Is It Time to Get Out of Afghanistan?

[Ray]

You focus too much on the lesser paramilitary arm of a proper insurgency. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm and you need completely different view on this civilian political supporters base.

I have not understood as to exactly what your are trying to convey.

1. a proper insurgency?

2. lesser paramilitary arm?

3. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm?

My experience has been confined to Kashmir, NE India and a bit of Mao stuff.

[Fuchs]

The actual fighters can be killed, but they will be replaced and new fighters will be more careful.

The movement only ends if the political side of it falters. Fighters without a base (politically convinced supporters) disappear quickly or at least morph into a much easier to defeat opponent.
A base without fighters simply generates (new) fighters.

The strategically more relevant target is therefore the supporter base. This base has been simplified as "Pashtuns", "drug trade", "foreigners", "highwaymen", but its actual face depends obviously on local circumstances (drug business isn't strong everywhere).

This supporter base is not a legitimate target for organised violence in our moral compass, so it's only going to be defeated by non-combat means.



In my opinion, all the (para)military efforts in COIN don't do much more than to push the insurgent fighters into the shadows. The really decisive fight is political - unless you're ready to take the gloves off. The latter is self-defeating for us since we have certain expectations on our warfare that do not tolerate Hama solutions any more.


Sometime in 2009 I argued for a COIN model that combined
# few military mobile strike reserves
# many cheap (para)military security forces
# semi-covert political action groups

The first two were tasked to keep the flame of war small, while the political action groups would turn the relevant people or solidify their support for the government cause (with a huge repertoire of actions, including dirty tricks, deportation and intrigue).


This war should have been run by diplomats and indigenous politicians assisted by bodyguard teams, interpreters and such.

Instead, it was run by the military which was and is not really suitable for the decisive domain of the war.

The result is known; a stalemate.

[Ray]

Valid points.

Fighters killed can be replaced. Yet, New fighters may not be careful since they maybe there for revenge killing of their kith and kin.

The Movement will end if the political ideology/ side destroyed. True.

However, if where the support base is i.e. KP where the terrorists have their sanctuaries that are only disturbed by Drones and nothing substantial happens, they will continue to proliferate, train, rest, refit and reorg, while their political heads rest and refit in luxurious environs like Abbotabad.

Therefore, it become essential to attack relentlessly the bases, including with ground troops, and in this instant case, KP and FATA.

Once the bases are destroyed and the area occupied, it will make it a buffer to where the ISAF is operating. Somewhat sanitised, at least better for somewhat unhindered operations.

The terrorist Heads can well plot and scheme in their luxurious houses and it would not matter since they would have no influence in the ‘buffer zone’ as they would not be able to inject any of their own there.

The support base is a legitimate target. If morality is to be debated, then infringing Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty with Drone attacks, CIA operatives masquerading as defence contractor and violating Pakistan’s airspace and injecting SEALs to kill a ‘guest i.e OBL is a huge moral question and totally contravening international law and niceties.

The action against terrorists cannot be only a military operation, it has to have a political solution ongoing. However, unless the military aspect of terrorism is seen to be on the verge of defeat, no political solution can be hammered out.

[Fuchs]

You're too stuck in thinking about sanctuaries and kills.

The supporting base are the villages where TB can move in, drink a tea and not get reported, but even be able to get some supplies and a bed for the night.
It's not something you deal with with drones and Hellfires.

The military reach is irrelevant. A whole infantry company can sweep that village and the next day the village wills till be part of the supportive base of TBs.
It's political.


And the support base is as much a legitimate target as it would have been legitimate if Germany had killed 30-80% of French civilians in '43 because of the Resistance.
No, they are not a legitimate target for deadly violence. The maximum justifiable violence would be a forced deportation.

[carl]

Fuchs:

Physical sanctuaries are important. It is much easier to stay alive when there is someplace to run to where the people hunting you can't physically go. That seems self evident. The trigger pullers are important and they can stay alive longer if they have access to a physical sanctuary.

[Fuchs]

Emphasis: Amagnetic needle in haystack.

