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Thread: Is It Time to Get Out of Afghanistan?

  1. #21
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Sometime in the future maybe -just maybe- humanity will advance to a point where it's going to look back at people who got it right early on and increase its respect for them and their long-derided opinions.


    In the case of AFG, there were people who saw that it's about time to get out of AFG as early as in 2002 ...


    There was also a group of I think 33 intellectuals who sponsored an ad in the NYT against OIF. Only one of them (Walt) has become a kind of nation-wide known pundit. The old warmongers of 2002 on the other hand ... many of them are still in the business and have become rich(er) by producing a net damage to their society.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Presley Cannady View Post
    Happens every year on September 11.
    Do you seriously believe that the 10th Anniversary of the start of what used to be called the Global War On Terror and has since been downgraded into an Overseas Contingency Operation is going to be spun in any way which might positively influence the American electorate to stay the course?

  3. #23
    Council Member Cannoneer No. 4's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Presley Cannady View Post
    1. They don't get to be demoralized, and someone should tell them as much. This isn't baseball and we're not talking about a pennant you can take another whack at next year.
    WHY don't they get to be demoralized?

    Who do you think the "someone" is that should tell them they don't get to be demoralized? Not the same people who were supposed to be in charge of morale on the home front, I hope.

    Think they'll meet with much success persuading-changing-influencing sceptics with your approach?

    2. JB contemplating the US quitting the field hinges on two very dubious notions: "that we've killed most of Al-Qaida," and that "[s]mall amounts of Special Operations Forces could have been left in strategic locations to periodically take out AQ as they popped up."
    Go to Jb's blog and tell him how dubious he is.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cannoneer No. 4 View Post
    Do you seriously believe that the 10th Anniversary of the start of what used to be called the Global War On Terror and has since been downgraded into an Overseas Contingency Operation is going to be spun in any way which might positively influence the American electorate to stay the course?
    I believe the Administration can't even close a next to empty detention camp in Cuba, let alone overcome the political and cultural pressure to fight the war. And it took ten years and the housing bubble popping to even get to the point where suggesting such a thing on the campaign trail was survivable.
    PH Cannady
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cannoneer No. 4 View Post
    WHY don't they get to be demoralized?
    Because they have an audience speak with no small amount of authority.

    Who do you think the "someone" is that should tell them they don't get to be demoralized? Not the same people who were supposed to be in charge of morale on the home front, I hope.
    So whenever somebody fails to do their job, feel free to use your megaphone to wonder aloud if America should call it quits?

    Think they'll meet with much success persuading-changing-influencing sceptics with your approach?
    I think that conceding the debate to the other side is a very...um...novel way of persuading them to your point of view.

    Go to Jb's blog and tell him how dubious he is.
    Come on. You know I said no such thing.
    PH Cannady
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  6. #26
    Council Member Cannoneer No. 4's Avatar
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    "Because they have an audience speak with no small amount of authority" is not a reason why commenters on blogs don't get to be demoralized that makes any sense.

    I say again, who do you think the "someone" is that should tell them they don't get to be demoralized? Looking for names or titles here, not another question. Admitting that you do not know is an acceptable response.

    JB contemplating the US quitting the field hinges on two very dubious notions

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cannoneer No. 4 View Post
    "Because they have an audience speak with no small amount of authority" is not a reason why commenters on blogs don't get to be demoralized that makes any sense.
    I think the confusion here lies in that you were talking about the comments and I was talking about the bloggers themselves.

    I say again, who do you think the "someone" is that should tell them they don't get to be demoralized?
    That's easy. Other milbloggers. Particularly ones who'd quickly pounce on echoes of Biden-lite in JB's post.
    Last edited by Presley Cannady; 04-05-2011 at 01:56 AM.
    PH Cannady
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    The red line is just an arbitrary horizontal line showing the width of the "Never Again" Region at that latitude. The "Never Again" Region encompasses the continental land masses of Eurasia and Africa.

    An expanded version of B.L. Montgomery's Rule 1:



    and Rule 2:





    Or, viewed from a ship, US force projection should not go beyond the far littorals of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, absent an extremely compelling reason - which is the "but..." in the equation.

    An old concept (e.g., Mahan and others of the "Guardian" school of thought). See A.T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911) (pdf free from Google Books).

