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    Default Bin Laden: after Abbottabad (merged thread)

    Moderator's Note: Clearly this incident will resonate here and I thought it appropriate to have a a thread in this area 'Global Issues & Threats'. Fourteen threads have been merged here to create a collection for Bin Laden items after his demise @ Abbottabad. Renamed the thread too. (Ends).


    Osama bin Laden Killed by U.S. Strike

    Entry Excerpt:

    Osama bin Laden Killed by U.S. Strike - ABC News

    There is a SWC thread on the subject at: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13211

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    Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-01-2016 at 10:00 PM. Reason: Mods Note added

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    Default Bin Laden News Roundup (Update in Progress)

    Bin Laden News Roundup (Update in Progress)

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    Al Qaeda

    Obama Announces Death of Osama bin Laden - Voice of America
    Bin Laden is Dead - New York Times
    Bin Laden Killed, 'Justice Has Been Done' - Washington Post
    U.S. Forces Kill Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan - BBC News
    Osama Bin Laden Killed in Shootout, Obama Says - Reuters
    Officials Provide Details on bin Laden Operation - Voice of America
    Body Buried at Sea After Raid in Pakistan - New York Times
    Detective Work on Courier Led to Breakthrough - New York Times
    Bin Laden Was Found at Luxury Pakistan Compound - Reuters
    Perhaps Largest Manhunt in U.S. History - Voice of America
    Senior Official in Pakistan's ISI Confirms Bin Laden Killed - Reuters
    The Most Wanted Face of Terrorism - New York Times
    Death of Bin Laden Not Mean Demise of Al Qaeda - New York Times
    Egypt's Al-Zawahri Likely to Succeed Bin Laden - Associated Press
    Al Qaeda No.2 Zawahri Most Likely to Succeed Bin Laden - Reuters
    Islamists: Bin Laden Death Will Not Mute Jihad Call - Reuters
    Amid Cheers, a Message: ‘They Will Be Caught’ - New York Times
    Afghans Fear West May See Death as the End - New York Times
    Afghan Leader: Bin Laden Strike Is Blow to Terror - Associated Press
    Afghan Leader Tells Taliban Not to Fight After Bin Laden's Death - Reuters
    Joy Erupts on U.S. Streets With Killing of Bin Laden - Reuters
    Bin Laden's Death Draws Cheers, Relief, Dismay - Associated Press
    Israel: Bin Laden Killing Triumph for Democracies - Reuters
    India Hails Bin Laden Death, More Needed to Fight Terrorism - Reuters
    Vatican Says Bin Laden Will Have to Answer to God - Reuters
    Muslim Brotherhood: U.S. Should Now Quit Iraq, Afghanistan - Reuters
    Bin Laden's Death: Reaction in Quotes - BBC News
    Obama’s Remarks on Bin Laden’s Killing - New York Times transcript
    After Osama bin Laden... - New York Times opinion



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    Default A really bad day for bin Laden – and for Pakistan

    A really bad day for bin Laden – and for Pakistan

    Entry Excerpt:

    The killing of Osama bin Laden is a satisfying triumph for Americans and the U.S. government. It would have been even more satisfying had it occurred in the weeks and months after the September 2001 attacks. But the fact that it took a decade to finally kill bin Laden should be warning to any who doubt the long memories and persistence of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism forces. They didn’t forget and they never stopped working on the problem.

    The Joint Special Operations Command, presumably the command responsible for the mission, should get credit for demonstrating its ability to successfully raid targets virtually anywhere in the world. The CIA also gets credit for patiently developing the required intelligence and for reminding everyone of the value of battlefield captures, interrogations, and human intelligence.

    Finally, President Barack Obama deserves great credit for taking the risk of ordering this raid. He likely knew that the past record of such high-visibility raids was not good and that much more can go wrong with these operations than go right. He must also have known that another Desert One fiasco could have been disastrous on several levels.

    Most notable was Obama’s willingness to shatter America’s relationship with Pakistan in order to take a gamble on getting bin Laden. For this raid is a black day for Pakistan and its relationship with the United States. As the White House background briefing on the raid makes clear, the United States kept the raid completely concealed from the Pakistani government. Combine this with the fact that bin Laden was found in a highly protected compound in a wealthy town near Pakistan’s capital, and a stone’s throw from a Pakistani military academy. Americans will be right to conclude that Pakistan was bin Laden’s long-time friend and not America’s. What little support Pakistan still enjoys in Washington will now likely melt away. Pakistan will have to look to China, its last friend, for the support it will need to survive.

