The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[Bill Moore]

Fabius please reread the posts from the view of a soldier on the ground trying to make sense of his tactical/operational environment. Kilcullen does provide a framework for operating in chaos, especially when higher doesn't have a clue. Although there is little new, it is compiled in a useful framework (like the Ranger handbook), and I sure wish I had it when I was in OIF.

Obviously this isn't a strategy for winning the war. If CPT Jones follows the 28 steps it may very well lead to positive attitudes towards the U.S. and neutralization of the embedded threats (not the transient ones), but it won't solve the overaching strategic issues of ethnic strife, unemployment, poor infrastructure, insecure borders, transnational actors, and a lack of nationalism (what is the Iraqi military fighting for?).

As jcustis stated above, I think you would be very surprised at what our guys understand at the Bn level and below, as they are living it, but there is only so much they can say. Remember we're soldiers not warriors, and there is a difference.

All that said I agree with many of your comments, and frequently refer to them while studying 4G and 5G concepts. I'm not pointing fingers, but I have yet to see a real strategy for countering 4GW. The strategies I have seen lack substance, and are based on a future force that doesn't exist.

I hardly consider myself old school, but I do believe the military should focus on the militarily achievable, and only get involved in a Somalia, Iraq, etc. if it is absolutely in our national interest. Iraq was a war of choice. Afghanistan was not a war of choice, but we did choose to stay instead of simply defeat the Taliban and leave (defeat as far as the Pakistan border). I know the arguments for staying, but I'm simply staying there was also the option of dropping the hammer, then leaving. We could revisit it later if need be.

Now assuming we only get involved (in the future) if it represents real national interests (vice the CNN pull effect), then one could assume we would take the measures necessary to stop support from places like Syria, Pakistan and Iran? I'm not convinced we (the military) don't know how to win this type of fight, but we can't do it fighting a politically correct war.

one point that I think people over look when they refer to our successes (Philippines,Malaysia,Dominican Republic) is they were islands! Directly or indirectly we could quarantine the entire country not just a portion of it. In COIN ops I think you have to think about the whole country! if you don't what is to stop him from running to the hills? If he is in the hills what stops him from running to the city? If it is not an Island what stops him from running to another country? Slapout

Slapout, Malaysia is not just an island, it also has a pennisula, but either way it is easy to isolate. The the Philippines on the other hand have over 700 islands at high tide, more during low tide. Fishing boats, ferries, workboats, etc. are numerous (it's a water highway) and it isn't as easy as one may think to blockade an island, now add to that the several islands the insurgency existed on. However, your point is still valid, because what is unique about the Philippines (and I believe Malaysia) is that the insurgents (the ones we defeated, not present day) didn't receive outside support (they didn't want it), and they didn't have safehavens in other countries. Both of these were relatively easy insurgencies to counter compared to Vietnam. It infuriates me when some students of COIN try to compare Malaysia with Vietnam as though it was the same type of fight, far from it. It is also far from Iraq and Afghanistan in scale.

[Fabius Maximus]

I absolutely agree that there are two perspectives displayed in this thread.

To borrow your phrase, there is a "ground" level view of Kilcullen's work. Company commanders get this memo, extract what they can out of it, and move on. It is not their job to win the war - just to accomplish their missions at the lowest possible cost. The previous thread – linked in the opening comment – covered this quite well.

Then we go to SWJED’s key observation:

Those of the “theorist camp" have the luxury of endless debate on the “grand strategic themes” of 4GW, COIN, IW, etal. Your views are better served directed at members of the National Command Authority and not Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders and Team Leaders.

The senior US leaders are the audience of Kilcullen's work. We're not winning, and Kilcullen's proposals attempt to change that, as clearly seen in his work taken as a whole. He's attempting to innovate, radically. I'm attempting -- by direct quotation -- to describe his innovations, and illustrate their weaknesses.

