Crowdsourcing on AQ and Analysis (new title)

[CWOT]

Bin Laden's death has many implications for al Qaeda terrorism and Western counterterrorism operations. I think the greatest impact of Bin Laden's death will be a sharp decrease in Gulf donor support to AQ Central. The media’s portrayal of AQ terrorism as an inexpensive undertaking are greatly exaggerated. While individual attacks, like AQAP’s “Printer Cartridge” plot, may only cost a few thousand dollars in supplies, annual AQ operational costs require millions of dollars. For AQ Central hiding in Pakistan, there are significant expenses in paying group members and supporting their families, arming and outfitting terrorists, securing communications and safe havens and then conducting operations.

Here’s my logic for why I think a ‘decrease in AQ fundraising’ will be the chief consequence of Bin Laden's death:

* AQ’s financial support arrives in three forms: donor support from the Gulf, illicit revenue from criminal enterprises, and sometimes earnings from legal businesses.

* UBL’s ability to secure donor revenue, more than any other reason, allowed him to initiate, propel and sustain AQ. Many other terrorist leaders have professed an extremist ideology and planned attacks on the U.S. However, no other terrorist brought in resources like UBL.

* AQ Central led by UBL relied heavily on donor support from the Gulf to sustain a Pakistani safe haven. While a common ideology helped bind AQ and certain tribes, money was critical to cementing a comprehensive alliance with the Taliban. Without Gulf donations being passed on to Taliban protectors, I believe the ideological bounds between AQ and the Taliban will erode.

* Donor support is infinitely better for terrorist groups than illicit financing. Illicit financing is time consuming; requiring terrorist groups to divide their efforts between securing resources and terror plot planning/recruiting/training. Additionally, the bartering and bickering involved with illicit financing usually results in ideological compromises that undermine AQ’s foundation. (AQIM is a good example.) Lastly, pursuit of illicit funding streams weakens AQ’s operational security creating vulnerabilities more easily exploited by Western CT efforts.

* Securing future donor support for AQ Central will require a capable AQ leader with roots in the Arabian peninsula. I’m uncertain Zawahiri and the North African AQ members will receive equal donor commitment. Thus, AQ Central in Pakistan will either 1) move to a more junior Saudi/Yemeni leader that can secure Gulf donor support, 2) fracture into an AQ affiliate led by a Pakistani/Afghan leader more able to secure resources via Taliban groups & illicit financing (this will likely lead to AQ Central shifting focus to guerrilla warfare in South & Central Asia) or 3) remain in the hands of AQ’s old guard (Zawahiri) and eventually be starved into irrelevance.

* In the future, Gulf donors supporting Islamist/Salafist causes will have to decide where best to invest their money.

1. Continue supporting AQ Central in Pakistan- Donors must wonder if AQ Central is worth the investment. With UBL dead, the Pakistani government under pressure to produce, and AQ on the run, what can a donation ultimately achieve?

2. Shift their donation to AQAP in Yemen- AQAP has steadily increased its recruitment, capability and attacks on the West. Led by Saudis and Yemenis, embedded in a Yemeni safe haven and close to the Gulf, why would a donor continue supporting an AQ Central on the decline rather than an AQAP on the rise?

3. Move their donations to Islamist groups competing for political power amongst current uprisings- One of AQ’s long time ideological goals was the overthrow of apostate regimes (near enemy). AQ never achieved this, but many other Islamist groups currently compete for national power in the wake of Middle Eastern and North African uprisings. Why donate to an AQ affiliate on the run, when a dollar donated to an Islamist group might result in an Arab regime more in line with Islamist principles?

What are some other dynamics to AQ donor support that I have overlooked?

[davidbfpo]

A detailed summary CWOT and finally you asked

What are some other dynamics to AQ donor support that I have overlooked?

At times you infer Gulf donors act as investors in the Global Jihad cause, via AQ Central. That is a good model to follow in part.

The AQ Central prospectus is quite clear: we are engaged in a relentless struggle, attempting to mount "spectacular" attacks - with allies / partners and have a long term strategy of antagonising our enemies into action.

Revenge IMHO is a particularly strong factor for those whose participation is only as an investor. All too often we forget terrorism is armed propaganda. AQ Central appear to have a more effective global PR appeal and infrastructure than the others.

AQAP gain much from the US focus and fear of them (that is another matter).

Donors appear to trust AQ Central, after all the relationship is far older and may date back to the 1980's. Once committed as donor how do you stop? Plus I would expect AQ Central has to endorse other groups before investments are made.

