Makes sense, but isn't support at least as much a function of casualties suffered as any thing else? (As McCain likes to mention, we've been in Germany since 45.)Originally Posted by SteveMetz
Brilliant, useful
Interesting, perhaps useful
Of little utility, not practical
Delusional
Incoming powerpoint complaint....
Getting back to the briefing for a minute, I guess it was OK. The problem, of course, is that I didn't have the benefit of hearing the actual presentation like Steve Metz did, so my take on the slides is very different without the context added by seeing the actual briefing. I'm enough of a powerpoint ranger to know that the slides are probably less than 50% of the content, if that (at least that's been my experience). Hence I'm inherently dubious about taking PPT presentations at face value unless there is detailed information or the text of the briefing is on the notes pages - something that is all too rare. To be honest, I really wish people wouldn't release slide presentations without the other content included in some form. Tufte's pamphlet/book on powerpoint ably demonstrates the dangers.
Makes sense, but isn't support at least as much a function of casualties suffered as any thing else? (As McCain likes to mention, we've been in Germany since 45.)
Last edited by Rank amateur; 05-22-2008 at 07:18 PM.
Exactly
Though I suspect that the effect starts developing in Year Two and therefor we should aim at preempting it about then.
Kilcullen says future studies should include "Options to extend the time available before the “Metz threshold” (Slide 53)."
Good luck with that; as Steve correctly notes that figure is historically derived and if it changes is more likely to go down rather than up. Future study should be aimed at beating the time, not extending it. Some will say that's not possible because "Insurgencies take ten years, etc." I disagree -- preparedness to and speed in adapting can cut that immeasurably.
On an allied note, Kilcullen also said: "Counterintuitive result: sniper risk up, IED risk up. (82d Abn and 10th Mtn casualties)
Emergency field intervention – discovered foot patrol skills had atrophied, instituted crash re-training (AWG). IED and sniper cas immediately dropped and kept dropping, patrol situational awareness and rapport improved.
(Slide 38)"
I suggest that an Army that discovers "foot patrol skills had atrophied" is terribly remiss at high and local levels, that 'crash' retraining should almost never be called for and that training must be ongoing even while in combat. Yes, I know the troops hate it -- but they understand the need and know it helps keep more of them alive even while they're bitching about it.
This Iraq thing has not been the US Army's finest hour. It probably doesn't need to be repeated and if history since 1945 has proven nothing else it has proven that the Army, regardless of many flawed attempts to affect political decisions, does not get to choose who and when it fights.
It does get to pick how it fights and we could be smarter about that...
Don't think so.
That will unquestionably apply to some Americans; most though really expect a war to produce casualties -- but they want payback for that loss in the form of results and due to our short attention spans, they want those results pretty quickly. The 1/3 rule applies.
But Germany isn't counterinsurgency.
Knew you were going to say that. How about Somalia? The public was supportive until the bodies showed up on TV. (Yes you can say Clinton was a wimp - that word is for Ken - but he was responding to the Metz effect.)
I'm still working my way through the presentation - and this is a bit simplistic - but it seems to me that end result of a successful COIN effort is always a political deal where everyone gets most of what they want except for the foreign counter insurgent. So I'd say the answer depends on whether you consider that a strategic success or strategic failure for us.
Last edited by Rank amateur; 05-22-2008 at 08:08 PM.
In Somalia we didn't even get the three years because it was sold as peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency.
I hate to be my usual dense self but I have no idea
what that has to do with what I said? Sorry...
Since Steve replied to me instead of you and I replied
to you instead of Steve...Oh, never mind...
Anyway... Bodies on TV always arouse SOME in the public; others -- most, I'm pretty sure -- not so much. Clinton was not a wimp (not BTW my sensibilities, which I'd think are obviously inured to far worse, but the Board's reputation as professional instead of being another internet cesspool. If that's too much to ask, don't worry about it), he truly did feel everyone's pain and he reacted to the TV as one of those who was truly affected by the sight. Like most politicians and some others, he thought everyone felt, believed and wanted the same things he did. They didn't -- and don't. IOW, he reacted as he thought the public did -- while some felt that way, most reacted differently, the vast majority of the great unwashed just got angry and wanted Somali blood...