To "translate" what he says “down” into standard doctrine is, I believe, to frustrate the purpose of his work. That's what I believe was said earlier by referring to his work as a "cliff notes."

Cliff notes are essential tools. I just doubt that was his intention in writing this. That is clear in his other works, which we might get to if we work thru his 28 articles.

Bill Moore:

... I have yet to see a real strategy for countering 4GW. The strategies I have seen lack substance, and are based on a future force that doesn't exist.

I agree.

Standard doctrine is not, I believe, working in Iraq and Afghanistan -- just as it has failed in so many similar wars. I believe Kilcullen agrees with me on this key point.

Nor have we devised anything better, yet. That's what I said in my post below, beginning "I'm not communicating clearly." Kilcullen is participating in a process to find such a strategy. Unfortunately, his solution is based on a force that does not yet exist, and which I believe will not exist in any reasonable time frame (generations).

Worse, his recommendations take us in the wrong direction. A bit of a complex discussion, probably not appropriate at this point.

This problem is not unique to Kilcullen. I believe it is common to those of many 4GW experts, such as Wilcox and Lind. This discussion is perhaps central to the debate about ways to fight 4gw, but unfortunately off-topic here. (Note the references below to past articles of mine that discuss this in greater detail)

[jcustis]

The answer to this has become obvious. The only way to wing fourth generation wars is to refurbish and redeploy M113 Gavins across the entire force, as they are profoundly more survivable than wheeled LAVs or Strykers, can be uparmored to withstand insurgent weapons, and can traverse 4GW battlefield terrain that other platforms cannot.

[jcustis]

I’m not going to delve into the 28 Articles. I think you’ve received enough subtle verbal blows to realize that you can’t hoist an argument against that text. If you still have a beef with those simple, thoughtful lines of text, then read no further. The same pretty much goes for the remainder of Kilcullen’s work. Through my reading, not once did I get the sense that he was hoisting the writing up and saying, “Look at this all you lesser thinkers, this is the roadmap to victory.” You may wish he were doing so to make your critiques easier, but don’t hold your breath. When I return to Iraq, the 28 Articles will be prominently displayed in my hooch. I don’t have to believe that each article is achievable, as that would be akin to going hungry because I don’t like one of the buffet selections.

I’ve been trained to offer concrete solutions as well as critiques, which is something I have yet to see you do:

Kilcullen is more ambitious, reaching far in search of a successful tactical formula for victory. Let’s not throw out the strange and new elements he suggests, but discuss what he actually said.

Even failed ideas move us forward, showing us another path that does not work.

What path would you have us choose oh enlightened one? Wait, let me get my Surefire…

Simple mantras from leaders like LtGen Mattis have shaped behavior and performance in ways you cannot imagine. They are simple and apply to the entire force, but because they are not the final recipe for victory, you seem to argue that they are less valid and pointless. I am here to tell you that if your moanful strategic corporal remembers the mantras, and prevents the needless death of one civilian, or one friendly fire incident, that is a good thing. At my level, the mantra has served a purpose. Perhaps you should not try to come down to my level, because you are disappointed and abhor my lot in life.

The not so dearly departed Rumsfeld said you go to war with the force you have. Would a 100% increase in the number of SF groups in country be a better approach? Perhaps, but we do not have that, and so certain qualities must be mimicked, attempted, and utilized.

If policy missteps had not been made by certain handlers of the politico-military force, we might have scaled down our presence to a small element of advisors, and we would not be having this discussion today. If there were civil war and we were not there, it would be a wholly Iraqi problem, not embracing us. Ding, ding…We are there, so tell me what you would have my Lance Corporals do? Oh wait, where did I put that Surefire again?

Perhaps we are not even dealing with a fourth generation war within the confines of Iraq and Afghanistan? After all, in all of the briefings and operational orders I’ve attended in the past 3 ½ years, I never heard the situation read as: “Gentlemen, we are embroiled in a fourth generation war…”

I fail to see where your article “Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?” Has any bearing on the discussion of COIN. We are in the fight, so live with it. Your grand theoretical brush has little to do with my world, working as a pair of boots on the ground. You threw it out there as something operationally applicable, but I can’t grasp what you meant. Please enlighten me.

