Learning from Iraq: COIN in American Strategy

[Jedburgh]

Steven Metz, SSI, 22 Dec 06: Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy

...Where does Iraq go from here? At this point, the best feasible outcome is, as Ambassador Dennis Ross describes it, "a central government with limited powers; provincial governments with extensive autonomy; sharing of oil revenue; and, at the local level, some rough form of representation and tolerance for minorities". Equally likely is sustained mayhem which eventually leads the government to settle with the insurgents, potentially giving them control of all or part of the Sunni triangle or at least some degree of political influence. It is possible, though, that the insurgents may provoke the government into a draconian response which might, in turn, lead to intervention by other predominantly Sunni Arab states, thus turning Iraq’s civil war into an international one. Either may result in a weak central government, dominated by corruption, with criminal gangs and sectarian militias wielding great influence, or a new authoritarian strong man. Sustaining a multiethnic and multisectarian democracy in the face of mounting sectarian war may be impossible. Outside forces, as Fareed Zakaria notes, can do little to stop a full-blown civil war until its energy is expended. Division of the country into three parts may be inevitable with continued conflict in areas of sectarian overlap, particularly Baghdad and Mosul.

But whether Iraq ultimately turns into a success or failure, it is invaluable as illumination for American strategy. If it is a unique occurrence, then once it is settled, the U.S. military can return to its old, conventionally-focused trajectory of transformation. But if Iraq is a portent of the future, if protracted, ambiguous, irregular conflicts that are cross-cultural, and psychologically complex are to be the primary mission of the future American military (and the other, equally important parts of the U.S. security organization), then serious change must begin.

[Rob Thornton]

I don't have time to read the whole 153 pg. doc, but this one sticks out right off the bat:

Division of the country into three parts may be inevitable with continued conflict in areas of sectarian overlap, particularly Baghdad and Mosul.

I've got plenty of friends and plenty of feed from the folks in Baghdad, and to make a connection between the two would seem to make the author's analysis dated (probably to 2004). I could spend allot of time telling you what the enemy is here, and what he is not- suffice to say, it is not sectarian violence of the scale you see down South. First, there are just not many Shiite here - there are however some sectarian killings - it almost reads like an exported hit. ref. ethnic viloence between Arabs and Kurds, - mostly IO and some attacks on KDP HQs, but not too much - lots of ineffective IO from the Baathists though trying to scare Arabs - however most Kurds here are in fact Sunni.

Most of the violence here is IEDs on the MSRs aimed at CF elements. Some mortars, some SAF, even some PSAF - but no where near the scale down South

Part of the reason - pretty good ISF (with IA being the stronger of the two, but IP coming along OK). Our former CF partner unit 5-20 IN from 3/2 SBCT went down to Taji in NOV. I just got an email from the CDR of B/5-20 today. He says the ISF there are very weak compared to this IA BDE. He says the brief he got when he arrived there was the IA unit there was rated TRA 1 (Training Readiness Assessment - 1 being the strongest number of 1-5). Our BN here is rated a 2 (the criteria to reach 1 requires being able to sustain certain things which requires resources we just don't see all the time - but in all other areas they are doing very well). My buddy says our TRA 2 BN is hands donw better then the TRA 1 unit he's working with in Taji.

I try and get stuff out to the Force on a regular basis about how stuff is working. I maintain a Advisor's LOG on CompanyCommand.mil - but many of you won't be able to access because you must be acitve duty. I just had an article called "An Irregular Shade of Blue" published in Armor, another coming up that Tom Odom really improved on for me about MiTT Relationships called "Avoiding the One Hand Clapping Effect", and another on Mosul COIN (many thanks to Marc for some awesome feedback) that Infantry is picking up for JAN/FEB (attached). None of these are perfect, none is meant to be the answer to all the Advising the ISF woes since everywhere is different, but all are meant to stimulate thought.

Tactically I think we are winning here in Mosul; strategically in Iraq I honestly don't know. Mosul however has a historical notion of going its own way. Through Khanates, Caliphates, Macedonians, etc., Mosul has been what Mosul has always been, a contact point with a cosmopolitan feel, I suspect it will retain that at its heart no matter who claims to be its master.

[marct]

Hi Rob,

I just finished reading the Mosul COIN piece: nicely done! I think it is a good article with some really good points.

After we chatted about it, I set part of my mind playing around with the idea of "perception" as a "battlespace" (yeah, I'm still working out the concepts for a theory of symbolic warfare). One of the things that came up as I was reading your article was about the construction of perceptions amongst Coalition Forces by the insurgents.

