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Thread: America's Asymmetric Advantage

  1. #21
    Council Member aktarian's Avatar
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    Can you say Doughet?

    I find this paragraph interesting.

    This illustrates another salient feature of air power: its ability to temper the malevolent tendencies of societies accustomed to the rewards of modernity. Given air power's ability to strike war-supporting infrastructure, the powerful impulse of economic self-interest complicates the ability of despots to pursue malicious agendas. American air power can rapidly educate cultured and sophisticated societies about the costs of war and the futility of pursuing it. This is much the reason why air power alone delivered victory in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, without the need to put a single U.S. soldier at risk on the ground.
    It took NATO air forces 78 days to have what was essentially third world country throw in the towel. And couple of things to consider about OAF:
    -USAF made serious deviations from it's aproach (IADS was still being hit late in campaign instead of being destroyed first and quickly
    -B-2s never went in alone but were escorted by EW planes (and, as said before, against third world country)
    -FRY AF kept numbers of planes operational (MiG-21s and light attack mostly)
    -NATO destroyed very few AFVs (around 10 IIRC), which makes one wonder what would happen if ground war would be fought

    I agree that air force alone can be effective, provied it has clearly defined goals that are within it's capabilities. Which is basically blowing stuff up. "El Dorado Canyon" was such case. "Desert Fox". 1992 (?) strikes against Iraqi intel service HQ as a response to Iraqi plot to kill Bush I in Kuwait. "Accountability" and "Grapes of Wrath" (not purely AF missions but close enough) were less clear as goals were less clear.

    So if your goal is just to make a point or punish somebody by damaging his infrastructure then air force (cmbined, if needed, by navy cruise missiles) is a way to go. If your goals are wider than you need ground troops.

    So what explains the rapid collapse of the Taliban and al-Qaida in 2001? Modern air power. More specifically, the marriage of precision weapons with precise targeting by tiny numbers of Special Forces troops on the ground. The results were stunning. Putatively invulnerable positions the Taliban had occupied for years literally disappeared in a rain of satellite-directed bombs from B-1s and B-52s flying so high they could be neither seen nor heard.
    I guess he didn't hear about certain force called Northern Alliance

  2. #22
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    Default Air Force and COIN

    There were several comments on the Air Force's ability to grasp FID/COIN and nation building doctrine, yet that doctrine has left our nation with the short straw more often than not. Even most of the victories we acheived such as our efforts in the Philippines and Haiti were short lived, these nations rapidly converted back into a state of corruption, abject poverty and violence. (Admitedly the Philippines has economic zones of success, but they are very limited).

    One could make arguments we failed to follow our own doctrine, or agencies outside the military didn't do their jobs, etc.. We already know the reality of what our other government agencies can achieve, and they should be listed under limitations when we do our planning. If State and other agencies can't execute the tasks in the doctrine, then the doctrine is non-functional. Another limitation that must be considered is the culture we're dealing with. You can't change cultures with COIN, and when we attempt to interject a foreign system or systems(democracy) it will almost always fail. Where have we done it successfully?

    Perhaps that explains why one of our most successful COIN operations was in Greece. They obviously had a long...... history of democracy and shared other similiar values with us. Our doctrine fitted that situation like a round peg in a round hole. We were successful with nation building in Western Europe and Japan for the same reasons. Although Japan has a unique culture, they were looking west long before WWII, and were the best capitalists in Asia at the time (I think China is neck and neck with them now). In summary our COIN doctrine works if we have an achievable end state, and if we have an idealistic end state it doesn't.

    Punitive raids do work in some situations, such as they have against Iraq and Libya. We have to accept the reality that we have go there every five years or so and lump them up to put them in their place. This is much, much cheaper, than attempting a regieme over throw and subsequently attempting to put a democratic government in place. Punitive raids on the other hand do not work (I can't recall any historic examples) against non-state actors.

