The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[stanleywinthrop]

Found this today on Col. Pat Lang's site.

By reading the comments found on this website, i've discovered the true cause for our problems in Iraq: Powerpoint!

For example:

Power Point has given to the briefer class (those who brief but don't always think) new power.

Damn you Bill Gates! (shakes fist)

[SWJED]

Power Point has given to the briefer class (those who brief but don't always think) new power.

Have you read Dr. Kilcullen, worked with him, heard him speak, or know him?

Do you know what words accompanied this PowerPoint briefing?

[Entropy]

Have you read Dr. Kilcullen, worked with him, heard him speak, or know him?

Do you know what words accompanied this PowerPoint briefing?

That is the point I tried to address earlier - that slides only present part of a presentation - and often not the most important part - and are therefore open to misinterpretation when divorced from the actual presentation. People these days trade and forward PP briefings all the time and I think it's wise to be cognizant of the limitations of the medium. I frankly don't like the practice yet I see it all the time.

[Ron Humphrey]

That is the point I tried to address earlier - that slides only present part of a presentation - and often not the most important part - and are therefore open to misinterpretation when divorced from the actual presentation. People these days trade and forward PP briefings all the time and I think it's wise to be cognizant of the limitations of the medium. I frankly don't like the practice yet I see it all the time.

and one that I had hoped we would see begin to be addressed through the use of newer technologies like face puppetry. The briefer would be able to give the briefing and be video taped after which the software is used to make an avatar of sorts give the brief in the different adobe or other models.

Imagine actually getting the rest of the story rather than having to wait for Paul Harvey to provide it later

It's easily doable and I agree that it might help avoid some of the selective pass on of information from such briefs by those who didn't necessarily get it in the context it was created with

[Shek]

In the New Yorker article written by George Packer "Knowing The Enemy", Dr. Killcullen refers to a list he made of the sources of information available to the Vietnamense villager in 1966 (10, 5 of which the government controlled) vs. the Afghan villager in 2006 (25, 5 of which the government controlled). I've looked through some of his papers and presentations and haven't come across these lists spelled out. Does anyone have these lists? Thanks.

[J Wolfsberger]

Can We Defeat the Taliban? from from The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.

(I didn't find any other posts referencing either the book or the article.)

[Cavguy]

Can We Defeat the Taliban? from from The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.

(I didn't find any other posts referencing either the book or the article.)

I'm in the midst of the book. Kilcullen is as always a good writer, and unloads on the Bush administration execution of GWOT as alienating many who did not need to be alienated, at least not all at the same time.

Some good and timely insights, but my initial impression this is a book that will not stand the test of time simply because it is rooted in the specific political issues of today. I'll reserve judgment to the end though.

[William F. Owen]

Having known David back when he was a serving Lt Col, and finding him an eminently sensible young chap, I have been very worried about some of things attributed to him, and the COIN poster boy image, some built for him. However, I found this which I think accurately portrays his actual contribution and the critical fact that everything we know about insurgencies we have know for a very long time.

I don't agree with all he says, but he is mostly correct, which is more than good enough and shows the benefit of studying military history and doing the research.

...and more here.

[davidbfpo]

Wilf,

Next week David Kilcullen is in London, talking at his book launch at IISS and I plan to be there. The more I listen and read the more I am impressed.

davidbfpo

[MCalvin]

CNAS hosted Kilcullen last month to discuss his book with David Ignatius. Video of the discussion is available here.

I agree with davidbfpo. Kilcullen's explanation of the four-part cycle of an insurgency with both local and global components, along with his explanation of the "accidental guerrilla" syndrome, seem to me the most comprehensive and well-developed and relevant extension of classical counterinsurgency theory that I've come across. I've only ever studied it from an academic perspective and have never been a practitioner (so my perspective is highly limited), but his use of experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere seems to add strong support to his arguments.

I found his short discussion on lexicon in the beginning of the book valuable as well. He describes why he chooses to use the term takfiri, as opposed to salafi or others, to refer to the hard-core of ideologically driven enemies that we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Worth the short read (pages xviii-xix)

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

that comes from being a little bit outside the system and the ability to say things that everybody's thinking...” from the Charlie Rose interview.

Having attended events to hear him speak on several occasions and being fortunate enough to interact with him socially, I believe that Kilcullen's greatest advantage is that he is plain spoken (mad props to someone who at a HASC hearing uses the term “kick their asses”), typically calls things the way he sees them, does not come off as a pretentious know-it-all, is careful in his proposals in that they may or may not work, and and is not protecting a career.

@ Mcalvin: totally agree, if one reads nothing more of his book, the intro alone should provide one with plenty of food for thought.

[Cavguy]

Chapter 2 on "full spectrum COIN" in Afghanistan is worth the price of the book alone, in my view.

[ajax622]

Last night, David Kilcullen spoke at the Pritzker Military Library in Chicago, IL. Mr Kilcullen gave an overview of his book, "The Accidental Guerilla" as well as provided some examples in his career as evidence to support the theories and recommendations presented in the book. A video of his speech and the following Q&A from the audience can be found at the following link:

http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.o...-kilcullen.jsp

[davidbfpo]

I am sure two other SWJ members attended (Major Marginal & MattC86), if you are resident in Chicago time to connect?

Thanks for the link too!