We (humans) have a tendency to use stereotypes (probably part of our evolutionary heritage). Still and all, the insurgents know Western stereotypes better than we (Westerners) know their stereotypes. Certainly embedding "trainers" in ISF and IP units is useful, but mightn't it also be a good idea to reverse this and embed Iraqi "trainers" in Coalition forces? Just a thought, but I would be very interested to see what you think of it.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

Marc,
Great point. We've had great success with embedding Koreans (KATUSAs) in US Army units. I've heard a few folks mention that we should consider an Iraqi Katusa program, but I'm not sure its gained any traction yet. We're also working hard on getting Iraqi officers to US and allied service schools - the latter is as much about cultural exchanges and strengthening long term security tes as sharing doctrine.
I'm really interested in what ou come up with ref. symbollic warfare - I think we can put it to use. I also sent you an RFI ref. Networks/Linkages via email.
Thanks, Rob

[marct]

Marc,
Great point. We've had great success with embedding Koreans (KATUSAs) in US Army units. I've heard a few folks mention that we should consider an Iraqi Katusa program, but I'm not sure its gained any traction yet. We're also working hard on getting Iraqi officers to US and allied service schools - the latter is as much about cultural exchanges and strengthening long term security tes as sharing doctrine.
I'm really interested in what ou come up with ref. symbollic warfare - I think we can put it to use. I also sent you an RFI ref. Networks/Linkages via email.
Thanks, Rob

Hi Rob,

Personally, I think it would probably be a good idea - reinforcing the message that the Iraqis have a lot to offer in the fight and a lot to teach everyone.

The symbolic warfare idea is stil in the think about - talk about stage <sigh>. I haven't got it to the point where I can actually write something coherent yet, but I think I have about 80-90% of the pieces. I'm thinking about trying to write up a case study as a first try at it - I'll send you a copy of the draft if that's okay with you.

On the RFI - it hasn't hit my email box yet, but I'll follow up asap. I hope you had a great (quite) Christmas .

Marc

[Shek]

Marc,
Great point. We've had great success with embedding Koreans (KATUSAs) in US Army units. I've heard a few folks mention that we should consider an Iraqi Katusa program, but I'm not sure its gained any traction yet. We're also working hard on getting Iraqi officers to US and allied service schools - the latter is as much about cultural exchanges and strengthening long term security tes as sharing doctrine.
I'm really interested in what ou come up with ref. symbollic warfare - I think we can put it to use. I also sent you an RFI ref. Networks/Linkages via email.
Thanks, Rob

Rob,

I just finished reading "A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam" by Neil Sheehan, and he specifically brings up how there were suggestions to MACV early on under Westmoreland to adopt a KATUSA like program; however, there was no interest and the concept was never developed or implemented. What kind of benefits do you think would be dervied specifically from this type of program in Iraq?

[Rob Thornton]

Shek,
I think its a long term benefit. Its one where embedded soldiers from the host nation would really see how we interact with each other. Example - trying to explain the role of our NCOs at different levels is difficult if your culture (or military cultrure) does not provide for it. Its our NCOs who uphold the standards, its our NCOs who perpetuate success, its our NCOs that allow us to decentralize and continue mission based off of intent. The same is true with the officers.
Here is a story about base defense of our little chunk of terrrain 5 or 6 months ago. The perimeter security positions were adequate, fields of fire not perfect, but my efforts to get new towers and ENG here work have mostly gone unanswered (side note/rant - talk about being on the outside looking in - MAREZ looks like the place was dipped in concrete and I can't even get a few towers out here and some T-Walls in 10 months? I've gotten a little of what I asked for, but I've had to wait on the AIF to fire a 2 stage RPG through a wall into one of my guy's room - OK enough rant )
Anyway in the back was a position that covered the 6, the position was well located, but could have been improved. Overwatching that position were several others that could have provided interlocking fields of fire. One day a RPG team supported by a PKC pulls up maybe a 100 meters short of the position; the PKC Gunner gets out quickly, fires a burst at the position, and the the 2 man RPG team gets out and and fires 3 rockets into our patch.
Well we decided to walk the ground with the BN CoC and AAR why it happened. I started by pulling up on a piece of high ground where we could look at the position from the reverse through binos without being seen by the two soldiers manning it. Both were lounging out there, helmet off, cell phone on, not paying any attention to pulling security. The BN CoC was furious; but I said hold onto your anger, because we need to walk down there and incidentally, this is less of a soldier failure and more of a leadership failure - you may find you need to look in the mirror after we finish.
So off we go to the position. As we get near, the helmets go on, the soldiers go into the bunker and they wait. We climb up and say hello. I'd asked the BN CoC to let me ask a few questions first. So, I says "when was the last time a leader came to check on you?" "Never" was the reply. "When was the last time somebody asked you what you were supposed to be doing here?" I asked. "Never." was the reply. I had to explaing to the CoC that being a leader implies taking on certain responsibilities - somewhere there should be a NCO who posted these guys, checked on them, ensured they were supplied, corrected them, etc. Somewhere there should be an officer who occassionally spot checked these positions, ensured they were tied in, understood how it tied into the defense, etc. It would be even better if a SNCO accompanied that officer, so the SNCO could mentor the officer. Somewhere there should have been some BN C2 that held the CO CDR tasked with the Defense of our patch accountable.
While it resonated with a few, most did not get it at the time. There just was not any relatvity, nothing for them to even remotely associate it with. The things I'd learned in my time coming up did not fit. FOrtunately we worked through it, and through a combination of static postions, and patrols AIF rarely screws with us here anymore (i'm still pissed about the lack of Force Pro here vs. the concrete ice cream cone at MAREZ , but Que Sera Sera)
While embedding MiTTs to BNs, BDEs and DIVs is good and works the big things, I think a KATUSA style approach would compliment it very well. It would also benefit our units out there with a SME on changes in "atmospherics" - "SGT Ibrahim, does this feel right to you?" "No LT, this feels like an ambush." While combied patrolling is useful also and provides modeling for ISF, it has its limitations. Somthings just take time and constant exposure to understand tacitly. Other lessons often get overlooked because they require reptition to resonate. It should not be looked at as the end all answer, but as another facet or tool in building an organization. They wil probably teach us as much as we teach them (this is true in my case), and they may reject some of what we do because it does not or cannot work for them.

