Crowdsourcing on AQ and Analysis (new title)

[Dayuhan]

A paper I have coming out soon will explore this in greater detail, but here is a snapshot side-by-side comparison of what we've been doing for 60+ years in "Containment" with what I propose is more appropriate for the emerging world with "Empowerment."

Empowerment is a word the President uses a great deal. It's in his intro to the National Security Strategy. But that is all it is, a word. A bold, encouraging word, with little to flesh out what he really means, what is his specific guidance to the government in this regard, how do we operationalize it, etc.

I don't know if this is the answer, but it is something I've been playing with at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. This is just a snapshot, so may well spark more questions than answers, but any comments, pro or con are always welcome from my august peers here at the SWJ.

I agree on containment... silly idea when the antagonist has no specific geographic boundaries within which they can be contained. I don't think you'll find anyone willing to argue against "empowerment" per se... it's a lovely word and very much the mot du jour. There's a reason why it stays mostly in the rhetorical realm, though: it's easy to say and difficult to do. We've a rather indifferent record at empowering our own disempowered citizens, and the complexities multiply when the people we propose to empower are citizens of other nations with their own sovereign prerogatives. How do we "empower" people in other countries, especially those in which our interference in internal affairs is generally highly unwelcome even among those we propose to empower?

Whom do you propose to empower, and how? As always, the devil is in the details...

[Chris jM]

I look forward to the article, but I don't see the two concepts being mutually exclusive in practice.

Empowering South Korea has the effect in containing North Korea, for example.

As I see it, the issue is one of perspective. Some people see whatever policy or strategy is in question as empowering group A, others will see it as containing group B.

Unfortunately I would point to your quote a few posts earlier - that is all it is, a word - and suggest that the same damnation applies to empowerment as it does containment.

I would like to be proved wrong, however.

[Bob's World]

Just providing food for thought, and it is good to see that the sharks are feeding.

No time now for a long reply, but some quick inputs:

As to example states? Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and Afghanistan to name but four. Each is unique in approach due to the unique relationships. Some are rich but weak, so we protect them from external threats. Some we protect from internal threats. In all we look the other way when they suppress the dissent of their own internal populaces, these nationalist insurgent movements, and bundle it under the auspice of "counterterrorism." Some we do so to ensure access to resources, some to ensure critical sea lanes remain open, some because we mistakenly believe that sanctuary comes from a "space" rather than a mix of more intangible factors. All are held up as friends and allies though all also routinely violate in their treatment of their own populaces core principles that hold out as our trademark and routinely demand of, or condemn other states for not subscribing to.

As to where our "core principles" are defined? Primarily from three documents, enshrined side by side in the National Archives: The Declaration of Independence, The Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. Many of these core principles are assessed differently over time, and those assessments are "values," a principle with judgment applied to it. We need to hold true to our own stated values, but we need to not demand them of others. Our core principles are fewer, and much more universal in application, such as a general concept that "all men are created equal," though in reality we understand the value assessed to that principle varies widely. Rights to life, liberty, pursuits of happiness. These too many different things in different cultures, or even within a single culture over time. These differences are values.

As to the common argument for never doing something new, even though most can agree that the current course is in need of change is "that would be hard, how would you do that." I am sure they asked the same thing of Mr. Kennan upon reading his long telegram, but they did not expect him to spell that all out for them. We realize that some things have to be given to the executors as a mission statement, and then figured out within those respective lanes. But this is just a summary slide from a deck of slides that summarize a paper, that in turn summarizes a concept.

Anything worth doing is likely to be difficult. Anything new is likely to be incomplete. For most of us, it is the challenges of new and difficult things that get us out of bed in the morning.

[Ken White]

Just providing food for thought, and it is good to see that the sharks are feeding.

Nibbles, no feeding frenzy...

Re: your cited States:

In all we look the other way when they suppress the dissent of their own internal populaces...

How do you propose we correct their tendency to do things of which you and some others disapprove? (emphasis purposefully added...)

Does not such corrective action interfere with your stated intent:

We need to hold true to our own stated values, but we need to not demand them of others.

Dichotomy there, you seem to want to have it both ways. You've never really addressed that issue even though many surface it occasionally. Some of us seem to think it important to your hypothesis...

As several of us -- not just ol' moi -- have mentioned, you cannot correct their attitudes and 'not interfere' at the same time. You occasionally suggest that if we just talk to them, they'll fix it. Lot of skepticism about that...

I'm pretty well aware of what our core principles are supposed to be and from whence they spring. Tthat's not an issue, this is:

...Many of these core principles are assessed differently over time, and those assessments are "values," a principle with judgment applied to it.

Exactly. The issue is how you persuade the American public, the Administration and Congress of the day to hew to those values. To say we should do so is easy. It is likely also futile UNLESS you can show a benefit to us for doing so and, thus far, you have failed to do that IMO.

As to the common argument for never doing something new, even though most can agree that the current course is in need of change is "that would be hard, how would you do that."

I'm all for doing something new and have long had gripes with what we are doing -- but the issue isn't avoiding change, it is how to bring that change about. I agree with where you want to go and have long -- along with several others -- suggested that your goal is good -- what's your strategery to get there?

But this is just a summary slide from a deck of slides that summarize a paper, that in turn summarizes a concept.

And my questions above were just a summary of the many more questions that slide raises.

