Crowdsourcing on AQ and Analysis (new title)

[CWOT]

Thanks for everyone's posts here. I've been analyzing a poll that I put together and this discussion helped my put some things together.
I understand the larger concerns about improving Middle East policy, etc. However, I'm not optimistic that this is really even an option. So, I'm trying to dissect the slow incremental developments which might contribute to a longer run strategy. Overall, I don't think Bin Laden really matters anymore and question whether the Afghan campaign needs to be what it is. I'm really interested in what it should be after the summer of 2011. Hence the question, "Does Bin Laden Matter?" and I think the answer helps us come to a solution for the end of this year.
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=116

CWOT

[CWOT]

Here are some of my thoughts on a post Bin Laden AQ based on the poll I put together in this original post.

“Other AQ member in AF/Pak becomes new leader of AQ Central” ended up being my selection. This was a tough decision but here was my logic in relation to the other choices.

1. Zawahiri is 'no fun'

Zawahiri might make a good “#2”, but I’m not sure other AQ members, the Taliban or the Haqqani network will let him ascend. I’m uncertain why exactly. However, I get the feeling that Zawahiri is always trying to outshine Bin Laden, lacks Bin Laden's charisma, and finds it hard to make friends amongst other AQ members. Zawahiri is also from the North African (EIJ) strain of AQ. Despite his legacy with the group, I think AQ Central will turn to someone from the Gulf or Central/South Asia to take the reins. Zawahiri may be talented from a terrorist sense but he has a 1990’s Al Gore feel to him and thus I believe will never rise above #2. This poses another question, if Zawahiri were not to assume the top job post-Bin Laden, would this fracture AQ’s base of North African support? Would there be damaged relations between AQIM and AQ Central? Would love to hear opinions in this!

2. Haqqani protection won't extend forever to Zawahiri

My guess is the Haqqani network will not provide protection for a Zawahiri-led AQ post-Bin Laden. While the Pashtunwali code for protecting guests has served Bin Laden well, I suspect that his death will bring the end of what has been an amazing level of Haqqani support. I also estimate that the Haqqani’s would not like to see Zawahiri emerge as the new leader of AQ Central, instead preferring someone with local interests (AF/PAK) of equal or greater priority than global jihad. Will the Haqqani’s support an AQ led by Zawahiri? Would love to hear opinions on this!

3. New AQ leader needs to be AF/PAK capable

To maintain safe haven in Pakistan, AQ Central must maintain Haqqani support, placate ISI members, retain AQ group initiative, and sustain global funding. To accomplish these four things, a current AQ member from AF/PAK other than Zawahiri will emerge to lead AQ Central. I do not believe Zawahiri will be able to do these four things post-Bin Laden. A Gulf Arab or South Asian AQ leader will have an easier time gaining local support, sustaining resource flows from donors and illicit networks, and cooperating with the ISI.

4. AQ Central shifts focus

Sustaining local support for AQ in AF/PAK will require AQ Central to focus on ‘near enemies’ as much as ‘far enemies’. Bin Laden’s death and the emergence of an AF/PAK centric AQ leader will bring renewed focus on central/south Asian insurgencies. AQ Central will not forget the need to attack the far enemy, but their base of popular support and wealth of recruits post-Bin Laden will come from countries in the larger AF/PAK region more than abroad.

What am I missing?

CWOT

[slapout9]

CWOT, IMO your missing it because you are looking at AQ as some type of business organization as opposed to looking at it as a family organization that does business. When you begin to focus on the Blood Lines and apply pressure there I think you will find out that they are not the Big Bad Wolves we think they are. Until we do that it will just be endless wack a mole.

[Fuchs]

CWOT, IMO your missing it because you are looking at AQ as some type of business organization as opposed to looking at it as a family organization that does business.

keiretsu ?

[CWOT]

keiretsu ?

keiretsu ?

This is a really cool word. I'm going to start using this term liberally and inappropriately now that I know what it is. I'll be like all the Army officers using the word "existential" around the Pentagon from 2004-2006.

This might make sense in a weird sort of way.

[Presley Cannady]

This is a really cool word. I'm going to start using this term liberally and inappropriately now that I know what it is. I'll be like all the Army officers using the word "existential" around the Pentagon from 2004-2006.

This might make sense in a weird sort of way.

On the other hand, you'll sound like a Forbes throwback to the early 1990s. The term itself was not natively coined and held meaning largely for Japanese and foreign business journalists attempting to discuss arrangement of the financial industry in Japan. It lacks the hard and fast tangibility of its antecedent term--zaibatsu--and like its father the word has become increasingly dated.

On the other hand, we have lots of colloquial English that works just fine to describe al Qaeda's structure: "gang," "clique," "syndicate," "fraternity," etc.

[Ray]

What one is probably missing is that one is analysing the issue from a western standpoint i.e. on a business matrix.

The important aspect is - religion; and that too a religion that assumes that it is the only religion that is ideal for mankind and connected is the fact is that this religion, rightly or wrongly, feels that it has not got its rightful place, owing to a joint conspiracy of all other religions in the world.