    Although the struggle against terrorism will go on, the death of bin Laden will bring a sense of finality for most in the American electorate. Combine that with more evidence of Pakistan’s duplicity, the evident breakdown in relations between the United States and Pakistan, and what will likely be the most bloody year for U.S. soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. The result could be a final collapse of public support for the war in Afghanistan. That probably won’t bother President Obama too much and will bolster his argument to accelerate the U.S. withdrawal from that war later this year.

    Nothing follows



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    Default Bin Laden Arabic Editorial Roundup

    Bin Laden Arabic Editorial Roundup

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    Bin Laden Arabic Editorial Roundup
    Selected Excerpts Compiled by Scott Weiner, PhD Student
    The George Washington University
    Translated from Arabic

    Continue on for the editorial roundup.



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    Default The Lawfulness of Killing Bin Laden

    The Lawfulness of Killing Bin Ladin

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    The Lawfulness of Killing Bin Ladin
    by Butch Bracknell

    Much has been made of the recent revelations that Osama bin Ladin was unarmed at the moment he was killed by U.S. special operations forces in close quarters battle. Let us put this issue to rest with dispatch, once and for all: Killing bin Ladin was not an extrajudicial execution, a murder, or a war crime. It was a combat engagement lawful under U.S. and international legal authority – full stop.

    Two rationales undergird the lawful killing an enemy combatant, including an unlawful combatant such as the transnational terrorist bin Ladin: self-defense and jus in bello.

    - The self-defense justification usually permits a “friendly” combatant to engage an opponent with deadly force when the combatant believes his or her life, or the life of other members of his or her unit or other authorized protected persons (for example, certain noncombatants present in the area, such as ordinary citizens, children, aid workers, or missionaries), is endangered by the hostile acts or intent of an opponent. Whether the opponent is armed is relevant to the self-defense analysis, but does not solely settle the issue. The key factor is whether a combatant reasonably believes his or her life (or the life of a protected person) to be in danger; for example, an enemy combatant may appear to have a weapon, even though he is unarmed. If the friendly combatant reasonably fears for his life or that of a protected person, deadly force is permitted and the defensive killing is not unlawful.

    Even so, discussion of the location of bin Ladin’s weapon and whether he might have been wearing a suicide vest are utterly irrelevant: engaging bin Ladin with deadly force is most appropriately viewed as grounded on the second rationale: jus in bello.

    - The law pertaining to the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello), which has developed since antiquity and includes certain provisions of the modern Geneva and Hague conventions, permits the sanctioned killing of an opponent in an armed conflict, regardless of whether he is armed at the moment he is engaged. So long as the opponent meets the minimum criteria to be regarded as a combatant (even an unlawful combatant), he may be engaged with deadly force, even if he is separated from his weapon. He may be killed while sleeping, eating, taking a shower, cleaning his weapon, meditating, or standing on his head. It is his status as an enemy combatant, not his activity at the moment of engagement, which is dispositive.

    Osama bin Ladin was an enemy combatant – again, full stop. His status as a virtual enemy of the United States is grounded on several factors: his declaration of war (fatwa) by Al Qaeda, of which he was the nominal chief, against the United States; the Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) of September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40); and, most likely, declaration of a state of hostilities (essentially, a state of “war”) by the President against an opposing belligerent: Al Qaeda, its footsoldiers, and its leaders. The qualifier “most likely” indicates that if the President has, in fact, declared Al Qaeda to be a hostile, belligerent force, the designation probably would be classified and non-public. It is also superfluous, as Congress supplied the necessary authority in the AUMF to make combat actions against Al Qaeda lawful. They described a category of combatants who may be targeted by U.S. forces, and Osama bin Ladin fell squarely into that category more precisely than any other person in the world. Targeting bin Ladin was based on bin Ladin simply being bin Ladin: his conduct as he stared down the wrong end of an MP-5 was immaterial.

