The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[Arnie]

Thanks for kicking this off Mike. Im trying to get my hands on a copy. Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking? Im particularly interested in understanding what insurgencies will look like in the future so we can begin planning how troops are trained so they are equipped for any future deployment. Do insurgencies always have the same fundamentals or will they morph into new strains? Maybe it just comes back to the simple drivers of life and death...im no expert just an insatiable appetite

[William F. Owen]

Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking?

It's his "original ideas" that I think are mostly wrong. The "Complex" and "Globalisation" stuff is mostly not good.

Im particularly interested in understanding what insurgencies will look like in the future so we can begin planning how troops are trained so they are equipped for any future deployment.

Dave Kilcullen cannot tell you because he can't tell the future. Neither can anyone else. Even if he could it wouldn't have much if any impact on training. Just do the stuff you've had to do in the past.

Do insurgencies always have the same fundamentals or will they morph into new strains? Maybe it just comes back to the simple drivers of life and death...im no expert just an insatiable appetite

War is war. Warfare changes but usually incredibly slowly.

I'm no expert either and share your appetite mate, but there is almost nothing worth eating from the "NEW-COIN" salad bar of nuts and mineral water.

[Arnie]

[QUOTE=William F. Owen;102233]
Dave Kilcullen cannot tell you because he can't tell the future. Neither can anyone else. Even if he could it wouldn't have much if any impact on training. Just do the stuff you've had to do in the past.

Crystal balls are hard to find I agree, but it seems in many facets of human endeavour we are always planning strategies and operations on the past in the hope we will avert a similar tragedy or event in the future.

Is COIN really any different to the "war" that has been waged in our cities between our social justice systems and a crime, drug and violence fuelled neighbourhood? This sector of our population can feel pretty isolated and lacking in representation so looks to other avenues. The Police, social workers, volunteers, NGOs and Government services try to set in a different levels to counter the criminal and gang activity that exploits this mess. May be we need to hire reformed gang leaders to help with COIN in Afghanistan?

[Arnie]

[QUOTE=Arnie;102354][QUOTE=William F. Owen;102233]
Dave Kilcullen cannot tell you because he can't tell the future. Neither can anyone else. Even if he could it wouldn't have much if any impact on training. Just do the stuff you've had to do in the past.

Crystal balls are hard to find I agree, but it seems in many facets of human endeavour we are always planning strategies and operations on the past in the hope we will avert a similar tragedy or event in the future.

Is COIN really any different to the "war" that has been waged in our cities between our social justice systems and a crime, drug and violence fuelled neighbourhood? This sector of our population can feel pretty isolated and lacking in representation so looks to other avenues. The Police, social workers, volunteers, NGOs and Government services try to set in a different levels to counter the criminal and gang activity that exploits this mess. May be we need to hire reformed gang leaders to help with COIN in Afghanistan?

[William F. Owen]

Is COIN really any different to the "war" that has been waged in our cities between our social justice systems and a crime, drug and violence fuelled neighbourhood?

Maybe the form is similar but criminals are subject to the criminal justice system. War is generally something exempt from that. You can only have effective criminal justice, when you actual physical control. War is generally a competition for that physical control.

May be we need to hire reformed gang leaders to help with COIN in Afghanistan?

Personally I'd hire Gang leaders who have hunted down and killed their competition, and exert tight control and authority over their communities. The reformed ones tend to reject violence.

[slapout9]

Personally I'd hire Gang leaders who have hunted down and killed their competition, and exert tight control and authority over their communities. The reformed ones tend to reject violence.

Ah ha, "The One Minute Guerrilla Solution." You would win !

[MikeF]

Thanks for kicking this off Mike. Im trying to get my hands on a copy. Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking?

as it should be read by everyone.

Arnie,

Even though I'm gonna critique this book to death, Dr. K is the only willing person so far to have the balls (intestinal fortitude in army speak) to categorically write on this subject.

I have much respect.

[William F. Owen]

Even though I'm gonna critique this book to death, Dr. K is the only willing person so far to have the balls (intestinal fortitude in army speak) to categorically write on this subject.

What about Paret, Kitson, Samay Ram, Charters, Tugwell and O'Neil to name just a few of the authors on my COIN shelf?

[Bob's World]

What about Paret, Kitson, Samay Ram, Charters, Tugwell and O'Neil to name just a few of the authors on my COIN shelf?

Some of us don't.

