America's Asymmetric Advantage

[LawVol]

In this article (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013), the author advocates airpower. Having read many of your observations in the past, I am interested in reading any responses to this.

It appears as if he is arguing for some form of "air control" policy like the Brits used between the world wars. On the other hand, he does states that we are unlikely to engage in Iraq-style nation-building, so airpower is the answer. Maybe an argument for sticking with punitive operations?

In any event, he certainly does not seem to see the utility of land-power and even states his belief of no need for an Army and a Marine Corps (which the former Marine in me finds blasphemous). Anyway, I look forward to your comments.

[Steve Blair]

I would say that this is a rehash of the standard Air Force party line. The Air Force has yet to come to terms with the fact that not every nation or national actor is going to have a military-industrial complex that can be targeted by air power. He also ignores the fact that aircraft losses are extremely expensive (at $2 billion or so a copy, how many B-2s will the Air Force really hazard?) and that losses of six or seven high-value air assets will halt an air campaign.

Air power cannot engage in nation building. It cannot block a supply line that does not depend on trucks or highly-developed roads. It failed to do so in Vietnam, and has also failed to do so in Iraq. The AF does not like situations that it can't control, so it tries to avoid them.

You cannot engage in purely punitive operations and then walk away. There is a certain moral obligation to fix what you break, or help create the end state that you desire, once you engage in such operations. Just because the AF doesn't want to do that doesn't mean that the obligation ceases to exist.

[pcmfr]

I am a huge proponent of air power -- persistant ISR, precision fires (usually guided by ground guys), give the US a strategic advantage no ememy can match. But the author -- an AF JAG (instant creditability loss in my eyes) -- conveniently overlooks numerous shortcomings of air power. He cites the killing of AMZ as a major air power success, but doesn't mention (or realize) that that op never would have happened had it not been for a boat load of folks on the ground who rolled up folks over a period of several months to gather the intel to put the ordnance on target.

And this:

The relative sterility of air power — which the boots-on-the-ground types oddly find distressing as somehow unmartial — nevertheless provides greater opportunity for the discreet application of force largely under the control of well-educated, commissioned officer combatants.

is just pompous BS, and discounts the fine enlisted combat controllers we have.

I do think he makes a valid point about the all volunteer force and the fact that we will probably never be able to employ the numbers of troops on the ground we had in previous wars.

[Steve Blair]

is just pompous BS, and discounts the fine enlisted combat controllers we have.

I would also say that's a pretty big swipe at the many WOs who fly Army helicopters.

I was just reading back through a paper by H.R. McMaster (Crack in the Foundation), and he makes some pretty telling and very valid points about the Air Force's almost dream-like state when it comes to the "transparent battlefield."

[LawVol]

First, thank you for the comments. Just a question or two.

Blair says: You cannot engage in purely punitive operations and then walk away. There is a certain moral obligation to fix what you break, or help create the end state that you desire, once you engage in such operations.

Please explain. Where does this obligation comes from? From the limited reading I've done, it would seem that punitive operations have been the norm for many years (e.g. the British Empire). In resorting to a moralistic argument, whose morals do we use? I'm not trying to be quarrelsome, I just want to understand the thinking. I've read a few articles advocating a desire to do away with the "you break it -you bought it" theory.

pcmfr says: the author -- an AF JAG (instant creditability loss in my eyes)

Please explain. The argument seemed well-reasoned (I'm withholding opinion, afterall that's why I sought input) and I've read many articles cited by this council from non-operators and even non-military authors.

Thanks for the input and I hope to receive more.

[RTK]

"The relative sterility of air power — which the boots-on-the-ground types oddly find distressing as somehow unmartial — nevertheless provides greater opportunity for the discreet application of force largely under the control of well-educated, commissioned officer combatants. "

I refer back to David Kilcullen's 28 Articles: Rank means nothing; talent is everything.

Additionally, David Galula would argue that it's pretty damned tough to conduct the civil-military operations that take 80% of your time in a COIN environment from 30,000 feet.

I have a hard time believing that a Major General is basing his argument off of the fact that he doesn't forsee another rebuilding effort like Iraq in the future. More proof that certain elements of leadership are completely out of touch with reality.

