The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[MikeF]

Mike, thanks for your indulgence and sorry for the derailment. Your response is more than fair.

Well, I for one appreciate your thoughts. I just didn't think this was the appropriate thread. Your words are broad, deep, and wide.

I'm actually going to come back to them as I continue to dissect Dr. K. He talks of hearts and minds, the essence of the so-called pop-centric COIN. I think he missed an important element. I'm gonna talk hearts, minds, and soul of rebellion. To use Dr. K's model, small wars are an open, robust conflict ecosystem. In my interpretation reversed from IR principles, it gets back to the state and nature of man.

But, we're not there yet. I want to see what others consider on his initial research questions and my added ones.

[huskerguy7]

I recently just began this book. Dr. Kilcullen's "Accidental Guerrilla" provided a large amount of information regarding COIN; one of my favorites. Dr. Kilcullen is a great resource for not only COIN, but also both Iraq and Afghanistan. I had the chance to interview him for a piece I'm working on regarding the ANA, and we discussed some interesting ideas.

My bad if I placed it in the wrong section.

Okay, IMO, other questions to consider,

1. Do we intervene in third-country counterinsurgencies?

2. If so, to what degree? Ranging from one advisor to a million man army.

3. Whom do we send? Ranging from political advisors to occupation forces.

4. What do they do? Ranging from advising in safe, rear areas to taking charge of clearing denied guerrilla safehavens.

The discussion, debate, and answers to those questions define the crux of the current dillemma in A'stan.

These are good questions to consider. However, each country has its own characteristics, so the answers to these can vary. My answers will assume that the country is Afghanistan.

I strongly support the idea of advisers, known as Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in Afghanistan, backed by air support (it doesn't matter if it's a couple of AFBs or CVGs). Basically, there is an OMLT for every "Kandak" or battalion. Each OMLT is about 20 troops.

In my mindset, this will work if there is a structured, organized army, if the OMLTs are trained to "Western" standards, and possess some knowledge of the local languages. They should also be educated on COIN.

Tasks and Responsibilities: OMLTs will be dug in with the forces they follow. They will train local soldiers, show them "tricks" (maintaining weapons, aiming properly, etc), fight with the local soldiers, and work with commanders. They would basically provide on site training and aid, and when things get bumpy, they would call in their air support. It would also be worth considering embedding an OMLT with a logistics unit, especially in a unit like the ANA.

As I mentioned before, there is no "standard" answer for these questions. In Afghanistan, you have an organized army that is also somewhat large (it must be big enough to have a presence, otherwise a full blown force is needed), not to corrupt (it's the ANP that's corrupt), and determined. In this case, I think advisers would be the best way to operate.

[William F. Owen]

For this thread, I just want to discuss David Kilcullen, a man that I love to read and listen to and adamently disagree with at times.

Amen. Nice guy as well, but having been a fan of his Infantry writing, I have come to disagree a lot with what he writes about COIN or what folks ascribe to him.
BUT:-

1. What kind of state are we trying to build or assist?

2. How compatible is the local government's character with our own?

3. What kinds of states have proven viable in the past, in this country and with this population?

4. What evidence is there that the kind of state we are trying to build will be viable here?

...and so what? Every one of those questions are policy questions. Dave is way outside his pay grade. These are questions for the Foreign Policy, and they assume that irregular warfare will take place in the context of that policy - which is not true.
You could have asked those questions about Nazi Germany. It would not have helped you win the war.

[MikeF]

A King without a Crown- the forlorn hope of winning hearts and minds.

In night comes day and the day comes to light, and I sing to my God in praise that it will be allright. Songs that I've been feeling.

- Matisyahu

Before we proceed, I would ask that someone/anyone provide a moment or a case study when a third party actor successfully persuaded a guerrilla to lay down his arms and embrace a foreign interventionist world view through peace, love, and fate.

The easy ones:

Ghandi- nope
MLK- nope
Malcom X- nope

Or as David Kilcullen explains (p. 4),

The second to act with respect for local people, putting the well-being of noncombatant civilians ahead of any other consideration, even- in fact, especially, ahead of killing the enemy. Convincing threatened populations that we are the winning side.

