism, and the impacts upon their respective populaces. Probably should be a separate thread that people spend some time thinking about.

Saudis are our allies, so that is good despotism, North Koreans are our enemies, so that is bad despotism. (I bang my head on my desk thinking that many actually believe this to be a sensible position to take)

Both governments have a pretty free hand at making thousands of arrests of those who dare to dissent with the official state position (even though both define "the state" as the views of a single, self-annointed family). Arrests without warrant showing probable cause; held without charge or habeus corpus. Most simply disappear.

Here is a critical difference. It is one of knowledge and control.

1. A populace drifts into conditions of insurgency (the fire is set, but not necessarily lit) when they come to perceive that they have lost control of the government (rather than the more widely held governmental view that insurgency is due to the government losing control of the populace...)

2. A government that can control information among their populace can control their populace, a government that cannot must acutally evolve to become responsive to their populace and employ influence and provide value.

The simple fact is that the Saudis can no longer control information to their populace, while my understanding is that the North Korean government remains fairly effective in that regard. So, when North Koreans are treated harshly or unfairly by their government there is no relative scale to judge that against. It just is what it is. This is increasingly not the case in countries like Saudi Arabia, and as our good friend Mr. Assad is learning, in Syria either. Again, it is not necessarily how the government treats the populace, it is how the populace feels about how the government treats them that matters most.

Assad is learning that even in his father's day one could get away with far more than one can today. The world is evolving rapidly in regards to information technology, and this is having a powerful effect on empowering populaces and in turn, changing the conditions within which governments must govern.

As countries such as North Korea become more connected, they will in turn become less stable. Likewise, already connected countries that cling to outmoded despotic models of governance (as assessed by their own popualces, our US and Western metrics are interesting, but not the ones that matter) are finding their rule faced with ever-growing internal dissent and popular challenge.

One can look at this in terms of "insurgency," or for those who see that as too military of a lens, one can look at this in terms of "sovereignty." From a recent product of mine:

"Sovereignty is a concept that varies by culture and over time. Sovereignty always exists within the populace, but to varying degrees it is delegated to the state to exercise and preserve. What the populace perceives is de facto (reality, or in fact), what the state officially proclaims is de jure (legal, or as defined by law). Where the two are in synch there is greater chance for stability, where the two diverge there is greater chance for instability."

There is a growing divergence of de facto perceptions and de jure definitions of sovereignty in many places, but particularly in the Middle East. No amount of increased security is apt to bridge those gaps, it will require the governments to evolve in terms of how they define their soverign duties as delegated to them by the populace to exercise on their behalf. From that same product:

"Perhaps one has a right (rather than duty) to control what is within their borders, but not a duty to control the border or what happens within it. The real duty is to protect the populace within that border from what comes across it. Efforts that become increasingly expansive, expensive and obtrusive in efforts to control are often counterproductive to the PRIMARY duty to the populace."

Governments must reassess what is their duty, and what is their right; what is it that their populace expects from them, and most importantly what it is they must control, and what it is they must merely influence to best serve their primary function of protecting the populace.

For governments such as the United States, with vast foreign interests, it is also critical to better appreciate where our sovereign rights and duties END, and where those of others BEGIN. Crossing those lines on occasion is necessary. Crossing them as a matter of course is dangerous and ultimately counterproductive.

[Dayuhan]

Saudis are our allies, so that is good despotism, North Koreans are our enemies, so that is bad despotism. (I bang my head on my desk thinking that many actually believe this to be a sensible position to take)

Who has said the Saudis are "good despots? It's a nation with which we have active trade relations. Their purchases of arms are very useful to our defense industry. It would be very inconvenient to us if they were to cease producing oil or produce a reduced amount. It would be very very inconvenient if the oil they control were to fall into the hands of a directly hostile power. How does "good" or "bad" enter into any of that?

It's not as if the Saudis are a client state, or a dependent, or as if we can control or affect the way they deal with the various factions of their populace.

The simple fact is that the Saudis can no longer control information to their populace, while my understanding is that the North Korean government remains fairly effective in that regard. So, when North Koreans are treated harshly or unfairly by their government there is no relative scale to judge that against. It just is what it is. This is increasingly not the case in countries like Saudi Arabia, and as our good friend Mr. Assad is learning, in Syria either. Again, it is not necessarily how the government treats the populace, it is how the populace feels about how the government treats them that matters most.

