Bruce Ackerman (Wiki) is a law prof (Yale). Spencer Ackerman (Wiki) is a national security reporter (aka Attackerman). Both are pretty much saying the same thing - "Death Panel" ..."No Due Process".

The Obama Administration opened itself up to that charge by (1) relying on war powers and military law as the principal basis for Awlaki's killing; but (2) then foregoing the military targeting process in favor of an NSC panel.

I doubt that the Ackermans would have been satisfied with the military targeting process. For example, Bruce asserts (with the certitude of a Stirling prof):

Up to this point, I haven't challenged the administration's larger claim that, putting aside the decision to target Awlaki, it had the congressional authority to send drones over Yemen in the first place. But the legal basis for its wide-ranging use of drones is remarkably weak. Shortly after Sept. 11, 2001, Congress certainly authorized force against any terrorist group that "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the 9/11 attacks. But Awlaki belonged to an organization, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that didn't even exist at the time. [JMM: this can be disputed] Indeed, it's increasingly tough to say that Congress's 2001 resolution authorizes the United States' continuing activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, given America's recent decimation of the original al Qaeda's fighting capacity.
Now, the 2001 AUMF does look in futuro:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
but Bruce would limit that to groups using the same names today as they did pre-9/11. Obviously, the Executive Branch does not agree; nor does a majority of the Legislative Branch. Nor do I; neither does Bobby Chesney, Is There a Significant Distinction Between “al Qaeda” and “al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”? (3 Nov 2010).

Who has constitutional authority to decide jus ad bellum (going to war) and jus in bello (behaving in war) issues ?

With very limited exceptions, the courts do not. These matters are "constitutional matters that are largely non-justiciable" - i.e., "political questions" as found by the Federal judge who dismissed the al-Awlaki family's law suit to enjoin his targeting. See my post, Al-Auloqi (Awlaki) case dismissed, from Dec 2010 (a number of links).

For those not familiar with Judge Bates' opinion, here are the key paragraphs:

To be sure, this Court recognizes the somewhat unsettling nature of its conclusion -- that there are circumstances in which the Executive's unilateral decision to kill a U.S. citizen overseas is "constitutionally committed to the political branches" and judicially unreviewable. But this case squarely presents such a circumstance. The political question doctrine requires courts to engage in a fact-specific analysis of the "particular question" posed by a specific case, see El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 841 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211), and the doctrine does not contain any "carve-out" for cases involving the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. While it may be true that "the political question doctrine wanes" where the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens are at stake, Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. at 64, it does not become inapposite. Indeed, in one of the only two cases since Baker v. Carr in which the Supreme Court has dismissed a case on political question grounds, the plaintiffs were U.S. citizens alleging violations of their constitutional rights. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 3 (1973).

In Gilligan, students at Kent State University brought suit in the wake of the "Kent State massacre," seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would prohibit the Ohio Governor from "prematurely ordering National Guard troops to duty in civil disorders" and "restrain leaders of the National Guard from future violation of the students' constitutional rights." Id. According to the Court, the plaintiffs were, in essence, asking for "initial judicial review and continuing surveillance by a federal court over the training, weaponry, and orders of the Guard." Id. at 6. Dismissing the plaintiffs' claims as presenting non-justiciable political questions, the Court noted that "[i]t would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches." Id. at 10. As the Court explained, the Judiciary lacks the "competence" to take "complex subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force," and "[t]he ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability." Id.

So, too, does the Constitution place responsibility for the military decisions at issue in this case "in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531; see also Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (explaining that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative - 'the political' - departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision"). "Judges, deficient in military knowledge . . . and sitting thousands of miles away from the field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately determine" if a specific military operation is necessary or wise. DaCosta, 471 F.2d at 1155. Whether the alleged "terrorist activities" of an individual so threaten the national security of the United States as to warrant that military action be taken against that individual is a "political judgment[]. . . [which] belong[s] in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry." El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 843 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, in holding that the political question doctrine bars plaintiff's claims, this Court does not hold that the Executive possesses "unreviewable authority to order the assassination of any American whom he labels an enemy of the state." See Mot. Hr'g Tr. 118:1-2. Rather, the Court only concludes that it lacks the capacity to determine whether a specific individual in hiding overseas, whom the Director of National Intelligence has stated is an "operational" member of AQAP, see Clapper Decl. ¶ 15, presents such a threat to national security that the United States may authorize the use of lethal force against him. This Court readily acknowledges that it is a "drastic measure" for the United States to employ lethal force against one of its own citizens abroad, even if that citizen is currently playing an operational role in a "terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Saudi, Korean, Yemeni, and U.S. targets since January 2009," id. ¶ 13. But as the D.C. Circuit explained in Schneider, a determination as to whether "drastic measures should be taen in matters of foreign policy and national security is not the stuff of adjudication, but of policymaking." 412 F.3d at 197. Because decision-making in the realm of military and foreign affairs is textually committed to the political branches, and because courts are functionally ill-equipped to make the types of complex policy judgments that would be required to adjudicate the merits of plaintiff's claims, the Court finds that the political question doctrine bars judicial resolution of this case.
Thus, the questions are not "legal" issues in the usual sense (matters to be decided by the courts), but "policy" issues to be determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches. That is not "new law".

So, unless I can swing some votes in Congress and/or change policy in the WH, my opinions on Awlaki aren't likely to have any effect. Maybe one or both of the Ackermans will have better luck.

I wonder what percentage of voters in the US know the key judicial issue (justiciability) re: the Awlaki matter was decided 9 months ago ?

Regards

Mike