    I know many don't concur with the 4GW concept, but I tend to lean towards we're dealing with something that our legacy doctrine doesn't address. Air power is only one tool in this fight, and a limited tool at that. However, our COIN doctrine hasn't proved overly useful to date either.
    Last edited by Bill Moore; 11-23-2006 at 04:39 PM.

  3. #23
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    The argument with the AF and COIN isn't so much about our COIN doctrine, which as Bill points out has some issues, but the fact that the AF doesn't even really acknowledge the existence of any other sort of war aside from all-out war. They have historically chafed under any sort of restrictions and seem to forget that it is the politicians who set the objectives and control the means, not the AF leadership. Evidence of this mindset is found throughout AF writing, especially when they turn their attention to Vietnam. AF education about MOOTW and other such scenarios is woefully lacking at even the most basic level.

    There are, in my opinion, a number of institutional reasons for this, most of which lie outside the SW discussion realm. But it needs to be remembered that one of the largest consumers of the defense budget isn't really in the mental place it needs to be in order to deal with SW issues.

  4. #24
    Council Member LawVol's Avatar
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    Default Af & Coin

    Thank you all for the comments. From my limited reading, it would seem that the notion that the AF just doesn't have a COIN doctrine nor particularly care about COIN is correct. Asside from Corum and Johnson's book "Air power in Small Wars," I haven't found anything on it. Anyone know of anything or perhaps have suggestions on the effective use of airpower in small wars.

    For my own thoughts, I think airlift is the best assest. I would think that using airlift to transport troops to the action and support smaller units among the population (i.e. CAP) would be preferred to mega-FOBs like in Iraq. Also, airlift combined with a security force and AF BEAR base and other construction assets could be used to address civil-humanitarian needs. I'm reading "Fiasco" now and it, along with some other critiques, indicated that we missed the boat in addressing the population's needs vis-a-vis basic infrastructure and needs. People tend to care more about whether their electricity is working and if they can buy food at the supermarket before they care about new constitutions and the like. Perhaps airpower can assist with this?

    I appreciate the comments for this neophyte in training. Although I'm still wondering why being a JAG is an instant credibility loss for Dunlap. Are you out there pcmfr?

  5. #25
    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by LawVol View Post
    Although I'm still wondering why being a JAG is an instant credibility loss for Dunlap. Are you out there pcmfr?
    I'll answer this one from my perspective: If he was an Air Force pilot, I'd still dismiss him as not knowing what he's talking about. As an Air Force lawyer his abilities to enter COIN at the pointy tip of the spear, especially as a Major General, are non-existant. He simply has no frame of reference to base his claims on.

  6. #26
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    Default Air COIN

    Air assets are important to recon, such as the Predator drone which acts as a force multiplier by allowing eyes on more of the country with fewer troops. Precision munitions also make air power effective at attacking enemy strong points with minimum collateral damage. Air lift just gets troops to the theater and civilian airlines can do that too. Once in the theater air assets can do some logistic work which thwarts the enemy's efforts against resupply.

    The enemy in Iraq concentrates against weakness. That makes combat troops his lowest priority when it comes to attacks. While his primary targets have been non combatants, he has also attacked infrastructure targets and supply convoys. Engagement with combat troops are almost always defensive when our forces are attacking his sanctuaries and safe houses. Non combatant targets include foreign workers trying to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure and reporters covering the war, as well as Iraqi civilians. Until the last year most of these civilian targets have been Shia.

    In terms of an "Air Force COIN strategy" I agree with Steve, that there probably is not one as such, but the emphasis on jointness has probably pulled them into the current Centcom strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the best air assets in Afghanistan may be the A-10 which can do serious damage to the Taliban light infantry and is not as vulnerable as attack helicopters in the same roll. Air assets in COIN operations also tend to be reactionary when friendly units come under fire.
    Last edited by Merv Benson; 10-09-2006 at 02:27 PM. Reason: typo

  7. #27
    Council Member pcmfr's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    I'll answer this one from my perspective: If he was an Air Force pilot, I'd still dismiss him as not knowing what he's talking about. As an Air Force lawyer his abilities to enter COIN at the pointy tip of the spear, especially as a Major General, are non-existant. He simply has no frame of reference to base his claims on.
    This pretty much nails it for me. Along with some personal bias I have based on JAGs providing worthless advice in a combat zone.

