Crowdsourcing on AQ and Analysis (new title)

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Thanks to all the Small Wars Journal Readers that participating in the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 and Post Bin Laden Polls over the past two weeks. I'm just now posting the first results of these polls.

For the results from each of the questions, I'll post an update on this thread.

Here's the first result from the Post-UBL poll--------

Of 147 participants in the Post-UBL poll, 121 respondents answered the following question:

“Now that Bin Laden is dead, how long until U.S. counterterrorism forces eliminate Ayman al-Zawahiri?”

The majority of respondents selected “Within the next 2 years.” This result surprised me as I thought most would estimate an earlier demise of Zawahiri. Additionally, respondents across all major professional categories selected their choices in remarkably similar distributions across the five answer choices.

For the charts see
"Voters say Zawahiri 1 to 2 years from capture: Poll Results #1"

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The first question asked during the Post UBL Poll was:

What will be the chief consequence of Usama Bin Laden’s death?

The largest group of respondents believes Bin Laden’s death will create no significant change to AQ operations. However, large subsets of respondents believe that:

1- Zawahiri will take charge of AQ’s strategic leadership and direction
2- AQAP based in Yemen will become the new head of AQ globally

For graphs and tables showing the results of this question, see this link.

Thanks to all of you for voted!

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Again, thanks for voting on the Post UBL and AQ Strategy Polls the past few weeks.

Here are the latest results:

"Voters responded to two different polls pertaining to the question of AQ’s future leadership. (one the week before UBL’s death and one the week after UBL’s death)

From the Post UBL Poll. The question was:

Assuming that Usama Bin Laden can be replaced, which al Qaeda (AQ) member has the necessary attributes to become AQ’s global leader?

I found the following results from this question interesting:

'Government’ voters were the least likely of the larger groups to pick Zawahiri.

No voters from ‘Academia’ picked Sayf al-Adl

‘Private Sector’ respondents picked Awlaki at a higher rate than any other group.

Voters responded to a similar question the week prior to UBL’s death during the AQ Strategy Poll 2011-2012. Of 325 respondents to this poll, 302 voters responded to the following question.

Over the next five years, who will be the most influential ideologue for AQ’s strategic direction?

I’ll write more on this later in the week but here are some interesting points:

Prior to UBL’s death,

‘Government’ respondents believed Zawahiri would be the most influential over the next 5 years. However, in a poll right after UBL’s death, they selected Zawahiri as the next leader at much lower rates than other groups.

‘Academia’ thought Libi was as important over the next 5 years as Awlaki.

Again, ‘Private Sector’ respondents selected Awlaki at much higher rates than other groups.

For Charts and Graphs depicting the results of these questions, visit the following link:

http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=277

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While poll results #1, #2, and #3 were all interesting in their own way, I believe the results of the AQ donor support question are the most interesting so far. Due to the fortunate timing of UBL's demise, I was able to run the same poll question the week prior and the week after UBL's death.

The first poll, AQ Strategy 2011-2012, initiated the crowdsourcing experiment on 27 April and 272 respondents tallied their votes for the following question:

Over the next two years, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)

The second poll, Post UBL Poll, began on the morning of May 2nd and 132 respondents cast their votes to roughly the same question with the same response choices. (Many voters from the first poll also voted in the second poll)

After UBL's death, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)

The before and after results from this question, I believe, illustrate Bin Laden's significance to AQ Central operations. It also suggests that UBL's death may significantly help AQAP's rise in Yemen.

Interesting results across the board. Here are a few that I picked out.

-Votes for "Shift to AQAP" increased dramatically after UBL's death.
-Votes for "Remain supporting AQ & Taliban in AFPAK" decreased sharply after UBL's death.
-10% of 'Academia' and 'Private Sector' voters moved away from "Shift to Islamist groups in North African uprisings".