[Steve Blair]

First, thank you for the comments. Just a question or two.

Blair says: You cannot engage in purely punitive operations and then walk away. There is a certain moral obligation to fix what you break, or help create the end state that you desire, once you engage in such operations.

Please explain. Where does this obligation comes from? From the limited reading I've done, it would seem that punitive operations have been the norm for many years (e.g. the British Empire). In resorting to a moralistic argument, whose morals do we use? I'm not trying to be quarrelsome, I just want to understand the thinking. I've read a few articles advocating a desire to do away with the "you break it -you bought it" theory.


Thanks for the input and I hope to receive more.

I understand your question, and don't find it at all quarrelsome.

If you look around the world, many of the failed states (in my opinion, anyhow) come from a mix of the old Imperial borders and failed punitive operations (Africa provides many good examples of this...consider the many French operations that have ended up prolonging some conflicts - Chad springs to mind here). Thus I think it can be argued that punitive operations do little to build stability (which is one of our stated goals) and instead work against such stability in many cases. From the moral standpoint, the standard "public line" of the US has been (and will most likely remain) that we can provide a better way of government and/or life for many in the world. If we're going to make the exportation of democracy one of our foreign policy cornerstones, that does bring with it a certain obligation to see our efforts through.

I would also like to comment on the author's lack of credibility. Any time the AF feels threatened in the budgetary sphere, articles like this start appearing. For historical evidence, take a look at "Setup" by Tilford (link is http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/...ord/Setup.pdf). Within the AF culture you stumble upon "true believers" such as this JAG general from time to time. They can be very disturbing, and do a great deal to divert AF internal attention from questions like strategic airlift, nation building, and other real world concerns and focus them on things like the F-22, "Airpower will win the war," and other matters.

[SWJED]

Just saw this on the Secrecy News Blog:

"Counterland Operations" (pdf), Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, 11 September 2006, refers to the use of U.S. air and space assets against enemy land-based forces.

[Steve Blair]

Just saw this on the Secrecy News Blog:

This also surfaced a couple of weeks or so ago on the Joint Electronic Library site. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/service...force_pubs.htm

One of the few sites they haven't locked down for .edu domains yet, and a wealth of interesting stuff.

[Bill Moore]

Please see Jedburgh's post under the Deuce Shop, Hezbollah TTP, post 16. There are two excellent articles on Israeli Air Force's performance during their fiasco in Lebanon. It is telling and very relevant to this discussion. Air strikes against non-state entities, especially well established ones such as the Hezbollah have minimum positive impact, and maximum negative impact. I would enjoy hearing one our Air Force members comment on these articles.

[SWJED]

Please see Jedburgh's post under the Deuce Shop, Hezbollah TTP, post 16. There are two excellent articles on Israeli Air Force's performance during their fiasco in Lebanon. It is telling and very relevant to this discussion. Air strikes against non-state entities, especially well established ones such as the Hezbollah have minimum positive impact, and maximum negative impact. I would enjoy hearing one our Air Force members comment on these articles.

Reposted here:

Here's the first two parts of a three-part series being published in the Asia Times:

12 Oct 06: Part 1: Winning the Intelligence War

...Our overall conclusion contradicts the current point of view being retailed by some White House and Israeli officials: that Israel's offensive in Lebanon significantly damaged Hezbollah's ability to wage war, that Israel successfully degraded Hezbollah's military ability to prevail in a future conflict, and that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), once deployed in large numbers in southern Lebanon, were able to prevail over their foes and dictate a settlement favorable to the Israeli political establishment.

Just the opposite is true. From the onset of the conflict to its last operations, Hezbollah commanders successfully penetrated Israel's strategic and tactical decision-making cycle across a spectrum of intelligence, military and political operations, with the result that Hezbollah scored a decisive and complete victory in its war with Israel...

13 Oct 06: Part 2: Winning the Ground War

...Moreover, and more significant, Hezbollah's fighters proved to be dedicated and disciplined. Using intelligence assets to pinpoint Israeli infantry penetrations, they proved the equal of Israel's best fighting units. In some cases, Israeli units were defeated on the field of battle, forced into sudden retreats or forced to rely on air cover to save elements from being overrun. Even toward the end of the war, on August 9, the IDF announced that 15 of its reserve soldiers were killed and 40 wounded in fighting in the villages of Marjayoun, Khiam and Kila - a stunning casualty rate for a marginal piece of real estate...