  8. #28
    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    When the original aspects of transformation started I watched in terror as once again the disbanding of the Marines was discussed. What I don't understand is why the Air Force exists. I know it is likely a result of the successes of World War 2, and that there was a consistent theme of air, sea, land to re-create the services. I was reminded recently that it takes an officer to drive a jet and a private to shoot a stinger. Cost effectiveness is definitely not balanced.

  9. #29
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    The existence of the AF is wrapped up pretty tightly in politics, which explains why they are to this day the most political of the branches. The roots do back to World War II, and even the interwar period, but the main thrust came after World War II and the dawn of the atomic era. Many factors went into it, including the perceived cost of maintaining a large standing army as opposed to the "cost savings" of an airborne atomic deterrent.

    And as yet another aside, the concept of officers only flying is something of an American aviation deal. Both the Germans and the British had flying sergeants in both World Wars, and the Marines did the same up until the first part of World War II. One could also argue that the high concentrations of officers in the AF has created its own problems (among them an NCO corps that is fairly weak when compared to those of the other branches), but this is way major tangent time...

    In any case, it's high time someone made the AF look at MOOTW/COIN in a serious way. NK bomb tests aside, it's really what we will be doing for the foreseeable future.

  10. #30
    Council Member LawVol's Avatar
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    Default air mobility

    What about using air mobility for resupply rather than convoys? In attempting to win hearts and minds, the hard hand some take in getting convoys to their destinations probably doesn't help. While it would probably be more expensive, it could potentially result in less casualties and less of a negative effect on the population we're trying to win over.

    I appreciate the responses and hope you don't mind the questions.

    Also, since COIN seems to be a multi-disciplinary endeavor, perhaps the JAG (with some small wars learning) could prove valuable, especially in light of the growing number of legal issues encountered in COIN.
    Last edited by LawVol; 10-10-2006 at 05:37 PM. Reason: typos

  11. #31
    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    It would be extremely expensive and we simply do not have anywhere near enough helicopters to replace trucks as logistics haulers.

    SFC W

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    A JAG officer, perhaps especially an air force JAG, would have a lot of important input as to the legal ramifications of COIN and Small Wars. Unfortunately, the author of the piece hasn't offered a legal opinion at all! Instead, he's talking grand strategy - and it's one we've heard before.

    Air power has an important role to play in all wars. Manned fighters and bombers will probably have their place no matter how advanced their robot counterparts become. But I don't think it's wise to believe that it can win wars all by itself. It's a nice bonus if it does, but it's foolish to count on that.

    This may be preaching to the converted here, but consider the following question: what happens when we run into an enemy against whom we cannot achieve air superiority? Or who has air superiority versus the US? Do the Spartans still have the world's great land forces?

  13. #33
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post
    It would be extremely expensive and we simply do not have anywhere near enough helicopters to replace trucks as logistics haulers.

    SFC W
    It's also a question of how much cargo can be carried and for what cost. It is possible to use helicopters to sustain combat units exclusively (it was done in Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division in 1965), but it requires a huge number of sorties and it's not practical in the long term. Some cargoes like fuel are simply easier to move via truck. There's also, as Uboat509 mentioned, the cost factor. It's much less expensive to run trucks than it is to get helicopters in the air. Doing solid airlift would also increase the logistics tail of the support element by a major amount.

  14. #34
    Council Member aktarian's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    It's also a question of how much cargo can be carried and for what cost. It is possible to use helicopters to sustain combat units exclusively (it was done in Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division in 1965), but it requires a huge number of sorties and it's not practical in the long term. Some cargoes like fuel are simply easier to move via truck. There's also, as Uboat509 mentioned, the cost factor. It's much less expensive to run trucks than it is to get helicopters in the air. Doing solid airlift would also increase the logistics tail of the support element by a major amount.
    IMO relying exclusively on air transport would also increase vulnerability during critical phases (landing, taking off, while exposed on the ground). Helicopters are more vulnerable to fire than trucks and disabling one wouldn't be that hard for determined enemy. Even if it's not destroyed it would take time to repair it, not to mention that you might need spares that can't be flown in by helicopter or would have to be flown in by sling load (thus again increaisng vulnerability).

