Iraqi Force Development - A Current Status Report (July-December 2005)
Executive Summary
In spite of the problems facing Iraqi forces, they have made major progress. Changes in the US-led Coalition advisory effort have led to steadily higher selection and training standards and better equipment and facilities. Embedding US training teams in each new Iraqi unit, and pairing them with US combat units until they could operate on their own, has made a major qualitative difference in the field. More and more Iraqi units have come on-line. By the end of 2005, some 125 Iraqi battalions were active in the military and security forces, some 40-45 had achieved enough readiness to play a significant role in security operations, and over 30 were able to operate in their own battle space without direct US or other Coalition support.

This progress occurred in spite of the fact that the Sunni Arab insurgents focused their attacks on fellow Iraqis and hit hard at every element of Iraqi forces. The insurgents also struck at virtually every other element of Iraqi society, and attacked Shi’ite Arab and Kurdish political leaders, religious figures and journalists, other members of the Iraqi elite, and ordinary citizens -- often in the form of suicide bombings that created mass casualties. The most extreme Sunni Islamists clearly had the goal of paralyzing the Iraqi political process, and such extremist groups attacked Shi’ite and Kurds in a way that seemed designed to provoke a major civil conflict.

Such progress, however, is not yet sufficient to guarantee either any meaningful force of Iraqi victory, or the ability of the US to make major troop withdrawals and still claim success. The following remaining problems in shaping effective Iraqi forces must still be addressed:
- Ensuring that they will act as national forces, and not Shi’ite and Kurdish forces
- Giving Iraqi combat battalions better balance and support
- Giving the security and police forces the same level of training and advisory support as the regular Iraqi forces
- Matching force development with political development and inclusiveness
- Supporting Iraqi forces with effective governance by civil authorities.

The regular Iraqi military still lack balance. They are still lightly equipped, and an initial emphasis on putting as many combat units into the field as possible, means they lack adequate headquarters, support, and logistic units. As a result, major further improvements are still needed in the regular forces that will take well into 2007, and require sustained US advisory efforts, aid, and military support.

As for the political dimension, most top Iraqi officials, and senior Iraqi Arab Shi’ite and Kurdish political leaders, continue to stress the importance of developing Iraqi forces that maintain a rule of law, and respect for human rights in spite of the insurgent attacks. They stress the need to fight corruption, and change the past culture of Iraq’s military and police forces to stress professionalism and promotion by merit.

Nevertheless, the Ministry of the Interior has failed to act on such goals and has allowed some elements of its special security units to act as a virtual extension of Shi’ite efforts to attack the Sunnis. This requires major new efforts to reform the forces of the Ministry of the Interior and both the special security services and police. Such efforts are only beginning to have an impact, but the Ministry of Interior has fired the commanders responsible for the worst abuses.

More broadly, the police still cannot act as an effective force in many areas of the country, and have many elements that lacked both competence and loyalty to the central government. These problems were compounded in Sunni areas by the difficulty of finding forces loyal to the national government. They were compounded in Shi’ite areas by loyalty to Shi’ite religious parties and intimidation by -- or partnership with -- Shi’ite militias. Many of the police were also local, and lacked the training and discipline of the police units trained and equipped by the Coalition and central government.

Both Iraqi forces and civil government are still far too slow to occupy the areas where the insurgents were defeated by the military and security forces. This lack of governance and the ability to establish security without military forces remained a major problem in many parts of the country, but made it difficult to exploit Iraqi and Coalition military victories in areas favorable to the Sunni insurgents.