The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[max161]

This has been a great discussion. Although we may have reached culmination of this thread I offer an excerpt of and link to Dr. Echevarria's lastest writing on trnsformation which I think provides an interesting alternative view for all the "transformers" and "futurists" out there.

Challenging Transformation's Clichés

Much of the dialogue concerning military transformation in the United States employs a number of popular, but hitherto unchallenged clichés. Clichés and catchwords are merely handy ways of capturing and conveying truths. Unsubstantiated clichés, however, can masquerade as truths and, unless exposed in time, ultimately prove costly and harmful to policy. This monograph examines five of the more popular clichés, or myths, found in transformation literature today. The fact that they continue to gain currency in the dialogue suggests that we need to examine our accepted truths more regularly.

The first cliché is that military transformation is about changing to be better prepared for the future, as if we could somehow separate the future from our current agendas, and as if we had only one future for which to prepare. In fact, transformation is more about the present than the future. Our views of the future are just as distorted by our biases and perspectives as are our views of the past or present. If forecasting the future is always affected by the present, the influences of the present are not always bad. Without biases, much of the information we receive would remain unintelligible. What we need, then, are the means and the willingness to recognize our biases, and to test them—to filter our filters.

The second cliché is that strategic uncertainty is greater today than it was during the Cold War. Unfortunately, this view overstates the amount of certainty that existed then and exaggerates the level of uncertainty in evidence today. We should not forget the amount of uncertainty that clouded conflicts in Korea, Indochina, the Middle East, and northern Africa, as well as the invasion of Hungary in 1956, the Cuban missile crisis of 1963, the Munich crisis of 1972, the Suez crisis of 1973, and the many tense moments that attended the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s uncertainty may be qualitatively different, but it is hardly greater than that which obtained during the Cold War. Moreover, we actually know a great deal about today’s threats, especially that of transnational terrorism; many recent works have added, and continue to add, to our wealth of knowledge about terrorism and specific terrorist groups. We know the demographics of these groups; their pathologies; the values they hold; their goals; the conditions they need for success; their sources of support; their methods, even though they continue to change; and in many cases, their structures and innerworkings, even though the experts themselves do not always agree.

The third cliché is that mental transformation is the most difficult part of any effort to change. Actually, the most difficult part of transformation is the complex task of managing the change itself. The ideas behind Gustavus Adolphus’ reform of the Swedish military during the 17th century—which included mobile artillery and greater use of musketry—were not hard to grasp. Likewise, Napoleon’s tactical and operational innovations—which involved combining mass and firepower with self-sufficient army organizations called corps—were not difficult to understand. In fact, the truly hard part about change is managing the change. That requires backing up vague visions and lofty goals with concrete programs that can provide meaningful resources for new roles and functions, and offering incentives or compensation packages capable of appeasing institutional interests, especially the specific interests of those groups or communities most threatened by change.

The fourth cliché is that imagination and creative thinking are critical for any successful transformation. While these qualities certainly are important, they are only vital when the effort is open-ended, or in its early stages. Once the transformation effort gains momentum, a new orthodoxy replaces the old one, and creative thinking, unless it remains “in the box,” becomes inconvenient. To be sure, creative thinking can generate a wealth of potential solutions to the practical problems and the incidental friction that come with implementing change. However, the next step, the critical analysis of those solutions, is essential to moving forward. In short, the only truly essential key to transforming successfully is the capacity for critical analysis, which enables us to challenge clichés and assumptions, to expose vacuous theories and seductive jargon, and, in theory at least, to assess the results of war games and other exercises impartially.

Finally, the last cliché is that militaries tend to transform slowly, or not at all, because they like to “refight the last war,” rather than preparing for the next one. While militaries tend to rely on historical models almost to a fault, organizations need to learn from their experiences. An organization that cannot, or will not, learn from its past is not likely to prepare itself very well for the future either, except by chance. Assessing what worked and what did not from historical data is integral to critical analysis. Learning from the past and preparing for the future require an ability to evaluate events as rigorously and objectively as possible.

[SWCAdmin]

For related discussions, see also

...continue to develop the Fundamentals of Company Level Insurgency thread, or talk to the COIN Redux thread, which never really garnered the discussion it deserved...