The sheer size of Afghanistan in area, population size and travel times means that there's not really a problem with hiding in plain sight. You need no physical or other 100% security. War claims souls anyway.


The real security wall there is loyalty (or fear, everything is fine as long as it works).

[carl]

Fuchs:

I disagree. To carry your haystack analogy further, you can find the needle if you have access to the haystack and keep looking. If you are not allowed to access to the haystack it is impossible to find it. The needle can rest easier that way.

Afghanistan is big but there are only so many places where humans can live. In a desert area there must be water close by and there may be only so many water holes. The hunters know where those are. You could live on a mountaintop but still there has to be water and fuel available. Probably most of the places where water, fuel, food and shelter are available have people near by. Those people may be with you, a valuable thing; but they may not, and if they are not they can rat you out and the hunters will come for you. In a physical sanctuary, no hunter can come for you.

Political support is vital but so is a sanctuary.

[Ken White]

Physical sanctuaries are important. It is much easier to stay alive when there is someplace to run to where the people hunting you can't physically go.

Not really much easier, just less stressful.. The flip side is time and effort lost moving from operating area to 'sanctuary' plus the increased logistic burden and the potential for attack while moving to and fro-- and one must always wonder how long the opponent will allow it to remain a sanctuary.

That seems self evident.

A large number of things that may seem self evident at first glance are not -- once some thought is given them...

The trigger pullers are important and they can stay alive longer if they have access to a physical sanctuary.

They aren't that important and generally are easily replaceable. Plus, if such a sanctuary exists, the nominal leaders tend to operate almost exclusively from that safe haven -- which creates trigger puller morale problems. Then there's the problem of the lad who gets to that safe haven after a few fights and elects not to return to the arena...

It's a set of trade offs. Like everything else.

[carl]

I still disagree. Physical sanctuary in the sense that Pakistan is a physical sanctuary for the Taliban is important. It is not only less stressful for a Talibani to stay alive there it is physically easier because he won't be hunted by ground troops there; not only easier but almost gaurenteed (sic). Drones may be around but there really aren't that many of them and they go after the bigger guys. There is extra time and effort involved in going to and fro but that is counterbalanced by the ability not to get kilt in the sanctuary. Time is not that important anyway for those guys. They got years and years. You do have to wonder how long the sanctuary will remain so, but given our record it will be indefinitely. Even if it stopped being one they gain the advantage for however long it does last. That is of value if they will win during that time.

The high mucky mucks have been in Pakistan for 10 years and their presence there hasn't seemed to cause many morale problems so far. If some of the trigger pullers decide to stay in Pakistan that isn't much different than if they decide to stay home in Afghanistan. Either way they aren't available. From what I know those guys drift in and out of the ranks all the time anyway, especially the lower down guys. I think it would be especially useful for low and mid level leaders to have a place safe from the hunters. Their positions are stressful.

I don't think the RAF has much application. They were a tiny group. It is easy to hide a tiny group. We have had things like that here, not as murderous but just as hard to hunt down because of sympathizers. A big group like Taliban & co. needs a physical sanctuary, especially for the big leaders. They wouldn't operate there unless they had to to stay alive.

It is a set of trade offs, but I just don't see how having a physical sanctuary isn't critically important for Taliban & Co. Sanctuary may be a fixation for small wars people, but it is a fixation for small wars people on both sides. If it wasn't important for the insurgents why would they be so set on using them? I don't think it is so strange.

[Ray]

Not really much easier, just less stressful.. The flip side is time and effort lost moving from operating area to 'sanctuary' plus the increased logistic burden and the potential for attack while moving to and fro-- and one must always wonder how long the opponent will allow it to remain a sanctuary.A large number of things that may seem self evident at first glance are not -- once some thought is given them...They aren't that important and generally are easily replaceable. Plus, if such a sanctuary exists, the nominal leaders tend to operate almost exclusively from that safe haven -- which creates trigger puller morale problems. Then there's the problem of the lad who gets to that safe haven after a few fights and elects not to return to the arena...