A defensive war denies foreign 4GW foes both an aggressor and the home court advantage. When attacking us, they bear the high costs and frequent mistakes typical of overseas adventures. This works well with Lind’s recommendation to de-escalate. Treat users of terrorism as criminals wherever possible, in the sense of avoiding use of soldiers unless necessary. Avoid engaging them massively and directly – unless they attack first.

In particular, this quote of yours shows a selective ignorance of several truths about the conflict we are in. This may be a great prescription for dealing with future threats (doubtful in my opinion) but we are not dealing with future threats my good man. Kilcullen seeks to set a framework for the threat we face in the here and now.

Most of your arguments in this thread smack of professional jealousy, and that's sad. If that is not the case, there’s no need to reply to this observation, as it is mine alone

Conventional/Special Operations. Capabilities that once resided exclusively in
Special Operations forces are proliferating to the combat force. Every soldier in contemporary conflict requires capabilities such as individual initiative, cultural sensitivity, linguistic competence, mastery of sophisticated weapons and sensors, and a capacity for small group independent operations – characteristics traditionally associated with Special Forces. Meanwhile, Special Operations forces are conducting conventional tasks such as screening, defence and largescale assault, and simultaneously developing more unconventional skills. Special and conventional operations are becoming increasingly integrated, occurring on the same terrain and relying upon intimate cooperation between combat forces, special operations forces and inter-agency elements. Moreover, although Combat Force tasks are different from Special Operations tasks, all soldiers require flexibility, physical and mental toughness, self-reliance and technical skills that allow them to be highly effective across a wider array of missions.

I pulled this from Kilcullen’s Complex Warfighting article, which was written for the AUS forces, not US. As you allege elsewhere in your writings, we should address weaknesses and not our strengths, in order to achieve victory in long wars. Kilcullen’s point about modern soldiers requiring a skill set for a wider array of missions, resonates with me because current and future non-state threats do not present themselves as massed formations, marching up on the Common, shoulder to shoulder. Because they may offer only a temporary target, junior leaders have to understand what they’ve seen, report it, and have the skills to engage it quickly.

What is under your saddle that makes you find fault with this? Is it the fact that such training requires a significant investment in time and resources? Is it the fact that may not see immediate returns on that investment? Are you saying that for those reasons we should not move towards a better force in these areas? Your logic is confusing along this line, because it almost sounds as though you advocate that we should throw our hands up, cry about the difficulty of the task, and then retreat to a corner with our thumb stuck in our mouth.

Look, we all know that COIN is a hard row to hoe, and there are no magic silver bullets. Many members of the SWC may actually appreciate your points, although they would not publicly admit so because of other entanglements. Perhaps you should stop looking amorously at Kilcullen and start an analysis of personnel ceilings, advisory team staffing policies, force rotation policies, and whether heavy armor has a place on the Iraqi terrain…Kilcullen is not your whipping boy.

Throughout your article, “What should we do in Iraq”, you’ve beaten the drum that likes to take grand swipes at almost everything, yet offers nothing concrete as a better way ahead. In that you appear to believe we can do our best by leaving Iraq to avoid future casualties, your views smell like the obverse of neo-conservative Malkinism. It also smells like Peters and Malkin combined because you hype things up to a crescendo, but depart with a fizzle. You’re more than welcome to ruck up. That is unless, you’re simply enticing us into a discussion with you so that you can gleam more material for a future article. Please provide appropriate citations to recognize our efforts.

