Paraphrasing is dangerous, so I'll quote directly (but still there is the danger of missing the context if you don't read the entire chapter).

Counterinsurgency Warfare "theory and practice", David Galula, Prageger, 1964, reprinted 2005.

p. 116 (selected sentences) (Ops he used the word power over, instead of control).

Quote 1. Contact with the population. is actually the first confrontation between the two camps for power over the population. The future attitude of the population, hence the probable outcome of the war, is at stake. The counterinsurgent cannot afford to lose this battle.

even if there is every reason to believe that a majority is sympathetic to the counterinsurgent. The inhabitants will usually avoid any contact with him. there is a barrier between them and the counterinsurgent that has to be broken and can be broken only by force. Whatever the counterinsurgent wants the population to do will have to be imposed. Yet the population must not be treated as the enemy.

The solution is first to request, and next order, the population to perform a certain number of collective and individual tasks that will be paid for. By giving orders, the counterinsurgent provides the alibi that the population needs vis-a-vis the insurgent. A terrible error would be, to issue orders and be unable to enforce them; the counterinsurgent must be careful to issue orders sparingly and only after making sure that the population can humanly comply with them.

Starting with tasks directly benefiting the population- such as cleaning the village or repairing the streets - the counterinsurgent leads the inhabitants gradually, if only in a passive way, to participatein the fight against the insurgent by such work as building roads of military interest, helping construct the village's defense positions................... END QUOTE

What seems so clear now, obviously wasn't so clear during the planning phase for this war. As much effort should have been dedicated to making contact with the population (defined above) as with defeating Saddam's military. We dug a hole that we can probably get out of with a lot of effort, and a well thought out strategy, but it will be a lot tougher than it should have been.

I have some experience working with Sheiks, and while I felt I was the cat's meow while doing it, after looking back on it now (a few years later) I wonder who was playing who. It was obvious we were playing each other, each getting consessions, but he was playing long term, I was trying to achieve realitively short term tactical (for lack of a better word) objectives such as cooperation, stability, etc. I couldn't tie my actions into an overarching strategy, because we didn't have one in 03; however, now that hopefully has changed, but I would think we would want the Iraqi government representatives to make the contact and make the deals with the various sheiks, and if they can't, do we really have an Iraqi government? I think that is the $100.00 question, because if we don't we need to go back to the drawing board concerning our strategy.