    Once designated a hostile enemy combatant, there are only two ways a combatant can be exempted from lawful targeting: by manifesting a clear and unequivocal intent to surrender, and by becoming wounded or otherwise incapacitated and incapable of resistance (hors d’combat). There is no evidence bin Ladin was wounded prior to administration of the lethal force which ended his life. Moreover, U.S. forces engaged in armed conflict are under no obligation to give an enemy combatant a chance to surrender; the enemy combatant must practically force his surrender on the U.S. force by manifesting it clearly, timely, and in a manner which enables U.S. forces to discontinue the use of lethal force. At this instant, a shield of legal protection descends around him, and U.S. forces are obligated to treat him humanely and consistent with the laws of armed conflict pertaining to detainees. Until the shield is present, triggered by manifest surrender, it is absent. Without the shield that only he could initiate through his surrenderous conduct, bin Ladin remained a legitimate target and was treated so by the assaulting U.S. force.

    Bin Ladin’s death was a triumph for the American intelligence community and the armed forces and provides, at long last, some solace to the victims of 9/11 and Al Qaeda’s other terroristic acts. His death will likely prove to be a strategic gain, and it eliminates a continuing threat to Americans at home and her citizens and forces abroad. It also was completely sanctioned under U.S. and international law. The intellectual energy spent obsessing and hand-wringing over bin Ladin’s death would be better spent on less clear-cut law of armed conflict issues facing the nation and the international community.

    Butch Bracknell is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps. A career military lawyer with tours in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, he is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, DC.



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    Default The SEAL Who Shot Bin Laden

    The SEAL Who Shot Bin Laden

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    Default CTC Sentinel on the Death of Usama bin Laden

    CTC Sentinel on the Death of Usama bin Ladin

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    West Point's Combating Terrorism Center has released a Special Issue of the CTC Sentinel on the death of Usama bin Ladin. The new issue can be found here.

    The Special Issue contains the following articles:

    - Bin Ladin’s Killing and its Effect on Al-Qa`ida: What Comes Next? By Bruce Hoffman
    - Special Operations Forces and the Raid Against Bin Ladin: Policymaker Considerations in Combating Terrorism by Michele L. Malvesti and Frances Fragos Townsend
    - How Bin Ladin’s Death Will Affect Al-Qa`ida’s Regional Franchises by Camille Tawil
    - The Impact of Bin Ladin’s Death on AQAP in Yemen by Gregory D. Johnsen
    - The Impact of Bin Ladin’s Death on AQIM in North Africa by Geoff D. Porter
    - Bin Ladin’s Death Through the Lens of Al-Qa`ida’s Confidential Secretary by Nelly Lahoud
    - Bin Ladin’s Location Reveals Limits of Liaison Intelligence Relationships by Charles Faddis
    - What the Experts Say... With Juan C. Zarate, Mark Kimmitt, Elliott Abrams, Michael F. Walker, Frank Taylor, Rohan Gunaratna, Dell L. Dailey and Thomas W. O’Connell



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    Default State Legal Adviser Koh defends legality of bin Laden raid

    State Legal Adviser Koh defends legality of bin Laden raid

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    In my Foreign Policy column from last Friday, I noted the muted defense given by Obama administration officials on the legality of the raid against Osama bin Laden. A wide range of international observers had questioned the raid’s legality and the U.S. government seemed restrained in its response to this criticism. In my column I noted the silence of Harold Koh, the U.S. State Department’s legal adviser, who in early 2010 had delivered a long speech defending the government’s use of lethal drone strikes against irregular adversaries against whom the United States is in a state of “armed conflict.”

    Today at the Opinio Juris blog, Koh finally made the U.S. government’s case. He quoted heavily from his 2010 drone speech. He also appended some analysis on the legal requirements for completing a battlefield surrender, which should be of interest to all infantrymen.

    In my column I surmised that the purpose of the administration’s reticence to thoroughly defend the legality of the bin Laden raid was to avoid declaring a checklist of requirements defining armed conflict status that might end up restricting the legal flexibility of the government against future irregular adversaries. Koh did not appear to add any disclaimers in this regard, so it remains to be seen whether some “lawfare” adversary of the United States will use Koh’s blog post against the government in the future.

    Nothing follows.



