Is It Time to Get Out of Afghanistan?

[Cannoneer No. 4]

What's changed?

The regime in America.

[jmm99]

30 Aug 2009 - AQ means ...

"The Base" - and as such, is supporting to efforts by other groups on a global basis to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on its analysis of each group and its plans. It also was (and probably still is, to a lesser extent) capable of its own direct action operations.

By analogy, AQ can be viewed as waging unconventional warfare in the classic sense of our FMs. A SFOB hinges on its personnel and functions, not on its location (or locations, which can be multiple - though obviously network-linked). So also AQ. That is COL Robert Jones' concept, which makes sense to me.

As to the 2001 invasion of Astan, two reasons were (1) retribution and reprobation; and (2) specific deterrence[*]. Both reasons would have been satisfied by a complete destruction of the AQ leadership in Astan as we then knew it. That goal was not realized (Tora Bora et al).

The direct action effort against the AQ leadership still persists (separate US command); but has been submerged by the much larger efforts of UN-NATO ("nation-building" and peace enforcement in favor of the Karzai government) and the US FID-SA effort with major combat support (as noted by Bill Moore).

Since AQ (as a "base" of personnel and functions) is a moving target, the linkage between the effort against it, and the much larger Astan efforts, is not very clear to me. I expect I shall be enlightened.

The Taliban, very intentionally on their part, simply got in the way of our direct action efforts against AQ.

-----------------
[*] Specific deterrence deters the individual wrongdoer (you execute the serial killer). That may have no general deterrence effect on serial killers to be.

30 Aug 2009 - Two kinds of deterrence

We've done a decent job on specific deterrence of AQ on three fronts: (1) intelligence + direct action (military); (2) intelligence + detention (law enforcement); and (3) disruption of network nodes, especially financing support (intelligence + counterintelligence).

As to general deterrence, not a real clue because I see no real plan to do that. By analogy, we need something akin to the European socialists who were anti-communist, but scarcely supportive of USG announced policies. I suppose support of certain Muslim governments (which ones ?) would be the answer. I also expect the tradeoff would be a much lesser role for the US in the Muslim world. That seems to be where Kilcullen is heading at the end of his book (Accidental Guerrilla).

As Ken noted, we are just getting into this - e.g., changes in Cold War strategy over decades.

Anyway, this is really a question for the younger generations.

So, what are your solutions to gain specific and general deterrence re: AQ ?

25 Jul 2010 - Well, one can question ....

whether a "COIN" strategy ever existed in Astan; and whatever the "Plan", the political side of the ledger was feeble at best ("lipstick on a pig" and the the rest of the cliches).

That didn't bother me cuz my rationale for being in Astan in the first place (and I never saw a reason to change the rationale) was to mount direct action operations against the AQ leadership cadres in Astan and Pstan (more a matter of "rental" operations), based on principles of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.

Other folks at much higher pay grades than mine, had different ideas.

Anyway, agreed: alia jacta est - and we are now in the period of Afghanization and exit strategy(ies).

The foregoing rationale (to me) constituted an overriding "but", even though Astan is in the middle of my personal "Never Again, but..." region - which looks like this:

World Map US Limits.jpg

However, that "but" only goes so far - especially when state building (or nation building) - which doesn't start to meet my "but" test, gets in the way of the direct objective for which we (US) started in 2001 Astan.

Frankly, if we would have a better chance of killing our tall brother and his shorter comrade, by letting Astan revert to its pre-2001 condition (and by using better targeting methods than used in the Clinton era), I'd say let that happen.

Both OEF and OIF had a certain initial cleanliness and clarity (the run up to Tora Bora and the run up to Baghdad) - and I count those among the most beautiful military efforts I've seen in my cognitive lifetime.

So, my question to those who have been or are there (such as 120mm, who must have much of the time in for Astan citizenship ) is this:

Is what we are doing now substantially advancing the direct objective I've outlined above ?

If not, then we should revise the "Plan"; and if that requires a tactical withdrawal, so be it. If it requires other affirmative actions in Astan or Pstan, so be those.

Regards

Mike

[bumperplate]

I realize I am not as informed as many but I'm growing ever so tired of these redundant comments: It's time to get out of Afghanistan.

Whether ill- or well-intentioned, these comments read in my mind as: Let's give in to the sand in our panties and just quit.

Can we Americans just decide to finish and win, for once?

I'm done with reading the naysayers, the depressed, the doom & gloom projectors and the apathy-ridden slugs that seem to think that no one currently in that theater or anyone preparing to go should be focused, positive, or feeling any sense of purpose.

I believe one of the above comments hit precisely on the desired end state: to have a govt in place that can do the fighting and run the country without being or becoming a safe haven for those that will do us harm. Until that or a similar end state is achieved, perhaps the negative nancys can just find a local Starbucks to complain about.

[jcustis]

Can we Americans just decide to finish and win, for once?