It's a set of trade offs. Like everything else.

Anyone who has done a long trek in the mountains with heavy battle load and gone through a few skirmishes will understand what a 'break' (forget about sanctuaries) mean.

One does not go back to base (sanctuaries) after every action. Therefore, the issue of logistics is redundant. One does a tenure and hangs around in local sanctuaries for the next actions, having been replenished. That is how the terrorist operate in Kashmir. Therefore, the danger of moving from a base and carrying out an operation and then returning to safe sanctuaries across the border is imaginary.

The terrorists operating in Kashmir are on a one year tenure and they are paid a King's ransom for the same. They are logistically topped up from across the border at their local sanctuaries and so can carry on with their activities. I daresay the Taliban, who are of the same genre, are any different in their modus operandi.

It would be unbelievable that anyone, be they terrorists or otherwise, do not require to rest, refit and reorganise. Obviously, it cannot be done in 'enemy' territory. Therefore, after a longish stint, they have to touch base at their sanctuaries which cannot be 'touched' without raising international concern of violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty.

For the Taliban, the KP area is ideal.

That is why the US Drones operate there and Pakistan complain of violation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Drones cannot target all areas and that is obvious.

[Ray]

You're too stuck in thinking about sanctuaries and kills.

The supporting base are the villages where TB can move in, drink a tea and not get reported, but even be able to get some supplies and a bed for the night.
It's not something you deal with with drones and Hellfires.

The military reach is irrelevant. A whole infantry company can sweep that village and the next day the village wills till be part of the supportive base of TBs.
It's political.


And the support base is as much a legitimate target as it would have been legitimate if Germany had killed 30-80% of French civilians in '43 because of the Resistance.
No, they are not a legitimate target for deadly violence. The maximum justifiable violence would be a forced deportation.

Indeed I am too stuck in the groove of sanctuaries and kill.

That I found was the crux to the issue, having also been on the high level parleys at the political level too, as also being on the ground level. Too much of theory at the political and totally devoid of the reality. Good chaps and wonderful thoughts but no way to get results.

I am not suggesting the Sri Lankan mode. It is inhuman. What I am suggesting is a cognizable military success on which the a political solution can be constructed.

I would be immensely surprised to find people beyond law and reason like the terrorists coming to the negotiation table when they are riding the crest of success. Don't take my word for it, you should have asked Mao when he was alive or you still have the chance, ask Castro!

If you have read my post carefully, you would find you are echoing my thoughts that The supporting base are the villages where TB can move in, drink a tea and not get reported, but even be able to get some supplies and a bed for the night.

It's not something you deal with with drones and Hellfires.

But where I disagree is your contention - The military reach is irrelevant. A whole infantry company can sweep that village and the next day the village wills till be part of the supportive base of TBs.
It's political.

Sanitising an area and even a whole province and having it registered as a failure of the terrorist is a MUST to bring the Taliban to the table for talks. A victorious lot does not come to the negotiation table.

Since you bring in if Germany had killed 30-80% of French civilians in '43 because of the Resistance may I remind you of The Treaty of Versailles? It should ring a bell, where even an unjust Treaty was meekly endorsed by the vanquished.

May I also remind you that Chamberlain, the British PM, with all his goodness, failed politically to bring Hitler to the negotiating table and Winston Churchill, the horrible man, made mincemeat of Hitler through wily political alliances and sheer brute force?

Politics without worthwhile military action is chasing the will o' the wisp!

The attack on Abbotabad has removed OBL which no political parley would achieve.

Who knows that is a starter towards the negotiating table. If not, some more would see the light of day till it works out.

I am not a Clancey fan. If only I had his trait of story telling, I would have been a millionaire since I have 'been there and done that' and each activity is a thrilling story by itself!

[Fuchs]

May I also remind you that Chamberlain, the British PM, with all his goodness, failed politically to bring Hitler to the negotiating table and Winston Churchill, the horrible man, made mincemeat of Hitler through wily political alliances and sheer brute force?

