Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

[Bob's World]

Taliban fight to remove an unwanted presence and influence from their homeland. The cause is more important to them than life. The ANA are recruited from among the Northern Alliance and then deployed far from home to fight for a cause that many do not believe in.

This is an important metric regarding the validity of US strategy in the region.

Another metric of the validity and legitimacy of the government of a country is how large of a centralized security force is necessary to suppress those elements of the populace who are willing to fight to challenge the same?

Is the answer to make the ANA and ANP bigger, or to make GiROA less offensive to the vast segment of the Afghan populace that the Taliban emerge from? Good COIN addresses both of those factors at the same time. Critical to this is appreciating that we are not talking about development projects (there has never been development in Afghanistan), but the very nature of the government itself. A few simple fixes would have more impact than throwing another 2-3 US divisions into the fight, let alone Afghan divisions.

Equally curious, is that in a land where the threat faced today is one that frustrated both the Soviet and the US military, that we would attempt to build a mini-me version of that force among the Afghans to deal with the same threat. How is that supposed to be more successful????

[jcustis]

Sir, you've worked the upper echelons of the "action guys" and I think some policy-makers responsible for our efforts.

Why does it seem like they can't buy a clue?

[JarodParker]

The ANA troops are no super fighters either

Never said they were. I'm sure both sides could teach basic fighting skills to a recruit in the same amount of time. But ISAF has the added responsibility of building "an army".

they do not need to handle more logistics than the Taliban (unless luxury requirements are added)

A group of insurgents who farm by day and fight by night or those who join the campaign after the harvest, etc will have a very different (informal and decentralized) logistics process when compared to a full-time/professional soldier who doesn't have his own farm, grain stores, family, house in the immediate vicinity. The soldier requires things like regular pay, uniform (including all the esprit de corps fostering insignias you mentioned earlier), housing (I don't think the locals would go for billeting), etc. So this brings with it a lot of baggage which the average TB weekend-warrior might not have to deal with.

they're not particularly lawful or loyal and rather less than more professional in the original meaning of the word.

No disagree here. And we'll be lucky if we can get this accomplished in 50 years. Look at countries like Egypt who've had a strong/competent military for decades but are still muddling around in this department. The western way of soldiering didn't happen over night, so we shouldn't expecting the Afghans to get there in just a few years. This will take a lot of follow-on training and some trial and error.

I'm not saying I'm sold on how ISAF is approaching the training/or the overall mission (not that it matters)... All I'm saying is that you're comparing apples and oranges. Anyway, I think we're getting off track. This thread was supposed to be about ANA units operating independently. And I think the consensus on that seems to be lack of motivation and leadership.

[Bob's World]

Sir, you've worked the upper echelons of the "action guys" and I think some policy-makers responsible for our efforts.

Why does it seem like they can't buy a clue?

This may surprise you (it surprised me as well) Policy makers don't understand this stuff. They have no background or experience in this, and frankly the military community has enabled them to see this as a military problem rather than as a political/policy problem. They wait for us to finish the dirty work so that they can get on with what they do. We have told them over and over that one must create security first. We are wrong. Get the political/policy aspect on track first, and then security will emerge over time.

Congress is only as informed as the general populace, they go off of what is in the media and carefully crafted official statements from DoD that are fed to them. They worry about their electoral bases first and foremost.

We have been saying for years that we are at war and that their are vital national interests at stake. Congressional response is "Now you want me to tell my people that we are not at war, and that these interests have been mis-stated or exaggerated?" "How can we do that (and not lose credibility and the next election)?"

Our government is wonderfully inefficient. I love that fact, because it is by design to prevent insurgency at home. It does make it hard to get to a logical approach to dealing with insurgency abroad, however....

[TDB]

This may surprise you (it surprised me as well) Policy makers don't understand this stuff. They have no background or experience in this, and frankly the military community has enabled them to see this as a military problem rather than as a political/policy problem. They wait for us to finish the dirty work so that they can get on with what they do. We have told them over and over that one must create security first. We are wrong. Get the political/policy aspect on track first, and then security will emerge over time.

Congress is only as informed as the general populace, they go off of what is in the media and carefully crafted official statements from DoD that are fed to them. They worry about their electoral bases first and foremost.

We have been saying for years that we are at war and that their are vital national interests at stake. Congressional response is "Now you want me to tell my people that we are not at war, and that these interests have been mis-stated or exaggerated?" "How can we do that (and not lose credibility and the next election)?"

Our government is wonderfully inefficient. I love that fact, because it is by design to prevent insurgency at home. It does make it hard to get to a logical approach to dealing with insurgency abroad, however....

I think this sums up a massive problem with any foreign policy venture, the people making the decisions have very little understand of the subject. I would be interested to know who is informing David Cameron, for example, on Afghanistan. Is it simply some civil servant paying lip service and dumbing it down for him, or is there a group of people knowledgeable on the country itself and on the nature of COIN thus helping him to develop his policy. I'd hazard a guess and say it was the former rather than the latter.

