The below link goes to a favorable mention of "Counterinsurgency Redux" by T. X. Hammes. Hammes is on the A-team of 4GW experts. His opinion deserves attention.
http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-i...-guerrilla-war
Brilliant, useful
Interesting, perhaps useful
Of little utility, not practical
Delusional
The below link goes to a favorable mention of "Counterinsurgency Redux" by T. X. Hammes. Hammes is on the A-team of 4GW experts. His opinion deserves attention.
http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-i...-guerrilla-war
Fabius, I like TX Hammes and try to read his articles, have not read his book yet, but I will. The last article I read of his was in Military Review (I think) about doing network analysis in order to make the enemy visible. Law Enforcement has been doing this for years since criminals don't walk around with a sign on their head that says Criminal. Glad he is on our side.
I am a bit surprised at the sharp tone of FM's criticism. Most of Mr. Kilcullen's statements seem to be plain common sense well put. The crux of FM's complaint seems to be that something less than perfect is useless.
1.
In his little area, the Company Commander is indeed in a competition as stated by Mr. Kilcullen. And, as as been demonstrated in Vietnam, Malaya and Iraq, it is possible to win that competition in his small area of responsibility.
Of course, the government of Iraq will be the entity that ultimately wins the war in the country as a whole. The Captain "can only help, as a secondary player in this game." But that secondary role can be a vital one.
2.
The Captain might well never know the turf as well as the guy who was born and lives there. But FM seems to imply that because he will never equal that knowledge the advice is meritless; if perfection can't be achieved, why bother trying for good enough.
It seems to me that the advantages the Captain brings, around 100 well trained and organized soldiers, good communications, superior fighting power, good transport, reliable supply, money to spend (hopefully) can make what less than perfect knowledge he can, through hard work, acquire, good enough to win a local victory.
Fabius I have to agree with Carl for the most part. I have yet to read all your posted links (except for the first post), but a Company of professional soldiers brings many things to their area of operations that probably didn't exist previously, such as a viable, non-bias security force. I have seen companies reenergize existing systems such as the local medical, sewage, education, banking, etc. If something isn't working, they go out and see what the problem is, and get the appropriate powers to be to fix the problem. We're generally there because the problem set was greater than the HN government could manage on its own, so to assume we bring no goodness is quite simply wrong. To state we're at a disadvantage because we're not on home turf is obviously a truism, but always has been, and it has not prevented us (and others) from winning in these types of conflicts previously.
As for Killcullen being a genius or a dreamer, I have to side closer to genius. You need to remember that he works for our Dept of State, so he can only go so far with his public statements. If you want to see if he understands where the differences between traditional COIN fits and modern 4GW I recommend reading the article titled "Knowing the Enemy" by George Packer in the NY Times. (See link below, note this was posted elsewhere in in the counsel, and surprisingly received little comment, it was the best articles I have read lately).
On the other hand I agree with you that a traditional COIN approach will not work in some cases, and OIF is one of them. More later, I need to read to your posts.
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/conten...061218fa_fact2
Bill
(a quickly written note, apologize for typos)
From the perspective of company commanders, this is just another set of advice, to be skimmed for a few insights. "#1 Know your turf ... tell me something I don't already know."
It's banal in the sense of commonplace, almost trivial.
(side note: For every members of Al Qaeda there must be hundred+ manuals on how to fight him, many of which are hundreds of pages long ... Perhaps we should conduct counterinsurgency by smothering our enemies with manuals.)
From a larger perspective this -- boiling his work down to commonplaces -- misses the key to Kilcullen's views. He's a brilliant PhD anthropologist - Lt Col in the Aussie Army.
I'll bet that he means this stuff, in its full glory as I described above. As do the senior DoD and State folks -- uniformed and not -- who promote his work.
The "excesses" (my word, not yours) that you throw away ("be the world expert on your district") are his key insights. Delusional as they might be.
This illustrates some key larger points as to why we lose these wars. Hence deserves attention!
Bill, how can you say I am too harsh on Kilcullen before reading my analysis? Perhaps I am too gentle. (I vote for option B, too nice too often to too many).
Since I quoted from this New Yorker article, I probably read it!
These "genius new CI experts" and "innovative new Army commander" articles in the general media are a staple of 4G wars. They appear all the way from the confident entry to the defeat and withdrawal at the end.
They deserve close attention, as they illustrate why we lose.
FB,
I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.
That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:
As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.Kilcullen then gives 28 steps to victory. Let's start at the top.
Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.
While I heartily endorse FM's call to look at the writings of Chet Richards, T.X. Hammes, William Lind and DNI generally ( I'd throw in John Robb too) I don't agree with his assessment of Colonel Kilcullen who comes with some good COIN experiences in Indonesia ( how many of us are familiar with the enormous constellation of hinterland militias there ? Talk to anyone from Besi Merah Putih lately ? From even the little I know about Indonesia, I can say it is as easily as complex a situation as Iraq in terms of ethnic, religious and political dynamics but with ten times the population and thousands of islands. Getting a handle on that requires some real brains).