    Regards

    Mike

    Ahhhh yes, Mahan. Interesting chap that. You will forgive me if I say that I (much) prefer Sir Julian Corbett (not just because I'm British but also because of the lectures of this man). Which see, for instance, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

    Do I detect a touch of the Monroe Doctrine in your spatial representation/policy preference? Does that mean the the US does not rule out land operations in Latin/South America? The Bay of Pigs didn't turn out too well IIRC and nor did the whole business with the Contra allthough you had a creditable showing in Panama and Haiti, in recent years (quite apart from Asian landwars).

    If so...das is sehr gut! I myself am all in favour of the establishment of Grossraume (a la the late great, and much maligned, Carl Schmitt).

    Still, thanks for the banter,

    Cheers,

    T

  9. #29
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    Default Hey T - have banter, will travel ....

    . Quite seriously, the banter does contain some nuggets that apply here - as from your Julian Stafford Corbett, Some principles of maritime strategy (1911; the same year as Mahan, but more overtly CvC and fairly arguably more modern) - from p.326-328 (emphasis added):

    Notes on Strategy

    PART ONE

    GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

    INTRODUCTORY

    Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.

    The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.

    War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.

    MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY

    We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.

    Primary objects are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign.

    Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

    Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds — Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.

    Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.

    Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes:

    (1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior [pg 327] object;

    (2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.

    Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war.

    But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem.

    It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versâ. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versâ. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only.

    Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

    Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with—

    (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.

    (2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.

    Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—

    (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.

    (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.

    (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.

    [pg 328]

    It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.
    Quite a decent summary of how to frame the boundaries of the problems presented and their solutions (as in Astan and Pstan).

    As to this:

    from T

    Do I detect a touch of the Monroe Doctrine in your spatial representation/policy preference? Does that mean the the US does not rule out land operations in Latin/South America? The Bay of Pigs didn't turn out too well IIRC and nor did the whole business with the Contra allthough you had a creditable showing in Panama and Haiti, in recent years (quite apart from Asian landwars).

    If so...das is sehr gut! I myself am all in favour of the establishment of Grossraume (a la the late great, and much maligned, Carl Schmitt).
    A number of questions and probably a digression from this particular thread - Maybe a later PM on them to see whether I can summarize my views in a semi-coherent manner.

    Regards

    Mike

  10. #30
    Council Member Cannoneer No. 4's Avatar
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    Default We Leave, al Qaeda Returns: Time to Nuke Afghanistan?

    http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/207206.php

    The Counter Insurgent-Supportive Blogosphere is begging for some credible, confidence-inspiring Strategic Communication from somebody.

  11. #31
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    For an insurgency to sustain itself, there has to be mass support, adequate finances, free supply of arms and ammunition, safe havens to recruit, train, refit and reorg and external support.

    Have these been addressed in Afghanistan?

    First and foremost, one has to eliminate the safe havens where recruiting, refitting, reorganising can is being done.

    Currently, all insurgents/ terrorists etc are with impunity recruit, refit, train, reorg and then launch forays against the ISAF.

    Drone attacks cannot address the issue in it totality, more so since the CIA and others have been given the marching orders.
    Last edited by Ray; 04-12-2011 at 03:12 PM.

  12. #32
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ray View Post
    For an insurgency to sustain itself, there has to be mass support, adequate finances, free supply of arms and ammunition, safe havens to recruit, train, refit and reorg and external support.

    Have these been addressed in Afghanistan?

    First and foremost, one has to eliminate the safe havens where recruiting, refitting, reorganising can is being done.

    Currently, all insurgents/ terrorists etc are with impunity recruit, refit, train, reorg and then launch forays against the ISAF.

    Drone attacks cannot address the issue in it totality, more so since the CIA and others have been given the marching orders.

    You focus too much on the lesser paramilitary arm of a proper insurgency. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm and you need completely different view on this civilian political supporters base.

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    Fuchs is correct in that statement however in the case of AFG, they probably all reside in the same (relatively) untouched sanctuary...in the unlikely event that were to be neutralised, the insurgency per se in AFG would wither away into inter-tribal feuding...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    You focus too much on the lesser paramilitary arm of a proper insurgency. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm and you need completely different view on this civilian political supporters base.
    I have not understood as to exactly what your are trying to convey.

    1. a proper insurgency?

    2. lesser paramilitary arm?

    3. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm?

    My experience has been confined to Kashmir, NE India and a bit of Mao stuff.
    Last edited by Ray; 05-03-2011 at 02:59 PM.

  15. #35
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    The actual fighters can be killed, but they will be replaced and new fighters will be more careful.

    The movement only ends if the political side of it falters. Fighters without a base (politically convinced supporters) disappear quickly or at least morph into a much easier to defeat opponent.
    A base without fighters simply generates (new) fighters.