Here we go again with "the populace". Whether we're talking about Saudi Arabia or North Korea or Syria, there is no "the populace". There are people who oppose the regime. There are people who support the regime. There are people who oppose the regime with deeply varied and often incompatible interests, desires, and objectives. there are lots of people who are neither supportive nor opposed.

200,000 in prison camps suggests that the North Korean control of information is not as complete or as effective as you suggest. The lack of active opposition (not that we'd know if it was there) suggests that efforts to scare the people into submission have been successful. The Saudis do a good bit of scaring themselves, though they have the added advantage of having produced enough prosperity that a large slice of the populace is more afraid of disorder, and possibly losing what they've got, than they are of tyranny.

When was Assad ever "our good friend"?

Assad is learning that even in his father's day one could get away with far more than one can today. The world is evolving rapidly in regards to information technology, and this is having a powerful effect on empowering populaces and in turn, changing the conditions within which governments must govern.

As I've said before, I think the impact of information technology on these situations is largely speculative and undemonstrated, and way overrated. Revolutions occurred before these technologies existed: people find ways to get information, and to communicate.

Governments must reassess what is their duty, and what is their right; what is it that their populace expects from them, and most importantly what it is they must control, and what it is they must merely influence to best serve their primary function of protecting the populace.

For governments such as the United States, with vast foreign interests, it is also critical to better appreciate where our sovereign rights and duties END, and where those of others BEGIN. Crossing those lines on occasion is necessary. Crossing them as a matter of course is dangerous and ultimately counterproductive.

As I've said before, this all sounds lovely in the abstract, but where does it get us in terms of actual, practical policy... in Syria, or anywhere else?

I asked this question before, trying to get back to Syria... an answer might be edifying:

What good does it do to "understand the dynamic at work" if that understanding doesn't lead to practical, viable policy options? You say you understand the dynamic, so what policy options does that understanding lead to?

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

You worry about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. I for one, have little interest in such debates. The more important insights are not found in the immaterial details of such arguments.

Cheers!

Bob

[Dayuhan]

You worry about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. I for one, have little interest in such debates. The more important insights are not found in the immaterial details of such arguments

I worry about translating deep abstract ideas into actual practical implementable policy because until you get a policy out of it the deep thinking really isn't doing you any good. If it doesn't pay off where the rubber hits the road, how is it helping you?

I have to wonder if the disinterest in discussing the practical application of these ideas stems partially from the sense that the ideas might not hold up so well when practically applied.

[Bob's World]

Blank round noted.

No, I am not concerned that the concepts do not stand up to the harsh light of reality, I just have come to learn that no example is adequate to satisfy your disagreement with the concepts I promote.

I will be the first to say that I do not offer "easy" or "simple" answers to hard problems; only that I attempt to attain an understand of the nature of such problems and offer a context that will allow for the development of a solution that has some hope of ultimately getting to the ends we seek. Our problem is not that our guys on the ground are not smart, capable and effective at what they do, our problem is that we apply a flawed concept of the problems we send them out to deal with, and design operations around those flawed concepts based on lessons learned form our historic perspectives of operations that have little validity in the current environment.

Assad is out of touch with his people, and out of date with his tactics. Ultimately he will fail because of that. Sure, he may suppress the movement for some period of time as his father did, but the turn is getting tighter and tighter on the return of such resistance. History tells us that certain approaches can suppress these problems. History also tells us that other approaches can resolve these problems in more enduring ways. We are hindered in that we have binned those two aspects of the history of the same dynamic into two distinct buckets. One bucket of military-led, insurgency warfare; and another bucket of civilian led civil disturbance. In either case, where the government evolves to address the concerns of the populace enduring effects occur, where the government applies various tactics to merely put down the disturbance/revolt a temporary suppression occurs.

I am not an Edison or a Jobs or a Wright. I don't invent this stuff. I am just an observer who thinks about what he observes and attempts to understand things that make little sense.

