The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[jcustis]

FB,

I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.

That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:

Kilcullen then gives 28 steps to victory. Let's start at the top.

As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.

Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.

[SWJED]

FB,

I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.

That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:

As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.

Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.

I started to post something along this line last night but got overwhelmed with the SWJ updates...

Again, spot on and well said.

[zenpundit]

While I heartily endorse FM's call to look at the writings of Chet Richards, T.X. Hammes, William Lind and DNI generally ( I'd throw in John Robb too) I don't agree with his assessment of Colonel Kilcullen who comes with some good COIN experiences in Indonesia ( how many of us are familiar with the enormous constellation of hinterland militias there ? Talk to anyone from Besi Merah Putih lately ? From even the little I know about Indonesia, I can say it is as easily as complex a situation as Iraq in terms of ethnic, religious and political dynamics but with ten times the population and thousands of islands. Getting a handle on that requires some real brains).

Kilcullen is giving general advice, not an operational plan (I doubt the DoD is listening anyway).

[Merv Benson]

I thought his comments on the enemy's tying of its tactics to his PR campaign was very insightful. I will let others argue over the effect of his works on the local level. One of the biggest failures we have had in this war is in the media battle space, While the man at least recognizes the problem, we still have put no one in charge of fighting in thsi battle space.

[slapout9]

Fabius, I read the article by TX at the link you posted, and thanks for posting as I said I like TX and enjoy reading his work, and I will get his book shortly. Maybe I can give you something to review. In the article he recommends several movies if you don't like to read- Lawrence of Arabia, Battle of Algiers,etc. I would suggest "Next of Kin" with Patrick Swazye. Sometimes it is a little goofy in places but it is closer to truth then you might think with reference to Family Tribes. There are some lessons to be learned for Iraq to. Blood is thicker than water or an idea. If you get a chance watch it, let me know what you think. I would also recommend it for the SWC, maybe a topic for future discussion. "Remember Kin is Kin and thats the way it is!!!!" Great line from some part of the movie. Later.

[RTK]

FB,

I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.

That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:



As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.

Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.

To echo jcustis as another former Troop commander who has been to Iraq for two years, LTC (Dr.) Kilcullen's pieces are Cliff Notes for those who haven't been there yet. True, most of what he's written becomes second nature to someone with experience in the arena. I had taken for granted the importance of some of his points (I first read his 28 points article after my second year in Iraq) though, in retrospect, I found myself using his article as a report card for performance.

In addition, I saw Dave Kilcullen present on his 28 Points article about 2 months ago. he presented the 28 points as a pre, during, and post operation PMCS of sorts. Most of his points can be addressed at the company level during an abreviated MDMP or mission planning process.

Also, it's interesting to me that Dave Kilcullen, TX Hammes, and John Nagl are all good friends and seem to quote each other regularly. I take it for what it's worth; a triad of guys who are pretty smart on the subject. Mixing their knowledge with what I've learned in over two years of COIN gives me, in my opinion, a pretty good handle on the COIN business.

$0.02

[Fabius Maximus]

Folks, we're all stumbling around here. If you want good answers, call Martin van Creveld. It's long distance, but worth it.

Meanwhile, back in the weeds, it does not help me when you say that I'm wrong (btw, you're pussycats compared to the DNI editorial cabal).

Or that I've mis-read Kilcullen (ditto).

I've given a close analysis of his text. Please give specifics as to my errors.

Zenpundit, Merv, and others have raised some great and specific points, which I will attempt to grapple with later. Now on to the central question ...

[Fabius Maximus]

I've not communicated this clearly. Just to get together on the same page, let's start at the beginning.

For the past 100 years or so, western nations have lost almost every war like Iraq (fighting as aliens in a less developed state). You can call them colonial wars, low intensity conflicts, guerilla wars, insurgencies, or 4GW’s. There have been a few exceptions, either long ago (Philippines) or probably fictional (Malaysia).

