The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

Bill,

I think our own approaches to the events of 9/11 have been far more damaging to the ideals contained within the US Constitution, the US Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence than anything done anywhere by any of our perceived "threats."

I will agree that dealing with Assad is not the key, and certainly not one we are postured to turn. We do, however, need to recognize that ISIL is the government of a newly emergent Sunni Arab State, and that the "defeat" of ISIL does not solve the problem, it only knocks it back into being a Sunni Arab Revolutionary Insurgency. Worse, it makes that population even less likely to listen to what the US has to say on how to move forward in addressing the very real and reasonable concerns these Sunni Arabs have with continuing to live under the Shia dominated governments of Syria and Iraq.

Better we focus on what we still retain some degree of control over, and work to offer to the Sunni the same partial-sovereignty package we shaped for the Kurds. This would have to be complete with some scheme for revenue sharing between the three primary systems of governance that is tied more to population than to geography.

When we tell the average Sunni that we are against ISIL, but not them - and in the same breath say we are dedicated to restoring the Iraqi state, it simply does not resonate. We drive the people into ISIL's arms with this policy.

So, to reiterate my concern with Dave Kilcullen - he is too threat-centric, and only offered a strategy that suggested one could defeat an insurgent threat by bribing a population to accept the status quo of governance they are revolting against.

We must become problem-centric. The Sunni Arab population of Syria and Iraq have a reasonable concern and are acting out to resolve it. So far, ISIL is the only one offering a realistic solution. We need to offer a better solution if we hope to outcompete ISIL and render them moot.

Bob

[slapout9]

It is a good article as far as we must face the primary situation from the stand point that we failed! From that start point we can begin to move forward. My suggestion is neither threat or problem based but purpose based....ask why it is the purpose of the USA to fix a failing Islamic belief system in the first place?

[Bill Moore]

I think our own approaches to the events of 9/11 have been far more damaging to the ideals contained within the US Constitution, the US Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence than anything done anywhere by any of our perceived "threats."

Bob, that was my point, it is matter of choices. The threats to our security are certainly real enough, but we have choices on how we respond to them. President Bush did a lot of positive things for homeland security, but his use of his narrative that accused anyone who questioned it as "being weak on terror" took us back to an era of McCarthyism. Now that we're in another era of excessive partisanship politics, politicians are reluctant to get stuck with that label by fear mongers.

When we tell the average Sunni that we are against ISIL, but not them

When you make statements like this, I think you are clinging to your political model even when it isn't relevant. There are clearly many Sunnis who reject ISIL, to include the 300 and some executed fairly recently. You can certainly tell the average Sunni in the region we're against ISIL and not them, and they'll probably get that. What they'll wonder is if we'll back them up if rise up against ISIL, and so far we haven't demonstrated that we will.

You paint the picture as black and white, and I don't see it that way. First, this is not a conflict being fought by strictly local fighters, there are thousands of foreign fighters supporting ISIL for a larger vision than resolving local political issues. All politics are not local, and they haven't been for a long time. Second, there are wars within wars. No doubt most Sunnis despise the former Iraqi government run by Maliki. I have no idea how they feel about the new one, but it would seem logical they would either want to replace the Shia led government, or seek an independent state. However, that doesn't mean they want to align with ISIL.

These models won't be solved by applying simple models. It is worthwhile to look at them through the optic of many models to gain a better understanding, but ultimately Kilcullen is right in my opinion when he states we need to start all over.

[Bob's World]

This is very much political for the Sunni Arabs is Syria and Iraq - that is the primary energy source that defines this conflict. Sunnis and Shia from around the globe for their own reasons - mostly, I suspect, to help shape the broader Sunni/Shia competition this political conflict takes place within. ISIL? They saw a parade that no one else either could lead or dared to try. They have created and now lead a de facto state. This makes them both more successful and more vulnerable than AQ at once and for the same reasons.

So yes, my model is simple, but it is not simplistic like the models applied by so many "experts" who see ISIL as being no different than AQ; and who don't appreciate that a tangible physical state makes ISIlL weaker and more vulnerable, not stronger.

Solve the Sunni governance problem first, and the rest will fall into a manageable place. Ignore the governance problem, and get ready for the very similar Kurdish situation in Turkey to go hot next. An avoidable tragedy that we are nudging toward the brink...

[Bill Moore]

Agree the political problem needs to be solved, but that isn't the same as saying ISIL represents the Sunni political view. The difference isn't subtle.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Best I can tell only a small minority of the locals or the foreign fighters buy into the political viewpoint of ISIL - but most all buy into the need for some sort of Sunni governed space in that region and the need to restore new stability to the current competition for where the line between Sunni and Shia influence lies. ISILis the only one stepping up to lead that effort. The US needs to own the fact that what we did in Iraq is what put both of those issues in play.

In this regard ISIL is very much like the Nazi party in Post WWI Germany. Few Gwrmans bought into their extreme ideology or approaches - but virtually all Germans believed in the need to turn back the injustices of Versailles.

When people need a ride desperately enough, and only one bus is coming around, they tend to get on the bus.

Who, besides ISIL is offering a solution to the fundamental problems at the root of this conflict?? Not the US with this new approach (that I believe the President was bullied into taking once the two beheadings occurred). We were doing better before, but needed a much clearer narrative and stated goals for our strategy.

if we truly stand for what we say we do as a nation, we need to champion an approach that is about evolving toward a more sustainable political future for the region, not simplistically trying to defeat those we deem as beyond the pale and to restore the obsolete and illegitimate political structures that brought us here to begun with.

Either way, I don't know how Turkey does not soon devolve as well into a similar conflict for a new, more legitimate governance for the Kurds. Turkey should be pressing for Civil Rights reforms similar to what the US wisely adopted in the 60s if they want any hope of staving off revolution and possible civil war.

As is often the case, governments hold both the primary cause and cure in their hands, but also the ability to simplistically employ legal violence to force the increasingly unsustainable status quo. Most opt for the latter.

[davidbfpo]

I have now re-read the original article, in which David K. refers to four threats - for Australia and others. Those threats are:

domestic radicalisation, foreign fighters, the effect of Islamic State on regional and global jihadist groups, and the destabilising effect of conflict in the Middle East.

Guy Fawkes was a Catholic radical who in 1605 attempted to blow up the British parliament in London, effectively to decapitate the establishment and is marked each 5th November with bonfires, fireworks and in places more. This article links him to the contemporary scene:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/1...r-change.html?

Here are key passages reagrding domestic radicalisation:

..the mobilising effect of overseas terrorist groups on people in our own societies — is the most immediate threat.....The randomness, unpredictability and copycat nature of these attacks, which require little preparation, give few warning signs, and are difficult to prevent, is what makes them so terrifying. Attackers are often disenfranchised, alienated, marginalised young people, frequently converts: society’s losers, who see radical Salafi-jihadist ideology as a way to be part of something big, historic and successful. They’re not really self-radicalised. Rather, they often access online terrorist materials (increasingly in English) for inspiration, instruction and training, or link up online with radicals who groom them for action.Defeating this threat is partly a matter of community policing to identify and engage at-risk individuals, and partly a matter of detecting and monitoring access to online forums, radicalisation networks, social media and online training materials.
Despite the fear these attacks create, police and intelligence agencies have a pretty good handle on this type of threat, but in the long term this brings a potential cost to civil liberties and community cohesion.

I have doubts that in reality anyone officially has a 'handle' on this problem, that includes the police and intelligence agencies. Too many of those id'd as 'at risk' here suffer from mental illnesses, not radicalism. 'Detecting and monitoring' sounds neat, it is not and for this threat threatens more of what we seek to defend.