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Thread: Is It Time to Get Out of Afghanistan?

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  1. #1
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    For an insurgency to sustain itself, there has to be mass support, adequate finances, free supply of arms and ammunition, safe havens to recruit, train, refit and reorg and external support.

    Have these been addressed in Afghanistan?

    First and foremost, one has to eliminate the safe havens where recruiting, refitting, reorganising can is being done.

    Currently, all insurgents/ terrorists etc are with impunity recruit, refit, train, reorg and then launch forays against the ISAF.

    Drone attacks cannot address the issue in it totality, more so since the CIA and others have been given the marching orders.
    Last edited by Ray; 04-12-2011 at 03:12 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ray View Post
    For an insurgency to sustain itself, there has to be mass support, adequate finances, free supply of arms and ammunition, safe havens to recruit, train, refit and reorg and external support.

    Have these been addressed in Afghanistan?

    First and foremost, one has to eliminate the safe havens where recruiting, refitting, reorganising can is being done.

    Currently, all insurgents/ terrorists etc are with impunity recruit, refit, train, reorg and then launch forays against the ISAF.

    Drone attacks cannot address the issue in it totality, more so since the CIA and others have been given the marching orders.

    You focus too much on the lesser paramilitary arm of a proper insurgency. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm and you need completely different view on this civilian political supporters base.

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    Fuchs is correct in that statement however in the case of AFG, they probably all reside in the same (relatively) untouched sanctuary...in the unlikely event that were to be neutralised, the insurgency per se in AFG would wither away into inter-tribal feuding...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    You focus too much on the lesser paramilitary arm of a proper insurgency. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm and you need completely different view on this civilian political supporters base.
    I have not understood as to exactly what your are trying to convey.

    1. a proper insurgency?

    2. lesser paramilitary arm?

    3. The much more relevant political base and supporters are more decisive because they replenish the losses of the paramilitary arm?

    My experience has been confined to Kashmir, NE India and a bit of Mao stuff.
    Last edited by Ray; 05-03-2011 at 02:59 PM.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    The actual fighters can be killed, but they will be replaced and new fighters will be more careful.

    The movement only ends if the political side of it falters. Fighters without a base (politically convinced supporters) disappear quickly or at least morph into a much easier to defeat opponent.
    A base without fighters simply generates (new) fighters.

    The strategically more relevant target is therefore the supporter base. This base has been simplified as "Pashtuns", "drug trade", "foreigners", "highwaymen", but its actual face depends obviously on local circumstances (drug business isn't strong everywhere).

    This supporter base is not a legitimate target for organised violence in our moral compass, so it's only going to be defeated by non-combat means.



    In my opinion, all the (para)military efforts in COIN don't do much more than to push the insurgent fighters into the shadows. The really decisive fight is political - unless you're ready to take the gloves off. The latter is self-defeating for us since we have certain expectations on our warfare that do not tolerate Hama solutions any more.


    Sometime in 2009 I argued for a COIN model that combined
    # few military mobile strike reserves
    # many cheap (para)military security forces
    # semi-covert political action groups

    The first two were tasked to keep the flame of war small, while the political action groups would turn the relevant people or solidify their support for the government cause (with a huge repertoire of actions, including dirty tricks, deportation and intrigue).


    This war should have been run by diplomats and indigenous politicians assisted by bodyguard teams, interpreters and such.

    Instead, it was run by the military which was and is not really suitable for the decisive domain of the war.

    The result is known; a stalemate.

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    Valid points.

    Fighters killed can be replaced. Yet, New fighters may not be careful since they maybe there for revenge killing of their kith and kin.

    The Movement will end if the political ideology/ side destroyed. True.

    However, if where the support base is i.e. KP where the terrorists have their sanctuaries that are only disturbed by Drones and nothing substantial happens, they will continue to proliferate, train, rest, refit and reorg, while their political heads rest and refit in luxurious environs like Abbotabad.

    Therefore, it become essential to attack relentlessly the bases, including with ground troops, and in this instant case, KP and FATA.

    Once the bases are destroyed and the area occupied, it will make it a buffer to where the ISAF is operating. Somewhat sanitised, at least better for somewhat unhindered operations.

