Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

[JMA]

Training of indigenous troops in another culturally remote country is a skill few countries have while even fewer are willing to commit to the long term input required.

A three part series from Stars and Stripes:

Part 1: Trainees try to be a force that can overcome child-abducting rebels – and their own horrific past

Part 2: Congolese battalion trained with purpose, but armed mostly with promises

Part 3: Congo’s challenge: Feeding troops consistently

A classic quote from Part 2:

Lt. Col. John Pierre Molengo, the commander of the Kisangani camp, downplayed the significance of the food and salary problems, instead blaming U.S. troops who introduced a standard that is difficult to match.

“We were spoiled by eating like Americans,” he said. “The soldiers’ normal way of eating changed.”

So where does the problem lie?

[Bill Moore]

JMA, I couldn't agree more with your last post. In SF we used to eat the local foods, or for larger events we may have deployed our own cooks for our troops, but not for the local troops we were training. This is just one of many examples where we attempt to introduce unaffordable standards of living, equipment, training, C2 procedures, etc., and we wonder why our training efforts have no long term effect? I noticed this shift in the 90s when former SECDEF Chenney started pushing Brown and Root support to the forces resulting in a decrease of our own internal capacity to sustain ourselves. B&R provided great support, and while many may disagree I think they provided too much support that over time had a negative effect on the way we fight, how we interact with others when deployed, etc. Want to make developing nation people hate you, all you have to do is invite them to dine at one of our outstanding dining facilities in a combat zone so they can see how we're living compared to the average citizen in that country. This creates the false perception of what the standard should be, and perhaps contributes to our naive belief that the locals are not good enough. I suspect if we were working with the Taliban, we would claim they weren't ready to fight on their own yet either. We could save millions of dollars and be more effective at the same time if kept striving to make war a four star hotel, and focused on what needed to be done.

[Ray]

I think JMA's and Bill's point is worth serious consideration.

Training locals and getting their administration to high US standards and standard of living appears fair but it makes them 'soft' (in terms of how they would have fought had they been fighting on their own, supposing they were doing so before the ISAF came).

While one concedes that one cannot fight modern battle solely on 'old' ways, yet the modernisation must be compatible to the local combat and social parameters.

For instance, over dependence on motor transport or helicopter lifts for people who are used to movement on foot for long distance without tiring, slowly downgrades their psychological, mental and physical endurance (while it does not do the same to the Taliban who do not have such 'modern' facilities) and their natural fighting capabilities that would be best for use against the Taliban.

An Indian example - For instance, the MRE or what we call composite rations and survival rations that the IA used were the same as what was issued during WW II. Much of it was wasted since the troops did not eat most of the stuff as it was not to 'Indian' tastes/ food habits. Nowadays, it is on an Indian menu and has been, as per reports, well received. Thereby, loss to the exchequer is less and tonnage hauled has been put to productive use.

[carl]

Bill Moore: At the risk of being blown out of the water, I think you missed the point of the references to feeding the Congolese troops. The 3 meals a day were provided so they would have enough energy and attention to be trained at all, not because of extravagant American habits. The Congolese way of 1 meal a day is not because the troops can function on that, the record of the FARDC proves that. The food money gets stolen before it gets to the troops. That Congolese colonel is just covering his thieving from his soldiers. The object of that mission is to get some troops trained. If they weren't fed properly they wouldn't have paid attention, couldn't have paid attention and wouldn't have listened because they would have been to busy figuring how to acquire or steal their next meal.

[Bill Moore]

Carl,

thanks for the clarification. I'm not launching any torpedos, but will leave my rant in place, because it still addresses part of the whole on why we don't do capacity building well.

[JarodParker]

Lt Gen Caldwell gave a presentation today at Brookings (shown on CSPAN) regarding the training of Afghan forces. He stated that they should be able to take charge in Dec 2014. Currently, only 1 of 84 infantry battalions is ready to operate independently (no advisers, etc). He added that there's another larger group (presumably several battalions) right behind them in the pipeline.
Link

[TDB]

I thought I'd post this in here as it seems to be one of the more active threads within this catergory.
Dispatches: America's Secret Killers
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/d...es/4od#3197175

Pretty damning thought nothing new. The negative effect such operations are having on COIN seems blatant yet it continues. Is this a case of Patraeus learning from his experiences in Iraq while dealing with AQI or him having little or no control over JSOC which operates outside of NATO command. I think that his appointment as the new head of the CIA is ever more interesting in light of such operations in Afghanistan.

Perhaps more on topic, it seems that there is a massive clash of cultures between the ANA and US shown in this documentary, I can only assume that the operations are in Pashtun areas and this idea of honour and respect is held pretty high up. "Bad Intel" can have a far reaching impact much more that egg on the faces of those who supplied it.