Because I often wonder when politicians make speaches, where are they getting in information from. Civil servants the Cabinet Office, that much is obvious but just how informed are these people. People are passed around the civil service for the first few years of their time there, this is sensible. I digress, but my point is how are policy makers, strategy designers informed, and the impact of those gathered together to inform policy and strategy makers. I'm thinking of Petraeus, Kilcullen etc in Iraq and then Afghanistan.

[jcustis]

This may surprise you (it surprised me as well) Policy makers don't understand this stuff. They have no background or experience in this, and frankly the military community has enabled them to see this as a military problem rather than as a political/policy problem. They wait for us to finish the dirty work so that they can get on with what they do. We have told them over and over that one must create security first. We are wrong. Get the political/policy aspect on track first, and then security will emerge over time.

Congress is only as informed as the general populace, they go off of what is in the media and carefully crafted official statements from DoD that are fed to them. They worry about their electoral bases first and foremost.

We have been saying for years that we are at war and that their are vital national interests at stake. Congressional response is "Now you want me to tell my people that we are not at war, and that these interests have been mis-stated or exaggerated?" "How can we do that (and not lose credibility and the next election)?"

Our government is wonderfully inefficient. I love that fact, because it is by design to prevent insurgency at home. It does make it hard to get to a logical approach to dealing with insurgency abroad, however....

I'm not completely surprised, after getting a glimpse at the disconnect between the RC commander and the lead of the PRT during my last deploy, over who was really doing what regarding the various Lines of Operation. It seemed as if he had to repeatedly fight off misperceptions by reinforcing that he was there to focus on security, in order to support the other LOOs, and not be looked at as the lead on governance and development. It routinely blew my mind that there was even a single question over it.

The difficulty that relationship caused, even down in my backwater corner of my AO, still pisses me off to this day.

[Ken White]

This may surprise you (it surprised me as well) Policy makers don't understand this stuff...

...Congress is only as informed as the general populace, they go off of what is in the media and carefully crafted official statements from DoD that are fed to them. They worry about their electoral bases first and foremost...

Our government is wonderfully inefficient. I love that fact, because it is by design to prevent insurgency at home. It does make it hard to get to a logical approach to dealing with insurgency abroad, however....

Yep -- and that's a feature, not a bug. It was purposely designed to be inefficient and to concentrate on the People it served to the detriment of foreign affairs, issues and involvement. We do not do the foreign adventure bit at all well; not group psychologically properly inclined. (Boy, is that an unwieldy phrase ).

We prosper mightily when we concentrate on our navel and avoid foreign entanglements (not commerce; entanglements) -- we have gone steadily downhill since we 'forgot' to do that...

You'd think the fools in Washington (Uniformed and not; the uniformed are a part of the problem) would realize that.

[jcustis]

I think some (maybe even many) do have a bit of a clue. They are hampered, however, by the notion they hold that the problem is too massive for them to solve as a lone individual, and they invariable butt up against the oppressive bureaucratic straight jacket imposed by the rest of the club, who are indeed staring at their navels.

[Ken White]

Conformity, uniformity, 'standards' and unity of effort (as opposed to unity of command) are all vastly over rated.

[davidbfpo]

Originally posted on the ANA thread and then found this - so initial comment edited away.

Following the NYT article on Gen. Odierno's guidance in the comments I found this by 'Ker':

As a former embedded trainer with an Afghan Army infantry battalion, I find it troubling that military leaders still use the terms "adviser" and "trainer" when referring to the soldiers who will be embedded with Afghan units. When our Afghan Army unit was sent to a hotspot in Kandahar or Helmand provinces, we the "trainers/advisers" did all of the fighting. It was not a comforting feeling knowing that the only people who had our back were Afghan Army soldiers. It was also not a good feeling knowing that we had to worry not only about the Taliban, but also whether any of the Afghan soldiers would attack us.

The role of the "trainer/adviser" is much more difficult and dangerous than the terms "trainer" and "adviser" connote.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/wo..._r=2&ref=world

[Bill Moore]

I suspect/hope that once we right size in Afghanistan the advisors will be forced to act as advisors instead of leading operations. If it is trulygoing to be Afghan run, that means Afghans will determine what missions they execute, when they execute them, and how they execute them instead of being a surrogate force for ISAF. It will require a mental shift for many of our aggressive advisors who I suspect are inherently Type A personalities. They'll have to pretend to be Type B personalities (its role playing) to be effective, and that isn't easy, but it can be done. You have to learn to transition between roles rapidly, and I think all our guys and gals are capable of doing so, they just need to be told that is the expectation (and it needs to be the expectation). If the intent is to continue to push our strategy, our ends, our means, and our ways then I think we'll continue to have challenges.

[Steve the Planner]

David:

Really good and topical.

The central idea framed by the quoted article is profoundly important.

The organizational structure and culture of trainer/advisors and training advising missions is so so easily overwhelmed by the big organization from which we originate, whether on the military or civilian side.

Small Wars, in order to stay effective Small Wars, must be built on the leveraging and partnerships, plus targeted specialty activities.

Once we become the actor, a new script is needed.

[davidbfpo]

I also wonder if external, foreign political pressure to reduce force levels will mean advisor teams will be affected. Notably will contractors (PMC) arrive; assuming that Kabul / GIRoA agrees? Secondly will non-US teams be deployed? Anecdote suggests some nations have kept well away from this role.