The drama to Afghanistan tends to be the fact that we've already "won" with regard to many of our initial goals, but yet the definition of a "win", and what it means to us as a populace, depends on where you sit. One side doesn't believe we've finished the job, because the Taliban oppose us and the guy we propped up to be Number 1. If they come to power, then Al Qaeda is going to rush back in. The other side believes that Al Qaeda will never have the same foothold it did before November 2001, in Afghanistan, and that we need to stop wringing our hands over the possibility that the Taliban may come to the fore and run a crippled state.

Erecting a wobbly government that cannot support itself without significant aid injections, and at the cost of a significant amount of our national treasure in lives and money, may make it a Pyhrric victory that we cannot afford.

Again, it all depends on where you sit. "Wins" are not black and white anymore.

[Presley Cannady]

The drama to Afghanistan tends to be the fact that we've already "won" with regard to many of our initial goals, but yet the definition of a "win", and what it means to us as a populace, depends on where you sit.

No, it really doesn't. Either 1) the enemy has been destroyed, forced to capitulate, or emasculated such that he no longer poses a threat to Americans and their interests on American soil or abroad (victory), or 2) he hasn't (not victory). However amazingly executed initial operations were, until 1) happens, there is no reasonable way the Coalition can call it a win.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

the desired end state: to have a govt in place that can do the fighting and run the country without being or becoming a safe haven for those that will do us harm.

Five months shy of a decade and we still aren't there. If you include opium growers, heroin smugglers and their protectors among those that will do us harm, we're a very long way from achieving success as you've defined it.

[Presley Cannady]

Five months shy of a decade and we still aren't there. If you include opium growers, heroin smugglers and their protectors among those that will do us harm, we're a very long way from achieving success as you've defined it.

What are the alternatives? The West will not countenance waging war in ways that might considerably expedite pacifying the Afghan population. The enemy enters and exits Afghanistan with impunity, and the Coalition cannot hope to field enough strength to deny him access to the border or points of departure and entry in neighboring countries. Your choices are:

1. hand him back the base he used to strike at Americans ten years ago, or
2. to stand up whatever institution it takes to keep him out once and for all.

Am I missing anything?

[Cannoneer No. 4]

You are missing the Strategic Communications campaign that somebody must competently wage to convince the American voter to pay for standing up whatever institution it takes to keep the enemy out once and for all.

[Bob's World]

"Win" and "Lose" are terms that are necessary for warfare. To attempt to play a war to a tie or a mutually beneficial solution is a fast way to end up in the "lose" column.

But this is insurgency, which, doctrine be damned, is not war at all. It is a country dangerously out of balance with itself, where the populace feels compelled to adopt illegal, and often very violent, means to seek to force the government to a sustainable balance point. Far too often the government (that is often quite happy with the current imbalance of power opportunity) response is one of warfare against the populace. The presence of warfare does not make a situation war. (This is an equally important policy point for US leaders, just because they have put US forces into combat around the globe of late does not mean that we are a nation at war either.)

So, is it a "win" if the US achieves what we think we need in Afghanistan (recognizing that what we think is at least a little wrong, and is quite possibly very wrong in terms of what actually best serves our interests)?

Is a "win" establishing GIRoA control over the entire nation through an incredibly expensive program of violence and bribery against the populace, held in place through a massive foreign trained and funded national security force?

Or is a "win" finding a new balance point that allows all Afghans to have equitable opportunity in the political and economic environment of their own nation? Does a satisfied populace under a system not controlled by the US better serve US interests than a suppressed populace under a system of our own design? In the modern age the answer is increasingly the former rather than the latter. We will learn that, but we have not learned that quite yet.

We should have learned that in Vietnam, but we took away the wrong lessons learned. We should have learned that in Iraq, but again, we took away the wrong lessons learned. Now we apply those flawed lessons learned to the latest problem.

A win for the US will be if the PEOPLE of Afghanistan win. Karzai and Omar will both need to compromise for that to occur. So will the Coalition. This is why the reconciliation process is so important. It cannot be the sham that follows a military defeat, it must be the reality that makes further military action unnecessary.

[Presley Cannady]

You are missing the Strategic Communications campaign that somebody must competently wage to convince the American voter to pay for standing up whatever institution it takes to keep the enemy out once and for all.

Happens every year on September 11.

[Tukhachevskii]

"Never again...but"

Sir, quick question. On your map what does the red horizontal line demarcate? (or were you just underlining the text.

[jmm99]

The red line is just an arbitrary horizontal line showing the width of the "Never Again" Region at that latitude. The "Never Again" Region encompasses the continental land masses of Eurasia and Africa.

An expanded version of B.L. Montgomery's Rule 1:

Do not march on Moscow

and Rule 2:

Do not go fighting with your land armies in China

Or, viewed from a ship, US force projection should not go beyond the far littorals of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, absent an extremely compelling reason - which is the "but..." in the equation.

An old concept (e.g., Mahan and others of the "Guardian" school of thought). See A.T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911) (pdf free from Google Books).