The scale of the donations is quite small and somewhere I recall reading a few years ago US$30m was the annual estimated amount AQ Central needed.

Finally fear of discovery for the donors by their own governments, who take action, not issue "coded warnings" and publicity. Given the apparent ease of making donations for many years without discovery and publicity I have a low expectation that donors are concerned with Western attention.

[CWOT]

I should probably parse out what donor support would consist of. I think there are a few different categories.

1- Money donated directly to AQ- this would, I imagine move through a hawala route directly to AQ financing POC. There's a fairly good discussion of this in the Ron Suskind book "The Way of the World" (I think, it could be the "one Percent Doctrine" can't remember)

2- Money given directly to Taliban tribes- Some of the donations go directly to Taliban tribes that provide protection for AQ and sustain the insurgency in Afghanistan. This has been going on since the 1980's and continues today. I'm trying to find the article but can't track it down. But there's a great quote where a Taliban leader in Pakistan says to the troops and some fellow commanders something to the sort of "Everyone needs to relax, things aren't that bad, you're still taking trips to Dubai"

3- Money pushed through the Madrassa system- Another route for donations is through the madrassa system; some of the money goes in through this route and gets spun off in different directions.

I think each one of these layers is essential to keeping AQ covered in Pakistan.

The scale of the donations is quite small and somewhere I recall reading a few years ago US$30m was the annual estimated amount AQ Central needed.

I don't know that I agree that $30M is small. And I think that is probably a decent estimate for that which AQ Central receives directly. But I think there is another large sum transferred to the TTP in Pakistan. I've seen estimates well into the $100's Millions to keep Taliban operations going. Only a portion of this would be from donors, but there is still several million.

Given the apparent ease of making donations for many years without discovery and publicity I have a low expectation that donors are concerned with Western attention.

You are right, I don't think they are worried about discovery either. I think their issue is more about 'Return on Investment', I imagine they'll keep donating, the question I'm more interested in is where will they donate, now that they have other options available?

[CWOT]

For those interested in this thread, here are some results from the poll I ran that are particularly relevant to AQ financing.

"
While poll results #1, #2, and #3 were all interesting in their own way, I believe the results of the AQ donor support question are the most interesting so far. Due to the fortunate timing of UBL's demise, I was able to run the same poll question the week prior and the week after UBL's death.

The first poll, AQ Strategy 2011-2012, initiated the crowdsourcing experiment on 27 April and 272 respondents tallied their votes for the following question:

Over the next two years, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)

The second poll, Post UBL Poll, began on the morning of May 2nd and 132 respondents cast their votes to roughly the same question with the same response choices. (Many voters from the first poll also voted in the second poll)

After UBL's death, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)

The before and after results from this question, I believe, illustrate Bin Laden's significance to AQ Central operations. It also suggests that UBL's death may significantly help AQAP's rise in Yemen.

Interesting results across the board. Here are a few that I picked out.

-Votes for "Shift to AQAP" increased dramatically after UBL's death.
-Votes for "Remain supporting AQ & Taliban in AFPAK" decreased sharply after UBL's death.
-10% of 'Academia' and 'Private Sector' voters moved away from "Shift to Islamist groups in North African uprisings".

In terms of volatility, 'Academia' had the highest volatility in their opinion before and after UBL's death. I found this particularly interesting as the 'Academia' crowd was the group most likely to select "Status Quo - No Significant Change" as the "Chief Consequence of UBL's death" in Poll Results #2. Based on their voting shift after UBL's death, I would have expected the 'Academia' group to have selected "AQ fundraising decreases" or "AQAP becomes new AQ Central".

For graphs, tables and additional analysis to what has been the most interesting poll result thus far, see

http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=290"

[CWOT]

Here is a related news story at al Jazeera english that I thought was particularly relevant.

Leaked cable: Gulf states 'funded extremism'
Leaked US diplomatic cable alleges Saudi Arabia and UAE sent $100m annually to radical Islamic schools in Pakistan.

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/mi...717683995.html

Here's a key quote:

Donors in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are estimated to have been sending up to $100 million annually to radical Islamic schools in Pakistan that back extremist groups, according to a leaked US diplomatic cable.

The cable alleged that financial aid for a "sophisticated jihadi recruitment network" was coming from "missionary" and "Islamic charitable" organisations in the Gulf, ostensibly with the direct support of the Saudi and UAE governments.