[jonSlack]

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2101598

Professor Collins' spirited defense of the ground perspective is exactly the kind of discussion I hoped my article would catalyze. His views are predictable, and not just because he is a retired career Army officer. Beginning in 2001, he served as a special assistant to former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz for, of all things, "stability operations." During his watch, the Pentagon made decisions that produced the "stability" issues we have in Iraq today. I evaluate Collins' assessments of the future in that context. Regardless, he is a respected pundit who provides much worth considering.

Collins makes the weird claim that "colossal" boots-on-the-ground efforts are "likely" in the next decade. Yikes! Is that the "likely" scenario they are teaching at the National War College? If so, here's a reality check: Given Iraq and the budget, it is abundantly clear that neither the American people nor their elected leadership are "likely" to green-light a "colossal" deployment of American troops abroad, especially in the near term.

The Air Force is support. Part of the support provided is similar to the indirect fire provided by Field Artillery. However, the planes only major advantage over the field artillery pieces is mobility. Another part of the support provided by the Air Force is airlift capability. Another part of the support is the capability that UAVs and other ISR assets contribute. Finally, the Air Force provides specialized personnel such as Combat Controllers and JTACs, PJs, meteorological specialists, and other low density skills that directly and indirectly support the Soldiers and Marines (and Sailors and other Airmen) on the ground. Yes, they provide valuable support, but they are still just support.

COIN/Small Wars require boots on the ground interaction, lethal and non-lethal. Cops cannot do effective police work without leaving the squad car and the military cannot accomplish COIN/Small Wars without being on the ground.

Concerning the writing of the piece, I do not like the disrespectful tone. Words like "yikes!" and "weird" to describe the points raised by Collins and the use of the pejorative label "pundit" to describe him take away from the article. Mr. Collins is a professor and a retired officer, the author should treat him with the respect he deserves.

[marct]

Concerning the writing of the piece, I do not like the disrespectful tone. Words like "yikes!" and "weird" to describe the points raised by Collins and the use of the pejorative label "pundit" to describe him take away from the article. Mr. Collins is a professor and a retired officer, the author should treat him with the respect he deserves.

I would second that point. Personally, I thought Gen. Dunlap's final paragraph

All of this said, Collins very ably represents a valuable perspective on America's security needs. We need more such lively exchanges!

was one of the most lovable ways of translating "and would you like cyanide with that port?". Honestly! I read Gen. Dulap's original article and wasn't impressed with it at all - his "rejoinder" has all of the gentility of a politician being asked to step away from the trough. In the words of my grandmother - "A pox on his house!".

Back to professor Collins' article for a bit. One point he makes stands out

The U.S. should continue to transform all of the armed forces for a complex future that might include war at any point on the conflict spectrum. The top priorities should be the development of a balanced force, mastery of joint and combined operations, networking the force, improving our understanding of foreign cultures and educating our young officers to see war in all of its many guises.

This resonates with a thread on this board a couple of months back about rebuilding along the lines of the Roman Legions. The problem, of course, is political will and the consequent cost.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

This dismissive tone is common with the Air Force when they send someone out to shoot down a message they don't like or conflicts with their perception of reality. This little bit

Unfortunately, many former armor and infantry officers such as Collins mistakenly read "air power" as exclusively "Air Force." That is a huge mistake. Actually, it is the tremendous air and missile arms of the Army, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard — along with the Air Force — that together form America's air power capability. Air power is, in fact, not just the most versatile war-fighting tool in the U.S. military, it is also the most joint. Trying to turn the air power debate into an interservice rivalry simply will not — pardon the expression — fly.

is a very common retort the Air Force uses, ignoring the fact that Marine air is joint by nature, and through no effort or cooperation on the part of the Air Force. And laying claim to the Army's assets (which the AF fought kicking and screaming every step of the way) under the blanket generalization of "air power" is for me the biggest lump of horse you know what in the entire article. The AF has for many years been claiming to be the most "Joint" of all the services. In fact, a recent book by the Air Force History Project "Air Force Roles and Missions: A History" has this as one of its most basic "points."