Wow, from my experience, this shows a deep lack of understanding of the populace. So, provide me at least one example of when these truths collectively persuaded an entire populace to lay down their arms.

I'm just asking for one instance, just one, and as much as you would like to assume, Dr. Nagl's version of the Malaya Emergency is not it. A lot of killing subsided beore his proposed lessons learned.

The only one that I can consider involves the old testament, trumpets blaring on a fortification, and a direct intervention by God.

Otherwise, in Schmedlap's terms, I'm gonna start drinking the bong water. I'll put this in the most simplest terms- If we stopped Mississippi from burning, if we protected the blacks there from being lynched, would that have stopped the civil rights movement? Nope.

Now that I gave you an analogy that you can understand, then answer the question,

Why?

[William F. Owen]

Or as David Kilcullen explains (p. 4),
The second to act with respect for local people, putting the well-being of noncombatant civilians ahead of any other consideration, even- in fact, especially, ahead of killing the enemy. Convincing threatened populations that we are the winning side.

Like MikeF, this is where I part company with Dave. Without specific context, this is a slippery slope. If you do not want military operations to adversely effect the population, do not conduct them. All military action risks killing civilians, the same way as all military action risks "friendly fire."

Making it clear that nothing will distract you from hunting and killing the enemy is an essential ingredient of breaking the enemies will to endure. Giving out any other message may suggest that taking hostages works, since it degrades your use of military power.

I'm just asking for one instance, just one, and as much as you would like to assume, Dr. Nagl's version of the Malaya Emergency is not it. A lot of killing subsided beore his proposed lessons learned.

Concur. John Nagl's is thesis is wonderful for promoting John Nagl's agenda, but it does not usefully inform thinking on Irregular Warfare.

[Steve Blair]

Wow, from my experience, this shows a deep lack of understanding of the populace. So, provide me at least one example of when these truths collectively persuaded an entire populace to lay down their arms.

I'm just asking for one instance, just one, and as much as you would like to assume, Dr. Nagl's version of the Malaya Emergency is not it. A lot of killing subsided beore his proposed lessons learned.

The only one that I can consider involves the old testament, trumpets blaring on a fortification, and a direct intervention by God.

Otherwise, in Schmedlap's terms, I'm gonna start drinking the bong water. I'll put this in the most simplest terms- If we stopped Mississippi from burning, if we protected the blacks there from being lynched, would that have stopped the civil rights movement? Nope.

Now that I gave you an analogy that you can understand, then answer the question,

Why?

Mike,

There are examples from the Indian Wars that involved minimal loss of life (Mackenzie's operations during the Red River War are one example, as is Carleton's campaign against the Navaho), and were usually predicated by an understanding of the tribes. Mackenzie figured out that killing warriors just got the vengeance cycle started (many tribes held that a death had to be avenged - a major consideration in the actual start of the Red River War), and he also pinpointed two major weaknesses of the Plains tribes: they couldn't replace lost supplies or physical equipment quickly or easily; and they were tied to their large pony herd. Thus his attacks (and those of Carleton as conducted in the field by Carson) targeted physical villages and pony herds and not the actual population. Mackenzie later disarmed the Sioux still on the reservation under Red Cloud by surrounding the camp before daybreak and telling them that he would destroy the village if they didn't turn in their arms. They did, because they knew he'd do it if they refused. But they also knew that he wouldn't harm them if they followed instructions.

Is that the same thing as Kilkullen's talking about? Hard to say, since I don't know what he was thinking when he wrote it. But it may show a more practical application of what we now call "hearts and minds." He may also be spinning that way in some sort of attempt to curb what he may feel is an over-reliance on firepower. Again, it's hard to say. A more useful way to look at the concept might be "understanding hearts and minds," which I take to mean taking the time to get a good grasp of what will and will not work in a particular situation and then acting on it. Mackenzie did that, as did Carleton and a handful of other skillful officers on the Frontier. But they also had years to develop their solutions. Our rotation practices don't necessarily allow that.

