The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[Fabius Maximus]

Folks, we're all stumbling around here. If you want good answers, call Martin van Creveld. It's long distance, but worth it.

Meanwhile, back in the weeds, it does not help me when you say that I'm wrong (btw, you're pussycats compared to the DNI editorial cabal).

Or that I've mis-read Kilcullen (ditto).

I've given a close analysis of his text. Please give specifics as to my errors.

Zenpundit, Merv, and others have raised some great and specific points, which I will attempt to grapple with later. Now on to the central question ...

[Fabius Maximus]

I've not communicated this clearly. Just to get together on the same page, let's start at the beginning.

For the past 100 years or so, western nations have lost almost every war like Iraq (fighting as aliens in a less developed state). You can call them colonial wars, low intensity conflicts, guerilla wars, insurgencies, or 4GW’s. There have been a few exceptions, either long ago (Philippines) or probably fictional (Malaysia).

Worse, 4GW’s might become the primary form of war in the 21st century. And as Iraq has shown, we do not know how to win such conflicts. In fact, we’re losing both wars in the Middle East theater.

One of our primary strengths is our free, competitive intellectual climate. Formally it is called the Delphi method. People write up proposals, which are circulated and intensely criticized. Eventually we find a solution. I doubt al-Qaeda has anything like this.

Kilcullen has written up a solution, in his various papers, for winning 4GW’s. The *proposal* might prove ineffective, but the *process* is of the highest importance.

This guy is a PhD anthropologist. If he wanted to write “cliff notes” – the basic stuff told to captains for generations or centuries (“know your turf”), he’d have done so in a fraction of the time and length.

The “cliff notes” version – boiling it down so that it only tells us what we already know – is just a recipe for defeat. Tried and failed.

Kilcullen is more ambitious, reaching far in search of a successful tactical formula for victory. Let’s not throw out the strange and new elements he suggests, but discuss what he actually said.

Even failed ideas move us forward, showing us another path that does not work.

[Fabius Maximus]

What is new in Kilcullen's discussion of PR & propaganda?

John Adam’s defense of the Redcoats following the Boston Massacre was – and was seen at the time – as a masterstroke of PR, gaining British sympathy for the colonies’ struggle against the Crown.

Ditto in the Civil War (aka, for you southerners, the War Between the States), where the PR war in Britain had a decisive effect on the outcome.

Ditto in WWI (e.g. the Zimmerman telegram).

That we’re doing so poorly in the information war for both Iraq and Afghanistan probably reflects the small number of Americans with the necessary knowledge of their cultures. Don’t hold your breath for this to change.


Re: Kilcullen’s discussion of the Indonesian insurrection

He misses, in my opinion, the primary difference between that and our wars in the ME. As do most who reference Lawrence. And often those looking for tips to win from the Malaysian Insurrection.

All were wars waged and won by the locals. We are aliens in a strange land. What works for the locals might be impossible for us.

[slapout9]

Fabius,one point that I think people over look when they refer to our successes (Philippines,Malaysia,Dominican Republic) is they were islands! Directly or indirectly we could quarantine the entire country not just a portion of it. In COIN ops I think you have to think about the whole country! if you don't what is to stop him from running to the hills? If he is in the hills what stops him from running to the city? If it is not an Island what stops him from running to another country?

PS It was the Invasion of the Damn Yankees not the war between the states!

[SWJED]

FM – I’ve followed this thread since you posted it and have to say I believe the “misunderstanding” of the replies lies in your quarter. The replies from seasoned COIN veterans in defense of Kilcullen are merely relating that his words of advice are appropriate and work in the world they operate in.

Those of the “theorist camp" have the luxury of endless debate on the “grand strategic themes” of 4GW, COIN, IW, etal. Your views are better served directed at members of the National Command Authority and not Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders and Team Leaders.

The operators do not have the luxury of picking and choosing the operational environment they are ordered to. What they do is adjust and make do with the best available information at their disposal. As Tom Ricks related in his recent book Fiasco – one third of our officers get it, one third are trying to get it and one third just want the hammer as their only tool in the box.

Kilcullen offers practical advice to the first two thirds and from what I gathered the majority of our operators appreciate his efforts. Again, these guys on the ground are not tasked with bringing world peace in our time. They are tasked with a difficult mission – a fuzzy end-state - and look to his words as a way to be part of the solution – not part of the problem. I take exception to anyone who imposes a top-down world view to those on the point of the spear.

Moreover, to those who say that advice such as this from Kilcullen and warrior-scholars such as Zinni, Petraeus and Mattis are just a blinding flash of the obvious, I submit we are not "real good" at lessons learned and often our best and brightest find themselves under the thumb of the last third mentioned above. Doses of reality from guys like Kilcullen, Zinni, Petraeus and Mattis should be written in stone so we don't need the next COIN guru to remind us of what we already know.

[jcustis]

End of story, 'nuff said, end of discussion. Thanks for being the eloquent verbal sword SWJED.

Nothing more to see here folks, you can continue to mill about smartly.

Oh, and FM, in response to:

The “cliff notes” version – boiling it down so that it only tells us what we already know – is just a recipe for defeat. Tried and failed.

, all I can say is that you would be surprised what people know, what they choose to ignore, and what they have to consciously suppress. This is sort of a walk a mile in my shoes moment, but I think you can understand...

[Fabius Maximus]

We're losing, but I guess that's not a problem. Ok, let's try again.

#2 -- Diagnose the problem.

Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick?

Having “strategic corporals” was insufficient. Now we need “doctorate captains.” This is not a task for company commanders, with already complex and heavy load of leadership and managerial tasks.

Worse, Kilcullen’s work persistently ignores this advice. There is little consideration given to the locals’ motivations, or al Qaeda’s. How does this struggle look to them?

Also, this advice highlights the difference between the UK “victory” in Malaysia and our current expeditions to the Middle East. The UK had over a century’s experience governing Malaysia, local knowledge that we lack and cannot quickly develop.

#3 -- Organize for intelligence.

In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations will be intelligence driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a “product” prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and intelligence section.

Kilcullen is moving regimental/battalion level functions onto combat companies, who are neither staffed nor trained for this level of complex and technical operations.

Training for this level of intelligence works takes at least two years, and the US State and Defense departments have far too such people for this to be realistic.

Wishing for what we lack is not a tactical doctrine; or rather it is a doomed one. Why not just ask for ten divisions of multi-lingual MP’s and be done with it?

We have fielded an army of the best educated and trained company commanders the world has ever seen. We can ask much of them, but not anything of them. Putting our Captains on a runway does not make them airplanes.

Increasing their responsibilities should not substitute for the military’s lack of effective doctrine and operational intelligence.

Simplifying their job might produce better results than making it more complex. Certainly the insurgents’ operational doctrines do not require leaders with a college degree, let alone graduate studies. Perhaps we can learn something from them in this respect.