U.S. Still Waiting For Iraqi Forces To 'Stand Up'

[jcustis]

I'm all for a surge in forces and increasing our advisory role, but have been a bit more hesitant of late. Getting more Iraqi troops and police online will relieve our burden and is the #1 condition for a phased withdrawal, but then what?

Has anyone seen analysis that digs into the dynamics of the insurgency, and claims a phased withdrawal will actually result in an reduction of attacks against the government? Put another way, if we are less of a fly in the ointment due to our presence, will some elements of the insurgency put down their arms simply because "the invaders have left"?

Given our technology, training, and skill sets, why are we having such a difficult time (beyond the simple matter of not enough boots on the ground) resolving the conflict? It's sort of a rhetorical question, and I have referred to Frank Snepp's Decent Interval to highlight the dangers of withdrawal when we probably don't have a solid grasp on what is motivating a bulk of the insurgency, or what the true insurgent capabilities are. And don't say it's AQ, because I'm not buying that in whole.

If we are having such a tough time, are there policy-makers out there who actually think that the Iraqi security and military apparatus can handle this when we've scaled down? This sort of goes back to a point earlier; are planners assuming that some elements of the insurgency will wane when we are not around?

EDITED TO ADD: And why is there talk of recommendations for withdrawal when we still haven't decided on the larger political issue of governance (e.g. partitioning). We've jacked things up so bad that I'd love to be a fly on the wall when some DoS representative goes to the Iraqi government and says, "You know guys, the elections and referendums were all great, and we're glad you got some sovereignty back, but you really need to split this country up into three parts." He'd be lucky to escape with his skin, because too many legislators have lost their lives for the hope of a peaceful and united Iraq. I think there will be a substantial amount of emotion (except perhaps with the Kurds) when they begin hearing that we want to dump the contents of the flask out and begin with a new experiment. It is, after all, there country now...right?

[Jedburgh]

From Parliamentary Brief, 1 Dec 06: No Law and No Order

...There are not enough civilian police advisors to advise the many IPS units. Military Police are backing up the civilians, but they lack the appropriate policing background to appropriately support the community-policing IPS. Similarly, although Italian Carbinieri have been involved in training and advisory roles, the majority of National Police advisers are also US military personnel.

This reinforces the military nature of National Police training and the combination may preclude the development of a force guided by policing, rather than war-fighting principles.

A police-focused counterinsurgency effort leverages the law and order aspect of the fight, and emphasises the protection of Iraqi civilians. A military-focused effort drops the bar for internal use of the armed forces, and for the use of military, rather than police tactics in a domestic framework. This can turn the population against the government and government forces which are seen as combatants rather than protectors, and feeds continued fighting....

[Merv Benson]

Bill Roggio has an interesting report on Iraqi police operations in Fallujah and the support they are getting from the Marines. It also goes into the problems of al Qaeda infiltration and targeting of the police.

[SWJED]

10 December Washington Post - Training Iraqis May Pose Risks For U.S. by Walter Pincus.

The newest program for training Iraqi security forces, embedding 11- to 15-member U.S. transition teams in Iraqi battalions, represents a "high-risk assignment" for the American officers and men involved, according to top military training officials.

The concept is considered so dangerous that a group of potential replacements stand ready at Fort Riley, the U.S. Army base directing the program, for immediate shipment to Iraq if members of a deployed team are killed or wounded, Maj. Gen. Carter F. Ham, who runs the training program, told House members last week.

While the U.S. training of Iraqis is considered key in determining the future of the American presence in Iraq, it remains a work in progress three years after it began, according to present and former senior U.S. Army and Marine officers involved in the process.

The disbanding of Saddam Hussein's army in May 2003 and the disappearance of local police units compelled the United States and coalition allies to rebuild almost from scratch a variety of Iraqi security forces, including a national army, local national guard units, special commando teams, a national police force, border police, local police and a facilities protection service.

Complicating matters was a desire among coalition officials in 2003 and 2004 to keep the new Iraqi army lightly armed, in part so it could not threaten any democratic government established in Baghdad. As part of that approach, former senior officers from Hussein's army initially were excluded from service, and the first national police units developed were not trained or equipped to deal with either insurgency or serious security threats...