Both articles are by Hays Parks.

The first is from 2012, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual. First, we need some background:

The United States military historically has held a leadership position in the development and publication of law of war manuals for its forces and those who command them to ensure compliance with the law of war obligations of this nation. U.S. Army General Orders No. 100, prepared by Professor Francis Lieber during the U.S. Civil War, was accepted and promulgated by President Abraham Lincoln on April 24, 1863. Thereafter the U.S. Army published RULES OF LAND WARFARE in 1914, in amended version in 1917, in an updated version in 1940, and again in slightly amended form in 1944. The Navy (May 1941, in draft form only) and Air Force (1976) published separate manuals. In 1956 the Army prepared and adopted a new manual, Field Manual 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, following U.S. ratification of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions the preceding year.
The project to replace FM 27-10, with an all services Law of War Manual, began in the mid-1990s. It went along fairly smoothly (despite the significant legal changes caused by GWOT, and more than one argument with the Bush White House). By 2010, the Manual was ready for publication.

Then, the Obama Administration's DoS, DoJ and NSC lawyers raised a number of roadblocks - which were not well met by the underqualified DoD civilian lawyer who was newly appointed as editor. We pick up that story in the second article from 2013, Where is the Law of War Manual? Here!:

From the outset it was agreed that the manual would be apolitical—it would be based on the law rather than political arguments inconsistent with the law of war. For example, the working group rejected arguments by some Bush administration officials that the law of war did not protect captured al Qaeda and that “enhanced interrogation procedures,” including waterboarding, should not be banned.

Obama administration political appointees, though, have aggressively sought changes in the manual to conform to their political philosophies or legal arguments in detainee litigation, pushing for rules and principles that vary from longstanding law of war treaty-based terminology and norms previously accepted by Republican and Democratic administrations.

One of the more egregious changes proposed by State Department political appointees and human rights activists on the National Security Council was the removal of a paragraph acknowledging that the law of war is lex specialis—the controlling law in armed conflict. Denying the lex specialis status of the law of war would enable activists to inject human rights law into the manual and onto the battlefield. Deletion of the lex specialis text was apparently not sought on the basis that it was legally incorrect, but, we suspect, because it was inconsistent with their political agenda.

Such a change would impose restrictions on U.S. forces in combat so that deadly force could be used only against an enemy who had refused a surrender opportunity or who posed an “imminent threat.” These requirements would place our fighters on a footing comparable to a police officer in the United States in a peacetime environment and at an extreme and unprecedented risk of being killed by the enemy or facing “war crimes” allegations by human rights activists.
Of course, one should not be surprised that politics - and resultant policies - reared their heads.

The first article provides some more examples of political correctness imposing its will:

Editing responsibilities were assumed by a young DOD attorney lacking military or law of war training or experience.

By way of example of State Department comments: The manual contains a chapter providing an explanation of each of the basic law of war principles. Even though they previously agreed to them, State Department lawyers complained that there was an unduly lengthy discussion of military necessity while not providing sufficient discussion of and emphasis on proportionality.

The law of war principle of military necessity was contained in U.S. Army General Orders No. 100 written by Francis Lieber (e.g., articles 14-16). Because it often is misunderstood, a long explanation was necessary. In contrast, proportionality was not a part of any law of war treaty until 1977, at which time it was adopted on the condition that the term proportionality itself not be used in the treaty text because a vast number of nations – including the former Soviet Bloc, Middle Eastern (other than Israel) and African nations – declined to accept that the principle existed.

Ironically, the manual’s discussion of military necessity was carefully researched and drafted by the late Edward Cummings who until his untimely death in 2006 was the State Department’s most senior and experienced law of war expert. The text had been endorsed by State Department lawyers as well as the international peer review.

Without consultation with the DOD Law of War Working Group, the new DOD editor deleted the discussion of military necessity from the main body of the manual, copying it and inserting it as a footnote, apparently to “reduce its emphasis”; and placed the paragraphs on proportionality ahead of the discussion of the principle of distinction until it was brought to his attention that but for the centuries-old pedigree of the principle of distinction there would be no principle of proportionality.

By way of another example, State Department lawyers, wanted the term “belligerent” to be substituted for “combatant”.

As adopted and used by nations for more than a century, combatant is the accepted law of war term. It was adopted in the Annex to the 1899 Hague Declaration II (ratified by the United States in 1902) and its successor, the 1907 Hague Declaration IV (ratified by the United States in 1909), and Articles 43(2) and 44 of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (signed by the United States in 1977 but not ratified due to objections not relating to use of the term combatant). In contrast, the term belligerent is not used in any law of war treaty insofar as reference to individuals is concerned.
These specific examples deal with terms that are material to rules of engagement - and distinctions between combatants, non-combatants and civilians.

I think it is just as well that an impasse has been reached on the DoD Law of War Manual. The gap between the positions in the 2010 final draft and the later changes demanded by DoS, DoJ and NSC cannot be easily bridged. I don't think they should be bridged. The gap between the 2010 final draft and the apparent position of many EU-NATO governments is even larger.

If those issues were solely matters of legal semantics, much less would be at stake. However, the same politics and policies also materially affect strategy and tactics - just as different politics and policies materially affected strategy and tactics in the Bush administration.

Regards

Mike