Sadly, when what one needs to do is difficult and requires a great deal of personal change, it is rarely also what one wants to hear.

[William F. Owen]

Sadly, when what one needs to do is difficult and requires a great deal of personal change, it is rarely also what one wants to hear.

Sorry Bob. I don't understand. COIN is a commonly written about subject. Moreover, it was well understood until recently.

I'm not talking about "Nation building." I am talking about defeating armed rebels so as political progress can take place - to paraphrase the Sultan of Oman.

[Bob's World]

Sorry Bob. I don't understand. COIN is a commonly written about subject. Moreover, it was well understood until recently.

I'm not talking about "Nation building." I am talking about defeating armed rebels so as political progress can take place - to paraphrase the Sultan of Oman.

True, you don't understand; and

True it is a realatively straight forward matter to employ the military to kill the armed rebelling element of one's populace.

The hard part is resolving the reasons why they were acting that way. Defeating insurgents is easy (relatively); defeating insurgency typically requires the government to change how it does business. Dave talks about how to change the popualce. Governments like to hear that.

I talk about changing the government. They don't like to hear that.

[William F. Owen]

True it is a realatively straight forward matter to employ the military to kill the armed rebelling element of one's populace.

Well it takes a good deal of skill to do well, but I concur.

The hard part is resolving the reasons why they were acting that way. Defeating insurgents is easy (relatively); defeating insurgency typically requires the government to change how it does business.

True but irrelevant. They can complain all they like once they give up their guns. Until they do that, political resolution is pointless and merely rewards their aggression.
The ONLY thing the military can do if force compliance and control, via use of armed force.

Dave talks about how to change the popualce. Governments like to hear that.

I talk about changing the government. They don't like to hear that.

But Dave's off his reservation, and you risk undermining the policy of those you work for.

[MikeF]

What about Paret, Kitson, Samay Ram, Charters, Tugwell and O'Neil to name just a few of the authors on my COIN shelf?

I have a wedding this weekend for one of my old platoon leaders. He's now a company commander in my old unit. Last night, we had the rehearsal dinner and festivities (so minimize my last three posts. It was a late night), and I surveyed the current officers in the squadron. Only half even knew what SWJ was, and none of them read regularly. That's been my experience in the Army.

Collectively, we're not this new generation of armed nation builders that sit around late at night reading about Malaya, Colombia, and the Phillipines. That is a myth. Instead, we'd rather hit the gym and the bar. In between deployments, the last thing that most guys want to talk about is war.

So, my point about Dr. K is that he's the only CURRENT one that has written coherently, and I know that I can only recommend one book for guys to read. After that, they zone out. That's another reason why I'm taking the time to critique this book. So, the guy who actually writes the next "COIN and Me" does it right.

From BW

Some people have a special knack for telling people what they want to hear. Some of us don't. Sadly, when what one needs to do is difficult and requires a great deal of personal change, it is rarely also what one wants to hear.

Sir, one of the beautiful things about SWJ is that the people that come here regularly are seekihg truth and better understanding. You're working to find it now, and that means it will be different from how others think. That's okay, but you have to remember that you have to sell your idea.

Actually, I plan on comparing/contrasting your work with Dr. K's in a bit. It gets into hearts, minds, and soul or rebellion.

[slapout9]

Short video from Brzezinski "easier to kill a million people, than to control a million people"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lkOOB...re=grec_browse

[huskerguy7]

Argue away, just back it up with at least some historical examples of success. That argument is an assumption (the kind that make an ass out of u and me) hence my four additional questions. Tom Ricks labeled it appropriately as a Gamble with no historical basis of support. I would suggest that we got lucky in Iraq.

Tequilla dubs it control. I understand his position, but I would suggest that it is always an illusion of control- appropriate for securing ground in the short term, but irrelevant in the long run strategic success.

Recently, my small reconnaissance squadron was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for our actions in taking down an Al Qaeda training camp during the Surge. I was the main effort. 80% of all actions were derived from my troop as a commander.

I also watched the aftermath of trying to control and change people.

I am well aware of the so-called necessity for us to interdict with mass, and I would suggest that it is rubbish.

As I consider Dr. K, I think his biggest shortcoming is his scope. He visited numerous units for short periods. In 3-4 day spurts, he tried to capture what each commander was facing. You never know truth without staying for at least three months with a unit. That remains his flaw. He heard what he wanted to hear and neatly packaged it into a book.

