Quote Originally Posted by Mike in Hilo
1) Re: Crossborder sanctuaries for Malaya CTs: I am nitpicking--mea culpa: In fact, the then heavily forested Thai border did pose real problems for the British-led COIN effort in Malaya....
As an aside, the current Thai government often accuses Malaysia of lending succor to the ongoing insurgency in southern Thailand. Borders troubles can work in both directions...
Quote Originally Posted by Mike in Hilo
2) Kilcullen's view, at least as he presents it, of the local citizen perusing the competing menus presented him by insurgents and COIN forces and judiciously selecting the best deal (one dish from the "hearts" column, a couple from the "minds" column), causes certain reservations to arise. This is not to say that there is no important role for the "carrot" in a carrot and stick approach...
Anyone who doesn't believe that the indig "peruse competing menus" in order to select the path that is most beneficial to them personally is extremely naive. Of course, the fundamental "benefit" is that which permits survival. The indig understand more clearly than the average troop exactly how transient our presence really is.

The RAND pub On Other War, posted in another thread a while back, discusses the Hearts & Minds vs Cost/Benefit theories of COIN, and does a pretty decent job of putting them in context. In my mind, they are inextricably linked and it comes down to possessing enough knowledge of the local situation to effectively blend the two methods into a strategy that will eventually have a real strategic impact.