[Fabius Maximus]

Thanks, Max161, for posting about Echevarria's article. One of the best I've seen in a long time; well worth reading.

[Menning]

This article was published back in December. Until more recently I couldn't find it online. George Packer writes a great article featuring David Kilcullen and the role of social sciences in GWOT. This is even more germane as Kilcullen is a member of Petraeus' "brain trust." I highly recommend looking at this piece.

Here's the link: http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/061218fa_fact2

[Tom Odom]

Thanks mate

I have Packer's Assassins Gate. And I actually read it.

I will look at this. I have a fondness for New Yorker because they sent Phil Gourevich to Rwanda

Tom

[Mark O'Neill]

Having just (quite late obviously) come across this thread, I have to agree with David's earlier post in response to Maximus' various critiques.

There is little utility in it for any public figure getting into deep debates with anonymous pundits.

Regarding 'precious' claims about ideas and plagarism (as our international man of mystery FM seems to imply that folks are copying him) , in my experience there is actually little 'new' under the sun. This (to me anyway) implies that it is highly likely that any number of informed people might think the same thing.

As we say here in Oz "harden up cupcake".

And if you are as good as you seem to think you are - come out and tell folks who you are. (Even as I write this I kind of expect some claim to privacy or security to be made in defence of anonymity. In my experience the people who make such claims are actually the last people to need them).


I have known DK for a while , and I have never heard him claim that he has all the answers. I do not necessarily agree with all that he writes. What is worthy (in my opinion) of admiration is that he is at least out there dreaming up stuff and trying to be creative - and owning up to it, good or bad, not hiding behind a psuedonym. In the current environment, that is gutsy. He stands by his stuff, right or wrong, and cannot hide.

Simple really. One can be Walter Mitty or one can 'own up'.

Send, over.

Mark

[SWJED]

12 April The Spectrum commentary - Kilcullen Leads Counterinsurgency by Tad Trueblood.

God bless the Australians. Through almost five and a half years of war now, they have been a steady, stalwart ally while others have wavered. The Australian armed forces are small but very effective in what they do, and they do it with little fuss and lots of professionalism.

One of Australia's quiet professionals has had a big impact on United States counterinsurgency strategy. He is Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, who through various turns of fate is now a part of Gen. Petreaus' "brain trust" in Iraq. Kilcullen served 21 years as an Australian Army infantry officer and still maintains his reserve. He led counterinsurgency operations in East Timor, advised Indonesian Special Forces, taught the British Army, advised the U.S. State Department, and earned a PhD in anthropology along the way.

As our military has struggled to learn (or relearn) the principles for successfully fighting a counterinsurgency war, Kilcullen's ideas have gained currency in the right circles - particularly among U.S. Army and Marine officers formulating a new manual for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In March of 2006, Kilcullen authored an 11-page memo in which he outlined his lessons learned and counterinsurgency best practices. It has become known as "Kilcullen's 28 points," and you can find it on the web with a quick Google search on that phrase...

[marct]

12 April The Spectrum commentary - Kilcullen Leads Counterinsurgency by Tad Trueblood.

Also interesting to note that the information box in that story provides only one link for information on counter-insurgency: here.

Marc

[SWJED]

Also interesting to note that the information box in that story provides only one link for information on counter-insurgency: here.

Marc

That link was not up this morning - or my coffee hadn't kicked in yet - appreciate you pointing that out.

[SWJED]

From today's Weekly Standard - Kilcullen Blogger Call by Michael Goldfarb.

Dr. David Kilcullen, who currently serves as senior counter-insurgency adviser to Gen. Petraeus and Multi-National Force Iraq, participated in a conference call with bloggers and reporters this morning.

Kilcullen has a distinguished record, having served as chief counter-terrorism strategist for the U.S. State Department, senior analyst in Australia's Office of National Assessments, and special adviser to the Pentagon for counter-terrorism during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. He also blogs at the Small Wars Journal.

The call lasted nearly 45 minutes, so I won't try and cover everything that was discussed, but there will be a complete transcript and audio file posted here sometime today.

So, a few highlights...

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

From today's Blackfive - COIN: Dr. Kilcullen in Blogger Roundtable.

