Is It Time to Get Out of Afghanistan?

[Ray]

contd from above.

A long post requires a long answer in deference to the effort put in and for the kindness of the poster to have replied my post with views that requires acknowledgement!

Sounds a load of bollocks, really. How would withdrawal from Afghanistan cause "loss of trade with the world"? You think the world would cease to sell the US stuff - you are presumably aware of the US trade deficit with the world - because the US leaves Afghanistan? Not much sense there.

Bollocks or gonads, the truth is if the US after much Tarzan like chest thumping and Kreegahs and Bandolos, in the final analysis turns out, after all that drama, to be a quitter. It is hardly the impression that encourages confidence. The world loves a winner!

It is not only Afghanistan that gives the impression in our parts. Iraq, Vietnam and the manner China is running circles around the US adds to the despondency here. However, the Obama visit to Asia Pacific and the strategic vision to contain China’s hegemony gives hope.

Why was the US the indisputable leader of the world? Because they had the economic and military might and could fulfil every action that they deemed necessary in these fields. But today?

On trade, will the others like US capital or trade agreements coming their way and be confident that they will not be left high and dry, for some reason or the other?

Whatever, it is disturbing times for well-wishers of the US.

I can't see any benefit accruing to China or Russia from a US withdrawal from Afghanistan... in fact I doubt that it would change much of anything.

The link in the last post (my) says it all.

Sun Tsu says:

1. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
2. Water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. (i.e. into a void)

There was nothing philanthropic at all about the US entry into Afghanistan. We went there to take revenge, kick AQ ass, and prevent AQ from taking further action against us. That was the strategic goal, and it made sense. Then mission creep set in, and we made a mess. We're good at that; we've lot's of practice.

Revenge as a human sentiment is understandable, its difficult to believe that ‘revenge’ is an input for strategy.

Surely you note that from the Soviet withdrawal to the point where AQ settled and created a bother, the US paid no attention whatsoever to Afghanistan. If all of these interests you propose are real, why would that have been the case?

US paid no attention because the USSR was on the course to collapse in its entire ramification as events proved.

Friedrich Nietzsche had said, “Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”

USSR had decomposed and was dead. The US hit the last nail in the coffin. Having done it, the US turned to where the priority lay – East Europe. Having achieved some success, the US turned to other frontiers like Afghanistan and Iraq. Rome was not built in a day!

The importance of oil is undisputed. Since Afghanistan has no oil and is not a significant conduit for oil, it is also irrelevant to this discussion.

Strategy is not a one point agenda.

If it were so, then I am surprised!

Oil and the market require conduits.

I'm not sure who's meant to be "us" or "them" in this picture, but since our presence in Afghanistan isn't keeping anyone with "us" and it certainly getting us any oil or natural resources, I don't see how these assertions are relevant to the matter under discussion.

‘Us’ is what Bush said was ‘Us’ and ‘them’ is the world that requires the US.

Once when the oil rolls through Afghanistan one will realise the relevance to the US economy and employment figures! Till that time escapism about core reasons can rule the roost.

The issue should be relevant since strategy, once again, is not a one point agenda.

[Dayuhan]

Once when the oil rolls through Afghanistan one will realise the relevance to the US economy and employment figures! Till that time escapism about core reasons can rule the roost.

Oil rolling through Afghanistan? In whose dreams?

Again, the source of the misconception - and it is a very widely held misconception - is a failure to understand the very limited scale of the Afghan pipeline proposal.

To put it bluntly, TAPI's influence on the US economy or US employment would be close to nil. If it were to be built by Unocal, as originally proposed, their stock might have bumped a few points and they might have had a few more domestic hires (you can bet most of the work would be subcontracted). I don't know that any US company is interested at present.

TAPI is designed to carry natural gas, not oil. Specifically, it's meant to carry 27 bcm/year of natural gas. 2 bcm/year would go to Afghanistan, 12.5 to Pakistan, 12.5 to India. The line might eventually be expanded to 33 bcm/year.

There has never been any suggestion that TAPI output would be reexported to China, the US, or the west. Given that Pakistan and India are gas importers and TAPI would not even come close to meeting their needs, there would be little to no sense in them building export terminals and buying or hiring LPG tankers to export gas they need for themselves.

I don't know of any active proposal to pipe oil through Afghanistan. Unocal floated the idea in the late 90s but it never even got to a serious planning stage. Even if the idea were revived the logical market would be Pakistan and India, which would not require tanker transit on top of the pipeline transit.

Compare those capacity figures with gas consumption in Pakistan and India, and you quickly see that those states will consume the output, none will go on to China and the West. To some extent that will relieve demand on ME supply, but there's a bit of a gas glut at the moment anyway and impact on the US would really be pretty negligible.

From the supply side, look at the total proposed capacity of TAPI and compare to the total output of Caspian producers. You see right away that TAPI will not displace the Russian and Chinese grids and is not meant to: it's just one among many conduits, and by no means the largest or most significant.

Look at the full list of pipeline projects aimed at getting Caspian oil and gas to market, many of them with greater capacity than TAPI and in a much more advanced stage of construction. That provides perspective: TAPI would be one small part of the Caspian export picture. Not a game-changer or a strategic revolution, far from it.

Looking at the pipelines currently existing, under construction, and planned, it's pretty clear that the Caspian states are diversifying. Their primary routes are to China, through Russia to Europe, and through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to Europe. All of those are existing routes with oil and gas now flowing and substantial upgrades in progress and planned. If TAPI is ever built it would supplement that system but it would not in any way replace it. No revolution or power shift in the picture.

The impact of TAPI is hugely overrated by those looking for an "all about oil" explanation for Afghanistan. It's just not that big or important. It would provide some steady revenue to Afghanistan... not a lot but in Afghanistan anything is a lot. It would provide some gas supply to India and Pakistan. It would provide an additional export outlet for some of Turkmenistan's gas. As such it's a potentially viable project if security improves, but it would have zero impact on the US or China and it would not mark anything remotely resembling a strategic shift.

The US would not control the output under any proposed scenario, and there is nothing in the project to suggest "control" of Caspian oil and gas supplies.