Syria is Assad's job to succeed or fail in, and currently he is failing both himself and his populace. Sad. The people are moving forward in their social evolution and seeking reasonable accommodations in governance to reflect that evolution. In essence, they seek to renegotiate their social contract with the government. They seek to re-balance what rights and duties they have vested in the government and which ones they retain in themselves. This does not mean US approaches to that division are the right ones for Syria, surely they are not. But the US has been down this path with some success. Turkey is also 100 years down this path with some success.

Helping leaders like Assad to seek and implement the right types of adaptations to stay in synch with their respective populaces should be a fundamental aspect of US foreign policy. Not pushing US fundamentalism, but rather working to preserve US rights for US citizens by recognizing that we do not need to shape the governments of others to either answer to us or to look and act like us; merely to be willing to work with us. We have our own evolution to deal with.

I doubt many Americans can see that US foreign policy is as out of touch with the populaces of the world as Assad's domestic policy is with the populaces of Syria. Or as Jesus would say, we cannot see the dust in his eye for the plank in our own. We too need to evolve, and we too are not listening to what others are telling us. Governmental behavior is very much like addict behavior in this regard.

But as I say, there are countless ways to operationalize this change of approach just as their are countless ways to operationalize any operation. The key is to understand the fundamentals and to establish the proper framework first, and then to allow the executor to proceed in the manner that works best for him. Do not confuse my refusal to argue tactics for my inability to devise tactical approaches, I just don't see the value in it.

Bill Moore often gets frustrated with my focus on getting the strategic context right when I weigh in on a discussion about some tactical aspect of these problems with an observation about the importance of getting the strategic context right first. Guilty as charged. There are thousands to strike at those leaves and branches, do not let it bother you so that I prefer to stand over here alone and strike at the roots. The roots need striking, and someone needs to do it.

(I'd like to say this is my only vice, and to leave me to it, but sadly I have plenty of other vices to keep it company.)

[jmm99]

From the BBC, Syria: Homs military attacks continue, say activists (4 Nov 2011):

Tanks have been shelling parts of the city, and medics at the main hospital told the BBC more than 100 bodies had arrived in the past two days.

All that does not put paid to the Arab League initiative; but it does suggest that brute force will only be overcome by brute force.

The rest of the story is from the Christian Science Monitor series dealing with the current events in Syria.

Give war a chance: Syrian Army defectors want to strike back at Assad. The 'Syrian Free Army,' a group of up to 15,000 defected Syrian soldiers camped in Turkey, is seeking to be recognized as the opposition's military wing (Arthur Bright, Correspondent / November 4, 2011):

He [Col. Riad al-Assad] told Reuters last month that he believes war is the only way to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and end the violence against civilians.

Assad says that the SFA is coordinating opposition troops across Syria, though he did not comment on whether the SFA was conducting cross-border raids from its camps in Turkey. Turkey has formally committed only to humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees, though the Telegraph notes that it has provided Assad with a personal security detail and controls access to him through its foreign ministry.

Turkey's support for the SFA further underscores how far Ankara has turned against its southern neighbor. In a commentary for the Christian Science Monitor, Joshua W. Walker writes that Turkey has progressed from silent ally to vocal critic, and is now "leading the push for international action and sanctions against Damascus."

Is Turkey doing this and other things to further "Western goals"; or is it acting in what it considers to be its enlightened self-interest ?

Turkey's rising clout leaves Iran fuming on sidelines of Arab Spring - The fast-emerging split between Turkey and Iran has revived a centuries-old rivalry between the Ottomans and the Persians (Scott Peterson, Staff writer / November 2, 2011).

On Tuesday, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan praised the months-long uprising in Syria, calling the 3,000 who have died there at the hands of security forces "martyrs."

"The Syrian people will achieve results from their glorious resistance," Mr. Erdogan said. "Democracy will show its true self in Syria. Justice and freedom will be obtained by the Syrian people by their own will."

Although the Arab League has no fond memories of the Turks, they are Sunni; and the Arabs don't trust the Persians either.

Turkey's bold about-face on Syria - Turkey's support for Syrian insurgents reverses detente with Damascus. Its about-face can reinforce an Arab League agreement with Syria to end violence, and reassure the West of its commitment to NATO values. But is the break an exception, or a broad change in foreign policy? (Joshua W. Walker / November 3, 2011):

By hosting Syrian insurgents and political opposition figures, and by readying harsh unilateral sanctions against Damascus, Turkey’s about-face with Syria signals a potentially significant shift to much stronger support for the democratic Arab awakening.