Hitler wasn't the supporting base, but the head.

Britain' time to convince a German supportive base to play nicely was in 1919-1932 when it was able to negotiate and deliver foreign political successes to Social democrats and thus keep the far right nutcases from power.

Later on, 1933-1945, the supportive base was too much in the grip of force.
It might still have helped not to ask for unconditional surrender in 1943, for this could have meant everything including national slavery in Siberia.

The attack on Abbotabad has removed OBL which no political parley would achieve.

Really? I think it would have been interesting to offer the continued existence of Islamabad for UBL's head.


A huge arms deal package at discount prices (worth 300 bn+, price 100 bn+) for India would also have been a good argument.
Instead, the U.S. government bribed directly and was content with almost no returns.

[Ray]

Hitler wasn't the supporting base, but the head.

Britain' time to convince a German supportive base to play nicely was in 1919-1932 when it was able to negotiate and deliver foreign political successes to Social democrats and thus keep the far right nutcases from power.

Later on, 1933-1945, the supportive base was too much in the grip of force.
It might still have helped not to ask for unconditional surrender in 1943, for this could have meant everything including national slavery in Siberia.



Really? I think it would have been interesting to offer the continued existence of Islamabad for UBL's head.


A huge arms deal package at discount prices (worth 300 bn+, price 100 bn+) for India would also have been a good argument.
Instead, the U.S. government bribed directly and was content with almost no returns.

Chamberlain was addressing the head = the political aspect. And failed.

When Britain addressed the base = Germany = the base. They won!

I think you are not paying heed to what is being said in Washington over the Abbotabad raid and planning. They are saying that Pakistan was kept out of the loop since Pakistan leaks like a sieve and OBL would have been alerted.

If indeed, as you suggest, that there should have been political solution to OBL, well then, we would still be roaming round and round like Tony Lumpkin.

You make a mistake. India is not Pakistan. Our govt is responsible to the people and such a 'bribe' would have brought the Govt down. And our Army is subservient to the civilian Govt and has no role in the political environment or governance of the country.
As it is, it (the Indian Govt) was shaky with that dubious deal over the Nuclear Agreement and now with the Japanese nuclear disaster, the Govt does not know where to hide.

Now, what was the bribe the US gave directly to India?

Even the US aircraft offered was way high in cost for India compared to the price sold to Australia. Hence, India said no way!

[jmm99]

Yes.

In support of said answer, we had a discussion nearly two years ago - e.g., some posts in it:

BW: What would "moderate" look like...

jmm99: What would "moderate" look like... part 1 and What would "moderate" look like... part 2

We could today be discussing the very same issues without substantial changes in what is expressed - and in fact we are !

We (US) have various open-source (and perhaps classified) "partnership agreements" with the GoA (initiated in the Bush administration and confirmed early on in the Obama administation). Based on the open-source documents, these are legally Presidential Executive Agreements; and could be legally terminated by the US.

With respect to the region (South Asia), I'd like to see all US military forces withdrawn - you all know my boundary lines; and that "Never Again" has a "but..." attached to it. One "but" could be direct actions of the type we have just witnessed.

Further with respect to the projection of non-military US capabilities, we would continue and rely on:

1. Diplomatic under DoS.

2. USIA - yup, good old agitprop under an agency independent of State.

3. USAID - yup, good old focused on local developmental liaison (tied into US trade and commerce) under an agency independent of State.

4. Peace Corps

5. Intelligence (Gathering and Analysis) - You decide on the organizational setup.

Not very isolationist, but it would be as non-interventionist as possible.

The key concept would be to move away from "partnership agreements" (and the "dammit, we made a contract" mentality) and into personal, emotional relationships with the people of South Asia.

Since I'm not "touchy feely", it ain't that - or close to that. What I'm talking about is mutual respect and communication based on shared, enlightened self-interests.

So, "Who [and Where] is John Galt?"

Regards

Mike

PS: Ray, sometimes I change my mind - temporarily hanging my Nehru jacket on the shelf (ha, ha).