[Bill Moore]

Gentlemen,

As defined by Hammes we are definitely (there is no gray area) involved in a 4GW fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One aspect I haven't heard discussed much is the difficulty that a democratic country has in dealing with 4GW, vice a totalitarian one. We have certain limitations based on our laws and values that are easily exploitable. Some advocate changing the laws (the big ones in the press are torture, eavesdropping, etc.) to deal with the emergency, but the reality is these wars will last several years, so changing our laws would not a be temporary fix, such as establishing martial law in New Orleans after Katrina.

There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address. In 4GW you can't win the fight on the battleground, but you can lose it there. Please read Hammes's "The Sling and the Stone" for clarification.

Bill

[jcustis]

There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address.

One may be the date when we will finally break our dependence on oil from the Arabian Peninsula.

I was speaking rhetorically on the fourth generation warfare bit. I don't like how theorists try to package everything neatly, then fight over the scraps of who came up with the name first, but I agree that what we face now fits within those parameters.

[Steve Blair]

Gentlemen,

As defined by Hammes we are definitely (there is no gray area) involved in a 4GW fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One aspect I haven't heard discussed much is the difficulty that a democratic country has in dealing with 4GW, vice a totalitarian one. We have certain limitations based on our laws and values that are easily exploitable. Some advocate changing the laws (the big ones in the press are torture, eavesdropping, etc.) to deal with the emergency, but the reality is these wars will last several years, so changing our laws would not a be temporary fix, such as establishing martial law in New Orleans after Katrina.

There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address. In 4GW you can't win the fight on the battleground, but you can lose it there. Please read Hammes's "The Sling and the Stone" for clarification.

Bill

I have to admit right from the start that I don't totally buy into the 4GW stuff. I just consider it a more developed (full spectrum, if you will) version of 3GW. Or an adaptation of old techniques to use new weapons and means of operations. That's my disclaimer.

That said, Bill makes a very valid point regarding the lack of serious discussion regarding the ability of an open democracy such as ours to succeed in this sort of warfare where one of the major weapons is PR. The United States has always had great difficulty in this sort of operation, precisely because of our free press and the way the press views its role with regard to government and military operations. Now I'm not advocating in any way changes to freedom of the press, but it's worth remembering that the British in their COIN-type operations (to include Northern Ireland) exercised much tighter control over the press and had more sweeping powers when it came to covert and military/police operations. Also, I would say the nature of our basic political system (with a controlled revolution every two years in the form of elections) makes it especially difficult to develop the kind of long-term, all aspect campaign plan that would be needed for this sort of conflict. Sometimes other countries have succeeded against a 3GW+ adversary because of subtle differences in their political system or the relationship their military has with the remains of a colonial police force.

From a military standpoint, we need things like what Kilcullen and Mattis have put out. Mattis has an exceptional ability to relate his thoughts to the men in the ranks, and that is something that is all too rare in our military today.

[Mike in Hilo]

1) Re: Crossborder sanctuaries for Malaya CTs: I am nitpicking--mea culpa: In fact, the then heavily forested Thai border did pose real problems for the British-led COIN effort in Malaya....Overthrow of Pibulsongram's pro-communist Thai government made a difference in Malaya. That said, no argument with the assertion that Malaya was not VN.....

2) Kilcullen's view, at least as he presents it, of the local citizen perusing the competing menus presented him by insurgents and COIN forces and judiciously selecting the best deal (one dish from the "hearts" column, a couple from the "minds" column), causes certain reservations to arise. This is not to say that there is no important role for the "carrot" in a carrot and stick approach...And of course, every place and every conflict are unique...Nevertheless, on the level of the general principle, far away and long ago, Thompson and Co. consistently drummed into our minds the concept that the Vietnamese peasant is not a free agent...(Indeed, as Fall pointed out, what freedom to choose was there between our offer to provide better hog breeding stock vs. the VC propensity to behead and disembowel with abandon?)...The Brits were so insistent on the not-a-free-agent point because of its obvious implications on application of a hearts and minds approach....They posited a corollary, viz.,: because he is not free to choose (and has, since antiquity, never been free to choose), we (i.e., COIN forces) must put him in a position where it will be physically impossible for him to provide any support to the insurgents--where he will not be subject to the pressures that would compel him to provide such support....In other words, make sure that he cannot choose the insurgent option, whether he wants to or not....Hence, the "drain the swamp/ confine the 'at risk' population in order to protect them" classical British approach....In the event, on the ground in VN, to be sure, the cogency of this argument led to a high level of adviser frustration, since the US did not hold sovereignty and loose-as-a-goose thirdworldism did not augur well for the application of air-tight controls on the movement of people and commodities. But that's another story.....