Regards

Mike

[Cannoneer No. 4]

It’s time to leave Afghanistan
http://jbsanctuary.wordpress.com/201...e-afghanistan/

Time to leave Afghanistan?
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2011/0....html#comments

Should we give up on Afghanistan?
http://thisainthell.us/blog/?p=22807

The comments on these blogs are an indicator that some of the most sympathetic and supportive members of the domestic target audience are disgusted and demoralized. Whoever does the SITREP Live from Afghanistan for the MILBLOG Conference will need to slip down to Dubai and spend a night in a Holiday Inn Express or La Quinta before they strategically communicate to that crowd.

[Presley Cannady]

The comments on these blogs are an indicator that some of the most sympathetic and supportive members of the domestic target audience are disgusted and demoralized.

1. They don't get to be demoralized, and someone should tell them as much. This isn't baseball and we're not talking about a pennant you can take another whack at next year.

2. JB contemplating the US quitting the field hinges on two very dubious notions: "that we've killed most of Al-Qaida," and that "[s]mall amounts of Special Operations Forces could have been left in strategic locations to periodically take out AQ as they popped up." I say dubious because there is no firm estimate of AQ's base strength, let alone that of its affiliates and all other individuals and groups willing to act independently in the same vein. Additionally, it seems ludicrous to suggest that special forces can range across a country the size of Texas and do a job that the entire Coalition commitment can't achieve in a territory half the size of New York.

It's one thing to be dissatisfied with the way things are going (though it helps if you at least show up with a better plan in hand). It's another thing to demand the Allies pack it up when an enemy bound and determined to get back on the offensive is still out there.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

1. They don't get to be demoralized, and someone should tell them as much. This isn't baseball and we're not talking about a pennant you can take another whack at next year.

WHY don't they get to be demoralized?

Who do you think the "someone" is that should tell them they don't get to be demoralized? Not the same people who were supposed to be in charge of morale on the home front, I hope.

Think they'll meet with much success persuading-changing-influencing sceptics with your approach?

2. JB contemplating the US quitting the field hinges on two very dubious notions: "that we've killed most of Al-Qaida," and that "[s]mall amounts of Special Operations Forces could have been left in strategic locations to periodically take out AQ as they popped up."

Go to Jb's blog and tell him how dubious he is.

[Tukhachevskii]

The red line is just an arbitrary horizontal line showing the width of the "Never Again" Region at that latitude. The "Never Again" Region encompasses the continental land masses of Eurasia and Africa.

An expanded version of B.L. Montgomery's Rule 1:



and Rule 2:





Or, viewed from a ship, US force projection should not go beyond the far littorals of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, absent an extremely compelling reason - which is the "but..." in the equation.

An old concept (e.g., Mahan and others of the "Guardian" school of thought). See A.T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911) (pdf free from Google Books).

Regards

Mike

Ahhhh yes, Mahan. Interesting chap that. You will forgive me if I say that I (much) prefer Sir Julian Corbett (not just because I'm British but also because of the lectures of this man). Which see, for instance, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

Do I detect a touch of the Monroe Doctrine in your spatial representation/policy preference? Does that mean the the US does not rule out land operations in Latin/South America? The Bay of Pigs didn't turn out too well IIRC and nor did the whole business with the Contra allthough you had a creditable showing in Panama and Haiti, in recent years (quite apart from Asian landwars).

If so...das is sehr gut! I myself am all in favour of the establishment of Grossraume (a la the late great, and much maligned, Carl Schmitt).

Still, thanks for the banter,

Cheers,

T

[jmm99]

. Quite seriously, the banter does contain some nuggets that apply here - as from your Julian Stafford Corbett, Some principles of maritime strategy (1911; the same year as Mahan, but more overtly CvC and fairly arguably more modern) - from p.326-328 (emphasis added):

Notes on Strategy

PART ONE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

INTRODUCTORY

Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.

The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.

War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.

MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.

Primary objects are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign.

Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds — Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.

Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.

Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes:

(1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior [pg 327] object;

(2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.

Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war.

But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem.

It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versâ. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versâ. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only.

Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with—

(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.

(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.

Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—

(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.

(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.

(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.

[pg 328]

It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.

Quite a decent summary of how to frame the boundaries of the problems presented and their solutions (as in Astan and Pstan).

As to this:

from T

Do I detect a touch of the Monroe Doctrine in your spatial representation/policy preference? Does that mean the the US does not rule out land operations in Latin/South America? The Bay of Pigs didn't turn out too well IIRC and nor did the whole business with the Contra allthough you had a creditable showing in Panama and Haiti, in recent years (quite apart from Asian landwars).

If so...das is sehr gut! I myself am all in favour of the establishment of Grossraume (a la the late great, and much maligned, Carl Schmitt).

A number of questions and probably a digression from this particular thread - Maybe a later PM on them to see whether I can summarize my views in a semi-coherent manner.

Regards

Mike

[Cannoneer No. 4]

http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/207206.php

The Counter Insurgent-Supportive Blogosphere is begging for some credible, confidence-inspiring Strategic Communication from somebody.