From CSIS, 23 Aug 06: Iraqi Force Development: Summer 2006 Update

Here's the ExecSum from the 72 page report:
Iraqi force development in the summer of 2006 occurred against a backdrop of increasing adversity and violence. Initial events suggested cause for optimism. A new elected Iraqi government that included all major factions finally took shape in May. Al-Qa’ida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed on June 7. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki seemed poised to take the initiative with a proposal for national reconciliation and the beginning of the Baghdad security plan called Operation Forward Together. Yet security proved an elusive goal, and inability to halt waves of sectarian-motivated killing sparked renewed fears of civil war as Shi’ite versus Sunni clashes escalated. Militias and “death squads” became the primary targets for security forces.

Securing Baghdad was clearly the central objective of Iraqi and Coalition efforts during the summer of 2006, and it proved to be an elusive goal. The “first phase” of Operation Forward Together relied on a show of strength with more Iraqi security forces on the streets manning more checkpoints. “Phase two” of the operation, formulated in late July well after the failure to slow the violence was apparent, incorporated more US troops and more elements of counterinsurgency warfare, specifically the “oil spot” strategy of creating secured areas one by one and the attempt to win the confidence of Iraqi civilians through more sensitive and subtle search operations and efforts to clean up battle-scarred neighbourhoods. “Phase two” may have been a better plan, but its true test will be when secured areas are returned to the control of Iraqi military and police units.

While Baghdad remained a center of attention, Iraqi and US forces attempted to reassert government control in Ramadi and the Anbar province at large, which remained a hotspot for Sunni insurgents. Another major operational development of the summer was the handover of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In July, Muthanna became the first Iraqi province transferred to full Iraqi security control, and more transfers were being planned.

Efforts to recruit and train Iraq’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces continued in the midst of the turmoil, and US military leaders reported that 268,000 Iraqi soldiers and police had been trained by midsummer, with the remainder of what was planned to be a 325,000-man force to be ready by the end of 2006. Yet the increased quantity of Iraqi “boots on the ground” did not result in immediate improvements of the security situation. Despite improved training and capabilities, persistent problems, notably sectarian militia loyalties, corruption, lack of logistical and administrative support, and a lack of trust from the Iraqi people, continued to hinder significant progress.

Iraqi internal politics could still lead to a major civil conflict between ethnic factions and sects. It is too soon to predict how well Iraqi forces can or cannot supplement, whether they will remain unified and serve the nation and not factions, and the extent to which they can eventually replace Coalition forces. The nation-building aspects of the “war after the war” remain a struggle in progress, and there still is no way to know whether the light at the end of the tunnel is daylight or an oncoming train.