It's just not that big a deal, nowhere nearly big enough for anyone to consider going to war over. Even the most casual assessment of costs and benefits would show that to be utterly pointless.

[Ray]

TAPI, the Asian Market and Oil’s Role in Strategy

Oil to be a commodity that engines economy requires the Market. Pipelines are the cheapest way to ferry oil.

India imports 60 % and China 40% of its oil requirement and it is growing. The Asia Pacific region’s dynamic oil market is marked by strong growth in consumption, declining regional oil production, and over capacity in its highly competitive oil-refining sector. Its “key players” are China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea—a group that includes the region’s five top consumers.

Importantly, in contrast to other areas of the world where the consumption of fuel oil—which is used primarily for power generation and in industry and shipping—is in decline, in Asia it will continue and with enormous populations and a robust economic outlook the potential for growth is huge.

Asia is the Middle East’s largest customer, accounting for over 60 percent of the crude exported from the region.

Therefore, the happening oil market is Asia.

Kairledy Kabyldin, head of the Kazakhstan’s national pipeline company opined, Iran was the shortest and cheapest route for oil the Asian market (from CAR).

Given the fact that the Iran is an anathema for the US, the alternate route that would be shortest and cheapest was TAPI.

That China is a competitor of the US requires no elaboration. Thus, if the pace of Chinese growth can be controlled, it will be to the advantage of the US.

Another issue that is of concern to the US is that China and India are ‘locking up’ oil resources by purchasing fields and acquiring equity oil, signing contracts on exclusive extraction or import rights, and other means of ‘taking oil off the world market’.

Therefore, the corollary is that any country that has ‘influence’, if not ‘control’ of the sources of oil and gas, will have a control over those who in dire need of it and hence, to an extent dictate terms with regards to world’s economy.

It would, thus, not be wrong to assume that oil pays a role in strategy, if not as a weapon.

US and Oil as a Strategic Weapon and War

That oil is an important strategic asset and for which wars can be fought is not a new policy of the US. It also applies to Afghanistan.

1. The ‘Carter Doctrine’ in 1980 made it clear wherein it stated that oil is vital to economic well being both for individual nations as also for the international economic system and it maybe seen to justify the use of force in assuring its availability.

2. That apart, Cheney, who understood the geopolitical importance of oil had observed, “Oil companies are expected to keep developing enough oil to offset oil depletion and also to meet new demand. So, where is the oil to come from?.....The Middle East with two thirds of the world’s oil and lowest costs is still where the prize ultimately lies.”

3. As early as May 2003, the then Deputy Defence Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz when asked why Bush attacked Iraq and not North Korea, stated that Iraq ‘floats on a sea of oil’!

4. Bush’s first Treasury Secretary indicated the obsession with oil by stating that even before inauguration the advisors were planning how to divvy up Iraq’s oil wealth.

5. That oil is a strategic asset is also proved by the fact that Robert Gates has made it clear to the Iraqis that once the US withdraws from Iraq, the US would maintain large bases euphemistically called ‘enduring bases’. Same is the case for Afghanistan.

6. US Ambassador Thomas Pickering, co-chair of the Afghan Study Group, on CBS’ ‘As it Happens’ (Jan 30, 2008) said, “ Afghanistan is of strategic importance, a failed state in the middle of a delicate and sensitive region that borders on a number of producers of critical energy.”

Therefore, it may not be wrong to believe ‘it is all about oil’.

TAPI

TAPI is not to replace all the oil pipe lines and that is obvious. It is to ferry oil to Gwadar for the Asian market, which is large, growing and the happening market.

The other pipelines off the Caspian will feed Europe (avoiding Russia) through Georgia and Ceyhan. Caspian and Russian oil has been connected to Xinjiang (China).

Instability in the Middle East poses a serious security issue for India, China as also for Japan and other Asian countries since there is no guarantee of a stable supply. Hence, diversification of the source of supply is prudent. The security of sealanes is also a serious concern.

The International Energy Agency estimates that by 2015 China will account for 42% of the global demand.

Chinese policy makers have three major worries:

1. Sudden disruptions in provision of oil to the global market could trigger serious energy shortages and sharp price spikes would have serious adverse effect on the Chinese economy.

2. China might be affected by disruption in tanker flows from unstable exporting regions such as Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Africa.

3. Japan and the USA might attempt to deny China vital oil supplies in the event of a confrontation, particularly over Taiwan, due to US strategic domination in the Persian Gulf and other key oil exporting regions, US naval control of critical transportation routes, and its cooperation with the Japanese Navy and emerging naval ties with the Indian Navy.

If China will account for 42% of the global demand, it is obvious that it will not be met solely by the Caspian – China pipeline. Also, owing to the instability of the oil producing region, China has to diversify it sources of oil and also its routes to China from the oil sources. Further, the more the routes, the quicker will be the aggregate flow of oil to China.

Thus, TAPI and Gwadar play a role for China and oil.

The Gwadar Port project has been under study since May 2001. Having no blue water navy to speak of, China feels defenceless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies. This vulnerability set Beijing scrambling for alternative safe supply routes for its energy shipments. The planned Gwadar Deep Sea Port was one such alternative for which China had flown its Vice Premier, Wu Bangguo, to Gwadar to lay its foundation on March 22, 2002.

Gwadar would be the closest route of African Oil, in case of any disruption in the Middle East oil supply. Further, there would also be no reason other than for oil for China to be building a pipeline from Gwadar to China over the Karakorum and a refinery at Gwadar.

In short, China is keeping all contingencies ready to ensure that there are no closure to her oil supply need including TAPI from which they could also tap oil, in case of problems elsewhere, be it a disruption in the Persian Gulf or the Caspian – China route.

Likewise, the Myanmar to China oil pipeline and railway is to ensure another route that caters for disruption, be it a naval blockade or otherwise, at the Malacca Straits.

If the US quits Afghanistan, then it will be just what the doctor ordered for China. They will move in and merely change the vendor of the TAPI oil. Taliban and their shenanigans will not affect China since it ‘does not interfere in the internal matters of countries’ (in other words, morality, mayhem and terrorism is not their concern).