In terms of volatility, 'Academia' had the highest volatility in their opinion before and after UBL's death. I found this particularly interesting as the 'Academia' crowd was the group most likely to select "Status Quo - No Significant Change" as the "Chief Consequence of UBL's death" in Poll Results #2. Based on their voting shift after UBL's death, I would have expected the 'Academia' group to have selected "AQ fundraising decreases" or "AQAP becomes new AQ Central".

For graphs, tables and additional analysis to what has been the most interesting poll result thus far, see

http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=290

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The Post UBL Poll asked the following question during the week immediately following UBL’s death:

What will be the chief consequence of UBL’s death for the U.S. and its Western allies?

140 respondents answered this question with surprisingly uniform distribution of votes across all professional categories and question responses.

-Most voters (44%) thought UBL’s death would result in no significant change in U.S. & NATO operations

-Many (36%) thought public pressure would force the withdrawal of Western partners from Afghanistan

-Few (20%) thought UBL’s death would shift the strategy from counterinsurgency (COIN) focus in Afghanistan to a regional counterterrorism (CT) focus in AFPAK.

Military voters were the only sub-group that thought somewhat differently than the overall crowd. Most military voters believe UBL’s death will lead to the exit of their NATO partners. (47% for Military compared to 37% for the crowd as a whole)

For graphs and additional analysis, see this link: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=303

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This week’s poll results focus on AQ affiliates. Specifically, which AQ affiliate will lead AQ’s next chapter. I asked several questions in the AQ Strategy Poll and the Post UBL Poll addressing this issue. This week, I’ll release several results from the AQ Strategy Poll but will begin today with the results of the Post UBL Poll question:

With respect to UBL’s death, which AQ affiliate will be the primary node of AQ over the next 2 years?

133 respondents answered this question the week after UBL’s death revealing some interesting insights:

-More than half (50%) of all voters identified AQAP in Yemen as the key affiliate for AQ globally.

-‘Academia’ respondents selected “AQAP in Yemen” at a far higher rate than other professional groups and “AQ Central in AFPAK” at a far lower rate than other professional groups.

-‘Academia’ and ‘Government’ voters were less concerned by an emerging “AQ affiliate amongst North African uprisings” than ‘Students’ and ‘Private Sector’ voters.

For more analysis and charts, see the following link: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=300

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Following up on Monday's Post UBL Poll results on AQ's affiliates after UBL, I returned to the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 poll conducted the week prior to UBL's death.

The first question asked pertaining to AQ affiliates was:

Which AQ affiliate has the greatest technological and operational ability to conduct a terror attack against the West?

Out of 295 respondents, I found the following to be of particular interest:

-The majority of all voters identified 'AQAP in Yemen' as having the greatest capability prior to UBL's death with 'AQ Central in AFPAK' coming in second.

-After AQAP & AQ Central, an 'Emerging AQ Affiliate amongst North African uprisings' received the third largest set of votes despite there being no clear picture of what that organization might be.

-The fourth highest vote getter was 'Other'. Amongst those 22 responses selecting 'Other', 10 voters cited AQ cells in Europe as the most capable and 6 cited homegrown recruits in the U.S. or the West as most capable.

-Prior to UBL's death, 'Academia' and 'Students' were the most bullish on AQAP while "Private Sector' voters were the most likely to select AQ Central.

-For charts on this question, see http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=310

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During the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 poll, voters were asked the following question:

Which AQ affiliate is most dedicated to attacking the ‘far enemy’ and least distracted with ‘near enemy’ battles?

296 respondents answered this survey question. Here are the results I found particularly interesting:

- The majority of voters found ‘AQ Central in AFPAK’ the most dedicated to attacking the U.S. and least distracted by ‘near enemy’ battles. I found this surprising considering the persistent drone attacks and other pressures present in AFPAK.

- ‘Media’ respondents (a small group of voters) selected AQAP in Yemen more than any other group. I was not surprised by this since the media appears obsessed with Awlaki.

-‘AQ in East Africa’ received the third highest vote count overall.

For charts and graphs breaking down voting groups, visit:
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=314

As always, thanks to those that voted!