    The strategically more relevant target is therefore the supporter base. This base has been simplified as "Pashtuns", "drug trade", "foreigners", "highwaymen", but its actual face depends obviously on local circumstances (drug business isn't strong everywhere).

    This supporter base is not a legitimate target for organised violence in our moral compass, so it's only going to be defeated by non-combat means.



    In my opinion, all the (para)military efforts in COIN don't do much more than to push the insurgent fighters into the shadows. The really decisive fight is political - unless you're ready to take the gloves off. The latter is self-defeating for us since we have certain expectations on our warfare that do not tolerate Hama solutions any more.


    Sometime in 2009 I argued for a COIN model that combined
    # few military mobile strike reserves
    # many cheap (para)military security forces
    # semi-covert political action groups

    The first two were tasked to keep the flame of war small, while the political action groups would turn the relevant people or solidify their support for the government cause (with a huge repertoire of actions, including dirty tricks, deportation and intrigue).


    This war should have been run by diplomats and indigenous politicians assisted by bodyguard teams, interpreters and such.

    Instead, it was run by the military which was and is not really suitable for the decisive domain of the war.

    The result is known; a stalemate.

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    Valid points.

    Fighters killed can be replaced. Yet, New fighters may not be careful since they maybe there for revenge killing of their kith and kin.

    The Movement will end if the political ideology/ side destroyed. True.

    However, if where the support base is i.e. KP where the terrorists have their sanctuaries that are only disturbed by Drones and nothing substantial happens, they will continue to proliferate, train, rest, refit and reorg, while their political heads rest and refit in luxurious environs like Abbotabad.

    Therefore, it become essential to attack relentlessly the bases, including with ground troops, and in this instant case, KP and FATA.

    Once the bases are destroyed and the area occupied, it will make it a buffer to where the ISAF is operating. Somewhat sanitised, at least better for somewhat unhindered operations.

    The terrorist Heads can well plot and scheme in their luxurious houses and it would not matter since they would have no influence in the ‘buffer zone’ as they would not be able to inject any of their own there.

    The support base is a legitimate target. If morality is to be debated, then infringing Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty with Drone attacks, CIA operatives masquerading as defence contractor and violating Pakistan’s airspace and injecting SEALs to kill a ‘guest i.e OBL is a huge moral question and totally contravening international law and niceties.

    The action against terrorists cannot be only a military operation, it has to have a political solution ongoing. However, unless the military aspect of terrorism is seen to be on the verge of defeat, no political solution can be hammered out.
    Last edited by Ray; 05-03-2011 at 06:24 PM.

  17. #37
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    You're too stuck in thinking about sanctuaries and kills.

    The supporting base are the villages where TB can move in, drink a tea and not get reported, but even be able to get some supplies and a bed for the night.
    It's not something you deal with with drones and Hellfires.

    The military reach is irrelevant. A whole infantry company can sweep that village and the next day the village wills till be part of the supportive base of TBs.
    It's political.


    And the support base is as much a legitimate target as it would have been legitimate if Germany had killed 30-80% of French civilians in '43 because of the Resistance.
    No, they are not a legitimate target for deadly violence. The maximum justifiable violence would be a forced deportation.

  18. #38
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    Fuchs:

    Physical sanctuaries are important. It is much easier to stay alive when there is someplace to run to where the people hunting you can't physically go. That seems self evident. The trigger pullers are important and they can stay alive longer if they have access to a physical sanctuary.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  19. #39
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Emphasis: Amagnetic needle in haystack.

    The sheer size of Afghanistan in area, population size and travel times means that there's not really a problem with hiding in plain sight. You need no physical or other 100% security. War claims souls anyway.


    The real security wall there is loyalty (or fear, everything is fine as long as it works).

  20. #40
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    Fuchs:

    I disagree. To carry your haystack analogy further, you can find the needle if you have access to the haystack and keep looking. If you are not allowed to access to the haystack it is impossible to find it. The needle can rest easier that way.

    Afghanistan is big but there are only so many places where humans can live. In a desert area there must be water close by and there may be only so many water holes. The hunters know where those are. You could live on a mountaintop but still there has to be water and fuel available. Probably most of the places where water, fuel, food and shelter are available have people near by. Those people may be with you, a valuable thing; but they may not, and if they are not they can rat you out and the hunters will come for you. In a physical sanctuary, no hunter can come for you.

    Political support is vital but so is a sanctuary.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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