U.S. Still Waiting For Iraqi Forces To 'Stand Up'

[SWJED]

5 December NY Times - U.S. Military Shifts Troops in Iraq Into Advisory Roles by Thom Shanker and Edward Wong.

American commanders in Iraq are already shifting thousands of combat troops into advisory positions with Iraqi Army and police units, especially in the capital, in their latest attempt to bring sectarian violence under control.

Changes in troop assignments over just the past three weeks included moving about 1,000 American soldiers in Baghdad from traditional combat roles to serve as trainers and advisers to Iraqi units, senior American officers said in interviews here. Commanders say they believe that a major influx of American advisers can add spine and muscle to Iraqi units that will help them to move into the lead in improving security.

The troops have been reassigned by commanders, who have not sought additional combat troops to replace them. While the troops have not been through the special program for trainers set up by the military, they are working in their areas of expertise, commanders said.

American generals in Iraq have made the reassignments in recent weeks even though President Bush and his senior national security advisers have not yet made a formal decision about whether to expand the American contingent sent to Iraq specifically to serve on military training teams.

Before the transfers began, between 4,000 and 5,000 troops had been assigned to about 400 training teams...

[Tom Odom]

As posted on the E Bird:

"You couldn't have gotten the 10 most brilliant men and women in America to design a way for us to fail in Iraq that would have been any better than what we have done on our own," lamented Garner, whom President Bush dispatched to Iraq to heal the country only to stand aside as Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III gutted the very post-combat pacification program that Garner had gotten the president to approve.

*"Robustly" train, re-equip with American modern arms rather than Warsaw Pact junk and advise all 120 Iraqi army battalions with American combat veterans rather than neophytes.

*Assign to each Iraqi battalion 20 to 25 American advisers, all combat tested, from the Army or the Marine Corps. The American advisory team would consist of a lieutenant colonel as its commander; a captain or major experienced in supplying beans and bullets, called a logistician; an artillery forward observer to call in artillery or air support; a radio operator; a medic; a captain and five sergeants with each of the three Iraqi companies in the battalion.

*Structure the career paths of American advisers so they are rewarded if they make the Iraqi battalion battle ready and penalized if they do not.

*Once the American advisory team certified the Iraqi battalion was combat ready, it would be inserted with that same battalion in a contested area now occupied by an American battalion. The advisory team would stick with the Iraqi battalion. It would have a quick channel for calling in helicopter gunships, fighter bombers, artillery fire and medical evacuation choppers with minimal delay. Pickup points for the medevacs would be established.

*The relieved American battalion would stay intact but be redeployed in some nearby peaceful area. The Americans would stay there for several months as a 911 rescue force. If the Iraqi battalion demonstrated it could do the job on its own, the Americans would leave Iraq. "So you have a two-phased redeployment," Garner said. "In the first phase you get the U. S. faces off the street, but they stay in Iraq. In the second phase, they leave Iraq."

*Gerrymander the parts of the country outside of Baghdad into three regions, drawn up in accordance with referenda asking the citizens the kind of regional government they preferred to live under: Shia, Sunni or Kurd. Each region would have its own governor and para-military force to protect its facilities and citizens. The federal constitution would remain in force but be strengthened to make sure Iraq's oil revenues were apportioned to every area of the country on the basis of population.

"You're never going to find a leader for Iraq whom everybody is happy with," Garner contended, on the basis of dealing with the Iraqis since 1991 when he was an Army officer protecting the Kurds in Iraq's mountains. "But if you split Iraq into regions whose governments are elected, you'll find leaders everybody coalesces around, like Massoud Barzani up north in Kurdistan."

Best

Tom

[jcustis]

I'm all for a surge in forces and increasing our advisory role, but have been a bit more hesitant of late. Getting more Iraqi troops and police online will relieve our burden and is the #1 condition for a phased withdrawal, but then what?

Has anyone seen analysis that digs into the dynamics of the insurgency, and claims a phased withdrawal will actually result in an reduction of attacks against the government? Put another way, if we are less of a fly in the ointment due to our presence, will some elements of the insurgency put down their arms simply because "the invaders have left"?

Given our technology, training, and skill sets, why are we having such a difficult time (beyond the simple matter of not enough boots on the ground) resolving the conflict? It's sort of a rhetorical question, and I have referred to Frank Snepp's Decent Interval to highlight the dangers of withdrawal when we probably don't have a solid grasp on what is motivating a bulk of the insurgency, or what the true insurgent capabilities are. And don't say it's AQ, because I'm not buying that in whole.

If we are having such a tough time, are there policy-makers out there who actually think that the Iraqi security and military apparatus can handle this when we've scaled down? This sort of goes back to a point earlier; are planners assuming that some elements of the insurgency will wane when we are not around?

EDITED TO ADD: And why is there talk of recommendations for withdrawal when we still haven't decided on the larger political issue of governance (e.g. partitioning). We've jacked things up so bad that I'd love to be a fly on the wall when some DoS representative goes to the Iraqi government and says, "You know guys, the elections and referendums were all great, and we're glad you got some sovereignty back, but you really need to split this country up into three parts." He'd be lucky to escape with his skin, because too many legislators have lost their lives for the hope of a peaceful and united Iraq. I think there will be a substantial amount of emotion (except perhaps with the Kurds) when they begin hearing that we want to dump the contents of the flask out and begin with a new experiment. It is, after all, there country now...right?

[Jedburgh]

From Parliamentary Brief, 1 Dec 06: No Law and No Order

...There are not enough civilian police advisors to advise the many IPS units. Military Police are backing up the civilians, but they lack the appropriate policing background to appropriately support the community-policing IPS. Similarly, although Italian Carbinieri have been involved in training and advisory roles, the majority of National Police advisers are also US military personnel.

This reinforces the military nature of National Police training and the combination may preclude the development of a force guided by policing, rather than war-fighting principles.

A police-focused counterinsurgency effort leverages the law and order aspect of the fight, and emphasises the protection of Iraqi civilians. A military-focused effort drops the bar for internal use of the armed forces, and for the use of military, rather than police tactics in a domestic framework. This can turn the population against the government and government forces which are seen as combatants rather than protectors, and feeds continued fighting....

[Merv Benson]

Bill Roggio has an interesting report on Iraqi police operations in Fallujah and the support they are getting from the Marines. It also goes into the problems of al Qaeda infiltration and targeting of the police.