U.S. Still Waiting For Iraqi Forces To 'Stand Up'

[Jedburgh]

CSIS 4 Oct 06 update to a report most of have read before:

Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?

...The effort to create effective Iraqi military, national security, and police forces is marginally more successful than Iraq political and economic efforts, but scarcely the level of success the US planned even at the beginning of 2005.

• Ministry of Defense: Still very much a work in progress. Poorly organized, divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, poor planning and fiscal control capability, problems with corruption.

• The regular army, air force, and navy (130,000 claimed to be operational; real number unknown): Army (128,230 men) merging as a real force at the infantry battalion level with some light mechanized and armored elements. Beginning to emerge as real divisions and brigades, although many headquarters, command and control, combat and service support, logistic and
intelligence elements are missing or having little capability. The regular Iraqi military still cannot operate without massive MNF-I support, embedded US and other coalition advisory teams, and largely US mechanized infantry, rmor, artillery, fixed and rotary wing air support, air mobility, and logistic and service support, Air Force (740 men) is at best a small cadre of forces with token reconnaissance and air transport capability. Navy (1,130 men) is slowly emerging as capable of carrying out own patrol missions, but is severely limited in operational capability with little real support capability.

Efforts that say the regular Iraqi forces are taking the lead, and that turnover command to Iraqi forces are not cosmetic. The regular military and some paramilitary National Police units are making real progress – although most units are severely undermanned, have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilitized, and many are Shi’ite or Kurdish dominated.

Iraqi forces will, however, be highly dependent on US and other MNF-I support well into 2008, and probably through 2010. Only a truly radical improvement in political conciliation could reduce this dependence, and the present drift towards added civil conflict could sharply increase it.

• Ministry of Interior: Still very much a work in progress and lags behind the MoD in capability. Poorly organized, with elements more loyal to Shi’ite and Kurdish parties than nation. Poor planning and fiscal control capability, serious problems with corruption.

• The National Police (24,400 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number unknown): Some elements have been properly reorganized and are as effective as regular army units. Most still present problems in terms of both loyalty and effectiveness. Still are some ties to Shi’ite and Kurdish militias. A number of units have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and
leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilitized

• Other MOI Forces (27,510 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number unknown): Most elements, like the Border Police, are just acquiring proper training and have only light equipment and poor facilities. Some elements are capable in undemanding missions. Most are underpaid,
underequipped, badly-led, and corrupt. Many are poorly facilitized.

• The Regular Police (120,190 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number probably under 100,000): Underpaid, underequipped, badly-led, and corrupt. Many will not fight or act if face a local threat. Desertion and absence rates high. Generally only function where security exists for
other reasons, or are tied to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces. Many are poorly facilitized.

The problems in the “trained and equipped police” forces are compounded by large number of locally recruited “police” and security forces loyal to local leaders and sectarian and ethnic factions. Various sectarian and ethnic militias are the real “police” in many areas.

• Facilities Protection Force, Pipeline Protection Force, and other limited security forces: Underpaid, underequipped, badly-led, and corrupt. Generally only function where security exists for other reasons, or are tied to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces.

The US and MNF-I plans that called for Iraqi forces to allow significant Coalition troop reductions in 2006 have failed, and the so-called “year of the police” has barely begun and will at best gather momentum in 2007. Real-world Iraqi dependence on the present scale of US and allied military support and advisory efforts will continue well into 2008 at the earliest and probably to 2010. Major US and allied troop reductions need to be put on hold indefinitely.

The only way to avoid this continuing dependence on the US and other outside power without greatly increasing the risk of a major civil war, and collapse of the Iraqi force development effort, would be a level of political conciliation so great as to fundamentally undermine the insurgency and end the drift towards civil war....

[Mondor]

It is awfully hard to stand up a unit of any kind if you do not have people, both in leadership and rank and file positions, deserting on a large scale. It is expected that large numbers of Iraq police and military units will desert when they go home on leave. While large scale desertions are crippling to any unit they hit new units harder as there is no official or unofficial cadre that can take in new replacements and bring them up to speed.
Until the desertion issue is solved it will be near impossible to build effective units.

Having said that, it must be realized that large scale desertion is merely a single symptom of the overall condition. As Arthur Speyer pointed out in his SWJ Oct 2006 article Disarming the Local Population “In Iraq, the first responsibility of every male is to protect his family”. I would hazard to venture that most of the Iraqi security force members have family situations that if one of our service members had the same family situation he would received an expedited hardship discharge so that he could go home and take care of his family.