Cheers,
Mike.

[Jedburgh]

1) Re: Crossborder sanctuaries for Malaya CTs: I am nitpicking--mea culpa: In fact, the then heavily forested Thai border did pose real problems for the British-led COIN effort in Malaya....

As an aside, the current Thai government often accuses Malaysia of lending succor to the ongoing insurgency in southern Thailand. Borders troubles can work in both directions...

2) Kilcullen's view, at least as he presents it, of the local citizen perusing the competing menus presented him by insurgents and COIN forces and judiciously selecting the best deal (one dish from the "hearts" column, a couple from the "minds" column), causes certain reservations to arise. This is not to say that there is no important role for the "carrot" in a carrot and stick approach...

Anyone who doesn't believe that the indig "peruse competing menus" in order to select the path that is most beneficial to them personally is extremely naive. Of course, the fundamental "benefit" is that which permits survival. The indig understand more clearly than the average troop exactly how transient our presence really is.

The RAND pub On Other War, posted in another thread a while back, discusses the Hearts & Minds vs Cost/Benefit theories of COIN, and does a pretty decent job of putting them in context. In my mind, they are inextricably linked and it comes down to possessing enough knowledge of the local situation to effectively blend the two methods into a strategy that will eventually have a real strategic impact.

[Bill Moore]

Galula describes this as a battle between two camps on who will "control" the population, a battle the counterinsurgent must win, or he risks losing the war. I think it is important to take his words literally, because he specifies control, which does not necessarily equate to winning the hearts and minds. The terrorists don't control the population with carrots, they'll simply brutally them and family members if they don't comply. I would call that control. He also states that in many cases the villagers (or townsfolk, etc.) were previously under control of the insurgents overtly, and now that the counterinsurgent is there the insurgents will still most likely exert varying degrees covert control until we can root out these covert cells.

I don't see it as a competition of menus that the populace as the freedom to choose from, because we always offer the lobster and steak special, compared to the rice and stale fish menu from the other camp, but that rice and stale fish looks pretty good when some is holding a knife to your son's throat. Hell yea, they'll take our steak and lobster, but that doesn't give us control.

A technique he offered was to order the population to do certain tasks to teach them that the coalition is in charge, because our orders would give them an excuse for working with the coalition, so hopefully they would be killed by the insurgents.

Until we figure out the security and control piece, our fancy menu means very little.

[Mike in Hilo]

I don't think I disagree....My point is the obvious one that keeping your head trumps the prospect of financial gain--And, for that matter, accepting the benefits of prosperity does not necessarily mean you'll favor the side that has brought you that prosperity....You'll favor the side that you know will prevail in the end, because to do otherwise would be suicidal. (ex.:all those prosperous communities where the VC taxation rate simply increased commensurate to the ability to pay, VCI called all the shots, and from which the VC Shadow Supply System got a significant infusion of rice for their troops).

Happy New Year,
Mike.

[SWJED]

Welcome ZenPundit readers. We encourage you to register and join the discussion.

[jcustis]

Bill, I'm not sure this came out right...curious if you meant something else.

A technique he offered was to order the population to do certain tasks to teach them that the coalition is in charge, because our orders would give them an excuse for working with the coalition, so hopefully they would be killed by the insurgents.

