The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[max161]

Anyone find a copy of this piece that is not behind the firewall? I do not have a subscription to The Australian.

Thanks

[Bob's World]

Once again, Kilcullen is half right and too threat centric in his thinking (yes, being "population centric to defeat the threat is still a form of being threat centric).

Any sane assessment clearly indicates we are worse of than when we started. So no arguments there. But when one's tactics fail to yield the strategic results one hopes for, it is not a failure of threat analysis, it is a failure of problem analysis.

In so many ways, the threats we have pursued have certainly been problematic, but they have more importantly been just dangerous symptoms of the deeper problems in the growing rifts between a wide range of population groups and the systems of governance that affect their lives.

We need to re-think the problem. Thinking about it in tactical threat centric terms has led to equally tactical threat-based successes. These types of successes tend to only last so long as energy is applied to hold them in some static state, and then roar back larger than ever due to the actual problem having been made worse through the effort.

[Bill Moore]

Most of his recommendations seem reasonable until we get to the last one.

Until Western powers commit to the ultimate replacement of the Assad regime with a transitional unity or ultimately a secular democratic government — something the original democracy protesters called for in 2011, right at the beginning of the war — it’s hard to imagine any Syrian volunteering to fight with us against Islamic State. In any case, it will be months or more before Iraqi and Syrian forces are sufficiently trained to take the fight forward effectively.

I agree Assad is a thug that ultimately needs to go. Frankly, it surprised that a man with his level of education responded to the Syrian Spring in such an inept manner, but he did and there is no going back to fix it. I'm not implying education makes one a saint, but from purely practical manner (survival of the regime), his response in 2011 needed to be a different approach than his father's heavy handed approach. The world has changed, and Assad should have recognized that.

The problem with Kilcullen's recommendation is this is so easy to say, and nearly impossible to do in a country that is divided in multiple factions. We removed abusive regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, but what followed didn't get us closer to our desired goals of reduced radicalization and increased stability. There are multiple reasons why, but those same reasons exist in Syria. Agree we need to completely rethink our strategy, but I don't see answers to the perplexing problem of what follows Assad on the near horizon. It isn't only local politics, but regional and non-regional countries who will keep their fingers in the pie to shape the situation in Syria to their advantage, not the advantage of the Syrian people. As he points out, the solution isn't a country solution, it must be a regional solution, and in some cases a global solution.

Kilcullen identified a threat that I dwell on frequently. We have many people in our ranks who dismiss threats that are not existential, but they only see existential threats as physical destruction. In the U.S., members of the military take an oath to defend the Constitution. If the ideas in the Constitution are threatened with our potential over or even appropriate reaction to threats (paramilitary police forces), then the our founding ideas are threatened, and that is a form of an existential threat. We can't afford to look at this purely in conventional terms of force on force.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

I think our own approaches to the events of 9/11 have been far more damaging to the ideals contained within the US Constitution, the US Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence than anything done anywhere by any of our perceived "threats."

I will agree that dealing with Assad is not the key, and certainly not one we are postured to turn. We do, however, need to recognize that ISIL is the government of a newly emergent Sunni Arab State, and that the "defeat" of ISIL does not solve the problem, it only knocks it back into being a Sunni Arab Revolutionary Insurgency. Worse, it makes that population even less likely to listen to what the US has to say on how to move forward in addressing the very real and reasonable concerns these Sunni Arabs have with continuing to live under the Shia dominated governments of Syria and Iraq.

Better we focus on what we still retain some degree of control over, and work to offer to the Sunni the same partial-sovereignty package we shaped for the Kurds. This would have to be complete with some scheme for revenue sharing between the three primary systems of governance that is tied more to population than to geography.

When we tell the average Sunni that we are against ISIL, but not them - and in the same breath say we are dedicated to restoring the Iraqi state, it simply does not resonate. We drive the people into ISIL's arms with this policy.

So, to reiterate my concern with Dave Kilcullen - he is too threat-centric, and only offered a strategy that suggested one could defeat an insurgent threat by bribing a population to accept the status quo of governance they are revolting against.

We must become problem-centric. The Sunni Arab population of Syria and Iraq have a reasonable concern and are acting out to resolve it. So far, ISIL is the only one offering a realistic solution. We need to offer a better solution if we hope to outcompete ISIL and render them moot.

Bob

[slapout9]

It is a good article as far as we must face the primary situation from the stand point that we failed! From that start point we can begin to move forward. My suggestion is neither threat or problem based but purpose based....ask why it is the purpose of the USA to fix a failing Islamic belief system in the first place?

[Bill Moore]

I think our own approaches to the events of 9/11 have been far more damaging to the ideals contained within the US Constitution, the US Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence than anything done anywhere by any of our perceived "threats."

Bob, that was my point, it is matter of choices. The threats to our security are certainly real enough, but we have choices on how we respond to them. President Bush did a lot of positive things for homeland security, but his use of his narrative that accused anyone who questioned it as "being weak on terror" took us back to an era of McCarthyism. Now that we're in another era of excessive partisanship politics, politicians are reluctant to get stuck with that label by fear mongers.

When we tell the average Sunni that we are against ISIL, but not them

When you make statements like this, I think you are clinging to your political model even when it isn't relevant. There are clearly many Sunnis who reject ISIL, to include the 300 and some executed fairly recently. You can certainly tell the average Sunni in the region we're against ISIL and not them, and they'll probably get that. What they'll wonder is if we'll back them up if rise up against ISIL, and so far we haven't demonstrated that we will.

You paint the picture as black and white, and I don't see it that way. First, this is not a conflict being fought by strictly local fighters, there are thousands of foreign fighters supporting ISIL for a larger vision than resolving local political issues. All politics are not local, and they haven't been for a long time. Second, there are wars within wars. No doubt most Sunnis despise the former Iraqi government run by Maliki. I have no idea how they feel about the new one, but it would seem logical they would either want to replace the Shia led government, or seek an independent state. However, that doesn't mean they want to align with ISIL.

These models won't be solved by applying simple models. It is worthwhile to look at them through the optic of many models to gain a better understanding, but ultimately Kilcullen is right in my opinion when he states we need to start all over.

[Bob's World]

This is very much political for the Sunni Arabs is Syria and Iraq - that is the primary energy source that defines this conflict. Sunnis and Shia from around the globe for their own reasons - mostly, I suspect, to help shape the broader Sunni/Shia competition this political conflict takes place within. ISIL? They saw a parade that no one else either could lead or dared to try. They have created and now lead a de facto state. This makes them both more successful and more vulnerable than AQ at once and for the same reasons.

So yes, my model is simple, but it is not simplistic like the models applied by so many "experts" who see ISIL as being no different than AQ; and who don't appreciate that a tangible physical state makes ISIlL weaker and more vulnerable, not stronger.

Solve the Sunni governance problem first, and the rest will fall into a manageable place. Ignore the governance problem, and get ready for the very similar Kurdish situation in Turkey to go hot next. An avoidable tragedy that we are nudging toward the brink...