Brilliant, useful
Interesting, perhaps useful
Of little utility, not practical
Delusional
Why didn't I see it right in front of me...
The answer to this has become obvious. The only way to wing fourth generation wars is to refurbish and redeploy M113 Gavins across the entire force, as they are profoundly more survivable than wheeled LAVs or Strykers, can be uparmored to withstand insurgent weapons, and can traverse 4GW battlefield terrain that other platforms cannot.
I’m not going to delve into the 28 Articles. I think you’ve received enough subtle verbal blows to realize that you can’t hoist an argument against that text. If you still have a beef with those simple, thoughtful lines of text, then read no further. The same pretty much goes for the remainder of Kilcullen’s work. Through my reading, not once did I get the sense that he was hoisting the writing up and saying, “Look at this all you lesser thinkers, this is the roadmap to victory.” You may wish he were doing so to make your critiques easier, but don’t hold your breath. When I return to Iraq, the 28 Articles will be prominently displayed in my hooch. I don’t have to believe that each article is achievable, as that would be akin to going hungry because I don’t like one of the buffet selections.
I’ve been trained to offer concrete solutions as well as critiques, which is something I have yet to see you do:
What path would you have us choose oh enlightened one? Wait, let me get my Surefire…Kilcullen is more ambitious, reaching far in search of a successful tactical formula for victory. Let’s not throw out the strange and new elements he suggests, but discuss what he actually said.
Even failed ideas move us forward, showing us another path that does not work.
Simple mantras from leaders like LtGen Mattis have shaped behavior and performance in ways you cannot imagine. They are simple and apply to the entire force, but because they are not the final recipe for victory, you seem to argue that they are less valid and pointless. I am here to tell you that if your moanful strategic corporal remembers the mantras, and prevents the needless death of one civilian, or one friendly fire incident, that is a good thing. At my level, the mantra has served a purpose. Perhaps you should not try to come down to my level, because you are disappointed and abhor my lot in life.
The not so dearly departed Rumsfeld said you go to war with the force you have. Would a 100% increase in the number of SF groups in country be a better approach? Perhaps, but we do not have that, and so certain qualities must be mimicked, attempted, and utilized.
If policy missteps had not been made by certain handlers of the politico-military force, we might have scaled down our presence to a small element of advisors, and we would not be having this discussion today. If there were civil war and we were not there, it would be a wholly Iraqi problem, not embracing us. Ding, ding…We are there, so tell me what you would have my Lance Corporals do? Oh wait, where did I put that Surefire again?
Perhaps we are not even dealing with a fourth generation war within the confines of Iraq and Afghanistan? After all, in all of the briefings and operational orders I’ve attended in the past 3 ½ years, I never heard the situation read as: “Gentlemen, we are embroiled in a fourth generation war…”
I fail to see where your article “Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?” Has any bearing on the discussion of COIN. We are in the fight, so live with it. Your grand theoretical brush has little to do with my world, working as a pair of boots on the ground. You threw it out there as something operationally applicable, but I can’t grasp what you meant. Please enlighten me.
In particular, this quote of yours shows a selective ignorance of several truths about the conflict we are in. This may be a great prescription for dealing with future threats (doubtful in my opinion) but we are not dealing with future threats my good man. Kilcullen seeks to set a framework for the threat we face in the here and now.A defensive war denies foreign 4GW foes both an aggressor and the home court advantage. When attacking us, they bear the high costs and frequent mistakes typical of overseas adventures. This works well with Lind’s recommendation to de-escalate. Treat users of terrorism as criminals wherever possible, in the sense of avoiding use of soldiers unless necessary. Avoid engaging them massively and directly – unless they attack first.