    The terrorist Heads can well plot and scheme in their luxurious houses and it would not matter since they would have no influence in the ‘buffer zone’ as they would not be able to inject any of their own there.

    The support base is a legitimate target. If morality is to be debated, then infringing Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty with Drone attacks, CIA operatives masquerading as defence contractor and violating Pakistan’s airspace and injecting SEALs to kill a ‘guest i.e OBL is a huge moral question and totally contravening international law and niceties.

    The action against terrorists cannot be only a military operation, it has to have a political solution ongoing. However, unless the military aspect of terrorism is seen to be on the verge of defeat, no political solution can be hammered out.
    Last edited by Ray; 05-03-2011 at 06:24 PM.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    You're too stuck in thinking about sanctuaries and kills.

    The supporting base are the villages where TB can move in, drink a tea and not get reported, but even be able to get some supplies and a bed for the night.
    It's not something you deal with with drones and Hellfires.

    The military reach is irrelevant. A whole infantry company can sweep that village and the next day the village wills till be part of the supportive base of TBs.
    It's political.


    And the support base is as much a legitimate target as it would have been legitimate if Germany had killed 30-80% of French civilians in '43 because of the Resistance.
    No, they are not a legitimate target for deadly violence. The maximum justifiable violence would be a forced deportation.

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    Fuchs:

    Physical sanctuaries are important. It is much easier to stay alive when there is someplace to run to where the people hunting you can't physically go. That seems self evident. The trigger pullers are important and they can stay alive longer if they have access to a physical sanctuary.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    You're too stuck in thinking about sanctuaries and kills.

    The supporting base are the villages where TB can move in, drink a tea and not get reported, but even be able to get some supplies and a bed for the night.
    It's not something you deal with with drones and Hellfires.

    The military reach is irrelevant. A whole infantry company can sweep that village and the next day the village wills till be part of the supportive base of TBs.
    It's political.


    And the support base is as much a legitimate target as it would have been legitimate if Germany had killed 30-80% of French civilians in '43 because of the Resistance.
    No, they are not a legitimate target for deadly violence. The maximum justifiable violence would be a forced deportation.
    Indeed I am too stuck in the groove of sanctuaries and kill.

    That I found was the crux to the issue, having also been on the high level parleys at the political level too, as also being on the ground level. Too much of theory at the political and totally devoid of the reality. Good chaps and wonderful thoughts but no way to get results.

    I am not suggesting the Sri Lankan mode. It is inhuman. What I am suggesting is a cognizable military success on which the a political solution can be constructed.

    I would be immensely surprised to find people beyond law and reason like the terrorists coming to the negotiation table when they are riding the crest of success. Don't take my word for it, you should have asked Mao when he was alive or you still have the chance, ask Castro!

    If you have read my post carefully, you would find you are echoing my thoughts that The supporting base are the villages where TB can move in, drink a tea and not get reported, but even be able to get some supplies and a bed for the night.

    It's not something you deal with with drones and Hellfires.


    But where I disagree is your contention - The military reach is irrelevant. A whole infantry company can sweep that village and the next day the village wills till be part of the supportive base of TBs.
    It's political.


    Sanitising an area and even a whole province and having it registered as a failure of the terrorist is a MUST to bring the Taliban to the table for talks. A victorious lot does not come to the negotiation table.

    Since you bring in if Germany had killed 30-80% of French civilians in '43 because of the Resistance may I remind you of The Treaty of Versailles? It should ring a bell, where even an unjust Treaty was meekly endorsed by the vanquished.

    May I also remind you that Chamberlain, the British PM, with all his goodness, failed politically to bring Hitler to the negotiating table and Winston Churchill, the horrible man, made mincemeat of Hitler through wily political alliances and sheer brute force?

    Politics without worthwhile military action is chasing the will o' the wisp!

    The attack on Abbotabad has removed OBL which no political parley would achieve.

    Who knows that is a starter towards the negotiating table. If not, some more would see the light of day till it works out.

    I am not a Clancey fan. If only I had his trait of story telling, I would have been a millionaire since I have 'been there and done that' and each activity is a thrilling story by itself!
    Last edited by Ray; 05-04-2011 at 08:50 AM.

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