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A slightly different video clip when David Kilcullen spoke to Google, with stories not on the Chicago link or used in his talk at IISS, London e.g. IO: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...orsgoogle.html

Half devoted to Q&A.
Found on the CNAS website and listened too tonight.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Discovered on an IT security blogsite ( http://www.schneier.com/blog/ ) an Australian TV debate between the COIN expert and a barrister:

Here, in a fascinating discussion with human rights lawyer Julian Burnside at the Melbourne Writers' Festival, he (Kilcullen) talks about the ethics and tactics of contemporary warfare. Julian Burnside is a human rights barrister and refugee advocate. He is the author of numerous publications and books including On Privilege and Watching Brief: Reflections on Human Rights, Law and Justice.

The weblink is: http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2668177.htm and two versions of the talk, a summary and the full, 56 minutes.

There is an audio only link: http://www.abc.net.au/tv/fora/storie...26/2667749.htm

Both websites have comments and this is pithy:

From the Schneier site 'You can't kill your way out of this problem'.

Clearly some of Bob's thinking has reached outside SWC.

There is a previous thread on Kilcullen's thoughts on COIN, but this debate has a different focus, so a new thread; if you want the previous thread it is: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7224

davidbfpo

[jmm99]

While the discussion touched on some LOAC issues, it never got off the legal ground since Barrister Burnside set out the framework for the discussion and Soldier Kilcullen is no barrister.

The initial hypothetical (by Julian Burnside, who seems a fairly laid-back individual) is interesting. He had UBL on a dialysis machine in the Tora Bora. Do you kill him or capture him ?

I'd add a few figures to the picture besides UBL, to wit: one of his wives and her female entourage, some children and young adults (the older boys being armed), and his ever-present body guards.

What should you do as "Coalition" commander with full power to decide (no higher micromanagement in the picture) ?

Legally, you first have to decide whether that pastoral picture is a Laws of War (military) or Rule of Law (civilian) situation. That is an important issue for discourse because all Coalition partners in Astan are not on the same legal page. As to the video, it would have been nice to have a barrister presenting the US position - which is based on the Laws of War. I'll spare the legal reasoning; but, to the US, we have Hague, 1949 Geneva and the latter's Common Article 3.

As I see it, compliance with US Laws of War depends on the means on hand that can be used. First, posit direct fires (well-aimed at specific targets). Under CA 3, the women and unarmed children are protected. The armed boys and the bodyguards are lawful targets under Hague & CA 3. UBL is actually an issue - is he rendered hors de combat because of the dialysis ? Possibly not - disconnect the tubes and grab the AK. If he were in a diabetic coma, the answer would be protected status.

Now, let's get back to reality at Tora Bora, where that pastoral picture was not present and indirect fires were the only realistic means at hand (based on "MAJ Fury's" book). What would be likely known is an approximate grid location of combatants (maybe including UBL). So, a bomb or bombs make their descent and hit the target - lawful under Hague if military necessity and proportionality apply, even if some civilians are also killed.

Reality would also include the ROE/RUFs then in place, which may or may not sanction the indirect fires COA - or, the direct fires COA, for that matter.

One could also do a legal analysis of the Rule of Law scenario - looking at the problem from a pure law enforcement standpoint.

The bottom line is that Barrister Burnside's first hypothetical and its variations could span the entire hour of the interview and then some. That would have made a great continuing ed segment for me, but very poor audience TV.

The title ("Does the end justify the means?") is a bit confusing when applied to a military context where ends, means and ways have entirely different meanings and usages from the philosophical question of "end justifying means".

[William F. Owen]

Haven't got time to look at the link, but I pretty much despair once people start trying to put "ethical" frame frame works into these discussions. It leads you down a blind alley that utterly fails to account for the realities of operations and imagines that these things are somehow choices or even controllable - they are not.

[Schmedlap]

What I notice in many discussions that involve ethics, law, and war is that there is a common error made among people who a) have legal backgrounds and b) get their knickers in a twist over inevitable civilian casualties and collateral damage that occurs in war. That error is that they completely forget all principles of respondeat superior and agency law. They assume that every decision made or action taken by a Soldier is one within the scope of that Soldier's job, within the bounds of the "normal course of business" for the organization, and within the Soldier's actual/implied authority. Often times, clearly, none of those are the case. Abu Ghraib comes to mind. There is still a large group of people convinced that that specific prisoner abuse was a policy directed by the administration. That would be like blaming me if I hire a guy to mow my lawn and, instead, he abandons the job, walks down the street, kidnaps a woman, and rapes her - and then concluding that I am a villain who justified the decision to have my lawn mowed by lying to the American people.

[M-A Lagrange]

Haven't got time to look at the link, but I pretty much despair once people start trying to put "ethical" frame frame works into these discussions. It leads you down a blind alley that utterly fails to account for the realities of operations and imagines that these things are somehow choices or even controllable - they are not.

100% agree with. But saying that, I still believe that there is a need to have a deeper look on "ethic" and specially when it comes to counter-insurgencies.

Using civilians as weapons can be done in various manners. Sending them after diffusion of false informations to re-establish government supporters presence in non-secure areas is, by my definition, non-ethical.

Debate on what is acceptable and what is not to do about civilian involvement in the build phase should be open or at least re-examined.