After the Bin Laden op, what is the impact? Not on terrorism. Merged thread

[carl]

I'm not sure you can count the op that killed OBL as a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. We say we didn't tell them, and I guess they claim they didn't know, but I don't see how that could be so. Both are lying to save face, like two men telling each other how good looking the other guy's wife is.

Questions 1, 2 and 3, I have no real idea. I can only hope that we would give up the Karachi supply line.

Questions 4 and 5. If Mr. Obama wants to, he can use that loathsome, cynical phrase "declare victory" and bug out, OBL's death being the victory. That would be even more doable if Zawahiri was killed also and maybe a couple of others. The actual facts of the situation won't matter. What matters is what will sell. If he pushes it, Mr. Obama can sell it as the requisite victory. He will have the enthusiastic support of most of the media, and besides, a lot of people want to believe it. Bugging out will be viewed as doing a lot to get him re-elected in his view.

It won't matter if Taliban & Co, AQ and various and sundry terrorists are cleaned out of Afghanistan. We will pretend it doesn't matter and we will justify that in three ways. The first will be to demonize the gov side. That will be done by basically saying they aren't worthy of our assistance. We will say they aren't worthy because they are corrupt, they don't fight hard enough, they have had plenty of time to get their act together and if they haven't by now it's not our fault, conflate the gov elites with ordinary Afghans, etc etc.

The second way will be to build up Taliban & Co. That will be done by highlighting every good thing they ever did and painting them as true representatives of the oppressed.

The third way will be to deny that anything bad will really happen after we bug out. That will be done by saying Taliban & Co are actually sensitive to world opinion, they've changed since 2001, Afghans will find a way to get together and work things out etc. etc.

You have read these already in various American outlets, some on this very sight. It all depends on whether Mr. Obama wants to push it. He doesn't have the nerve to just cut and run. He needs a "victory" to justify a bug out. He has that now if he wants to use it. We'll see. It wouldn't be the first time we've bugged out and left innocent millions to their fate.

[Ray]

Carl,

What you have mentioned is what the average American would love to hear - declare a victory and quit.

However, from the strategy point of view, why did the US go into Iraq and also Afghanistan?

The answer lies in the Defence Policy Guidelines and the National Energy policy of the US mentored by Dick Cheney, when he was the Secretary of Defence. They were masterpieces giving the new strategic scenario post Cold War and the US priorities.

I don't have the copies of the same since my hard disk crashed with all that.

IIRC, he had stated that the US has to have their presence in areas which were hotspots in the world so that the US could react fast and in the correct timeframe, which was not feasible given the location of the US troops at that time.

He also mentioned that the oil supply lines and areas had to have US control and US had to deny the same to 'adversaries'.

He also mentioned that there should be forces at sea to undertake immediate expeditionary actions and on which other forces could build upon.

Iraq panned out copybook to this theory of Cheney.

The US being still in Iraq and in Afghanistan, is pushing and containing the Russian underbelly. It is also peeking into China and the Uyghurs.

Leave Afghanistan and you leave it to the Russian and Chinese.

[Bob's World]

We went into Iraq because we lacked the ability to get a substantial conventional force into Afghanistan at the time, and we had to give them some appropriate target to engage. Saddam was just the poor stupid bastard who walked into the company orderly room when the 1SGT was looking for a volunteer.

AQ only followed us to Iraq, and we turned that country into a battlefield for AQ to attempt to atrit us upon and break our will to remain in the Middle East.

As to Afghanistan, we were largely mission complete there, and only retained a presence to have a base of operations for going after AQ. During the course of that we enabled the Northern Alliance to create a government and constitution that made it clear to the exiled Taliban that they were legally banned from any chance at economic or political opportunity in their own country, and thereby gave birth to a growing revolutionary insurgency against GIRoA. As we surged forces to counter the growing violence and pushed Northern Alliance police and army units out into the rural areas it fueled a growing resistance insurgency as well.

So, to your quesiton, is this a matter of "declaring victory and going home" or rather a matter of recognizing that the primary reason we stayed following the intitial effort to run AQ out of the country is now accomplished. Our very exit will reduce much of the causation for the resistance insurgency in Afghanistan proper; and without our continued protection I suspect that the Northern Alliance will get much more serious about working out a compromise with the Taliban leadership in Pakistan to address the revolution as well.

Or we can stay and continue to work to CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD our way to "victory."

[carl]

Ray:

I forgot to mention a fourth reason that would be used to justify a bug out of Afghanistan. It will be said that even if Takfiri terrorists do try to use the place as a base again, it won't matter because we will control that with drones and spec ops strikes. The fact that that couldn't be done because of no bases and no human intel won't matter. It doesn't have to work. It just has to sound good so it will sell. What most Americans know about these things comes from the movies, and in the movies, the guy behind the computer screen knows all and can direct the spec ops guy who can get anywhere at any time. It would sell.