Dr. David Kilcullen, well known to readers of this page (see especially here), was the guest in the DefendAmerica.mil Blogger's Roundtable this morning. Audio and a transcript will be (but as of this writing are not yet) available here.

I was invited to participate in the Roundtable (which, I found out when I got there, is being run by an old friend of mine -- a military contractor named Tim Killbride, who has recently done some writing of his own on the topic)...

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

9 July issue of the Weekly Standard - Richard Lugar, Meet David Kilcullen by William Kristol.

... Contrast Lugar's speech with an assessment of the situation in Iraq posted the very next day on the Small Wars Journal website. David Kilcullen, a former Australian military officer, is one of the world's leading experts on counterinsurgency warfare. A sharp critic of the previous U.S. strategy in Iraq, he was asked by General Petraeus to serve as an adviser during the development and early execution of the new strategy. Now finishing up his tour of duty, Kilcullen offered "personal views" of "what's happening, right now." It's worth reproducing much of Kilcullen's report, "Understanding Current Operations in Iraq"...

[Rob Thornton]

As a soldier how do you react to the different positions taken by politicians (in general)? You prefer to believe (at least I do) that these elected officials are trying to represent the interests of the United States, their constituents at home, and the soldier abroad, but it sometimes contrasts with your own emotions and perspective.

There seems to be a self defeating air of mistrust and self deception we must overcome in D.C, in the U.S. and abroad. People often compare (wrong for many reasons I think) the Iraq War and the Vietnam War. What people fail to do well is place Iraq in the context of the stated AQ (and their spawn) strategy. I'm not sure we can afford to fail in Iraq. We've hear the various withdrawal with _____________ options, but I think they miss the point.

You cannot reason with someone that is anathema to your core beliefs, one of you must cease to believe or exist.

We mirror image our process of rationalization into AQ and Iran to try and understand them and their motivations, but when we do so we deceive ourselves. Some of us have seen some of these hard core types up close - not the ones who look deflated on capture, but the ones who through their eyes look like serial killers, the ones with contempt for life regardless of age, sex, or anything else human beings might raise moral issues with. These animals are not confined to Islam or the Middle East, but they do seem to be attracted to the fringes of religious movements where extremism coincides with their cruelty.

While many of the people we encounter in Iraq are just trying to put food on the table, or regain honor and dignity, the hard core of the bunch murder because it feeds them - they are every bit as evil as Jack the Ripper. While many insurgents in Iraq can be brought back into their society (and in fact are being), these few Irhabs will not be - the idea of society is totally, 180 deg. at odds to the self interests of these few. These animals will murder until they die, even if locked up they will murder in their hearts until given the chance to do so again.

I believe that if we remove ourselves from Iraq before there is a functioning government that can provide security and work towards stability, the Irhab will gain empowerment. In an environment where we chose to leave a vacuum, the Irhab will prosecute Hirabah against any of those Iraqis and foreigners who they can justify exterminating. It will devolve into a Taliban like state where destroying anything and anyone (Christian, Yizidi, even Muslims) not acquiescing to this severely perverted form is encouraged. They will re-write the history of Mesopotamia through annihilation and erasure.

If left unchecked it will spread. It will be exported at first, infecting areas through information and money - like tiny tumors throughout the body. It will be impossible through our political paralysis to know if they are benign or malignant until after they gain enough strength to resist less intrusive treatments - this is part of a published AQ strategy. They will seek to challenge us in our homes in our own countries, because they cannot stand even the slightest challenge to their views. For them our continued existence is intolerable.

For these animals pluralism anywhere cannot be tolerated - for them its just a question of having the resources to destroy it. They are clever and will cultivate the outward appearance of confining their goals in the name of their right to exist, after all who are we to export freedom, or Christianity or anything regardless of the level of oppression others face? In the Irhab view they have no moral obligation to be honest to the apostates of the world (meaning anyone that disagrees with them), lying is justified and encouraged. If America can be duped into believing they will stop, then they should be encouraged to do so. However, eventually they see themselves as gaining the resources – it is written plainly in the AQ strategy - they see it as prophesized and communicate it as future, present and past tense.