On Collins' article, I found this part quite interesting:

General Dunlap's central conclusion that land forces "will be of little strategic import in the next war — the one we ought to be thinking about and planning for now" is questionable for three reasons:

First, we have a poor track record of predicting the locale and character of the next war. Some examples: Because of the atomic bomb, we were convinced that ground forces and surface navies were outmoded in 1949. The Korean War (for which we had no plans) proved otherwise. The force that did so well in Desert Storm was designed to meet an enemy on the plains of Europe. Afghanistan was the last place on earth that the Pentagon thought we might have to fight. Sadly, our advances in technical intelligence have not improved our ability to predict any specific war.

Accordingly, we ought not prepare our forces for a single war scenario — neither "the one" in East Asia, as Dunlap would prefer, or the global war on terrorism, as some single-focus, ground-force advocates would advocate. Rather, we must be prepared to fight whatever war is deemed by the president and the Congress to be in our national interest. We must have a full-spectrum military for a full-spectrum world.

Second, Dunlap's misunderstands what ground forces are supposed to do. He believes ground operations should be adjuncts to air operations, but the opposite has been the more usual case. Even in the 21st century, the seizure of territory and its occupation will be essential in wars of various stripes, even if it increases our casualties and opens us up to the possibility of the abuses attendant to close combat.

Third, counterinsurgency and stability operations will likely be a significant part of many future conflict scenarios. Post-Desert Storm, we marched into the 1990s content with our conventional general-purpose forces, only to find that peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and stability operations were the dominant items on our agenda. Nearly 15 years later, that trend shows no sign of letting up.

Dunlap is, in spite of his protests to the contrary, a spokesman (perhaps a willing, unconscious one rather than a deliberate one) for the standard Air Force line. You could take many of his assertions, print them in an Air Force magazine from the 1950s or 1960s, and never notice the difference.

[Steve Blair]

And in what seems like an interesting counterpoint to Dunlap's article we find this in the same issue.

One paragraph that stood out for me was

Experience over theory

It should be clear, then, that the big-war mind-set of the ACTS interwar theorists led to far more interest in theories espousing attacks of a strategic nature than in the practical application of air power during this period. Kennett accurately assessed that "the United States learned no clear and indisputable lessons on air support from the limited wars of the late thirties." To be fair, however, some airmen in the Army Air Corps were skeptical, choosing to err on the side of experience. For example, Gen. Orvel Cook explained that, as a student at ACTS in 1937-38, "some of us had more experience than some of the instructors and, consequently, we took a lot of this instruction with a large grain of salt, and we more or less made up our minds, ... no matter how dogmatic the instructor might be." In a 1936 letter, Lt. Col. M.F. Harmon and Maj. Oliver Gothlin expressed concern about an ACTS theory that lacked supporting evidence: "This has never been done. ... A note of caution should be sounded against the too ardent adoption of peace time [sic] theories and hypothesis when they are not supported by actually demonstrated facts nor by the experiences of war in the only war in which aviation was employed." In making one good observation, however, these two officers missed another point that is arguably more important: Air power had, in fact, been employed many times since World War I, the "only war" they chose to recognize. It was this type of omission that led to an interwar theory, uninformed by interwar experience, that would ultimately dictate the U.S. approach during World War II and lay the foundation for air doctrine in the decades that followed.

The author is also a student at the Marine Corps War College.

[120mm]

I would say that the US Air Force is, indeed, an important asset in the GWOT...For the terrorists. I would say that unlike the author, air power is one of the LEAST versatile weapons... The man on the ground is so much more versatile. Aircraft can bomb or not bomb... period. The man on the ground can actually DO SOMETHING other than kill/destroy. And infantry remains the most Precision-guided Munition known to man.

Frankly, even the most "precise" PGM results in exploitable "collateral damage" which is used by the terrorists/insurgents/whomever to drum up anti-US sentiment.

Secondly, the dependence on airpower and PGMs is seen as weakness and cowardice by the islamic extremists we currently face - which they use to drum-up anti-US sentiment.

We need airpower for national defense, and as a sort of super-mobile artillery, but c'mon.... I for one am all for paying our infantry more than pilots....