We should empathize with the average Iraqi security force member. Let’s put ourselves in his shoes for just a moment.

1. You joined because there was no work and your family desperately needs the money.
2. You have inadequate equipment to do your job. (uniform shirt v. body armor, an AK with three mags v. an American’s minimum of seven mags and supporting arms, and no consistent logistic support or long term medical care)
3. Your leadership is as untrained as you are and possibly corrupt.
4. Your pay is late and or less than you thought it should be.
5. Your family is in physical danger specifically because you are a member of the security forces.
6. You feel you protect your family better from home than by fighting other Iraqis in some other part of the country.

How many of us would guarantee that we would not take an “extended” leave of absence in a similar situation? During the American Civil Way the South had a similar problem. During Sherman’s march to the sea large number of troops from the effected states left the army to take care of their families. It was not unusual for a junior member of the Confederate military to have enlisted two or even three times. He would simply discharge himself to take care of some family emergency/situation and then join up again to get back into the fight.

This is the classic chicken and egg quandary, which came first? In this case you need some measurable measure of stability in order to build professional military forces, but in order to gain that stability you need professional security forces. This was/is the case in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. How we solve it remains to be seen, but my feeling is that it can only be solved by a major change in local attitudes which will change behaviors and local conditions.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 2 Nov 06: Options for Expanding Iraqi Forces: Goals and Realities

...The basic problem with all Iraqi forces is that while over 300,000 have been trained and equipped, many have since left and deserted, substantial numbers have been killed and wounded, and some 10-20% of those who remain are absent at any given time because they leave to take care of their families and transfer their pay in a country where there is no meaningful banking system. The Iraqi regular forces and National Police are probably only about 20-25% short of the totals reported for trained and equipped manpower. The figures for the regular police and Facilities Protection Force are much larger, probably well in excess of 30% of the total of men reported as trained and equipped, but there is no accurate way to track the total.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that all Iraqi forces, including the army, were recruited and equipped to serve locally in limited defensive roles, not act as mobile forces trained and equipped to act as active combat units deployable throughout the country to deal with insurgency and civil conflict. This means the recruiting base must now be changed, new pay and arrangements are needed to create a nationally deployable force, and new equipment and facilities will be need for the deployable units thrust into more serious combat...

[Jedburgh]

...current look at Iraqi forces by Cordesman at CSIS, 30 Nov 06:

Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: The Critical Problems and Failures the US Must Address if Iraqi Forces Are to Eventually Do the Job

...There is no way to summarize Iraqi force development in simple terms, particularly because so much depends in the near term on whether Iraqi efforts at political conciliation, effective governance, and a government presence in the field do or do not succeed. The ISF development effort cannot succeed without major progress in all of these areas, any more than they can succeed without the creation of effective Iraqi forces and Iraqi popular belief that MNF-I forces will leave as soon as possible and Iraq will be truly sovereign.

The one critical punch line that does emerge from this analysis, however, is that there is no near term prospect that Iraqi force development will allow major reductions in MNF-I forces, and that ISF force development can only succeed if the MNF-I provides active combat support well into 2008 and major advisory and aid support through 2010. Every element of ISF development still requires years of effort and support, and any successful policy towards Iraq that offers serious hope of avoiding massive increases in sectarian and ethnic violence, and continued insurgency, requires an honest recognition of this fact.

The US can only do more harm to Iraqi force development if it continues to exaggerate Iraqi capability, attempts to expand Iraqi forces even more quickly, and transfers responsibility before Iraqi forces can do the job. As in Afghanistan, the US can only win in Iraq if it is willing to fight a "long war." Rushing Iraqi forces in, and American forces out, is a strategy where "exit" is given far higher priority than success. It may provide a cosmetic rationale to disguise failure and defeat, but not prevent it.

To put it bluntly, the US government and Department of Defense must stop lying about the true nature of Iraqi readiness and the Iraqi force development. As this report describes in detail, there are many very real successes. The nearly meaningless metrics of success the US has adopted, however, can easily lead the US to choose the wrong options in Iraq, continue to fail to provide adequate resources, and encourage US and allied withdrawals because of political decisions made for the wrong reasons. Like all elements of strategy, Iraqi force development needs to be based on honesty and realism, not "spin," false claims, and political expediency.