Once again, as the Carter Doctrine enunciated – oil is vital to economic well being both for individual nations as also for the international economic system and it maybe seen to justify the use of force in assuring its availability.

The country that control/ influence the oil, oil supply and manipulates it, is the one who will control the world economy.

It is for the US to take a call!

(India too is diversifying her oil sources).

[Dayuhan]

A couple of outright errors here...

TAPI is not to replace all the oil pipe lines and that is obvious. It is to ferry oil to Gwadar for the Asian market, which is large, growing and the happening market.

TAPI won't run to Gwadar. It's planned to run from Kandahar to Quetta, then to Multan and end in Fazilka, in India. It will not run to a port at all, as the product is not planned to go any farther than Pakistan and India, which will consume all of the output.

TAPI is not intended to "ferry oil". It's intended to carry natural gas.

As I explained in the previous (unread?) post, TAPI will not carry enough gas to even fill Pakistani and Indian demand, let alone enough to send on to East Asia. It's just not that big.

China's interest in Gwadar port is as a naval base to secure its trade route from the ME. I know of no existing plan to pipe oil to Gwadar for Chinese use, nor would such a plan be practical.

The International Energy Agency estimates that by 2015 China will account for 42% of the global demand.

Wrong. You need to read more slowly. China is projected to account for 42% of the global increase in oil demand through 2015.

China now consumes about 9mbpd, or around 11% of the global 84mbpd production. The US consumes over 18mbpd, or around 22% (off the top of my head, not using a calculator here. IEA forecasts China demand at 16.3mbpd by 2030, which is obviously not even close to 40%. That was a 2007 projection, and growth has actually been less than anticipated at that time. In 2007 China was expected to be using 11mbpd in 2011, not 9. That's a consequence of the price spike, which has slowed demand growth.

TAPI is irrelevant to oil calculations, of course, because it would carry natural gas, an analogous but different commodity. It is also irrelevant to China calculalions, because none of the output would go to China. It represents far too small a portion of global gas supply to be relevant to any "control" equation.

Most pf the oil data you cite are irrelevant to any discussion of Afghanistan. As I mentioned above, we are all aware that oil is important. The question is whether Afghanistan is important to the global oil picture, and the simple answer is "no". Afghanistan is neither a significant producer nor a significant corridor for oil transit.

East Asia is indeed a booming oil market, but that is irrelevant to discussion of Afghanistan and the impact of TAPI, which would not supply East Asia. Even at maximum projected throughput of 33bcm/yr the API output would be fully consumed by Pakistan and India.

Kairledy Kabyldin, head of the Kazakhstan’s national pipeline company opined, Iran was the shortest and cheapest route for oil the Asian market (from CAR).

Given the fact that the Iran is an anathema for the US, the alternate route that would be shortest and cheapest was TAPI.

Lots of people say lots of things, but Kazakhstan and China have already built a major oil pipeline net and a 40 bcm/yr gas pipeline directly linking Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and China. Actions speak louder than words.

That China is a competitor of the US requires no elaboration. Thus, if the pace of Chinese growth can be controlled, it will be to the advantage of the US.

Fallacy. First, constraining China's growth is not necessarily in the US interest (and IMO is not in the interests of the US). Second, the US cannot constrain China's access to oil. Anyone with money can buy oil, and China has lots of money.

Given that TAPI wouldn't supply China in any case, this seems much ado about nada.

Another issue that is of concern to the US is that China and India are ‘locking up’ oil resources by purchasing fields and acquiring equity oil, signing contracts on exclusive extraction or import rights, and other means of ‘taking oil off the world market’.

Again, fallacy. None of these agreements actually "lock up" oil; they can be altered at any time. If a new government took over in, say, Angola, they could easily and legally toss any agreement with China out the window.

Also, oil committed by a producer to a consumer is not "off the market". If Angola commits 3mbpd to China, that's oil that the Chinese will not be buying elsewhere, which frees up other oil for others to buy.

Oil is almost infinitely fungible. This is often forgotten. For example, in the case of Iraq, what is important to the US and all other consumers) is that Iraqi capacity comes back on the market. Where it actually goes makes no difference at all. If Iraq pumped 6mbpd and every drop went to China, that would suit the US just fine, because that would free up other oil from China's other suppliers.

There's a huge amount of nonsense written on the internet about energy by people who have little to no comprehension of energy markets.

Therefore, the corollary is that any country that has ‘influence’, if not ‘control’ of the sources of oil and gas, will have a control over those who in dire need of it and hence, to an extent dictate terms with regards to world’s economy.

The US cannot control the world's energy supplies, and it would be silly for them to try: that's how world wars start. At the end of the day, anyone with money can buy oil... and that's just fine for the US.

Again, we all know that oil is a strategic issue globally. It just isn't a strategic issue in Afghanistan.

Gwadar would be the closest route of African Oil, in case of any disruption in the Middle East oil supply. Further, there would also be no reason other than for oil for China to be building a pipeline from Gwadar to China over the Karakorum and a refinery at Gwadar.

Again, irrelevant to Afghanistan. A pipeline from Gwadar to China wouldn't pass through Afghanistan, nor would it carry TAPI product. TAPI product is not even sufficient to meet Pakistani and Indian demand.

In any event, China isn't "building a pipeline from Gwadar to China over the Karakorum". It's been discussed, but it isn't being built and I'm not sure it will be, for cost/benefit reasons.

What people often fail to understand about pipelines is that capacity is limited by size. The Kazakh-China pipleine is quite large. It carries 140k bpd, a very small fraction of China's consumption. It cannot carry more, that is it's capacity. Even if a Gwadar-China pipeline was twice the size of the Kazakh pipeline, it could not begin to compensate for a closure of the straits of Malacca or other sea sources. By contrast, a ULCC carries 2m barrels, and there are lots of them available. If you need more, you hire more boats. Can't do that with a pipeline: it carries only its max capacity... and it is extremely easy to disrupt.

If the US quits Afghanistan, then it will be just what the doctor ordered for China. They will move in and merely change the vendor of the TAPI oil.