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The first question of the AQ Strategy Poll 2011-2012 asked 268 respondents the following question the week prior to Bin Laden’s death

Assuming 1) AQ’s Senior Leaders (UBL and Zawahiri) still have some directional authority over AQ affiliates and, 2) AQ is designing a strategy to survive and flourish based on recent events, what will be the primary focus of AQ’s strategy from the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012? (You can only pick one)

This goal of this question was to anticipate what al Qa’ida’s main effort would be through 2012. Reminder, respondents voted on this question the week prior to Bin Laden’s death.

Here are the findings I found most interesting:

-‘Attacks in Pakistan’ received the most votes followed closely behind by ‘Multiple attacks in the West’, ‘Strengthen AQAP in Yemen’ and ‘Repaint AQ’s role in the Arab Spring’. Overall, there was no strong preference for any one option.

-All professional groups voted in remarkably similar distributions across all responses. This is one of the only questions where groups did not significantly diverge in preference.

-‘Academic’ and ‘Government’ voters diverged in their preferences on almost all of the survey questions analyzed up to this point. However, in this question, ‘Academic’ and ‘Government’ voters were normally within 5% of each other for every response.

-‘Government’ respondents were the most likely group to pick ‘Strengthen AQAP in Yemen’. I wonder if all groups would pick this choice in larger numbers had the question been asked the week after Bin Laden’s death.

For Charts and Graphs see this link:
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=391

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All.

Again, thank you for the support last year with the al Qaeda Strategy 2011-2012 survey and the Post-Bin Laden Survey. Prompted by the recent announcement of al Qaeda and al Shabaab, I finally compiled and analyzed the survey responses to the last question of the AQ Strategy Survey.

The last question analyzed from the survey asked 268 people the following question with regards to al Qaeda.

In two years, will regional insurgent groups and local, upstart terror groups continue to brand themselves as AQ affiliates?

(Example: GSPC changing its name to AQ in the Islamic Maghreb or al Shabaab calling itself AQ in the Horn of Africa.)

Here were the answer choices.

-No, AQ Senior Leadership will deny independent extremist groups branding as AQ affiliates because this weakens AQ's operational control and undermines AQ's global credibility.

-No, groups will not brand as an AQ affiliate as AQ's image has tarnished due to inactivity and internal fracturing.

-Yes, groups will continue to brand as an AQ affiliate in order to receive ideological guidance, operational direction, and financial/technological resources.

-Yes, groups will still consider AQ a powerful symbol and will brand as AQ affiliates. However, new groups will not have direct ties to AQ's senior leadership or resources.

I'll first discuss the results from April 2011 and then compare it to what has happened over the past 10 months with regards to name changes.

Below are two charts. (Click this link for the charts) The first shows the raw vote totals for the four answer choices by combining the votes of all five major professional categories. The second chart shows the percentage of people in each professional category choosing each of the four options. Note, there were only 12 'Media' voters in total so their voting in chart 2 appears more extreme than it actually is. Here are the findings I found particularly interesting.

-Votes overwhelming selected "Yes, groups will re-brand but have no direct connection with AQ".

-The notion that groups would re-brand to receive additional resources and guidance finished third out of four choices, but many analysts are currently citing this as the reason behind Shabaab's recent merger. Only the smallest voting group, 'Media', selected this more than other groups.

-The lowest vote getter was "No, AQ will deny new groups from branding as AQ." 'Academia' selected it the most, but even then, only a little over 10% selected it. I also find this surprising as it appears Bin Laden and Fazul both denied Shabaab the title of an AQ affiliate prior to their deaths.

For additional analysis on this question, you can visit this post at this link: Al Qaeda's Name: Stronger or Weaker?

Also, thanks to your contributions to the survey, I've been able to compare the results of the survey with current events with regards to al Qaeda's ups and downs. For those interested in how your survey results can be used, here is a link to some recent news regarding al Qaeda's financing and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda Where's the Money? Not Dead, but Dying, Part 2.

Again, thanks for your support answering the survey!