Point 17: Be prepared for setbacks- Things don't go perfectly, despite even the best of plans. Western logic doesn't always translate well. Despite your best effort to explain a specific COA to a sheik, he may not roll with it. If you've hinged your entire plan on the COA he's refuted, you probably needed to plan a bit better. Stuff happens. Deal with it.
Point 18: Engage the Women; Beware the Children- Iraq, despite the men's perspective, is a matriarichal society. Getting into the women's networks influences the family network and gets 14 year old Joe Jiahist grounded and beaten with a wooden stick by his mom. Aside from the pure comedic value of these types of events, the women's circles are often the untapped venues of success in this type of society. Conversely, the insurgents are more ruthless than we are. They use kids because they're impressionable and, to them, expendible. It's much easier, seemingly, to deal with the kids, but they're distractors and oftentimes scouts for insurgents.
Point 19: take stock regularly- It may seem like common sense, but after continuous operations for prolonged periods, it's tougher to do than you'd think. Determining the metrics of progress can change from week to week. But it lets us know where we are and where we need to go.
Point 20: Remember the global audience- Perception is reality, even if it's wrong. The way this war is covered, a private flashing a group of kids with the muzzle of his weapon on routine patrol can be cut and spliced into a nasty IO message for the insurgents. We are always on stage and they have the benefit of the doubt globally right now.
Point 21: Exploit single narrative- This goes right into the IO plan. It must be tailored to fit your specific area. Again, this is something we don't train regularly and we learn by doing.
Point 22: Local forces should mirror enemy, not ourselves- Further, they should mirror local operational requirements. What the use in providing the villiage doctor with an endocrinology lab that he doesn't know how to use? i don't know either, but some division surgeon thought it was a good idea. Additionally, just because we have bells and whistles for equipment doesn't mean our partnering Iraqi unit does to. We need to remember that. Often we don't.
Point 23: Practice Armed Civil Affairs- CMO can be a decisive operation depending on where you are. You must be able to transition rom CA to combat operations quickly. Additionally, the CA bubba isn't the only one doing CA work; your 19D1O is probably doing more CA in a day than the Civil Affairs officer will do in 3 days.
Point 24: Small is beautiful- Iraqis want to see results. The proliferation of small programs that work does wonders. Also, small is recoverable and cheap. They don't need to know that.
Point 25: Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces- The strategy is the iceburg, his forces are the tip. Ask Capt Smith from the Titanic what was more important. We often look for the 10 meter target and forget what's downrange.
Point 26: Builld your own solution, attack only when he gets in the way- Combat operations doesn't win COIN For a company, since combat operations are what we've trained for, they're our comfort zone. CMO, IO, economic development, and the sustainment of security forces are all bigger moneymakers in COIN than combat operations. It's tough to get to work, but more productive once you do.
Point 27: Keep extraction plan secret: Everyone has a farewell tour with the sheiks, tribal leaders, political leaders, and others in the AO they've worked with over the year. That gets back to the insurgents. We need to watch it, but I was guilty of this too. It's where human instinct and developed relationships interfere with what is doctrinally right.
Point 28: Keep the initiative- Insurgents are used to the initiative. Hell, our battle drills are all named "react to ____." By good planning and intel development, you can kick an insurgent in the teeth by making him react. Insurgents can handle Initate ambush but aren't too good at the React to Contact game and usually die in place.


The bottom line is that every point Kilcullen makes has an operational relevance that you apparently won't acknowledge.
Quote Originally Posted by Fabius Maximus View Post
To "translate" what he says “down” into standard doctrine is, I believe, to frustrate the purpose of his work. That's what I believe was said earlier by referring to his work as a "cliff notes."
Since I started using that phrase, that isn't what I was inferring at all. The 28 points are a checklist for good behavior, things you should be doing. They're a compass for operations that, until recently, we really didn't train on. Will they always work? Probably not. Even Duke loses a basketball game now and then with a great coach and a great plan. But I know that even Kilcullen would tell you that these are not meant to be an end-all, be-all answer to COIN operations.