  15. #35
    Council Member Ray Levesque's Avatar
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    Default A general-officer level cheer leader

    His argument is just a rehash of the supporters of the 1990s "revolution in military affairs" that led many to believe that high tech weaponry (and Info Tech) would allow the US to fight any kind of war and win, at a much reduced cost. The only type of strategy his thinking supports is that of “decisive battle.” The problem with “decisive battle” is that whether a battle or war is decisive requires the enemy to accept the result. If he doesn’t accept a battle’s outcome, the war drags on.

    His thinking represents tactical thought, not strategic – in the end the types of war in which we’re involved in Iraq and Afghanistan are won at the strategic level, not the tactical. Targeting is not strategy and never will be. Airpower cannot be the only tool in the strategic toolbox – not all problems require the same tool.

    The reality is that our problems in Iraq are derived from poor strategic decision-making and not from a lack of airpower. Insurgencies are won or lost at the strategic level – we can always win at the tactical-level.

    Dunlap’s argument reflects parochialism at its worse, and his article is more suited for a group of cheerleaders.
    Ray

  16. #36
    Council Member pcmfr's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jones_RE View Post
    This may be preaching to the converted here, but consider the following question: what happens when we run into an enemy against whom we cannot achieve air superiority? Or who has air superiority versus the US? Do the Spartans still have the world's great land forces?
    If/when that happens, then the US will no longer remain the world's dominant power. Ditto for maritime supremacy. I agree with everyone here who says that air power alone doesn't win wars, but when we don't have it, we will certainly lose.

  17. #37
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by pcmfr View Post
    If/when that happens, then the US will no longer remain the world's dominant power. Ditto for maritime supremacy. I agree with everyone here who says that air power alone doesn't win wars, but when we don't have it, we will certainly lose.
    I don't think anyone here is arguing that we don't need air power. But there is a certain faction within AF higher leadership that feels airpower can "go it alone" and do whatever is needed. This "true believer" faction tends to boil most problems down to target selection and weapons delivery, and also blurs the tactical and strategic areas into one lump that can be solved by proper ordnance delivery. They tend to avoid tactical considerations when possible because that may lead to a discussion of CAS; something the AF has been historically averse to under most circumstances.

  18. #38
    Council Member pcmfr's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    They tend to avoid tactical considerations when possible because that may lead to a discussion of CAS; something the AF has been historically averse to under most circumstances.
    I'm not sure that is true anymore, since we have proven that with PGMs, CAS can be successfully (and safely) executed from 25K+ feet.

  19. #39
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    It is possible to do CAS at that range, but that isn't the same thing as the AF leadership wanting to make those resources available. Being able to do the mission and wanting to do the mission are two separate things. The AF historically has never been especially into CAS, since it distracts from what they feel are their main strategic missions (strategic bombing and space operations, although other missions do crop up from time to time).

  20. #40
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    Default Transitory power

    Air power is transitory. There is a reason why attacks were called air raids. An air raid has the ability to degrade and inconvenance, but by its nature it cannot last more the moment of impact and detonation. To have combat persisting power you have to have troops and equipment that can occupy and dominate an area.

    Mao's theory of revolutionary warfare which relied on a raiding strategy still called for a point where there would be a general uprising that overwhelmed the enemy and allowed his forces to dominate an area.

    The US effort in Afghanistan in concert with the Northern Alliance was actually and accelerated application of the revolutionary warfare theory.

    It is the transitory nature of air power that makes it unable to cut lines of communication or control ground battle space. Combined arms operations are going to continue to be the most effective way to dominate and control a battle space.

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