How so? The US would not be the "the vendor of the TAPI oil" (and can we finally get it straight that it's gas, not oil?) in any event. The vendor is Turkmenistan. The consumers are Pakistan and India. Afghanistan is a transit country. The US is not in the picture. Period, end of story.

The country that control/ influence the oil, oil supply and manipulates it, is the one who will control the world economy.

It is for the US to take a call!

Nobody controls the oil supply, and nobody controls the world economy. To try would be stupid. Deal with it. In any event, Afghanistan is hardly a step toward controlling oil supply. In terms of impact on oil supply, it's one of the world's least relevant places.

[Ray]

A couple of outright errors here...

TAPI won't run to Gwadar. It's planned to run from Kandahar to Quetta, then to Multan and end in Fazilka, in India. It will not run to a port at all, as the product is not planned to go any farther than Pakistan and India, which will consume all of the output.

TAPI is not intended to "ferry oil". It's intended to carry natural gas.

[QUOTE]China's interest in Gwadar port is as a naval base to secure its trade route from the ME. I know of no existing plan to pipe oil to Gwadar for Chinese use, nor would such a plan be practical.[ /QUOTE]


Comments:

TAPI to Gwadar and Pipeline to China ex Gwadar

Washington’s dream scenario is Gwadar as the new Dubai – while China would need Gwadar as a port and also as a base for pumping gas via a long pipeline to China.

http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=4059

Islamabad has proposed an alternative route to Turkmenistan – from Iran to Pakistan with entry point through Balochistan where Gwadar port could be used as an export point for Turkmenistan gas. Under the newly proposed route, the pipeline will pass near Reko Diq copper mine project in Chaghi district of Balochistan and onward to Gwadar port. The alternative western route reduces the length of gas pipeline to 1,490-kilometre from 1,680-kilometre on Herat-Kandahar route.
http://www.syedfazlehaider.com/2010/...adlines-again/

The planned TAPI pipeline offers benefits to all four participating countries and would promote cooperation. For Turkmenistan, it would provide revenue and diversification of export routes. For Pakistan and India, it would address energy deficits. In Afghanistan, it would provide revenue for development and gas for industrial enterprises. The potential for export to other countries through the Pakistani port of Gwadar is a further advantage.
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=...ent&Itemid=358

Connecting Gwadar and Xinjiang

At the southern end of the Karakoram corridor is the Gwadar port overlooking the Arabian Sea. The port offers several strategic advantages to China. In economic terms, it can potentially link Xinjiang to the global trading system through the Karakoram Highway.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37017

Beijing is also interested in turning it into an energy-transport hub by building an oil pipeline from Gwadar into China's Xinjiang region. The planned pipeline will carry crude oil sourced from Arab and African states. Such transport by pipeline will cut freight costs and also help insulate the Chinese imports from interdiction by hostile naval forces in case of any major war.
http://hisamullahbeg.blogspot.com/20...t-and-kkh.html

The above five quotes indicate:

1. Indicates that Gwadar is the terminal.
2. There is a pipeline connecting Gwadar to China.
3. There is a road to connect Gwadar with China. (I have also read that there is to be a rail link too!)
4. TAPI will also connect to Gwadar.

There is nothing to suggest that China cannot tap into the TAPI gas.

However, the possibility that China could, is borne out by:

Delhi has now objected to any Chinese participation in constructing the Asian Development Bank (ADP) funded Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline
http://www.timesofkabul.com/?p=745

That the West has interest in Turkmenistan gas is borne out here:

Turkmenistan sits atop the world’s fourth-biggest natural gas reserves and Russia, China and the West are vying to expand their presence there as the country cautiously relaxes the isolation imposed by Berdymukhamedov’s late predecessor Saparmurat Niyazov.
http://www.syedfazlehaider.com/2010/...adlines-again/

As I explained in the previous (unread?) post, TAPI will not carry enough gas to even fill Pakistani and Indian demand, let alone enough to send on to East Asia. It's just not that big.

I have read your post.

I understand that TAPI alone cannot feed the requirement of India and Pakistan, let alone China.

TAPI is NOT the SOLE source that is contemplated to feed the Indian, Chinese or Pakistan requirement.

The key word is 'diversification' of source and routes.

As no single source can meet any country’s requirement, all countries have multiple sources and India and China to offset their requirement, in addition, are also buying off exclusive oil and gas bearing blocks or signing contract for exclusive supply.

Wrong. You need to read more slowly. China is projected to account for 42% of the global increase in oil demand through 2015.

China now consumes about 9mbpd, or around 11% of the global 84mbpd production. The US consumes over 18mbpd, or around 22% (off the top of my head, not using a calculator here. IEA forecasts China demand at 16.3mbpd by 2030, which is obviously not even close to 40%. That was a 2007 projection, and growth has actually been less than anticipated at that time. In 2007 China was expected to be using 11mbpd in 2011, not 9. That's a consequence of the price spike, which has slowed demand growth.

This is what another source says:

By 2015, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the use of oil in China will increase some 70 percent from 2009 levels, accounting for 42 percent of global demand over that time period.
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-s...umption-2011-4

Most of the oil data you cite are irrelevant to any discussion of Afghanistan. As I mentioned above, we are all aware that oil is important. The question is whether Afghanistan is important to the global oil picture, and the simple answer is "no". Afghanistan is neither a significant producer nor a significant corridor for oil transit.

East Asia is indeed a booming oil market, but that is irrelevant to discussion of Afghanistan and the impact of TAPI, which would not supply East Asia. Even at maximum projected throughput of 33bcm/yr the API output would be fully consumed by Pakistan and India.

I wonder if gas is irrelevant to Afghanistan or TAPI.

In my last post, I have adequately proved that oil is a part of US strategy and that US will go to war to control it. The Carter Doctrine proves it so and so are the observation/ statements of Cheney and other US Administration policy making bigwigs indicates the same.

In so far as TAPI is concerned, with accelerating demand for oil and gas, countries are seeking new sources and diversifying the sources.

Every drop of oil and every cubic cm of gas are important to developing countries which are industrialising at a rapid pace.

If oil was not a strategic asset and even a weapon that could be used as sanctions, why should countries be worried and start diversifying with multiple sources and ensuring multiple routes to ensure oil and gas reaches them?

