The actual fighters can be killed, but they will be replaced and new fighters will be more careful.

The movement only ends if the political side of it falters. Fighters without a base (politically convinced supporters) disappear quickly or at least morph into a much easier to defeat opponent.
A base without fighters simply generates (new) fighters.

The strategically more relevant target is therefore the supporter base. This base has been simplified as "Pashtuns", "drug trade", "foreigners", "highwaymen", but its actual face depends obviously on local circumstances (drug business isn't strong everywhere).

This supporter base is not a legitimate target for organised violence in our moral compass, so it's only going to be defeated by non-combat means.



In my opinion, all the (para)military efforts in COIN don't do much more than to push the insurgent fighters into the shadows. The really decisive fight is political - unless you're ready to take the gloves off. The latter is self-defeating for us since we have certain expectations on our warfare that do not tolerate Hama solutions any more.


Sometime in 2009 I argued for a COIN model that combined
# few military mobile strike reserves
# many cheap (para)military security forces
# semi-covert political action groups

The first two were tasked to keep the flame of war small, while the political action groups would turn the relevant people or solidify their support for the government cause (with a huge repertoire of actions, including dirty tricks, deportation and intrigue).


This war should have been run by diplomats and indigenous politicians assisted by bodyguard teams, interpreters and such.

Instead, it was run by the military which was and is not really suitable for the decisive domain of the war.

The result is known; a stalemate.