[MikeF]

Is that the same thing as Kilkullen's talking about? Hard to say, since I don't know what he was thinking when he wrote it. But it may show a more practical application of what we now call "hearts and minds." He may also be spinning that way in some sort of attempt to curb what he may feel is an over-reliance on firepower. Again, it's hard to say. A more useful way to look at the concept might be "understanding hearts and minds," which I take to mean taking the time to get a good grasp of what will and will not work in a particular situation and then acting on it. Mackenzie did that, as did Carleton and a handful of other skillful officers on the Frontier. But they also had years to develop their solutions. Our rotation practices don't necessarily allow that.

Good comments, Steve, and I should clarify my position. That page just pissed me off. Certainly, if you can find a way to end an insurgency nonviolent, that is wonderful just like my favorite insurgent is Martin Luther King achieving his political aims nonviolently. But, from what I've experienced and studied, those instances are typically outliers.

Let me try this another way. Once a community has gotten to the point where they are willing to send their teenage daughters or eight year old boys to blow themselves up, then you're probably going to be engaged in a tough fight.

The ironic thing is that most Pop-Centric dudes don't disagree with me. As we discuss it, they typically say, "Mike, you are absolutely right, but we can't say it like that. It sounds too harsh." I respond that the way they are saying it confuses others and leads to more people getting killed.

Case in point. A couple of pages later, Dr. K follows up with,

Again, in practice, this population-centric approach often involves as much fighting, if not more, than an enemy-centric approach, because putting in place effective population protection forces the enemy to come to us, so that we fight the guerrillas on our terms, not on theirs. Ironically, an effective population-centric strategy usually results in far greater losses to the enemy-- in terms of insurgents killed, wounded, captured, surrendered, or defected-- than does a superficially more aggressive enemy-centric approach.

He regains his sanity. Unfortunately, most people don't make it to that page.

[Steve Blair]

Good comments, Steve, and I should clarify my position. That page just pissed me off. Certainly, if you can find a way to end an insurgency nonviolent, that is wonderful just like my favorite insurgent is Martin Luther King achieving his political aims nonviolently. But, from what I've experienced and studied, those instances are typically outliers.

I'd say based on my study as well that you're quite correct. To go back to my favorite period, Mackenzie's methods wouldn't work well against the Apache, who had none of the cultural vulnerabilities that he was able to exploit with the Comanche. Would he have successfully adjusted? I think so based on his record. As a counter-example, Crook was fairly successful against the Apache, but suffered at the hands of the Plains tribes. His techniques simply didn't work against their mass, and he never seemed to grasp that fact.

I think hearts and minds tends to get twisted here based on the American desire for a "one size fits all" answer or some sort of silver bullet. Are aspects of hearts and minds useful? Sure, but only in the proper place and at the proper time. It's everything after the 'but' in the last sentence that is often missed. Yet as Crook demonstrated, it's also critical to have a handle on what it is that makes those hearts and minds tick.

[MikeF]

I recently just began this book. Dr. Kilcullen's "Accidental Guerrilla" provided a large amount of information regarding COIN; one of my favorites. Dr. Kilcullen is a great resource for not only COIN, but also both Iraq and Afghanistan. I had the chance to interview him for a piece I'm working on regarding the ANA, and we discussed some interesting ideas.



These are good questions to consider. However, each country has its own characteristics, so the answers to these can vary. My answers will assume that the country is Afghanistan.

I strongly support the idea of advisers, known as Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in Afghanistan, backed by air support (it doesn't matter if it's a couple of AFBs or CVGs). Basically, there is an OMLT for every "Kandak" or battalion. Each OMLT is about 20 troops.

In my mindset, this will work if there is a structured, organized army, if the OMLTs are trained to "Western" standards, and possess some knowledge of the local languages. They should also be educated on COIN.

Tasks and Responsibilities: OMLTs will be dug in with the forces they follow. They will train local soldiers, show them "tricks" (maintaining weapons, aiming properly, etc), fight with the local soldiers, and work with commanders. They would basically provide on site training and aid, and when things get bumpy, they would call in their air support. It would also be worth considering embedding an OMLT with a logistics unit, especially in a unit like the ANA.