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    Default Current Books on Pakistan, Shiism, and Saudi Arabia: Thinking Beyond Usama Bin Laden

    Current Books on Pakistan, Shiism, and Saudi Arabia: Thinking Beyond Usama Bin Laden

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    Current Books on Pakistan, Shiism, and Saudi Arabia: Thinking Beyond Usama Bin Laden
    by Youssef Aboul-Enein

    Download the Full Article: Current Books on Pakistan, Shiism, and Saudi Arabia: Thinking Beyond Usama Bin Laden

    I spend a significant amount of time conducting seminars on Islam, Islamist Political Theories, and Militant Islamist Groups to units deploying to the Middle East, as well as to leaders attending the National Defense University. Part of the benefits of teaching, is a requirement to keep current on books recently published about the region. I hope to give you an overview of books I enjoyed and others that were much more challenging and do not garner my immediate recommendation. Three current books will be featured in this review essay, one each on Pakistan, Shiism, and Saudi Arabia. Let us begin with a book that gets my vote as required reading for 2011, Anatol Lieven’s new book on Pakistan.

    Download the Full Article: Current Books on Pakistan, Shiism, and Saudi Arabia: Thinking Beyond Usama Bin Laden

    Commander Aboul-Enein is author of “Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat,” (Naval Institute Press, 2010). He is Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and Senior Counter-Terrorism Advisor at the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism. Commander Aboul-Enein wishes to thank the National Defense University Librarians for directing him to a few of these books. Good teaching demands great librarians. Finally he wishes to thank his ICAF colleague CAPT Chan Swallow, USN for his edits that enhanced this review and more importantly his discussion of these books.



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    Default Molding Perceptions: American Engagement with the Media after the Bin Laden Raid

    Molding Perceptions: American Engagement with the Media after the Bin Laden Raid

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    Molding Perceptions: American Engagement with the Media after the Bin Laden Raid
    by Marno de Boer

    Immediately after the successful conclusion of the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound the United States government and its agencies fed the press and public alike with information about the event. Two trends stand out in this information flow; the rapidity with which it was delivered, and the fact that much of it later turned out to be incorrect. While it is not yet possible to determine whether this was the result of a deliberate policy, it was highly successful in getting a favorable story across during the first few days after the action, the period crucial for forming people’s perceptions. In this way, the American media policy, while in some ways an evolution of prior engagements with the media, also began to show a likening to the ones successfully adopted by regular and irregular opponents alike in the last decade. This article argues that this new policy was fairly successful and might be a worthwhile model for dealing with the press during future events.



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    Default Getting bin Laden

    Getting bin Laden

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    Getting bin Laden: What Happened that Night in Abbottabad by Nicholas Schmidle, The New Yorker. BLUF: "... Obama and his advisers went into a second room, down the hall, where others involved in the raid—including logisticians, crew chiefs, and SEAL alternates—had assembled. Obama presented the team with a Presidential Unit Citation and said, “Our intelligence professionals did some amazing work. I had fifty-fifty confidence that bin Laden was there, but I had one-hundred-per-cent confidence in you guys. You are, literally, the finest small-fighting force that has ever existed in the world.” The raiding team then presented the President with an American flag that had been on board the rescue Chinook. Measuring three feet by five, the flag had been stretched, ironed, and framed. The SEALs and the pilots had signed it on the back; an inscription on the front read, “From the Joint Task Force Operation Neptune’s Spear, 01 May 2011: ‘For God and country. Geronimo.’ ”"



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    Default Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?

    Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?

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    Default Revelations on the Killing of Osama bin Laden

    Revelations on the Killing of Osama bin Laden

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default BBC: Bin Laden raid book offers rare insight

    Mark Urban, a BBC journalist and ex-Army officer, who has written several books on the SAS and Northern Ireland, has written a review of 'No Easy Day' by Mark Jones:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19606623

    A few of his comments:
    What emerges is a vivid portrait of the world in which these people lived, going out on raids so many times to kill or capture suspected terrorists that they all began to merge.
    This puzzles me, partly as Iraq is not Afghanistan:
    There are signs that the special operations campaign in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the Bin Laden raid in neighbouring Pakistan, has been markedly less successful in reducing the wider pattern of violence than it was in Iraq.
    I expect some here will hold far stronger opinions on the book's publication, Urban concludes:
    His book, understandably enough, focuses on the door-kickers' view, the dedication of those willing to go up against suicide bombers and extremist leaders, as well as the losses suffered by his comrades.

    He has done a service to openness and accountability in writing it.
    davidbfpo

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    Default SOF in Iraq

    This Daily Mail article appears a few months ago, I don't recall posting it, but it does provide some context for the previous post on SOF in Iraq:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...-granules.html

    I expect the story was "spin" and was carefully vetted pre-publication.
    davidbfpo

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    Default

    And by service to openness he did a great disservice to his country, fellow servicemen and word.