[JKM4767]

I don't have time to read the whole 153 pg. doc, but this one sticks out right off the bat: I've got plenty of friends and plenty of feed from the folks in Baghdad, and to make a connection between the two would seem to make the author's analysis dated (probably to 2004). I could spend allot of time telling you what the enemy is here, and what he is not- suffice to say, it is not sectarian violence of the scale you see down South. First, there are just not many Shiite here - there are however some sectarian killings - it almost reads like an exported hit. ref. ethnic viloence between Arabs and Kurds, - mostly IO and some attacks on KDP HQs, but not too much - lots of ineffective IO from the Baathists though trying to scare Arabs - however most Kurds here are in fact Sunni.

Most of the violence here is IEDs on the MSRs aimed at CF elements. Some mortars, some SAF, even some PSAF - but no where near the scale down South

Part of the reason - pretty good ISF (with IA being the stronger of the two, but IP coming along OK). Our former CF partner unit 5-20 IN from 3/2 SBCT went down to Taji in NOV. I just got an email from the CDR of B/5-20 today. He says the ISF there are very weak compared to this IA BDE. He says the brief he got when he arrived there was the IA unit there was rated TRA 1 (Training Readiness Assessment - 1 being the strongest number of 1-5). Our BN here is rated a 2 (the criteria to reach 1 requires being able to sustain certain things which requires resources we just don't see all the time - but in all other areas they are doing very well). My buddy says our TRA 2 BN is hands donw better then the TRA 1 unit he's working with in Taji.

I try and get stuff out to the Force on a regular basis about how stuff is working. I maintain a Advisor's LOG on CompanyCommand.mil - but many of you won't be able to access because you must be acitve duty. I just had an article called "An Irregular Shade of Blue" published in Armor, another coming up that Tom Odom really improved on for me about MiTT Relationships called "Avoiding the One Hand Clapping Effect", and another on Mosul COIN (many thanks to Marc for some awesome feedback) that Infantry is picking up for JAN/FEB (attached). None of these are perfect, none is meant to be the answer to all the Advising the ISF woes since everywhere is different, but all are meant to stimulate thought.

Tactically I think we are winning here in Mosul; strategically in Iraq I honestly don't know. Mosul however has a historical notion of going its own way. Through Khanates, Caliphates, Macedonians, etc., Mosul has been what Mosul has always been, a contact point with a cosmopolitan feel, I suspect it will retain that at its heart no matter who claims to be its master.

I certainly agree that Mosul doesn't always follow the trends of the rest of the country. I left Mosul in Jan '04, during the infancy of the insurgency that would soon devastate the area. I attribute a lot of the problems to tactical failures on the part of the TF that replaced the 101st. Mosul in the spring and summer of '04 is a perfect example of what large FOBs do to a battlespace. I have also recently learned of the successes of ISF in the city and compared to what Mosul used to look like, I think CF have done a commendable job in the last year. After a year on a MiTT, I can understand the labors of getting Iraqis to 1. get along and 2. take ownership of their mission and AO.

[Shek]

I certainly agree that Mosul doesn't always follow the trends of the rest of the country. I left Mosul in Jan '04, during the infancy of the insurgency that would soon devastate the area. I attribute a lot of the problems to tactical failures on the part of the TF that replaced the 101st. Mosul in the spring and summer of '04 is a perfect example of what large FOBs do to a battlespace. I have also recently learned of the successes of ISF in the city and compared to what Mosul used to look like, I think CF have done a commendable job in the last year. After a year on a MiTT, I can understand the labors of getting Iraqis to 1. get along and 2. take ownership of their mission and AO.

JKM,
FYI - we were forced to consolidate into large FOBs. We fought to maintain many of the company FOBs that were used by you guys open only to be told no at the GO level. I was asked by a few of the Iraqis that "hosted" platoon FOBs if we could keep them open, but the same as above applied. Baghdad was pushing towards reducing the footprint.
Shek