As I mentioned before, there is no "standard" answer for these questions. In Afghanistan, you have an organized army that is also somewhat large (it must be big enough to have a presence, otherwise a full blown force is needed), not to corrupt (it's the ANP that's corrupt), and determined. In this case, I think advisers would be the best way to operate.

I like the way that you're thinking. What a concept- let the host nation take responsibility for their own country. BTW, it's also much cheaper in both US blood and treasure, and, in the long term, is typically more successful.

[tequila]

I'm a much bigger fan of the idea of "control" over the population rather than the concept of "hearts and minds", which as everyone notes is very fuzzy. Basically, I think Kalyvas is mostly right.

Control can come about through many different factors and context matters above all. In some places a substantial police presence may be enough, in others a combined mil/police or mil/only presence has to occur. But an effective and continuous presence among the population must be gained and maintained by the counterinsurgent force - whether this presence is a co-opted force of former insurgents, a warlord, an elected council with its own locally recruited militia, a secret police force, whatever. Using Kilcullen's term, "repetitive raiding" is not enough against an insurgency of any strength.

[Tukhachevskii]

I read some of Killcullen's articles and found them a mixture of the common-place/sense (in terms of tradtional COIN theory) and some assertions I found just to unpalatable for comfoft. In his Countering Global Insurgency piece, that I read in the Journal of Startegic Studies but which was repreinted in the SWJ, I found his recommendations the equivalent of proposing appeasement as a global coin strategy (we all know how well appeasement worked with Hitler don't we?). He used systems theory to explicate the global aspects of Islamic insurgency and then failed to join the dots by stating that we need to ammeliorate local issues to prevent them becomming global ones. Yet that approach merely fuels bandwagoners and leaves us open to an Islamic protection racket. Surely, the best way is to detach local agents from their ability to globalise a conflict (which may or may not have anything to do with Islam)- i.e., through controlling/policing the global commons, an aggresive IO operation through all media channels that questions and detonates the Islamic theology that these people justify themselves with, stregthening our own western values and civil societies at home to prevent them subverting us from within, etc.- rather than actually legitimate their global aspirations framed through, say the Israeli-Palestinian issue, or Chechnya. By addressing the so-called issue that supposedly generate these conflicst we are actually legitimising and further fuelling the utopian Islamic mindset. Do we/he really think that by solving the palestinian question Islamic warfare will simply end? What's next after Israel? Spain, sorry, Al-Andalusia? France? The balkans? From what I have read re: his book, I am glad I didn't pick up a copy that was going cheap in a charity shop, which is the best place for it IMO

By the way, I am writing an article that will further outline my criticisms re: Kilcullen and traditional COIN and hope its hosted by the SWJ so if I seem like I just exploded into a rant I hope you now know why! Also, while I'm on my high horse, I do not subscribe to the view, peddled by many in the media establishment here in Blighty (multi-culturalism strikes again) that being anti-Islamic equates to Racisim; is anti-Nazism hatred for Germans or anti-Communism hatred for Russians? The Arab's were the first victims of Islam (and not the last, unfortunately)and the least we can do is help them, and others, "throw off the schackles of their own immaturity" (as Kant once said). (And you though I was cured of rants...still seeking therapy I'm afraid.)

[slapout9]

Let me try this another way. Once a community has gotten to the point where they are willing to send their teenage daughters or eight year old boys to blow themselves up, then you're probably going to be engaged in a tough fight.

Exactly, we have forgotten the difference between a Revolt (armed overthrow of the government) vs. a Rebellion (Riot)against a law, policy or situation. A rebellion can be solved peacefully because the people still believe in their government, in fact that is why they are rebelling, to get the government to change. In a Revolt they don't want the government to change........ they want to CHANGE the whole government. Negotiating with them will be pretty useless......unless it is terms of your surrender.

[MikeF]

Very good comments all around. I feel bad for beating up Dr. K this much, and I haven't even gotten through the introduction.

Here's a great speech that he gave at Google a while back.

