I spent an hour and a half on this post, only to find the subject closed when I hit submit. I'm posting in the soapbox forum for my own personal gratification.
Quote Originally Posted by Fabius Maximus View Post
He's attempting to innovate, radically.
Quite the opposite, actually. He's summarizing the evolution of leadership in theater that began in April 2003 when we first started to fight the insurgency. While you're quite fond of starting with the first point and shredding it to pieces in rhetoric brimming with hyperbole, I could give you concrete operational examples of virtually every one of the 28 points being implemented successfully by either my troop or one of my brother troops in theater over the last 3 and a half years.

Point 1: Know your Turf- Very little difference from saying "Conduct IPB"
Point 2: Diagnose the Problem- Looks like Mission Analysis
Point 3: Organize for Intelligence- Companies don't have intelligence sections. Smart and innovative companies have developed intelligence sections that collect and analyze intelligence from the platoons. These ad-hoc sections were more often than not better suited and outperformed BN intelligence sections with actual intelligence MOS soldiers.
Point 4: Organize for Inter-Agency Operation: in your typical Mission Rehearsal Exercise, a company doesn't even touch inter-agency operations. In theater, maximizing the effectivness of inter-agency operations, particularly in the realm of CMO projects, can make or break your combat tour.
Point 5: Travel light and harden CSS- It doesn't take a Rhodes Scholar to see that CSS convoys were getting hammered right off the bat (remember PVT Lynch). We didn't do a good job in training our logisticians to fight on the roads. Conversely, for every tank or Bradley with a good load plan in theater I saw 8 gypsy wagons for tanks with all kinds of crap hanging off them that their crew would never use. Utilization of the conex for junk not used is an important PCI.
Point 6: Find a political/cultural advisor- Why did SF traditionally conduct UW and FID missions? Because being culturally astute are SF imperatives in their doctrine. We, in the conventional force, were never trained that way. Good units pulled in people who knew what they were talking about. I remember learning a great deal from Dr. Hashim. Once in theater, I got hooked into a sheiks family who brought me up to speed on the specific cultural dos and don'ts in my area. It helped place my soldiers in my troop on a higher plain of understanding than other units in theater. Our performance and results spoke to that.
Point 7: Train the Squad Leaders - then Trust them- On the high intensity battlefield, I, as a troop commander, can maneuver individual sections much easier than the COIN environment. The abilities of my junior leaders are paramountly important to everything I do. They conduct independent operations. Most of my patrols in my troop were lead by an E5 or E6. I had 3 officers in my troop. They couldn't be everywhere. I, as did my PLs, had to trust my NCOs to do the right thing constant with the commander's intent I wrote.
Point 8: Rank is nothing, Talent is everything - Goes back to the rule of thirds that Ricks talks about in Fiasco. Some are really good at COIN, some suck. Some of our best COIN operators are E5s and E4s who are out there every day. They understand how 2nd and 3rd order effects work. They see them up close and personal.
Point 9: Have a game plan- It may be surprising to you that many units go into an area without one. This ties back into Points 1-4.
Point 10: Be there- Near and dear to my heart. As a reconnaissance tactics instructor, it's my job to communicate to the force that R&S planning and operations work in COIN just like they do in HIC environments. If you're unable to place effective fires at the critical point and time (which in OCIN is 3-7 seconds) you'll lose the engagement. Developing NAIs on areas that have high IEDs and overwatching them will eliminate IEDs in given area. Again, goes back to IPB and planning
Point 11: Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions- First reports are wrong 95% of the time. Insuregents know when RIP/TOA is happening. depending on where you are, some lay low and some hammer the new unit. Those laying low can paralyze a new unit into inaction. Going into the game with a plan and sticking to it is better than initial improvisation.
Point 12: Prepare for handover from Day 1- We reinvent the wheel on each rotation. It has been said we fought the Vietnam war for one year 11 times, rather than for 11 years. Many units get the RIP/TOA files and paperwork and never look at them again. That's a travesty. Additionally, some units are preparing to RIP/TOA with indigenous forces. that needs to be planned from Day 1.
Point 13: Build Trusted networks- May seem like common sense but many units think they can do it on their own. There are people in the community who want to help, despite great risk to themselves and their family. Taking them in and getting them to help your unit will make the unit successful. Goes back to the cultural advisor piece. If the tree branches are overt operations, the tree's roots are relationships with and in the local populace.
Point 14 and 15: Start Easy and Seek early victories- Some go in and try to take down the entire AQIZ network in Iraq in their first 48 hours. the easiest victories have very little to do with kinetic operations; SWEAT-MS victories, tribal engagments, and equipping of security forces are the easiest 3 things to focus on. The populace see this and will warm to your unit quickly.
Point 16: Practice Deterrent patrolling- Firebase concepts, which conventional units were completely against initially, lend well to this. Dominating the environment through sheer presense to deter attacks goes back to R&S planning.

To be continued