TAPI is one such diversification and another route to get the fuel asset.

Therefore, to feel that TAPI is not important to South and East Asian markets would not be correct, given that there is hectic parleys on amongst countries involved in obtaining the TAPI benefits. I think I have given the links of the talks held as late as this year (20 Apr 2011).

The question that arises is, if Afghanistan and TAPI is not important, strategically or otherwise, to the US scheme of things, then why is it objecting to and has totally blocked the IPI?

Lots of people say lots of things, but Kazakhstan and China have already built a major oil pipeline net and a 40 bcm/yr gas pipeline directly linking Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and China. Actions speak louder than words.

China is very clear of its objectives – to be a superpower and even overhaul the US as the real superpower in the pursuit.

China is acutely aware of the importance of oil and gas for her uninterrupted growth to reach her goal.

Yet, China does not have a blue water Navy. China is well aware of this handicap in the event the US blockades the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca.

Therefore China has done the following:

1. Built and still increasing her strategic reserves for oil and gas.

2. Diversify her sources for fuel.

3. Not depend solely on Middle East gas (under US influence including blockade of sea lanes) and therefore the Kazakh. Myanmar and Russian oil (which will be relatively free of US influence).

4. Have multiple land routes to ferry oil and gas to China to include Gwadar – Xinjaing and Myanmar – China, through railway, roads, oil and gas pipelines and ports.
(http://www.burmacentredelhi.org/news...-project.html0)

[Ray]

Fallacy. First, constraining China's growth is not necessarily in the US interest (and IMO is not in the interests of the US). Second, the US cannot constrain China's access to oil. Anyone with money can buy oil, and China has lots of money.

Given that TAPI wouldn't supply China in any case, this seems much ado about nada.

If it was not in the interest of US to contain China including its growth then why:

Both Japan and the U.S. are increasingly feeling the need to push back on China’s growing hegemony in Asia. As for how the geopolitical landscape shifts going forward, there are four possible scenarios how the landscape will evolve.
http://abwblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/...ith-china.html

And why is the US trying to build strategic partnership with India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, in addition to its already established strategic relationship with Japan and Australia.

And this will indicate that the US does not want China to have a free run:

Earlier in July this year, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared at the Hanoi ASEAN meeting that it was in USA’s national interest to keep the sea lanes of South China Sea free for international shipping, it was apparently construed by the Chinese officials as instigating Vietnam against Beijing on the disputed Spratly Islands of the South China Sea.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5C...paper4081.html

Again, it is the question of Oil and growth that is driving Strategy.

Again, fallacy. None of these agreements actually "lock up" oil; they can be altered at any time. If a new government took over in, say, Angola, they could easily and legally toss any agreement with China out the window.

That way everything can be tossed out of the window.

Not really a fallacy.

How can a new govt legally toss out an agreement? Would that not be catered for in the legal agreement on the contract? Is there no court of international arbitration? There is!

Also, oil committed by a producer to a consumer is not "off the market". If Angola commits 3mbpd to China, that's oil that the Chinese will not be buying elsewhere, which frees up other oil for others to buy.

Oil is almost infinitely fungible. This is often forgotten. For example, in the case of Iraq, what is important to the US and all other consumers) is that Iraqi capacity comes back on the market. Where it actually goes makes no difference at all. If Iraq pumped 6mbpd and every drop went to China, that would suit the US just fine, because that would free up other oil from China's other suppliers.
There's a huge amount of nonsense written on the internet about energy by people who have little to no comprehension of energy markets.

Here it is on the ‘lock up’ of oil

Taking oil off the market?
The increasing dependence of China and India on imported oil and gas, and the way the two countries cope with this situation, has global ramifications. A much-debated question is how to judge Chinese and Indian efforts to ‘lock up’ oil resources by purchasing oil fields and acquiring equity oil, signing contracts on exclusive extraction or import rights, and other means of ‘taking oil off the world market’, if this is what they are doing. Only if the state-owned companies that acquire equity oil are willing or obliged to provide the oil to their home market at below-market prices may these deals be said to ’take oil off the market’.
http://www.prio.no/files/file47777_0...ia__final_.pdf

The US cannot control the world's energy supplies, and it would be silly for them to try: that's how world wars start. At the end of the day, anyone with money can buy oil... and that's just fine for the US.

Again, we all know that oil is a strategic issue globally. It just isn't a strategic issue in Afghanistan.

Events so far have shown that they are not attempting to try, but they have tried and succeeded in controlling the world economy.

They have broken the monopoly of OPEC!

They are ensuring the China does not have a free run to the South China seas!

Control of any oil supply is a strategic issue and so is TAPI.

Again, irrelevant to Afghanistan. A pipeline from Gwadar to China wouldn't pass through Afghanistan, nor would it carry TAPI product. TAPI product is not even sufficient to meet Pakistani and Indian demand.

In any event, China isn't "building a pipeline from Gwadar to China over the Karakorum". It's been discussed, but it isn't being built and I'm not sure it will be, for cost/benefit reasons.

What people often fail to understand about pipelines is that capacity is limited by size. The Kazakh-China pipleine is quite large. It carries 140k bpd, a very small fraction of China's consumption. It cannot carry more, that is it's capacity. Even if a Gwadar-China pipeline was twice the size of the Kazakh pipeline, it could not begin to compensate for a closure of the straits of Malacca or other sea sources. By contrast, a ULCC carries 2m barrels, and there are lots of them available. If you need more, you hire more boats. Can't do that with a pipeline: it carries only its max capacity... and it is extremely easy to disrupt.

True the KKH will not run through Afghanistan.

The fact that China also wants to join in the TAPI with others indicate that they have their interests. If not, where are they interested to join the group?

China has not only a pipeline but are building roads and railways from ports to China, both in Pakistan and in Myanmar.

Chinese Army engineers are already working in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

China has alternate oil sources and routes that are not under US influence.

As I have mentioned, it will not offset closure of Hormuz or Malacca, it is merely diversifying and keeping options open.