Ad guy begs to differ. I believe that the image of the US soldier being dragged through the street had far more effect than any definition. (I was going to post the picture to illustrate my point, but having seen it again, I decided against it.) Anyone who doubts the emotional impact of that image, can Google it.
The reason we got so much time in Iraq has to do with Bushes stubbornness - or resolute leadership if you prefer - Kerry's wishywashiness and the spin doctors' brilliant use of the term "flip flopper." The strength of the Republican brand didn't hurt either.
It's an eye for an eye country. Something I keep meaning to start a thread about.
One of the problems with counterinsurgency is that there is no way to visually show payback in a newsclip. (One reason the Air Force keeps getting so much money is the cool targetting footage.)
There shouldn't be any doubt, however, that public opinion can be manipulated. Staying alive - and keeping your guys alive - will delay the Metz affect. It's also an attack against the enemy strategy, which is to remove public support for the COIN effort by creating casualties.
Do you consider that
Perhaps the less the foreign CI gains the less responsibility they have for what happens after they leave. In other words (and so as not to be misinterpreted) If the main premise is to successfully build everybody there and make sure they are vested and capable of keeping things good the less likely you are to have to get involved in such a manner again. EMPOWERMENT if done right can be a wonderful thing. If in word only it can actually be counter-productive
Know yourself
Do unto others
Tis better to give than to receive
Tis better to die in honor than to live in defeat
And so on
Those who came before us actually knew a lot more than we seem to sometimes about how the world really works
Last edited by Ron Humphrey; 05-22-2008 at 09:58 PM. Reason: to add
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
There is a reason why it wasn't sold
as counterinsurgency -because there was not an insurgency present. One of the key ingredients required - a functioning state, did not exist in any form. What we did have was an anarchical situation with various groups picking over the body of what passed for Somali society.
In all the nightly and morning briefs I sat in - Australian, Coalition and UN, from CJTF Comd Level to Component (ARFOR and MARFOR) to Battle group, no one in the five and a bit months I was there mentioned the terms 'insurgency' or 'counterinsurgency'. There was plenty of talk about UN Chapter VII...
Last edited by Mark O'Neill; 05-22-2008 at 10:00 PM. Reason: spelling
I was a civilian, fat, dumb and happy (and probably drunk too) in college when Somalia happened. I still remember my reaction, which was essentially, "WTF? We go there to feed these people and this is what they do? F' em." I think the public did not understand how the mission evolved in Somalia (I know I sure didn't at the time) and still thought of it as a humanitarian mission. When you expect a humanitarian mission and you see bodies mutilated and dragged through the streets, the result is pretty predictable.
Well, for what it's worth, we and our coalition partners did, in fact, save the lives of tens, maybe even hundreds of thousands of Somalis.
No doubt about that at all.
I'd appreciate it if someone could explain xxx
Last edited by Ken White; 05-23-2008 at 12:32 AM. Reason: Opsecish
That
is a very Clintonian assessment...
I have no doubt about the first statement. Or the last. Agree with both.There shouldn't be any doubt, however, that public opinion can be manipulated. Staying alive - and keeping your guys alive - will delay the Metz affect. It's also an attack against the enemy strategy, which is to remove public support for the COIN effort by creating casualties.
On the one in between those two we can differ in the matter of degree. Yes, it can delay it slightly; conversely, if the media sells ad space and time, it bleeds and leads and that, too is manipulation of public opinion, inadvertant or not. That aspect can negate any manipulation the other way. The 1/3 rule applies; as you point out, the bad guys know this and can work public opinion as well or better than we can and they aim for that wavering middle third. Here's an example LINK. Now why would they target the Germans...
Casualties are only part of the picture; for a few they are THE criteria, for most Americans results matter. More. Much more
P.M. on the way.
Nothing significant...
A closer look at the briefing gives me some concerns one of the slides. I hope it's a "example" slide and not a "real" one with real info, if you catch my meaning.
Last edited by Entropy; 05-23-2008 at 01:03 AM.
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