Both you and Mike are on the same vein that I've been before in trying to make peers understand part of the problem with civilian compliance/support. There are parts of Iraq that are like Little Italy. The residents know that the police cannot be everywhere and at all times, so they are not going to go against the mob and provide information.

Hence the sharp rise of powerful militias to protect neighborhoods (and whichonly require the right trigger to become sectarian thugs). Our inability to provide a security blanket, through whatever policy failure you want to pick, perhaps gave rise to the militias for two reasons.

1) There was an identified need for militia protection NOW and potentially for the future.

2) There was a forecasted need for militia protection as the coalition eventually reduced its footprint.

Anyone have a data source for the size and number of militias, and any recorded increases in the 2002-present time frame?

[Rob Thornton]

I was going to post this as an RFI, but jcustis' post convinced me the wheels ae already turning here

There are parts of Iraq that are like Little Italy

. The sheikhs up here are a little like mafia dons, not exactly like the Gottis (but that is about as close as any US example (didn't Slapout mention a Patrick Swayze movie that might fit too?), but maybe closer to the ones you read about in Sicily.

I've been emailing back and forth between marct and a freind of his he introduced me to who works networks about trying to piece together how things are working up here. The sheikhs seemed linked to just abut everything. Example as in the "How to win in Al Anbar" cartoon, the sheikhs own all the good stuff (factories, mills, etc.); they are also tied to allot of bad things (corruption, AIF, crime, etc.); they have most of the real influence (muktars, government, people, mosques, foreign monies, etc.). Because they are somewhat low key to the Americans who only spend a year here, most of us don't really understand their role or influence. They sort of come across as the "wealthy uncle" because the Americans here mostly interact with the layers in between. We generally look for those people in roles we understand, and feel comfortable interacting with. The further west you from here, the less likely I think a person can make an association that makes sense.

They are the 4000 year old tradition behind the scenes who make phone calls and get things done, but they are also a kind of cultural icon; so much so that many officials wish they were sheikhs - kind of a strange 70s rock star idolation. The sheikhs are ancient compared to Ba'athism, but I think they more or less defined (or redefined) that political ideology to suit their needs.

To complicate matters in 2003 it seems we had a kind of 52 card pick up where all the cards got jumbled up. The sheikhs were the only face cards left after Saddam and crew were removed, and they more or less were left face up ( I mean we know who the sheikhs are). However allot of the sheikhs' men/buisness associates/friends of the family were put into positions of authority in the new government (includes the military and police). Now we have people who are in positions of authority where their loyalties should be to the government, but instead have interests more closely aligned to a sheikh or a group of sheikhs.

I think the IA (at least at the BN and BDE levels) should not be making deals with the sheikhs, maybe not even asking favors - here, deals and favors are two ways - (..and one day I'm going to need a favor from you...), and this would put the IA CDR with conflicitng loyalties and more then one master. However, the mayor/governor could probably pull it off, after all in a way - they are all politicians anyway, and all politicians are....well universal.

When it gets right down to it up here in Ninewa, it seems to be mostly about the flus (pronounced "floose" but meaning money) and influence and less about political ideaology and religion, those seem to be more tools to manipulate the populace. Make no mistake, they have their place, but it my observation that "cultural economics" drives the train here in Mosul.

So anybody out there got any thoughts on the sheikhs? Does it work this way in the other provinces?

The BN CDR for the IA BN I'm with told me one day, "you know Saddam either bought off the sheikhs or replaced them (those often referred to here as the 1990 sheikhs) in order to gain their influence; if the new government could get the sheikhs to go along, we could fix most of the problems." I'm not trying to minimize the influence of the big time clerics ( a kind of sheikh in their own right when it comes to influence), but after some of the stuff I've seen I'm inclined to agree.

Where does this tie in with Kilcllen? Maybe I'm paraphrasing way out there, but his work (and the body of work it has generated) has been useful to me in helping me see problems for what they are/might be vs. what I'd prefer them to be.

Best regards, Rob