Robert C. Jones:

I like Mr. Armitage's explanation for the resurgence of Taliban & Co. better. He said we put the fear of God into the ISI in 2001 and they stayed scared for a few years. Then they figured out that we weren't serious about things and decided to get back into the game. We fouled up some other things too but the main thing is we didn't follow Forrest's rule "Keep up the scare" when it came to the Pak Army/ISI. We've been doing more along the lines of Oprah's rule "They have to like me". Forrest works better.

I hope your right that a bug out would result in sweet compromise but I suspect the gates of hell would open and things would get worse than we can possibly imagine.

Ray and Robert C. Jones:

I saw a Frontline production yesterday about an insurgent group in north central Afghanistan. They didn't walk much, they went everywhere on motorcycles, two to a bike. The tracks they used were easy for a motorcycle but would be impossible for a MATV. They would go on patrol in groups.

I've read about insurgents use of motorcycles before. How much of a mobility advantage does that give them and what can we do to counter it? (I know this question is off topic but since you guys are both here I figured I'd ask.)

[Ray]

As the events unfolded, it was Afghanistan which was in the sight of the US where Osama was being hunted (2001).

The Iraq invasion came in 2003.

Therefore, there should have been substantial force for Afghanistan, if that force was available later for the Iraq invasion.

What is most important the swinging to Iraq leaving the principle aim to take on the AQ in Afghanistan violated the Principles of War - Selection and Maintenance of Aim and Concentration of Force. It result was obvious.

If in Afghanistan one created a constitution that made it clear to the exiled Taliban that they were legally banned from any chance at economic or political opportunity in their own country, then one does not understand Afghanistan. That is surprising since US connection with Afghanistan went way back during the activities to throw USSR out. History, itself, shows that Afghans are lords of what they survey and have no equation to any central body, except in a cosmetic way, their King.

Given the strategic importance of Afghanistan, if the US quits, which it can, Russia and China will lever their way in and that would not do US much good from a strategic point of view, as also, make the whole effort in Afghanistan a total waste of resources in men, matériel, money et al.

Do read this link.

http://cinemarasik.com/2009/10/10/af...o-america.aspx

Apart from an analysis of the present situation, it also traces the importance of Afghanistan historically.

Excerpt:

Chance Favors The Prepared Mind

The Chinese Leaders are masters of the Prepared Mind concept. China would not have risked going to war with India in 1950s to annex Tibet. But India's prime minister Nehru, is an act of historical stupidity, unilaterally pulled the Indian Army out of Tibet. The Chinese were prepared and they walked in.

The Chinese are also determined and ambitious. Tibet is gone virtually forever. There is no way China will give it up. Tibet is strategically crucial to China. It provides direct land access to Xinjiang for Eastern China. It gives China control of the top of the world and a direct access to Kashmir.

America, frankly, lucked out in Afghanistan. The 2001 attacks allowed America the moral ground to remove the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. Now, America is in control of this vital strategic asset, this gateway between Central Asia, China, Iran, Pakistan and India. It boggles our mind that reasonably patriotic Americans can even consider leaving Afghanistan for the next 10-15 years.

Today, Afghanistan is the land nexus of the World, the World of nearly 3.5 billion people with growing incomes and rising aspirations. America lucked into this nexus position. The question is whether the American mind is prepared to seize this chance the way China did with Tibet.

Unlike Iraq in 2006, this World wants America to stay in Afghanistan. This is of course the real World - India, Iran, Russia, China, Turkey, the Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan & Turkmenistan.

The only regime that does not want America to stay in Afghanistan is the Pakistani Army and the ISI, the Army's Intelligence service. Notice we do not say Pakistan, the country. Because, the Pakistani people will leave peacefully if American pacifies Afghanistan. But as they say in Pakistan, the Pakistani Army owns the country and not the other way around.

If America runs away from Afghanistan, it will never be allowed in again. The game for Afghanistan will begin again, this time with China, Pakistan, India & Iran. We would favor the China-Pakistan axis to win this prize. What is the prize? Central Asia, access to the Persian Gulf and Trade with 3.5 billion people.

[Ray]

I've read about insurgents use of motorcycles before. How much of a mobility advantage does that give them and what can we do to counter it? (I know this question is off topic but since you guys are both here I figured I'd ask.)

Everyone in Afghanistan would have a weapon. It is macho. Therefore, if they were on MCs, they would pass off as any other villager!