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    Default Yes...

    Quote Originally Posted by Wyatt View Post
    And by service to openness he did a great disservice to his country, fellow servicemen and word.
    Selective "Openness" in service to self isn't of use to anyone else in any event...

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    Default

    This author is not alone in his sins.

    Someone within the SOF community felt compelled to leak that it was "SEAL Team Six" on this particular raid. There was no need to focus attention on that one organization.

    Someone has made "I killed bin Laden" a major platform point in an election bid.

    Did a guy actually on the mission seek to grab a little for himself as well? Yes, and he is wrong for that. So are those much higher than him who gave up information or exaggerated their roles as well.

    I would like to see us chalk this up as "we screwed this up." See us learn from that and move on with a new mindset that moved these types of missions off the front pages and off the top of our list of approaches for dealing with such problems, and into the shadows of rare, limited operations that are as much urban legend as stated policy.

    Instead we will most likely crucify this one operator and blithely carry on as before.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default Book Review: Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11

    Book Review: Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11

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    Default Abbottabad raid: assessing Hersh's LRB piece

    Hamid Hussain a regular contributor comments:
    As usual, after Seymour Hersh’s piece about OBL killing, many good friends asked few questions. I thought Hersh’s story will get some traction for a while but it didn’t last even two weeks. Anyway, my two cents below
    Due to size his commentary is in two parts.

    Four weeks ago, veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published account of killing of Osama bin Ladin (OBL) in London Review of Books. Hersh disputes official versions of Pakistan and United States and claims a massive cover up. Hersh is a well known investigative journalist and his two most important works were uncovering of My Li massacre in Vietnam and prisoner torture at Abu Gharaib prison. However, some of his most recent works especially imminent U.S. attack on Iran proved to be incorrect. In his recent work, Hersh’s admit that he doesn’t have any conclusive proof about his conclusions but believes his sources.

    Hersh’s main sources of information include one retired senior U.S. intelligence official who only had knowledge about the initial intelligence about OBL and two consultants to Special Operations Command. Hersh gives opinion of few others especially The New York Times reporter Carlotta Gall that she was told by a Pakistani official that Pasha knew about the raid and a Pakistani author Imtiaz Gul’s statement that four Pakistani intelligence operatives told him that they believed that Pakistani military must have knowledge of the operation although they had no proof. Hersh is not on a solid ground but rather on thin ice with these sources. However, there are many aspects of Hersh’s story which are true and he raises many genuine questions which are still unanswered. Answers of such questions about covert operations usually take decades but we are living in the age of Julian Assange, Private Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning and Edward Snowden and hope that we may find answers sooner than later.

    Hersh’s main conclusions are;

    - CIA learned about OBL from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who betrayed the secret for the $25 million reward.

    One retired Brigadier/Major General rank officer who served with Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) settled with his family in United States around that time period. However, many Pakistanis including army officers migrate to United States and Canada and though there is suspicion about this particular officer but no one is sure. All the evidence suggests that no one was sure about the identity of OBL and if true, it is most likely that this officer had some suspicion and he shared this with Americans. It is not clear whether he met Americans in Islamabad or in Dubai? I’m pretty sure that this officer had retired and was not serving at ISI at the time he contacted Americans. There is some confusion about the events as Americans used some retired Pakistani army and police officers for surveillance of OBL compound. However, these officers had no idea about the identity of the resident of the compound. It has been suggested that this team was also moved out of Pakistan just before the launching of the operation.

    - OBL was prisoner of ISI since 2006. He was in Hindu Kush mountains from 2001 to 2006 and ISI got hold of him by bribing local tribal people. However, Saudi Arabia paid for his upkeep. Pakistan wanted to keep OBL as a hostage to ensure that al-Qaeda and Taliban stayed in their own lane. If they deviated then Pakistan would hand over OBL to United States for some kind of a deal in future. Saudi Arabia wanted to keep OBL out of U.S. reach for fear of their own connection with OBL. Pakistanis were worried that Washington may learn from Saudis while Saudis were fearful that Washington may learn from Pakistanis.