China is having multiple pipelines to China and so the capacity of pipeline as such would not be material. It sources are Russia, Kazakhstan, Africa, Myanmar, and they are trying to operate in the South China Sea as well.

How so? The US would not be the "the vendor of the TAPI oil" (and can we finally get it straight that it's gas, not oil?) in any event. The vendor is Turkmenistan. The consumers are Pakistan and India. Afghanistan is a transit country. The US is not in the picture. Period, end of story.

Here is how US is in the picture.

A large part of proposed Foreign Military Financing and other equipment and training aid for FY2005mwill be used to create a rapid reaction brigade at the Atyrau military base, and to support the Kazakh (formerly Central Asian) Peacekeeping battalion, to help Kazakhstan “respond to major terrorist threats to oil platforms or borders,” and otherwise “protect Caspian energy infrastructure and key energy transport
r out e s” (State Department ,Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY2005). U.S.-Kazakh relations could be troubled by the upcoming U.S. trial of an American charged with passing bribes from oil companies to Kazakh officials……

The Tengiz oilfield began to be exploited by Chevron-Texaco and Kazakhstan in a consortium during 1993 (U.S. Exxon-Mobil and Russia’s LUKoil later joined). The Karachaganak onshore field is being developed by British Gas and Italy’s Agip oil firm, who estimate reserves of more than 2.4 billion barrels of oil and 16 tcf of gas. In 2002, another consortium led by Agip reported findings from its test wells and research that Kazakhstan’s Kashagan offshore Caspian oil field had between 7-9 billion barrels of oil in proven reserves, comparable to those of Tengiz. Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are about one million barrels per day (bpd). Armitage stated in April 2004 that “Kazakhstan could well be producing over three million bpd by the end of this decade, making [it] one of the world’s top five oil-exporting nations.”

The link will also indicate the amount of money given to Kazakhstan as aid.

The US’ and the West’s influence in Kazakhstan and its oil and gas can be well understood.

Nobody controls the oil supply, and nobody controls the world economy. To try would be stupid. Deal with it. In any event, Afghanistan is hardly a step toward controlling oil supply. In terms of impact on oil supply, it's one of the world's least relevant places.

Control of world economy is a complex subjects and it covers many facets.

We could start with the Brentwood Agreement and its effect on the control of the world economy.

Then when OPEC did not play ball, US acted.

1. US Senate committee backs bill to break OPEC cartel
http://www.plattsenergyweektv.com/st...5784&catid=293

2. The Politics of Oil Prices: 50 Years of OPEC
http://www.middleeastwarpeace.info/2...years-of-opec/

The issue to note also that OPEC ‘was constrained’.

TAPI is a just another cog for control that is meshed into the game to be effective.

[Dayuhan]

On the way out of the house at the moment, but this, link or no link, clearly makes no sense at all:

By 2015, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the use of oil in China will increase some 70 percent from 2009 levels, accounting for 42 percent of global demand over that time period.

http://www.businessinsider.com/the-s...umption-2011-4

China consumed 8 million bpd average in 2009. A 70% increase would be 13.6 mbpd. That would be 16% of world consumption (less than the US), not 42%.

Let us not talk falsely now...

[davidbfpo]

Taken from Post 105 by Ray:

The above five quotes indicate:

1. Indicates that Gwadar is the terminal.
2. There is a pipeline connecting Gwadar to China.
3. There is a road to connect Gwadar with China. (I have also read that there is to be a rail link too!)
4. TAPI will also connect to Gwadar.

I hesitate to enter this exchange, but it is clear that the TAPI pipeline is planned and Gwadar maybe the terminal. This project has been planned and pondered for sometime now. Yes, a Chinese investor has indicated a willingness to build a huge copper mine in Afghanistan, but in none of the posts here has anyone indicated a Chinese investor plans to invest in TAPI. Given the likely instability in Afghanistan for the medium term this pipeline is a dream.

The KKH across the Himalayas is an amazing engineering feat, but is largely symbolic and has very little freight carrying capacity. Note it has been blocked several times by natural events and is closed part of the year, it is not an all-year highway. Yes, the KKH connects to the Pakistani road network and so can reach Gwadar. A rail link is simply not an option given the geography, although there is a railway to Rawlpindi. Yes, the PRC built a railway across the Tibetan plateau to Lhasa, so railway engineers can achieve marvels.

Nor are Pakistani railways known for their effectiveness, especially when compared to India - hence the national investment in roads and a road haulage industry dominated by Afghan drivers.

See:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karakoram_Highway

Freight economics mean that sea freight is currently preferable, for bulk loads including oil and for the vast proportion of commercial freight. Air freight moves a lot by value.

In my opinion the decision by external nations on Afghanistan's future is based on far more political factors than pipe dreams, roads and railways.

[Ray]

On the way out of the house at the moment, but this, link or no link, clearly makes no sense at all:



China consumed 8 million bpd average in 2009. A 70% increase would be 13.6 mbpd. That would be 16% of world consumption (less than the US), not 42%.

Let us not talk falsely now...

I think it would unfair to state I am talking falsely.

It will be appreciated that I am not a surveyor of oil figures or projected the figures.

I merely go by what are the figures available (for public consumption).

By the logic that I am falsely talking because of the link , I reckon every link on the forum would be by that standard, false.

So, what by your yardstick should be the baseline?

Personal opinions?

That could be false also!

[Ray]

Taken from Post 105 by Ray:

I hesitate to enter this exchange, but it is clear that the TAPI pipeline is planned and Gwadar maybe the terminal. This project has been planned and pondered for sometime now. Yes, a Chinese investor has indicated a willingness to build a huge copper mine in Afghanistan, but in none of the posts here has anyone indicated a Chinese investor plans to invest in TAPI. Given the likely instability in Afghanistan for the medium term this pipeline is a dream.

The KKH across the Himalayas is an amazing engineering feat, but is largely symbolic and has very little freight carrying capacity. Note it has been blocked several times by natural events and is closed part of the year, it is not an all-year highway. Yes, the KKH connects to the Pakistani road network and so can reach Gwadar. A rail link is simply not an option given the geography, although there is a railway to Rawlpindi. Yes, the PRC built a railway across the Tibetan plateau to Lhasa, so railway engineers can achieve marvels.