Recall the old staffers dictum -- answer the question, answer the question that should have been asked and answer the questions your answer will generate...

Anything worth doing is likely to be difficult. Anything new is likely to be incomplete. For most of us, it is the challenges of new and difficult things that get us out of bed in the morning.

Yeah. Howsomeever, it's been my observation that it is far less difficult if one provides consensually viable steps instead of just telling the boss he's stupid...

[Bob's World]

Well, it is the boss that says do "Empowerment." The President put it in his comments in the NSS, and uses it in virtually every forum. By sitting down and considering what he means by that and coming back with a proposal for how that concept might be employed in a new grand strategy/focus to foreign policy, I believe I am merely doing due diligence.

I know for a fact that within the Chairman's strategy team they are drilling into very similar concepts.

No one's calling anyone stupid, but I do sometimes question the motivations of those who ignore specified and implied tasks given to them by their boss if favor of continuing to do what they are comfortable doing. Particularly when it is fairly clear that what they are doing is not working very well.

As to the Realist/Idealist I put that in to make people stop and think. "Containment" has a very "realist" name; but in execution, every since 1950 it has been focused on the containment of ideologies we disagree with. Communism, Islamism. Very Idealistic. "Empowerment" on the other hand has a very Idealistic name, but as I envision it (there is no doctrine or historic experience) it is implemented in a very realist way. Only applying it where national interests exist; and then building coalition and identifying competitors on any given issue by the relative shared and conflicting interests of other parties in regards to that issue.

As an example, the US may only have 20% match on national interests with Iran, but as applied to stability in Afghanistan we may well have an 80% match. A NATO ally such as Germany may have an 80% match with the US in general, but only a 20% match in regards to this issue of Afghan stability. Logic then dictates that the more effective partner for this issue is Iran. This is in concert with Washington's caution on enduring friends and enemies. Containment demands enduring enemies and friends alike. Not very realistic. Empowerment realistically realizes that such issues vary by issue.

As one British leader once said "Britain has no enduring allies, only enduring interests." (or words to that effect).

[CWOT]

Thanks for everyone's posts here. I've been analyzing a poll that I put together and this discussion helped my put some things together.
I understand the larger concerns about improving Middle East policy, etc. However, I'm not optimistic that this is really even an option. So, I'm trying to dissect the slow incremental developments which might contribute to a longer run strategy. Overall, I don't think Bin Laden really matters anymore and question whether the Afghan campaign needs to be what it is. I'm really interested in what it should be after the summer of 2011. Hence the question, "Does Bin Laden Matter?" and I think the answer helps us come to a solution for the end of this year.
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=116

CWOT

[CWOT]

Here are some of my thoughts on a post Bin Laden AQ based on the poll I put together in this original post.

“Other AQ member in AF/Pak becomes new leader of AQ Central” ended up being my selection. This was a tough decision but here was my logic in relation to the other choices.

1. Zawahiri is 'no fun'

Zawahiri might make a good “#2”, but I’m not sure other AQ members, the Taliban or the Haqqani network will let him ascend. I’m uncertain why exactly. However, I get the feeling that Zawahiri is always trying to outshine Bin Laden, lacks Bin Laden's charisma, and finds it hard to make friends amongst other AQ members. Zawahiri is also from the North African (EIJ) strain of AQ. Despite his legacy with the group, I think AQ Central will turn to someone from the Gulf or Central/South Asia to take the reins. Zawahiri may be talented from a terrorist sense but he has a 1990’s Al Gore feel to him and thus I believe will never rise above #2. This poses another question, if Zawahiri were not to assume the top job post-Bin Laden, would this fracture AQ’s base of North African support? Would there be damaged relations between AQIM and AQ Central? Would love to hear opinions in this!

2. Haqqani protection won't extend forever to Zawahiri

My guess is the Haqqani network will not provide protection for a Zawahiri-led AQ post-Bin Laden. While the Pashtunwali code for protecting guests has served Bin Laden well, I suspect that his death will bring the end of what has been an amazing level of Haqqani support. I also estimate that the Haqqani’s would not like to see Zawahiri emerge as the new leader of AQ Central, instead preferring someone with local interests (AF/PAK) of equal or greater priority than global jihad. Will the Haqqani’s support an AQ led by Zawahiri? Would love to hear opinions on this!

3. New AQ leader needs to be AF/PAK capable

To maintain safe haven in Pakistan, AQ Central must maintain Haqqani support, placate ISI members, retain AQ group initiative, and sustain global funding. To accomplish these four things, a current AQ member from AF/PAK other than Zawahiri will emerge to lead AQ Central. I do not believe Zawahiri will be able to do these four things post-Bin Laden. A Gulf Arab or South Asian AQ leader will have an easier time gaining local support, sustaining resource flows from donors and illicit networks, and cooperating with the ISI.

4. AQ Central shifts focus

Sustaining local support for AQ in AF/PAK will require AQ Central to focus on ‘near enemies’ as much as ‘far enemies’. Bin Laden’s death and the emergence of an AF/PAK centric AQ leader will bring renewed focus on central/south Asian insurgencies. AQ Central will not forget the need to attack the far enemy, but their base of popular support and wealth of recruits post-Bin Laden will come from countries in the larger AF/PAK region more than abroad.

What am I missing?

CWOT