To back-up the original quotation a recent UK TV series, by Ross Kemp, devoted one hour long programme to an ANA Kandak in Helmand, with a UK advisory team. Some of the issues illustrated were local, others more profound and suggested to me there is a long road ahead.

[Steve the Planner]

Same with the Iraqi police training missions.

Why not hire or deploy 300 Nepalese or Brazilian police trainers if the complexity and security needed to deploy US ones became so unbearably expensive/complex after our departure?

In a conflict/post-conflict environment, "training" and advisory missions create whole constellations of new issues and complexities of impediments to successful implementation.

[Steve the Planner]

David:

Musings on Iraq has an article today on Iraq's rejection of NATO trainers:

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/

[Dayuhan]

Looking at the initial question...

Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

... the first question that came to my mind was "whose missions are they?"

Are we expecting Afghans to lead missions where the mission objectives and parameters are set by Americans in support of American strategic and policy objectives?

If Afghans are assigning objectives and parameters in support of their own policy objectives, it certainly makes sense to expect Afghans to provide the leadership. If we're the ones setting up the missions, expecting Afghans to lead is just asking them to do our work for us.

Unless, of course, we assume that our objectives and goals are the same as those of Afghans, but I'm not sure that assumption would be well founded.

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan,

Thanks for the reminder:

whose missions are they?

I wonder how ISAF and their politicians will react when the GIRoA decides that 'X' is no longer is a mission too far? For sometime I have thought Helmand Province is peripheral to GIRoA's national interest when the "crunch" comes; there are far more vital places, roads and population centres.

When GIRoA decides, the ANSF obey and the advisers go along. I think not, the advisers, especially any non-US, will quietly exit.

[Bill Moore]

If the intent is to continue to push our strategy, our ends, our means, and our ways then I think we'll continue to have challenges.

That was the intent of this sentence on my previous post. There is a major difference in my view between using HN and other forces as force multipliers or surrogates, and advising a nation on how to respond to "their" security problems.

Both missions have their value, the Brits, French, U.S. and other have used surrogates for decades, but we need to recognize the difference between a simple force multiplier approach to pursue "our" strategy and providing advice to assist a nation with "their" strategy.

There is no logical reason that an organization will or should pursue our objectives after we leave, unless they embrace the same strategy and objectives. This is where the simplistic of "through, by, and with" is misleading, and why I recommend we purge it from our lexicon.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

Exactly right.

Witness the US's version of the Iran threat to Iraq.

Our view: Desperate "existential" threat of some kind of imminent Iranian invasion (or cooptation) of Iraq. Underscored by our (not their) concern about Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Their view: Iraqis hate outside domination. Iraqis will allow much from Iranians (especially tourism), trade heavily with Turkey and Asia, and believe that their oil is their oil. Either pro-Iranian Maliki will deliver on prosperity or he will be out; to close to Iran and he will be out.

Their strategy: Let Iran help wherever it can, take the money from the 20,000 or so daily visitors to Najaf (including many Iranian Shia's). When Iran's chief religious/political officer, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, wants to open an office in Najaf, he is simply given the cold shoulder, and word is sent out that the quietist Sistani does not approve.

“Do you know who in Iraq hates Iran more than anyone? It is Najaf,” said Neama al-Ebadi, director of the Najaf-based Iraq Center for Research and Studies, echoing a view widely expressed on the streets of the city.

“The Shiites of Iran are Iranian first. They think they’re superior to Arabs. But Najafis believe they are the original Shiites and the Iranians are just copies.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...UuO_story.html

Or Joost Hillerman's assessment:

"The Turks are very clever — they are using soft diplomacy and economic power to extend their influence against the Iranians — even though they wouldn't put it that way," says Joost Hiltermann, an Iraq analyst with the International Crisis Group.

"The Iranians don't have anything comparable to offer to Iraq. It doesn't have the same quality of goods, the same kinds of investments. And so Turkey can beat Iran at that game. As long as it's a peaceful rivalry, a peaceful competition, the Iraqis can balance one against the other, and meanwhile can develop themselves. They are not under anyone's direct control," he says.

Once the economic "sucking sound" of US departure is heard, and Iraqis become confident that our diplomatic objectives are no more than the routine meddling of all foreigners, then they will want more trade and business with US firms:

http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-13/u...nouri?_s=PM:US

Certainly, there are places like Falluja where US baggage is heavy, but, believe it or not, as rough tourism begins in the North at even a fraction of the Najaf volumes, we become more welcome, just as Iranians are.

The sooner the complete military/diplo change, the sooner we can accept each other on even terms. Then, we can start a new relationship.

[G Martin]

Dayuhan got it right: whose missions are they? Until the MoD and MoI come up with their own campaign plans based on their own assessment of the threat- even with 100% capable ANSF- we won't get them "in the lead"- and that shouldn't surprise anyone. Of course, as others have mentioned, when they write their own threat assessment and campaign plans (and ones not done under the "duress" of continued U.S. funding/equipping), I bet they won't match the ones that back our interests...