    If we believe this version of events then ISI officials even if small in numbers from 2006 to 2011, some local tribesmen and members of Saudi royal family as well as U.S. officials were in the loop since 2006. Even if we keep to bare minimum considering compartmentalization of intelligence apparatus, it will still include at least several dozen individuals from three different countries. This is very unlikely and the weakest link is local tribesmen. Tribesmen are selling the information to anyone who is holding the purse. Intelligence agencies of many western countries, Afghanistan, India, Saudi Arabia and Iran get all kind of information from local sources. After getting money from Pakistan, these tribesmen would be running to everybody and his cousin to get the mother load of cash for OBL information. OBL never trusted tribesmen on both sides of the Durand Line.

    If Pakistanis were holding OBL as an insurance against al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks on Pakistani targets then this theory doesn’t hold any water. In fact from year 2006 to 2011, Pakistani security establishment saw a string of very high profile attacks from al-Qaeda as well as Taliban. The list includes bombing of an army recruiting center at Dargai in November 2006, bombing of a bus carrying employees of ISI in Rawalpindi in September 2007, bombing of a mess of Special Services Group (SSG) at Tarbela in September 2007, bombing of ISI regional headquarters at Peshawar in Novemebr 2009, bombing of ISI office in Multan in December 2009, bombing of police headquarters and ISI office in Lahore in May 2009, attack on army’s General Head Quarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi when General Kayani was in his office in October 2009 and in December 2009 militants attacked a mosque in cantonment area of Rawalpindi killing several army officers including a Major General, a Brigadier and two Lieutenant Colonels. In addition, a serving Lieutenant General (Surgeon General), former commander of SSG Major General Amir Faisal Alvi and Major General Muhammad Bilal were assassinated by militants. In a two weeks time period, militants targeted three serving Brigadiers in Islamabad area killing Brigadier Moinuddin Ahmad while Brigadier Waqar Ahmad Malik and Brigadier Sohail Ahmad survived the bullets of the assassins. These are examples of only high profile attacks on military installations and individuals and does not include countless bombings that killed hundreds of policemen, paramilitary forces and civilians. These facts simply demolish the myth that OBL was parked in Abbottabad by Pakistani army brass as leverage against al-Qaeda or Taliban.


    - Then Pakistan Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani and then DGISI Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha cooperated with Americans in operation. They provided blood sample of OBL to Americans to confirm identity of OBL, provided all details of the compound, ensured no resistance, made sure that the SEALS helicopters reached Abbottabad without triggering any alarms and provided a liaison office for CIA at Tarbela Ghazi; a site of ISI covert operations. Pakistani cooperation in the operation included allowing two Chinook helicopters to park at ISI covert operation base at Tarbela Ghazi, a Pakistani ISI liaison officer accompanied SEAL team in helicopter from Afghanistan and ISI guards of the compound were told to leave the compound as soon as they heard the noise of helicopter rotors.

    If we accept this version then we have to accept that several dozen officers from the rank of army chief to sepoys guarding the compound were in the loop. Tarbela is where Special Services Group (SSG) has a base and to my knowledge there is no specific site at Tarbela for any activities or training of ISI. At different time periods, some small American technical teams were embedded with Pakistanis troops for signal intelligence and intercepting militant communications. If Pakistanis had already arranged everything for the Americans from confirming OBLs identity with blood test, details of the compound, and a safe passage to all helicopters and sending all guards on furlough on the night of operation, do they still need to put an ISI liaison officer on the American chopper probably to give them directions. The man on chopper was a Pushtu speaking American posted with a SEAL outside the compound to speak to locals in their language in case anybody came inquiring about the action. It is most likely that even he didn’t know about the nature of the operation or the identity of OBL until the show was over.

    - Kayani only asked the Americans to bring in a small team and make sure to kill OBL. In addition, killing of OBL should be kept secret for about seven days and then a carefully crafted cover story should be released announcing that OBL is killed in a drone strike in Hindu Kush on Afghan side of the border. The reason Pakistan army wanted to use this cover because OBL was a hero to many Pakistanis.

    I’m not convinced that Pakistanis wanted to embark on such a complicated course for such a flimsy reason.

    - Pasha told Americans that he could not keep OBL in the compound any longer as too many people in Pakistani high command knew about his presence. Head of air defense command and many local commanders were fully briefed by Kayani and Pasha about the whole mission.

    Such type of sensitive operation cannot be kept secret if so many people are involved.


    davidbfpo

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