Worse, 4GW’s might become the primary form of war in the 21st century. And as Iraq has shown, we do not know how to win such conflicts. In fact, we’re losing both wars in the Middle East theater.

One of our primary strengths is our free, competitive intellectual climate. Formally it is called the Delphi method. People write up proposals, which are circulated and intensely criticized. Eventually we find a solution. I doubt al-Qaeda has anything like this.

Kilcullen has written up a solution, in his various papers, for winning 4GW’s. The *proposal* might prove ineffective, but the *process* is of the highest importance.

This guy is a PhD anthropologist. If he wanted to write “cliff notes” – the basic stuff told to captains for generations or centuries (“know your turf”), he’d have done so in a fraction of the time and length.

The “cliff notes” version – boiling it down so that it only tells us what we already know – is just a recipe for defeat. Tried and failed.

Kilcullen is more ambitious, reaching far in search of a successful tactical formula for victory. Let’s not throw out the strange and new elements he suggests, but discuss what he actually said.

Even failed ideas move us forward, showing us another path that does not work.

[Fabius Maximus]

What is new in Kilcullen's discussion of PR & propaganda?

John Adam’s defense of the Redcoats following the Boston Massacre was – and was seen at the time – as a masterstroke of PR, gaining British sympathy for the colonies’ struggle against the Crown.

Ditto in the Civil War (aka, for you southerners, the War Between the States), where the PR war in Britain had a decisive effect on the outcome.

Ditto in WWI (e.g. the Zimmerman telegram).

That we’re doing so poorly in the information war for both Iraq and Afghanistan probably reflects the small number of Americans with the necessary knowledge of their cultures. Don’t hold your breath for this to change.


Re: Kilcullen’s discussion of the Indonesian insurrection

He misses, in my opinion, the primary difference between that and our wars in the ME. As do most who reference Lawrence. And often those looking for tips to win from the Malaysian Insurrection.

All were wars waged and won by the locals. We are aliens in a strange land. What works for the locals might be impossible for us.

[slapout9]

Fabius,one point that I think people over look when they refer to our successes (Philippines,Malaysia,Dominican Republic) is they were islands! Directly or indirectly we could quarantine the entire country not just a portion of it. In COIN ops I think you have to think about the whole country! if you don't what is to stop him from running to the hills? If he is in the hills what stops him from running to the city? If it is not an Island what stops him from running to another country?

PS It was the Invasion of the Damn Yankees not the war between the states!

[SWJED]

FM – I’ve followed this thread since you posted it and have to say I believe the “misunderstanding” of the replies lies in your quarter. The replies from seasoned COIN veterans in defense of Kilcullen are merely relating that his words of advice are appropriate and work in the world they operate in.

Those of the “theorist camp" have the luxury of endless debate on the “grand strategic themes” of 4GW, COIN, IW, etal. Your views are better served directed at members of the National Command Authority and not Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders and Team Leaders.

The operators do not have the luxury of picking and choosing the operational environment they are ordered to. What they do is adjust and make do with the best available information at their disposal. As Tom Ricks related in his recent book Fiasco – one third of our officers get it, one third are trying to get it and one third just want the hammer as their only tool in the box.

Kilcullen offers practical advice to the first two thirds and from what I gathered the majority of our operators appreciate his efforts. Again, these guys on the ground are not tasked with bringing world peace in our time. They are tasked with a difficult mission – a fuzzy end-state - and look to his words as a way to be part of the solution – not part of the problem. I take exception to anyone who imposes a top-down world view to those on the point of the spear.

Moreover, to those who say that advice such as this from Kilcullen and warrior-scholars such as Zinni, Petraeus and Mattis are just a blinding flash of the obvious, I submit we are not "real good" at lessons learned and often our best and brightest find themselves under the thumb of the last third mentioned above. Doses of reality from guys like Kilcullen, Zinni, Petraeus and Mattis should be written in stone so we don't need the next COIN guru to remind us of what we already know.