Soccer Hooligans as a force multiplier

[davidbfpo]

I am sure football gangs have acted as a 'force multiplier' before for political protest, usually not for mass movements as in Egypt, but extreme right wing / nationalist groups in Russia and the UK for two examples.

In this instance were the Ultra's combat skills available when the confrontations with the riot police occurred or after they retreated?

When rioting emerges from public protest the presence of groups like the Ultras will make a dramatic difference, for their discipline, experience and sheer delight in fighting. Crowds may waver when the state responds to the start of a riot, at that moment the Ultras provide a shell of protection as the crowd decides what to do.

[carl]

Check out the blues and the greens from Byzantium. They were two factions of chariot racing fans who got into politics. Fascinating that is still happens.

David:

That last paragraph of yours was a very good analysis.

[tequila]

Very good article in MERIP that outlines the basic history of the Egyptian protests and reminds us of how huge and nationwide the movement really was, as opposed to the very Tahrir-centric view we got in the West from our Cairo-based Western news media.

The soccer clubs were a very small part of a very large nationwide movement - what the author calls a "strong society" that was increasingly well-versed in confronting the Egyptian state. Mao would have called it a "dry field" waiting for the spark.

The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution

...
Egypt’s momentous uprising did not happen because Egyptians willed it into being. It happened because there was a sudden change in the balance of resources between rulers and ruled. Mubarak’s structures of dominion were thought to be foolproof, and for 30 years they were. What shifted the balance away from the regime were four continuous days of street fighting, January 25–28, that pitted the people against police all over the country. That battle converted a familiar, predictable episode into a revolutionary situation. Decades ago, Charles Tilly observed that one of the ways revolutions happen is that the efficiency of government coercion deteriorates. That decline occurs “when the character, organization and daily routines of the population to be controlled change rapidly.” [5] The organization and daily routines of the Egyptian population had undergone significant changes in the years preceding the revolt. By January 25, 2011, a strong regime faced a strong society versed in the politics of the street. In hindsight, it is simple to pick out the vulnerabilities of the Mubarak regime and arrange them in a neat list as the ingredients of breakdown. But that retrospective temptation misses the essential point: Egyptians overthrew a strong regime ...