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Thread: U.S. Still Waiting For Iraqi Forces To 'Stand Up'

  1. #21
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    Default Police operations in Fallujah

    Bill Roggio has an interesting report on Iraqi police operations in Fallujah and the support they are getting from the Marines. It also goes into the problems of al Qaeda infiltration and targeting of the police.

  2. #22
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    Default Training Iraqis May Pose Risks For U.S.

    10 December Washington Post - Training Iraqis May Pose Risks For U.S. by Walter Pincus.

    The newest program for training Iraqi security forces, embedding 11- to 15-member U.S. transition teams in Iraqi battalions, represents a "high-risk assignment" for the American officers and men involved, according to top military training officials.

    The concept is considered so dangerous that a group of potential replacements stand ready at Fort Riley, the U.S. Army base directing the program, for immediate shipment to Iraq if members of a deployed team are killed or wounded, Maj. Gen. Carter F. Ham, who runs the training program, told House members last week.

    While the U.S. training of Iraqis is considered key in determining the future of the American presence in Iraq, it remains a work in progress three years after it began, according to present and former senior U.S. Army and Marine officers involved in the process.

    The disbanding of Saddam Hussein's army in May 2003 and the disappearance of local police units compelled the United States and coalition allies to rebuild almost from scratch a variety of Iraqi security forces, including a national army, local national guard units, special commando teams, a national police force, border police, local police and a facilities protection service.

    Complicating matters was a desire among coalition officials in 2003 and 2004 to keep the new Iraqi army lightly armed, in part so it could not threaten any democratic government established in Baghdad. As part of that approach, former senior officers from Hussein's army initially were excluded from service, and the first national police units developed were not trained or equipped to deal with either insurgency or serious security threats...

  3. #23
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    Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 7 Dec 06:

    LTG James J. Lovelace, DCS, G-3: On the Status and Training of MTTs for OIF

    MG George J. Flynn, CG, TECOM: Transition Team Training

    MG Carter F. Ham, CG, 1st ID: Transition Team Training

  4. #24
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Default

    Jed, these last three links you posted are now dead. Any chance that you save the content, as I did not get a chance to read them.

  5. #25
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    Jed, these last three links you posted are now dead. Any chance that you save the content, as I did not get a chance to read them.
    After checking out the site, it looks like they completely killed all transcript links during the transition. That seems a bit unneccesary.

    But yes, I do have soft copies saved. If you PM me with an e-mail address, I can send them out.

    - Ted

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