[huskerguy7]

I like the way that you're thinking. What a concept- let the host nation take responsibility for their own country. BTW, it's also much cheaper in both US blood and treasure, and, in the long term, is typically more successful.

It sounds good, but it really depends on the host nation's capabilities and motives. For example, in a country like Somalia where little organization exists, it won't work very well. Also, the size of the army matters. Fourtanetly, the ANA is over 100,000 and is growing.

However, one may argue, that you may need a "full force" initially. This may be necessary to restore immediate order and help set up the "right" partner.

I could see this working well in some scenarios. The OMLTs have been praised in Afghanistan (to bad there are many vacant spots).

Or, this may be a little out there, but consider hiring contractors to fulfill the jobs instead?

I just saw, but have yet to read an essay about the mentoring process.

Good comments.

[slapout9]

Very good comments all around. I feel bad for beating up Dr. K this much, and I haven't even gotten through the introduction.

Here's a great speech that he gave at Google a while back.

Don't feel to bad, you probably sold a lot of books for him

[Mike in Hilo]

Re: the lines Mike F quoted from p.4 of the Intro on the importance of placing the wellbeing of civilians ahead of killing the enemy, and the importance of convincing threatened populations that we are on the winning side--Strikes me we have a contradiction...

My own training and experience long ago convinced me that the primary COIN general principle--the indispensible sine qua non--was indeed convincing the population that we are on the winning side. May require a higher priority on killing the enemy (not advocating slaughter of civilians, for sure). That and "control" as Tequila has defined it.

Cheers,
Mike.

[Arnie]

Thanks for kicking this off Mike. Im trying to get my hands on a copy. Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking? Im particularly interested in understanding what insurgencies will look like in the future so we can begin planning how troops are trained so they are equipped for any future deployment. Do insurgencies always have the same fundamentals or will they morph into new strains? Maybe it just comes back to the simple drivers of life and death...im no expert just an insatiable appetite

[William F. Owen]

Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking?

It's his "original ideas" that I think are mostly wrong. The "Complex" and "Globalisation" stuff is mostly not good.

Im particularly interested in understanding what insurgencies will look like in the future so we can begin planning how troops are trained so they are equipped for any future deployment.

Dave Kilcullen cannot tell you because he can't tell the future. Neither can anyone else. Even if he could it wouldn't have much if any impact on training. Just do the stuff you've had to do in the past.

Do insurgencies always have the same fundamentals or will they morph into new strains? Maybe it just comes back to the simple drivers of life and death...im no expert just an insatiable appetite

War is war. Warfare changes but usually incredibly slowly.

I'm no expert either and share your appetite mate, but there is almost nothing worth eating from the "NEW-COIN" salad bar of nuts and mineral water.

[MikeF]

However, one may argue, that you may need a "full force" initially. This may be necessary to restore immediate order and help set up the "right" partner.

Argue away, just back it up with at least some historical examples of success. That argument is an assumption (the kind that make an ass out of u and me) hence my four additional questions. Tom Ricks labeled it appropriately as a Gamble with no historical basis of support. I would suggest that we got lucky in Iraq.

Tequilla dubs it control. I understand his position, but I would suggest that it is always an illusion of control- appropriate for securing ground in the short term, but irrelevant in the long run strategic success.

Recently, my small reconnaissance squadron was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for our actions in taking down an Al Qaeda training camp during the Surge. I was the main effort. 80% of all actions were derived from my troop as a commander.

I also watched the aftermath of trying to control and change people.

I am well aware of the so-called necessity for us to interdict with mass, and I would suggest that it is rubbish.

As I consider Dr. K, I think his biggest shortcoming is his scope. He visited numerous units for short periods. In 3-4 day spurts, he tried to capture what each commander was facing. You never know truth without staying for at least three months with a unit. That remains his flaw. He heard what he wanted to hear and neatly packaged it into a book.

[MikeF]

Thanks for kicking this off Mike. Im trying to get my hands on a copy. Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking?

as it should be read by everyone.

Arnie,

Even though I'm gonna critique this book to death, Dr. K is the only willing person so far to have the balls (intestinal fortitude in army speak) to categorically write on this subject.

I have much respect.