Nor are Pakistani railways known for their effectiveness, especially when compared to India - hence the national investment in roads and a road haulage industry dominated by Afghan drivers.

See:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karakoram_Highway

Freight economics mean that sea freight is currently preferable, for bulk loads including oil and for the vast proportion of commercial freight. Air freight moves a lot by value.

In my opinion the decision by external nations on Afghanistan's future is based on far more political factors than pipe dreams, roads and railways.

I am aware of high altitude roads and have regularly travelled and even driven on one of the highest road in the world (5359 m or 17,582 feet).

There are landslides but they are cleared.

It is correct that Afghanistan is a dangerous place and so is Iraq. US is still hanging around Iraq and will do so in the future too in the 'enduring bases'.

I believe that the Chinese are going to extensively tunnel to build the railway. Not confirmed though.

As far as the Lhasa railway in Tibet, when it was being constructed, there was much scepticism about it because of the engineering 'impossibility' of any construction on the permafrost.

I am no cheerleader of the Chinese, and so I would rather wait and watch and not write them off prematurely.

[jmm99]

or how to defend against wabid wabbits - Wiki and Full Text.

That doctrinal piece of Cold War work still underlies our (US) policy in South Asia (and since the Indian Ocean cannot be neatly subdivided, its SW and SE Asian outliers). It certainly has been attacked, but with no real success over the last 31 years - from Andy Basevich's, The Carter Doctrine at 30 (lest you place Basevich among leftist wingnuts, he's a conservative - Basevich bio):

For most Americans, the 30th anniversary of the Carter Doctrine – promulgated by President Jimmy Carter during his January 1980 State of the Union Address – came and went without notice.

The oversight ranks as an unfortunate one. To an extent that few have fully appreciated, the Carter Doctrine has had a transformative impact on U.S. national security policy. Both massive and lasting, its impact has also been almost entirely pernicious. Put simply, the sequence of events that has landed the United States in the middle of an open-ended war to determine the fate of the Greater Middle East begins here.

The Carter Doctrine stands in relation to the ongoing Long War as the Truman Doctrine stood in relation to the Cold War.
....
Prior to January 1980, the Pentagon and the rest of the national security establishment had viewed the Middle East as a backwater. In terms of U. S. strategic priorities, that region of the world lagged well behind Europe and East Asia and probably behind Latin America, as well.

Jimmy Carter’s announcement that the Persian Gulf constituted a vital U.S. national security interest changed all that. In short order, the aims implied by the Carter Doctrine expanded. Within a decade, the United States was not content to prevent outside powers from controlling the Gulf. It sought to claim for itself a dominant position in the region. Within two decades, the arena in which the United States sought that dominant role had expanded, eventually encompassing the entire Greater Middle East.

So, Ray was correct to cite this as a keystone to present US policy. A critical issue to some of us ("Never Again, but...") is how to remove that keystone - without becoming a Samson in the process.

While we are mucking about Basevich's blog, here are several of his links:

The New Imperialism: China in Angola, Rafael Marques de Mora

Nervous Neighbors: China Finds a Sphere of Influence, Richard Weitz

AfPak 2020: A Symposium, Victor Davis Hanson, James Traub, Ann Marlowe, Matthieu Aikins

The first two articles simply provide some context for the viewpoints in the Symposium.

Obviously, I personally don't favor continuation of the Carter Doctrine or its so-called Reagan Corollary.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I think it would unfair to state I am talking falsely.

Possibly so; I was just channeling Jimi Hendrix channeling Bob Dylan. So it goes.

It will be appreciated that I am not a surveyor of oil figures or projected the figures.

I merely go by what are the figures available (for public consumption).

By the logic that I am falsely talking because of the link , I reckon every link on the forum would be by that standard, false.

So, what by your yardstick should be the baseline?

The baseline should be common sense. Before citing or quoting data or opinions, they have to be run through a basic screen: there's a lot of lunacy on the net and a lot of outright errors. In this case, anyone even vaguely familiar with oil markets would know instantly that the claim cited was baseless. It's baseless no matter how often it's repeated.

The first requirement for making sense out of material gleaned from online browsing is to engage the BS meter and assure that it's fully functional.

To echo David, I'd point out the following:

The currently planned route of TAPI is as I stated above.

The Pakistanis have proposed an alternate route, which looks like it would conveniently cut out India.

There have been discussions of a Chinese-funded port at Gwadar and pipeline to China.

Proposals and discussions are words. Please don't talk about these things as if they exist, because they don't.

These proposals were clearly not the reason why the US entered Afghanistan, because they didn't exist when the US entered Afghanistan.

This is all words dancing on the head of a pin, though, because if you take it back to the question of why the US is in Afghanistan, none of it makes any difference. Even in the remote event that TAPI was running at 33bcm/year and every bit was going to China, that would not be anything remotely close to a cause for war in Afghanistan. There is no way on this sad earth that the US would go to war to prevent 33 bcm/yr of gas from getting to China, or to get that gas to go somewhere else. It's just not enough to be worth it. There's not even the vaguest shred of economic logic there.

That's not saying oil and gas aren't important. They are. This particular case, though just doesn't involve enough gas to justify the enormous expense and liability of war. Not even close. We're not talking about the Straits or Hormuz here, or Iraq.

[Fuchs]

I don't think he or most people interested in the Afghan War are working with cost/benefit analysis.

There's a lot of subjective thought, emotion, instincts involved. Psychological factors like habit and fashion (group dynamics) are involved.


It's more about people feeling that Afghanistan is important and feeling that Afghanistan's location in Asia (the fashionable continent) is relevant.


This whole Afghanistan nonsense was not the work of a strategy master creating a cunning plan (my archetype for this are Machiavelli or von Bismarck) in his office and everything then just unfolds.
It's rather like very important yet very useless people stumbling into a mess because several interested parties and certain events pushed them forward.

[Dayuhan]

A few things you might want to reconsider before repeating them...