This situation is a unique opportunity for the US to keep its nose out of the tent; and to allow the Middle East to work out its own solution.

Backgrounders:

Who backs Syria's Assad? Top 4 sources of support

Long road to freedom: Seven reasons why Syrian protesters have so far failed to topple Assad

Mod's Note: for both linked articles registration is required.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

David, I believe you; but I get the whole thing (after quite a while loading on a slow ISP) in both links without registration. Haven't the foggiest idea of why.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

JMM,

Ah perhaps the registration "wall" is for non-US users? Similar to the problems found when US members try t view BBC TV documentaries?

[Dayuhan]

I am not concerned that the concepts do not stand up to the harsh light of reality, I just have come to learn that no example is adequate to satisfy your disagreement with the concepts I promote.

That's odd, because I largely agree with the concepts, I just disagree with the way you often propose to apply them.

I quite agree that we shouldn't be installing dictators or enabling them to suppress their populaces. Problems arise, though, when we start imposing those concepts where they don't fit: as in assuming that we sustain dictators that we do not in fact sustain, and assuming that we have influence when in fact we do not.

I will be the first to say that I do not offer "easy" or "simple" answers to hard problems; only that I attempt to attain an understand of the nature of such problems and offer a context that will allow for the development of a solution that has some hope of ultimately getting to the ends we seek.

What I see here is that when it comes down to application, which is the whole point, it always seems to boil down to the penultimate blank rounds of "urge and encourage", us influence where we've none to use. If the understanding doesn't lead to practical, functional policy, what good is it?

Our problem is not that our guys on the ground are not smart, capable and effective at what they do, our problem is that we apply a flawed concept of the problems we send them out to deal with, and design operations around those flawed concepts based on lessons learned form our historic perspectives of operations that have little validity in the current environment.

I'd say our problem is that we put guys on ground we've no reason to be on and assign them tasks totally unrelated to what they are trained and equipped to do.

Assad is out of touch with his people, and out of date with his tactics. Ultimately he will fail because of that. Sure, he may suppress the movement for some period of time as his father did, but the turn is getting tighter and tighter on the return of such resistance. History tells us that certain approaches can suppress these problems. History also tells us that other approaches can resolve these problems in more enduring ways. We are hindered in that we have binned those two aspects of the history of the same dynamic into two distinct buckets. One bucket of military-led, insurgency warfare; and another bucket of civilian led civil disturbance. In either case, where the government evolves to address the concerns of the populace enduring effects occur, where the government applies various tactics to merely put down the disturbance/revolt a temporary suppression occurs.

Possibly so... but since this thread is meant to be about Syria, please apply this understanding to the Syrian situation and suggest what policy we might adopt that would have a chance of achieving productive results.

The people are moving forward in their social evolution and seeking reasonable accommodations in governance to reflect that evolution.

If we're talking about the portion of the populace that's protesting, I think what they;re seeking is Assad's departure. Whether that qualifies as a "reasonable accommodation" would depend on who you ask. I don't see them being satisfied with any resolution that leaves Assad in power, nor do I see Assad and his portion of the populace being satisfied with any resolution that does not leave Assad in power. Not a lot of room for compromise, and continuing violence seems the most likely outcome.

Helping leaders like Assad to seek and implement the right types of adaptations to stay in synch with their respective populaces should be a fundamental aspect of US foreign policy.

I do not think the Disaffected portion of the Syrian populace, or for that matter disaffected Arab populaces in general, would be terribly impressed with any US effort to help Assad "seek and implement the right types of adaptations to stay in synch" with his various populaces. That would be interpreted, quite reasonably, as helping Assad stay in power, since they (and we) know that whatever effort he made to stay in synch would be for show only. How is a preference for keeping Assad in power and an effort to keep him there going to get anyone in synch with the disaffected Syrians?

I doubt many Americans can see that US foreign policy is as out of touch with the populaces of the world as Assad's domestic policy is with the populaces of Syria.

Now we've jumped from generalizing about national populaces to generalizing about a global populace. The US can't even keep in touch with the diverse and conflicting demands of its own populaces, truing to keep in touch with the infinitely more diverse and conflicting demands of every populace in the world is the ultimate exercise in futility.