I like that thought from Tequilla. It will only work for the short term. History has shown that we can get anywhere we want, but once we get there, things slow down and we don't make progress. I guess that's where the "mentor" idea comes in. Rather than keeping a big force there, bug out and leave some mentors and air support. This second part, hasn't been a big part of history, so my argument is all theory. As everyone knows, theory isn't always right.

I have a wedding this weekend for one of my old platoon leaders. He's now a company commander in my old unit. Last night, we had the rehearsal dinner and festivities (so minimize my last three posts. It was a late night), and I surveyed the current officers in the squadron. Only half even knew what SWJ was, and none of them read regularly. That's been my experience in the Army.

Collectively, we're not this new generation of armed nation builders that sit around late at night reading about Malaya, Colombia, and the Phillipines. That is a myth. Instead, we'd rather hit the gym and the bar. In between deployments, the last thing that most guys want to talk about is war.

So, my point about Dr. K is that he's the only CURRENT one that has written coherently, and I know that I can only recommend one book for guys to read. After that, they zone out. That's another reason why I'm taking the time to critique this book. So, the guy who actually writes the next "COIN and Me" does it right.

From BW


Sir, one of the beautiful things about SWJ is that the people that come here regularly are seekihg truth and better understanding. You're working to find it now, and that means it will be different from how others think. That's okay, but you have to remember that you have to sell your idea.

Actually, I plan on comparing/contrasting your work with Dr. K's in a bit. It gets into hearts, minds, and soul or rebellion.

I completely agree with this. Despite what you may expect with the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the mentality of a large part of the population seems to be the same as it was in the 1990s: big conventional weapons will allow us to win everywhere. COIN is often misunderstood and interpreted as "surging."

I have several peers who are either part of the military, or are trying to obtain a competitive position in it (SF mainly). They know quite a bit about different conventional weapons, but when I bring up COIN, both their knowledge and optimism is limited. I then recommend "Accidental Guerrilla" or visiting SWJ, but they don't have the interest. I'm not sure of the causes, but it is to bad.

Like others, I am shocked by the fact that some portions of the US military continue to somewhat ignore COIN. Yes, I understand and agree that we should continue to develop and train for a large scale conventional engagement, but irregular warfare will continue to exist after Afghanistan and Iraq.

[William F. Owen]

I have a wedding this weekend for one of my old platoon leaders. He's now a company commander in my old unit. Last night, we had the rehearsal dinner and festivities (so minimize my last three posts.

Mazal Tov. Salams etc.

Collectively, we're not this new generation of armed nation builders that sit around late at night reading about Malaya, Colombia, and the Phillipines. That is a myth. Instead, we'd rather hit the gym and the bar. In between deployments, the last thing that most guys want to talk about is war.

....and no one should expect you to. Very few doctors read medical journals, on a regular basis, if at all. I have no quibble with the pure professional who just wants to do the job.
.....but you are NOT nation builders. You are soldiers.

So, my point about Dr. K is that he's the only CURRENT one that has written coherently, and I know that I can only recommend one book for guys to read. After that, they zone out. That's another reason why I'm taking the time to critique this book. So, the guy who actually writes the next "COIN and Me" does it right.

Again, I concur. That book should have been FM3-24. IMO, it was not fit for purpose. Back when I knew Dave, I liked him. Good writer, smart man, but I would treat his COIN insights with extreme caution, as I would both Galula and Thompson.

[Fuchs]

It's always difficult to be sure about some concept or theory before it proves itself in practice.

That is a major issue with COIN theory; it does not seem to win a war. The successes always seem to be stuck on the local or regional a.k.a. tactical level.
Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan - there's no strategic success to be attributed to COIN theory.


(Iraq had in my opinion only a coincidence of COIN tactics and "surge" with dominating Iraqi factors such as people getting fed up with AQI & civil war and finishing the ethnic cleansing).

Maybe we should understand COIN theory as tactical instead of pretending that it's a recipe for strategic success.

[JMA]

It's always difficult to be sure about some concept or theory before it proves itself in practice.

That is a major issue with COIN theory; it does not seem to win a war. The successes always seem to be stuck on the local or regional a.k.a. tactical level.
Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan - there's no strategic success to be attributed to COIN theory.

Apart from the Boer War - 1899-1902 (perhaps not a true counter-insurgency) what COIN war has not been settled through some sort of political action? I would say that the military aspect is merely a means of buying time to allow a political settlement rather than face a military solution.