If the US quits Afghanistan, then it will be just what the doctor ordered for China. They will move in and merely change the vendor of the TAPI oil. Taliban and their shenanigans will not affect China since it ‘does not interfere in the internal matters of countries’ (in other words, morality, mayhem and terrorism is not their concern).

First, as previously stated, a Chinese presence in Afghanistan would not "change the vendor of the TAPI oil". For one thing it's gas, not oil, and the vendor would still be Turkmenistan.

Security would still be a major problem. Whether or not China interfered in Afghanistan would be quite immaterial. The pipeline would be a major source of revenue for the Afghan government, and would thus be a target for any insurgent fighting the Afghan government. Realistically, whoever comes out on top of the current Afghan mess is going to face insurgents, and those insurgents will target the government's sources of revenue no matter who the foreign partner is.

How can a new govt legally toss out an agreement? Would that not be catered for in the legal agreement on the contract? Is there no court of international arbitration? There is!

Ask Hugo Chavez. He's unilaterally re-ordered any number of oil-related agreements, and gotten away with it.

Surely you recall a country or two in the Middle East nationalizing foreign-owned oil infrastructure?

In the case of China's Arican excursions in particular, nationalization would be easy and I expect to see it happen sooner or later in some cases. All a new government would have to do is claim that the existing agreement was consummated illegally, due to bribery (true in every case), that it is inconsistent with national interest, and that it is thus void. They'd get away with it.

Here it is on the ‘lock up’ of oil

Again, having a source doesn't make something true. Oil committed by a supplier to a consumer is not "taken off the market". If Angola commits 3mbpd to China, that removes 3mbpd of supply from the market, but it also removes 3 mbpd of demand from the market. The market remains unchanged.

Events so far have shown that they are not attempting to try, but they have tried and succeeded in controlling the world economy.

They have broken the monopoly of OPEC!

They are ensuring the China does not have a free run to the South China seas!

The US does not control the world economy. I think we've all seen recently that nobody controls the world economy.

The US did not break the monopoly of OPEC. OPEC never had a monopoly. Their dominance has been to some extent reduced by the rise of non-OPEC production, but the US didn't do that. More than anyone else the Russians did, and the other non-OPEC producers.

China does have free run of the South China Sea. So does the US. So does everybody else. It's an open corridor.

Control of world economy is a complex subjects and it covers many facets.

We could start with the Brentwood Agreement and its effect on the control of the world economy.

If you're referring to the Bretton Woods agreement, I'm familiar with it. You, apparently, are not.

On China, while there's a great deal of hysterical Sinophobia out there, I don't share it, or see China as an enemy or a threat (and I live in SE Asia). Judging from actions, I don't think the US Government shares that hysteria either, though some politicians certainly do. In any event the US would not go to war in Afghanistan to contain China... that would make cutting off your nose to spite your face seem downright logical.

The US presence in Afghanistan is not about oil or gas. Afghanistan is simply not important enough to the energy picture to justify the gargantuan expense of war.

It is about disrupting and defeating AQ, and while that goal has not been achieved completely, it has arguably been achieved to the greatest extent that it can be achieved in Afghanistan without doing things the US is not going to do... like invading Pakistan.

The size of the US presence in Afghanistan is in many ways counterproductive. It actually reduces US leverage on Pakistan, because the enormous logistic requirements cannot be met without Pakistani cooperation. Reducing the force to a level that could be sustained without transit through Pakistan would allow the US to be much more assertive with Pakistan.

I'd also submit that the size of the US presence is actually retarding the growth of Afghan capacity. If Afghan leaders see that the US is indefinitely committed to doing all the fighting, most of the governance, and paying all the bills, they have no incentive to be effective. They can take it easy, let us do the work, and focus on filling their pockets. A substantial US drawdown could be a tangible reminder to GIROA, ANA, and ANP that the time is coming when they will have to stand or fall on their own... and that could be a very useful way of motivating them to take more responsibility.

Too often the options are cast as "abandon the Afghans" vs "stay the course". That's bogus. There's a whole range in between maintaining the status quo and running away.

[omarali50]

Taken from Post 105 by Ray:


In my opinion the decision by external nations on Afghanistan's future is based on far more political factors than pipe dreams, roads and railways.

Hear Hear! I agree one hundred and ten percent.

[jmm99]

on this and other topics with Ray and Steve (Dayuhan). For that, I'd buy a Web cam; but not the connect fees.

Ray, you definitely need an avatar - and Kali ain't it (or maybe she is).



Regards (to both of you "contentious buzzards" )

Mike

PS: Thinking about it, I'd add JMA. Then I'd have a spectrum of "contentious buzzards" across the Indian Ocean - PI to India to South Africa.

[Dayuhan]

This whole Afghanistan nonsense was not the work of a strategy master creating a cunning plan (my archetype for this are Machiavelli or von Bismarck) in his office and everything then just unfolds. It's rather like very important yet very useless people stumbling into a mess because several interested parties and certain events pushed them forward.

Truly is it said that thou shalt not attribute to malice (or conspiracy, or strategy) what is adequately explained by stupidity (or blundering, or accident).

PS: Thinking about it, I'd add JMA. Then I'd have a spectrum across the Indian Ocean - PI to India to South Africa.

You'd have to add Fuchs for a European perspective, and an Aussie. And Ken, of course. Somebody would have to keep us all in line, and who else could?

[Ken White]

a line. I would like the Hot Dog and Popcorn concession, though...

[Ray]

Mike,

Thanks for the links.

When I quit learning, I will be dead!

[jmm99]

As to Fuchs - NO. He should definitely know why I say that. "Nuff said" (it's personal).

As to an Aussie, Mark O'Neill of the "Deadly Red Hand of Ulster" - YES.

As to Ken White (for whom at SWC, I have "the respect" - you can parse that as to the definite article), he can be "tie break" or whatever else he wants to be, including Regimental Sgt. Maj. G-d knows, he's earned it.

I except the "Hot Dog and Popcorn concession" from Ken's venue. That exception is to avoid any appearence of impropriety - because of what a CSM of the Army once engaged in. A good friend and client of mine saw all of that happening at the various clubs around Saigon. The CSM had more than a "Hot Dog and Popcorn concession" going.

Regards

Mike