Kilcullen is giving general advice, not an operational plan (I doubt the DoD is listening anyway).
I thought his comments on the enemy's tying of its tactics to his PR campaign was very insightful. I will let others argue over the effect of his works on the local level. One of the biggest failures we have had in this war is in the media battle space, While the man at least recognizes the problem, we still have put no one in charge of fighting in thsi battle space.
Fabius, I read the article by TX at the link you posted, and thanks for posting as I said I like TX and enjoy reading his work, and I will get his book shortly. Maybe I can give you something to review. In the article he recommends several movies if you don't like to read- Lawrence of Arabia, Battle of Algiers,etc. I would suggest "Next of Kin" with Patrick Swazye. Sometimes it is a little goofy in places but it is closer to truth then you might think with reference to Family Tribes. There are some lessons to be learned for Iraq to. Blood is thicker than water or an idea. If you get a chance watch it, let me know what you think. I would also recommend it for the SWC, maybe a topic for future discussion. "Remember Kin is Kin and thats the way it is!!!!" Great line from some part of the movie. Later.
To echo jcustis as another former Troop commander who has been to Iraq for two years, LTC (Dr.) Kilcullen's pieces are Cliff Notes for those who haven't been there yet. True, most of what he's written becomes second nature to someone with experience in the arena. I had taken for granted the importance of some of his points (I first read his 28 points article after my second year in Iraq) though, in retrospect, I found myself using his article as a report card for performance.
In addition, I saw Dave Kilcullen present on his 28 Points article about 2 months ago. he presented the 28 points as a pre, during, and post operation PMCS of sorts. Most of his points can be addressed at the company level during an abreviated MDMP or mission planning process.
Also, it's interesting to me that Dave Kilcullen, TX Hammes, and John Nagl are all good friends and seem to quote each other regularly. I take it for what it's worth; a triad of guys who are pretty smart on the subject. Mixing their knowledge with what I've learned in over two years of COIN gives me, in my opinion, a pretty good handle on the COIN business.
$0.02
Last edited by RTK; 12-28-2006 at 08:28 PM.
Folks, we're all stumbling around here. If you want good answers, call Martin van Creveld. It's long distance, but worth it.
Meanwhile, back in the weeds, it does not help me when you say that I'm wrong (btw, you're pussycats compared to the DNI editorial cabal).
Or that I've mis-read Kilcullen (ditto).
I've given a close analysis of his text. Please give specifics as to my errors.
Zenpundit, Merv, and others have raised some great and specific points, which I will attempt to grapple with later. Now on to the central question ...
I've not communicated this clearly. Just to get together on the same page, let's start at the beginning.
For the past 100 years or so, western nations have lost almost every war like Iraq (fighting as aliens in a less developed state). You can call them colonial wars, low intensity conflicts, guerilla wars, insurgencies, or 4GW’s. There have been a few exceptions, either long ago (Philippines) or probably fictional (Malaysia).
Worse, 4GW’s might become the primary form of war in the 21st century. And as Iraq has shown, we do not know how to win such conflicts. In fact, we’re losing both wars in the Middle East theater.
One of our primary strengths is our free, competitive intellectual climate. Formally it is called the Delphi method. People write up proposals, which are circulated and intensely criticized. Eventually we find a solution. I doubt al-Qaeda has anything like this.
Kilcullen has written up a solution, in his various papers, for winning 4GW’s. The *proposal* might prove ineffective, but the *process* is of the highest importance.
This guy is a PhD anthropologist. If he wanted to write “cliff notes” – the basic stuff told to captains for generations or centuries (“know your turf”), he’d have done so in a fraction of the time and length.
The “cliff notes” version – boiling it down so that it only tells us what we already know – is just a recipe for defeat. Tried and failed.
Kilcullen is more ambitious, reaching far in search of a successful tactical formula for victory. Let’s not throw out the strange and new elements he suggests, but discuss what he actually said.
Even failed ideas move us forward, showing us another path that does not work.
What is new in Kilcullen's discussion of PR & propaganda?
John Adam’s defense of the Redcoats following the Boston Massacre was – and was seen at the time – as a masterstroke of PR, gaining British sympathy for the colonies’ struggle against the Crown.
Ditto in the Civil War (aka, for you southerners, the War Between the States), where the PR war in Britain had a decisive effect on the outcome.
Ditto in WWI (e.g. the Zimmerman telegram).
That we’re doing so poorly in the information war for both Iraq and Afghanistan probably reflects the small number of Americans with the necessary knowledge of their cultures. Don’t hold your breath for this to change.
Re: Kilcullen’s discussion of the Indonesian insurrection
He misses, in my opinion, the primary difference between that and our wars in the ME. As do most who reference Lawrence. And often those looking for tips to win from the Malaysian Insurrection.
All were wars waged and won by the locals. We are aliens in a strange land. What works for the locals might be impossible for us.
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