But as I say, there are countless ways to operationalize this change of approach just as their are countless ways to operationalize any operation. The key is to understand the fundamentals and to establish the proper framework first, and then to allow the executor to proceed in the manner that works best for him. Do not confuse my refusal to argue tactics for my inability to devise tactical approaches, I just don't see the value in it.

What I see there is people who are concerned with application coming back and telling you that the theory has real problems on the application end, and you telling them that you don't want to worry about that, because you just do theory. That's a bit frustrating to people who are concerned with application.

[jmm99]

From Zaman, Ankara weighs options in Syria stalemate (6 November 2011, NOAH BLASER , İSTANBUL):

In the wake of last week’s failed bid by the Arab League to halt violence in Syria, Turkey now more than ever may be pressured into creating a humanitarian “buffer zone” in Syria, a form of interventionwhich regional experts say, carries unknown consequences.

“Some form of intervention in Syria will be considered seriously if events worsen and international action is absent.” Middle East expert Oytun Orhan told Sunday’s Zaman on Friday. Orhan, a fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), says that such a development would prove to be a “last choice” for Turkey in an eight-month conflict that has seen Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad crack down against an anti-regime protest movement.

Ankara has sent increasingly clear signals that it would consider such a “last choice” in recent weeks, with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu telling the Financial Times in a Tuesday interview that “we hope that there will be no need for [a buffer zone or a no-fly zone] but of course humanitarian issues are important ... protecting citizens is the responsibility of every state.”

The increasing willingness to discuss a limited form of intervention in Syria comes amid widely held expectations that Wednesday’s Arab League cease-fire deal with Syria would fail to stop bloodshed, expectations which seemed to be confirmed when over 20 were reported killed by security forces in the 24 hours following the deal’s announcement. ...

The ideal case for Ankara would be:

While Ankara begins to discuss the possibility of intervention, both experts say that the key to putting more diplomatic pressure on Syria rests with the Arab League. According to Landis, the Arab League will need to “follow the example of Turkey,” condemning the regime after failing to leverage its privileged relations with the regime into reforms.

Landis states that a change in stance from the Arab League will provide the best scenario for gaining a UN condemnation and sanctions, long awaited by Turkey and the West. Once the league condemns Syria, “then all eyes will be focused on China and Russia. Only by strong condemnation from the Arab League will China and Russia be forced into condemning Syria at the UN.”

Such official pressure would be a welcome development for Ankara. “Turkey is hoping for a solution in the UN,” Orhan stated. “Turkey has from the start wanted to solve this crisis diplomatically.”

The development of that best case scenario seems problematic.

Regards

Mike

[AdamG]

(CNN) -- A fledgling force of Syrian military deserters struck an important government security complex on the outskirts of the capital overnight, a bold strike reflecting the resolve and confidence of the regime's opposition.
The assault came ahead of an Arab League meeting Wednesday to reaffirm a decision to suspend Syria's membership, a decision the group took over the weekend after President Bashar al-Assad's government failed to abide by a proposal to end a brutal crackdown on protesters.

http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/16/world/...est/index.html

[ganulv]

http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/16/world/...est/index.html

So…
A) The regime pretends this never happened.
B) It occurs to the regime that its strategy isn’t bearing fruit.
C) The regime freaks the f##k out and takes the gloves off.

The November 8th Frontline was not bad at all. You don’t get a huge amount of insight into the social organization of those standing against Assad but there is some good footage. And, hey, investigative journalism, how often do we get to see that in this millenium?

[jmm99]

D. The Syrian Freedom Army, assisted by Turkish volunteers, crosses the Turkish-Syrian border.

Regards

Mike

[AdamG]

BEIRUT — Attacks by army defectors are transforming the Syrian uprising into an armed insurgency that threatens to spiral into civil war. The Free Syrian Army holds no territory, appears largely disorganized and is up against a fiercely loyal and cohesive military that will stop at nothing to protect the regime.
Still, without foreign military intervention or significant cracks in President Bashar Assad's iron rule, the rebel group has emerged as the best hope for a growing number of protesters who have all but given up on peaceful resistance.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45390188...a#.TsrwwGP0vG4

See also
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/n...ashar-al-assad