This feeling is not of recent history. It has been festering ever since the collapse of the great Islamic Empire with immense intellectual achievements that stretched from Spain in the West to most countries in the East and also the disintegration of the Caliphate.

Closure to time, the creation of Israel, right under the nose of the Muslims, then bolstering it and finally the humiliation of the drubbing the united Muslim countries repeatedly experienced at the hands of tiny Israel, which true to the mindset, blamed it on a western conspiracy. The failure to wrest Kashmir from India, inspite of western support at the UN, added insult to injury to the mindset.

However, given the US strategic requirement and hence assistance, the overthrow of the Soviets in Afghanistan by Islamic 'warriors', rejuvenated dreams of the Caliphate and the glorious past of the Islamic Empire and that the Islamists were on the ascendancy.

While all what happened in Afghanistan was because of the efforts of the Mujahideens, they were nevertheless a fragmented lot without any real united command. Each of the fragments jockeyed to be supreme to no avail.
Hence, there was no real and cognisable victory of Islam over the rest.

AQ and OBL provided the illusory leadership of the Islamic world at war. Not because of any spectacular victory in the local arena, but because of 9/11 where the Great White Satan - the fountainhead of all conspiracy against Islam was brought to its knees by OBL. Hence, he became a rallying point.

However, true to islam, temporal power overtook the spiritual. While OBL reigned supreme as the messiah, his and his organisation's power and achievements got diluted as the other factions jockey for power and because of relentless pressure of the US, wherein the open support of certain governments got pushed to the background and even coerced into attacking OBL and his organisation.

Thus, while OBL has become somewhat irrelevant, yet one does not know what is the residual influence his organisation has as of now.

Notwithstanding OBL and his organisation, other factions have come to the forefront and are effective.

Therefore, it is moot point, if these factions, having tasted blood and power, will abdicate these to OBL's organisation without a quid pro quo.

Hence, maybe the focus of the WOT should not only focus on the AQ, but also on the various other factions that are operating and the synergy that they created in tandem with the AQ operating in the background.

And the effect of Islam and the desire to return to the glorious days should be also cranked in, in any analysis.

The fact that the Pakistani Army and the ISI are half hearted in their effort on the WOT is an indicator that Islam continues to be a paramount factor since they willingly accept the chaos and mayhem and assassination of their Governors and Ministers and leaders, apart from the near daily bombings, in their country caused by the fundamentalist flag bearers of Islam.

[CWOT]

CWOT, IMO your missing it because you are looking at AQ as some type of business organization as opposed to looking at it as a family organization that does business.

I don't think so. I agree that it is ideology that binds these folks together. But, ideology binds better when there is money coming from the top. Bin Laden was successful because he disbursed funds to his underlings. Some will be devout until the end simply due to ideology. When Bin Laden ties, resources will get tight, ambition will breed discontent, and the family organization will have to adjust to stay alive. Ideology and shared suffering will keep the inner circle of AQ together. Beyond that, I'm not sure. Zawahiri doesn't have the same gravity as UBL and I'm uncertain how the Haqqani network will respond to a Zawhiri led AQ. I don't think the family will run the same. UBL rose to power because he didn't follow the family's wishes, especially the preferences of Azzam. What's to say another underling won't seek a new direction once Bin Laden dies?

[slapout9]

I don't think so. I agree that it is ideology that binds these folks together. But, ideology binds better when there is money coming from the top. Bin Laden was successful because he disbursed funds to his underlings. Some will be devout until the end simply due to ideology. When Bin Laden ties, resources will get tight, ambition will breed discontent, and the family organization will have to adjust to stay alive.

CWOT,I mean literal family ties,not a pseudo family organization, more like the Old Mafia. IMO AQ is a collection of family members, some that were supported for generations by Arab wealth and they provide loyalty and support so long as it advances the main Arab families tribal power. The family wealth is very much the key IMO. Yes perhaps many of the low level guerrillas are just street thugs fighting for money but the ideology is more of a cover story IMO, but largely elite Arab Families benefit from AQ and the WOT/GWOT/LWOT or whatever we are calling it now days.

Remember the old 3 rings of power concept from Italy? I bet there is not a whole lot of difference in how the AQ and AQ types organizations work.

[Bob's World]

AFPAK is moot to AQ's operations and mission. Much like Iraq, it is merely the ring in the bull's nose that allows a much smaller, weaker creature to exert influence over a much more powerful one.

"terrain means nothing" is one of those insurgency 101 lessons that always gets set aside, typically when a frustrated counterinsurgent is reduced to only measuring success in terms of body count and terrain held.

AQ's mission and organization cannot be "contained" in some location. Nor can it be "defeated" by denying it some location. The conditions AQ feeds upon lay within the conditions of insurgency that simmer in so many nations across the greater Middle East. None of these conditions are being addressed by operations in AFPAK, nor are they being addressed by security force capacity building operations in any of those afore mentioned nations. Security forces merely manage the manifestations of these conditions.

Unlike the bull, it is within our power to simply reach up and remove the ring from our nose. But then where would the bull go? What would the bull do? At least the bull knows where to stand when held by the nose.