Only way is to stop them and question them. But that would mean many average chap will be harassed and it would not be good for the PR that is so essential for a COIN campaign.

[JMA]

Everyone in Afghanistan would have a weapon. It is macho. Therefore, if they were on MCs, they would pass off as any other villager!

Only way is to stop them and question them. But that would mean many average chap will be harassed and it would not be good for the PR that is so essential for a COIN campaign.

These guys are (should be) drone fodder (drones are cheaper to operate than gunships). Just take this problem by the scruff of the neck and say to the people in that district that it is open season on guys on MCs. They will get used to it. It will solve the problem in no time. After that you can negotiate the terms and conditions of further MC use in that district.

[carl]

JMA:

I am not sure that would work so well. You would deprive people of an important means of transport for occasional gain. I would guess there wouldn't be enough aircraft available to really make it stick. If you blanketed a small area for just a few days while covering some kind of operation though, maybe that would work. You might still run the risk of knocking off some guy who was desperate to get his sick wife to a doc and wasn't thinking so straight.

When I mentioned the motorcycles I was thinking more along the lines of getting into remote places that our big vehicles can't go either for regular patrolling or in careful pursuit. Should we use motorcycles, or 4-wheelers or dune buggy type things to try to match their mobility? That was what I was thinking.

[Ray]

After Osama: Why I Still Think America Should Be in Afghanistan

Peter Bergen

Link

a comment on this:

05/04/2011 - 2:39am EDT | Konstantin

Somebody’s been reading good ole Small Wars Journal.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/journal/iss/v7n3.pdf

The pertinent article by LTC Mann begins on page 4. Check out that Officerese. It is thick, but a careful reader will discern that the paper is an updated description of the Village Stability Operations & affiliated narrative exploitation TTPs to which Peter Bergen refers in this TNR article. Other than references to the Taliban and a cursory mention of the history of Afghan governance principles, the paper appears to be a regurgitated, less formatted min ... view full comment

[jmm99]

either 2013 or 2017. My crystal ball ain't accurate enough for either year - sorry

Rasmussen has been doing a series of pollings which now has boiled down to, Americans Are Reluctant to Defend Any of These Allies (Wednesday, April 27, 2011). Here is a summary graphic of the results:

Defend or Not.jpg

I can't come up with any consistent rationale which might explain these results.

The real crossover point (40-40-20) is Denmark; but Japan (43-44-13) gets the first heaveho in the chart.

Anyone ?

Astan = 30-54-16 - not a surprise to me.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

I think the poll is largely meaningless. If you polled Americans in 1800, 1850, 1900, 1950, 2000 or any year you'd care to choose the results would be the same. The question has no context so most people will default to "none of my business" unless they've heard of the place or been there. How else can you explain such little regard for New Zealand.

When there is context things are different.

[Dayuhan]

I can't come up with any consistent rationale which might explain these results.

The real crossover point (40-40-20) is Denmark; but Japan (43-44-13) gets the first heaveho in the chart.

Anyone ?

Astan = 30-54-16 - not a surprise to me.

What struck me about that is that 20% said eithe "no" or "unsure" to defending Canada, and over 20% said "yes" or "unsure" to the rather absurd notion of defending North Korea.

From this I assume that there's a portion of Americans that disapprove of any defense of a foreign country, a portion that automatically approves, and a portion that is fundamentally undecided.

In between I have no explanations, but 'd be interested to see a survey of general positive-negative impressions of the same list of countries and put them side by side. I suspect you'd see that it correlates less with any perceived strategic desirability than with a general like/dislike scale. It need not be added that many of the respondents would likely have only very rudimentary knowledge about many of the countries on the list. If we excluded results from individuals who couldn't find the country in question on a map or name the country most likely to invade the country to be defended, we might get fairly different results.

[JMA]

After Osama: Why I Still Think America Should Be in Afghanistan

Peter Bergen

Link

a comment on this:

05/04/2011 - 2:39am EDT | Konstantin

Somebody’s been reading good ole Small Wars Journal.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/journal/iss/v7n3.pdf

The pertinent article by LTC Mann begins on page 4. Check out that Officerese. It is thick, but a careful reader will discern that the paper is an updated description of the Village Stability Operations & affiliated narrative exploitation TTPs to which Peter Bergen refers in this TNR article. Other than references to the Taliban and a cursory mention of the history of Afghan governance principles, the paper appears to be a regurgitated, less formatted min ... view full comment

Ray, the following article struck a cord with me. I liked it.

I would appreciate your comment from the sub-continent (no matter how short):

After Osama bin Laden, Pakistan’s narrow window for redemption - By Mansoor Ijaz