What happens in Iraq right now matters to our future survival. We must succeed there, or we will go back in a much shorter period of time then we think. The next time all the moderates, and anyone who befriended us there will be dead, murdered along with their families and any hint they ever existed as anything but apostates. Iraq is not Afghanistan either, and anyone who thinks OBL & AQ did not learn from the last 5 years is at the pinnacle of ignorance – they are already making plans on how to consolidate and protect the gains they see as inevitable. Failure and withdrawal under any terms less then those that leave a secure and stable Iraq that tolerates the pluralism of its inhabitants (yea - that would equate to a representative system of some flavor) only sets us up for eventually going back. You can say it will never happen, but it will. The AQs of the world don't see it like we do, for them history is already written and they won, all they have to do is wage the global jihad.

[Old Eagle]

The job of newspapers (media) is to sell newspapers.

The job of politicians is to get elected.

If you accept those two reality points, you won't get so worked up about otherwise intelligent ? politicians doing/saying idiotic things, or newspapers/media consumed by such things as Paris Hilton (she's out of jail) and Anna Nicole Smith (she's still dead).

All politics is local.

That said, I am amazed at the resiliency of Joe Liebermann in the face of true adversity. Whoda thunkit?

[Rob Thornton]

Hey OE,

The job of politicians is to get elected.

Is it? Or is that just job #1?

I don't have much of a problem with all politics being local if that means they are represenative of those who elected them. It starts to get fuzzy when talking the T-TH in D.C. and the F-M at home raising $$$ for the next campaign.

I can't help getting worked up, in fact I'd say more people should. Of course its my opinnion, but I believe there is more at stake here then just Iraq. Liebermann has done what few others have, he's demonstrated leadership and candor.

Regards, Rob

[T. Jefferson]

But too many of our politicians are not serious. As retired General Jack Keane told the New York Sun last week, "The tragedy of these efforts is we are on the cusp of potentially being successful in the next year in a way that we have failed in the three-plus preceding years, but because of this political pressure, it looks like we intend to pull out the rug from underneath that potential success." I would only qualify Keane's statement in this way: Such a frivolous and thoughtless betrayal of our fighting men would be too contemptible to be called tragedy.

I for one, really do not want to see another liberation of Saigon. Politicians as a group never seem to learn from history, especially military history.

[T. Jefferson]

Rob:

The AQ strategy sure seems reminiscent of Marx and his "historical inevitability.”

If we bail, I would expect to see a massive growth in Shia militias and a return to out and out Sunni vs. Shia civil war.

[carl]

Rob:

Very well said. I get worked up too when I think of maybe two wars lost and two peoples betrayed in my lifetime; both because of the fecklessness and lack of moral character of our high leaders.

I just wish I could state it as well as you.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Rob:

Very well said. I get worked up too when I think of maybe two wars lost and two peoples betrayed in my lifetime; both because of the fecklessness and lack of moral character of our high leaders.

I just wish I could state it as well as you.

Rob,
About politicians, it all matter about sociology and the making of the ruling elite, in my own opinion and from personal knowledge acquired on the field.

Further readings of authors such as Gaetano Mosca (The Rulling Class), Vilfredo Pareto (The Mind of Society), George Sorel (varied works), James Burnham (The Machiavellians), Frederick the Great, and Nicolo Machiavelli, of course, provide further enlightenments.

About the courage, reliability and trustworthiness of politicians the dominant and basic parameter I personally consider is whether the personality of a given politician seem fit this of the “lion model,” or the “fox model.”

The way the making of the ruling elite is done from country to country is a variable of tremendous importance. In some instances corruption or past events in life likely to give hand to blackmail is a prerequisite since a highly empowered person who is not corruptible or has no such record is hard to get rid of if ever he crosses the political line on the basis of which he has been selected (yes, I didn’t say elected). Things are different in more democratic countries such as the United States, of course.

Sometimes ago I did write something more explicit and nearly exhaustive under the form of a comment, about this question. It is entirely based upon the reading of the above mentioned author. Just in case, you can access it at the following link and in looking for my name:

http://neveryetmelted.com/?p=1807

[Granite_State]

The job of newspapers (media) is to sell newspapers.

The job of politicians is to get elected.

Not really the issue with Lugar though. Don't necessarily agree with him, but he was just reelected, and I would think his seat is very safe. Wouldn't cite his own reelection as an issue here.