I would like to share some observations with you on the counterinsurgency doctrine that is to be formally published. It appears to me that the focus of creating effective learning materials that are crisp, concise, bulleted, and easy to read must have changed in the 40 years since I was an Marine officer training and leading men in combat in Vietnam. I have read a draft of the "new doctrine entitled "Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations", and frankly, it has the appearance of a 150-pages literature survey that is part of someone's Master's Thesis. The Marine Corps spent a year putting this togther and it is reassuring to know that they were able to draw on the expertise of knowledgeable warriors such as Lt. Col. Nagl who wrote "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" (a phrase from T.E. Lawrence's 1920 report on how to create an insurgent force). Having read more than 50 books on counterinsurgency, combined with my own experience, the authors would have done well extracting the critical elements from Capt. Davis Galula's 500 pages of notes, "Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1956" or his small but very well organized book "Counterinsurgency Warfare", adding the Marine Corps relevancy and examples, and formatting the materials into topics, lessons, and modules, with learning objectives and salient points.
I feel that H. John Poole, who has written some very good books that could serve as the basis for a more readable doctrine. Among his good ones are "Tactics of the Crescent Moon", "Militant Tricks", and "Phantom Soldier" could have made a significant contribution since his books are very readable, formatted for quick assimilation of the material, and illustrated to reinforce critical points. I guess it was felt that battalion commanders, the target audience of this publication, don't relate well to illustrations and graphics to help visualize the concepts. The authors would have done well to have used a good part of the book "The Army in Vietnam" by my good friend Andy Krepinevich, as the basis for negative examples to reinforce the positive concepts that they attempted to put forth in this work.
The other publication, "Small Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency" is less lofty and esoteric, and covers the topics a little better but I wonder about the reading level of the material if this is targeted to lieutenants and sergeants. One of the more useful pieces is the chapter "The Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" by David Kilcullen. Another good piece that would have provided more insight into the role of civil affairs in a counterinsurgency is the "handbook for Military Support of Pacification" publish by MACV in 1968. Other good references include "U S Army Special Warfare School MATA Handbook for Vietnam" January 1966, FM 31-73 "Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency" (a lot of information on engineering and construction), the "U S Army Special Warfare School Helpful Hints for Advisors (RVN)", the series of Marine Corps Bulletin 3480 "Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in the Republic of Vietnam".
Both publications need work and additional input from those of us who were advisors and CAP members in Vietnam, as well as other counterinsurgencies. to put a more practical and useable face on these tomes. The authors should reread the original Small Wars Manual (I have a copy and will be happy to lend it to the authors) for readability, format, layout, and practicality.