Most of your arguments in this thread smack of professional jealousy, and that's sad. If that is not the case, there’s no need to reply to this observation, as it is mine alone
I pulled this from Kilcullen’s Complex Warfighting article, which was written for the AUS forces, not US. As you allege elsewhere in your writings, we should address weaknesses and not our strengths, in order to achieve victory in long wars. Kilcullen’s point about modern soldiers requiring a skill set for a wider array of missions, resonates with me because current and future non-state threats do not present themselves as massed formations, marching up on the Common, shoulder to shoulder. Because they may offer only a temporary target, junior leaders have to understand what they’ve seen, report it, and have the skills to engage it quickly.Conventional/Special Operations. Capabilities that once resided exclusively in
Special Operations forces are proliferating to the combat force. Every soldier in contemporary conflict requires capabilities such as individual initiative, cultural sensitivity, linguistic competence, mastery of sophisticated weapons and sensors, and a capacity for small group independent operations – characteristics traditionally associated with Special Forces. Meanwhile, Special Operations forces are conducting conventional tasks such as screening, defence and largescale assault, and simultaneously developing more unconventional skills. Special and conventional operations are becoming increasingly integrated, occurring on the same terrain and relying upon intimate cooperation between combat forces, special operations forces and inter-agency elements. Moreover, although Combat Force tasks are different from Special Operations tasks, all soldiers require flexibility, physical and mental toughness, self-reliance and technical skills that allow them to be highly effective across a wider array of missions.
What is under your saddle that makes you find fault with this? Is it the fact that such training requires a significant investment in time and resources? Is it the fact that may not see immediate returns on that investment? Are you saying that for those reasons we should not move towards a better force in these areas? Your logic is confusing along this line, because it almost sounds as though you advocate that we should throw our hands up, cry about the difficulty of the task, and then retreat to a corner with our thumb stuck in our mouth.
Look, we all know that COIN is a hard row to hoe, and there are no magic silver bullets. Many members of the SWC may actually appreciate your points, although they would not publicly admit so because of other entanglements. Perhaps you should stop looking amorously at Kilcullen and start an analysis of personnel ceilings, advisory team staffing policies, force rotation policies, and whether heavy armor has a place on the Iraqi terrain…Kilcullen is not your whipping boy.
Throughout your article, “What should we do in Iraq”, you’ve beaten the drum that likes to take grand swipes at almost everything, yet offers nothing concrete as a better way ahead. In that you appear to believe we can do our best by leaving Iraq to avoid future casualties, your views smell like the obverse of neo-conservative Malkinism. It also smells like Peters and Malkin combined because you hype things up to a crescendo, but depart with a fizzle. You’re more than welcome to ruck up. That is unless, you’re simply enticing us into a discussion with you so that you can gleam more material for a future article. Please provide appropriate citations to recognize our efforts.
Make no doubt
Gentlemen,
As defined by Hammes we are definitely (there is no gray area) involved in a 4GW fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.
One aspect I haven't heard discussed much is the difficulty that a democratic country has in dealing with 4GW, vice a totalitarian one. We have certain limitations based on our laws and values that are easily exploitable. Some advocate changing the laws (the big ones in the press are torture, eavesdropping, etc.) to deal with the emergency, but the reality is these wars will last several years, so changing our laws would not a be temporary fix, such as establishing martial law in New Orleans after Katrina.
There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address. In 4GW you can't win the fight on the battleground, but you can lose it there. Please read Hammes's "The Sling and the Stone" for clarification.
Bill
True, Bill
One may be the date when we will finally break our dependence on oil from the Arabian Peninsula.There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address.
I was speaking rhetorically on the fourth generation warfare bit. I don't like how theorists try to package everything neatly, then fight over the scraps of who came up with the name first, but I agree that what we face now fits within those parameters.
I have to admit right from the start that I don't totally buy into the 4GW stuff. I just consider it a more developed (full spectrum, if you will) version of 3GW. Or an adaptation of old techniques to use new weapons and means of operations. That's my disclaimer.Originally Posted by Bill Moore
That said, Bill makes a very valid point regarding the lack of serious discussion regarding the ability of an open democracy such as ours to succeed in this sort of warfare where one of the major weapons is PR. The United States has always had great difficulty in this sort of operation, precisely because of our free press and the way the press views its role with regard to government and military operations. Now I'm not advocating in any way changes to freedom of the press, but it's worth remembering that the British in their COIN-type operations (to include Northern Ireland) exercised much tighter control over the press and had more sweeping powers when it came to covert and military/police operations. Also, I would say the nature of our basic political system (with a controlled revolution every two years in the form of elections) makes it especially difficult to develop the kind of long-term, all aspect campaign plan that would be needed for this sort of conflict. Sometimes other countries have succeeded against a 3GW+ adversary because of subtle differences in their political system or the relationship their military has with the remains of a colonial police force.
From a military standpoint, we need things like what Kilcullen and Mattis have put out. Mattis has an exceptional ability to relate his thoughts to the men in the ranks, and that is something that is all too rare in our military today.
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