Sir, quick question. On your map what does the red horizontal line demarcate? (or were you just underlining the text.Originally Posted by jmm99
Sir, quick question. On your map what does the red horizontal line demarcate? (or were you just underlining the text.
Hey Tukhi,
The red line is just an arbitrary horizontal line showing the width of the "Never Again" Region at that latitude. The "Never Again" Region encompasses the continental land masses of Eurasia and Africa.
An expanded version of B.L. Montgomery's Rule 1:
and Rule 2:Do not march on Moscow
Do not go fighting with your land armies in China
Or, viewed from a ship, US force projection should not go beyond the far littorals of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, absent an extremely compelling reason - which is the "but..." in the equation.
An old concept (e.g., Mahan and others of the "Guardian" school of thought). See A.T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911) (pdf free from Google Books).
Regards
Mike
More blogging on this subj:
It’s time to leave Afghanistan
http://jbsanctuary.wordpress.com/201...e-afghanistan/
Time to leave Afghanistan?
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2011/0....html#comments
Should we give up on Afghanistan?
http://thisainthell.us/blog/?p=22807
The comments on these blogs are an indicator that some of the most sympathetic and supportive members of the domestic target audience are disgusted and demoralized. Whoever does the SITREP Live from Afghanistan for the MILBLOG Conference will need to slip down to Dubai and spend a night in a Holiday Inn Express or La Quinta before they strategically communicate to that crowd.
1. They don't get to be demoralized, and someone should tell them as much. This isn't baseball and we're not talking about a pennant you can take another whack at next year.
2. JB contemplating the US quitting the field hinges on two very dubious notions: "that we've killed most of Al-Qaida," and that "[s]mall amounts of Special Operations Forces could have been left in strategic locations to periodically take out AQ as they popped up." I say dubious because there is no firm estimate of AQ's base strength, let alone that of its affiliates and all other individuals and groups willing to act independently in the same vein. Additionally, it seems ludicrous to suggest that special forces can range across a country the size of Texas and do a job that the entire Coalition commitment can't achieve in a territory half the size of New York.
It's one thing to be dissatisfied with the way things are going (though it helps if you at least show up with a better plan in hand). It's another thing to demand the Allies pack it up when an enemy bound and determined to get back on the offensive is still out there.
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
WHY don't they get to be demoralized?
Who do you think the "someone" is that should tell them they don't get to be demoralized? Not the same people who were supposed to be in charge of morale on the home front, I hope.
Think they'll meet with much success persuading-changing-influencing sceptics with your approach?
Go to Jb's blog and tell him how dubious he is.2. JB contemplating the US quitting the field hinges on two very dubious notions: "that we've killed most of Al-Qaida," and that "[s]mall amounts of Special Operations Forces could have been left in strategic locations to periodically take out AQ as they popped up."
Because they have an audience speak with no small amount of authority.
So whenever somebody fails to do their job, feel free to use your megaphone to wonder aloud if America should call it quits?Who do you think the "someone" is that should tell them they don't get to be demoralized? Not the same people who were supposed to be in charge of morale on the home front, I hope.
I think that conceding the debate to the other side is a very...um...novel way of persuading them to your point of view.Think they'll meet with much success persuading-changing-influencing sceptics with your approach?
Come on. You know I said no such thing.Go to Jb's blog and tell him how dubious he is.
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
"Because they have an audience speak with no small amount of authority" is not a reason why commenters on blogs don't get to be demoralized that makes any sense.
I say again, who do you think the "someone" is that should tell them they don't get to be demoralized? Looking for names or titles here, not another question. Admitting that you do not know is an acceptable response.
JB contemplating the US quitting the field hinges on two very dubious notions
The red line is just an arbitrary horizontal line showing the width of the "Never Again" Region at that latitude. The "Never Again" Region encompasses the continental land masses of Eurasia and Africa.
An expanded version of B.L. Montgomery's Rule 1:
and Rule 2:
Or, viewed from a ship, US force projection should not go beyond the far littorals of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, absent an extremely compelling reason - which is the "but..." in the equation.
An old concept (e.g., Mahan and others of the "Guardian" school of thought). See A.T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911) (pdf free from Google Books).
Regards
Mike
Ahhhh yes, Mahan. Interesting chap that. You will forgive me if I say that I (much) prefer Sir Julian Corbett (not just because I'm Britishbut also because of the lectures of this man). Which see, for instance, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
Do I detect a touch of the Monroe Doctrine in your spatial representation/policy preference? Does that mean the the US does not rule out land operations in Latin/South America? The Bay of Pigs didn't turn out too well IIRC and nor did the whole business with the Contra allthough you had a creditable showing in Panama and Haiti, in recent years (quite apart from Asian landwars).
If so...das is sehr gut! I myself am all in favour of the establishment of Grossraume (a la the late great, and much maligned, Carl Schmitt).
Still, thanks for the banter,
Cheers,
T
Hey T - have banter, will travel ....
. Quite seriously, the banter does contain some nuggets that apply here - as from your Julian Stafford Corbett, Some principles of maritime strategy (1911; the same year as Mahan, but more overtly CvC and fairly arguably more modern) - from p.326-328 (emphasis added):
Quite a decent summary of how to frame the boundaries of the problems presented and their solutions (as in Astan and Pstan).Notes on Strategy
PART ONE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS
INTRODUCTORY
Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.
The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.
War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.
MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY
We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.
Primary objects are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign.
Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.
Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds — Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.
Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.
Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes:
(1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior [pg 327] object;
(2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.
Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war.
But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem.
It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versâ. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versâ. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only.
Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.
Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with—
(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.
(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.
Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—
(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.
(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.
(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.
[pg 328]
It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.
As to this:
A number of questions and probably a digression from this particular thread - Maybe a later PM on them to see whether I can summarize my views in a semi-coherent manner.from T
Do I detect a touch of the Monroe Doctrine in your spatial representation/policy preference? Does that mean the the US does not rule out land operations in Latin/South America? The Bay of Pigs didn't turn out too well IIRC and nor did the whole business with the Contra allthough you had a creditable showing in Panama and Haiti, in recent years (quite apart from Asian landwars).
If so...das is sehr gut! I myself am all in favour of the establishment of Grossraume (a la the late great, and much maligned, Carl Schmitt).
Regards
Mike
We Leave, al Qaeda Returns: Time to Nuke Afghanistan?
http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/207206.php
The Counter Insurgent-Supportive Blogosphere is begging for some credible, confidence-inspiring Strategic Communication from somebody.
For an insurgency to sustain itself, there has to be mass support, adequate finances, free supply of arms and ammunition, safe havens to recruit, train, refit and reorg and external support.
Have these been addressed in Afghanistan?
First and foremost, one has to eliminate the safe havens where recruiting, refitting, reorganising can is being done.
Currently, all insurgents/ terrorists etc are with impunity recruit, refit, train, reorg and then launch forays against the ISAF.
Drone attacks cannot address the issue in it totality, more so since the CIA and others have been given the marching orders.
Last edited by Ray; 04-12-2011 at 03:12 PM.
You focus too much on the lesser paramilitary arm of a proper insurgency. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm and you need completely different view on this civilian political supporters base.
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