Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

[Pete]

In that last paragraph, you synthesized what some in the Army refer to as "On the spot corrections" (one of the biggest leadership errors ever...) and of which others have said "I see a problem, I own it and must fix it." That gets carried forward to the old 'Pottery Barn rule' fallacy.

Back during Shy Meyer's "Hollow Army" days we had a small pocket-sized handbook called something like the Commander's Guide for Maintenance. It had such useful indicators and tips as the following:

-- "Are the tires flat?"

-- "Does radiator coolant and oil leak out of the vehicle and make puddles on the pavement of the motor pool?"

-- "Do flames and smoke come out of the engine compartment when the engine is running?"

That's from the same U.S. Army that was 30 miles from Berlin on V-E Day in May 1945.

[Bill Moore]

How we got to the point of taking the lead in this fight is understandable, but the fact that this many years later we're still in the lead is a failure to face the reality that we can't force the Afghan people to play by our rules without using a degree of force/oppression that is not only illegal but unethical by our standards. Nor can we can't bribe the Afghan people by throwing money at them (nation building and CMO). While they may accept the money and even say thank you, their views of the world and the occupying forces will remain the same. You can buy sex, but you can't buy love.

The only answer is to allow the Afghans to settle it their way, and unfortunately it will probably be ugly unless we can find an intelligent means to disengage from the lead in their internal affairs while still providing support to the right people (another million dollar question, who are the right people?). As Bob stated, less is more if we transition our effort to FID, but this FID mission (if it actually becomes one) will most likely differ from the norm. We can't blindly accept and reinforce the Karzai regime, so how do we transition to FID effectively? Is it is even possible?

While it sounds counter intuitive we have more leverage when we have less troops on the ground fighting. When we shift to a supporting role (and that support can include limited combat operations when needed) the Afghan government and security forces are more dependent on us than they are now, and if they don't reform we can threaten to cut off the aid. We had to threaten to do this in El Salvador to compel the government there to clean up its act and respect the rule of law.

However, since we're the ones fighting, I'm not convinced we have any leverage over the Afghans. They probably see it as our fight. While hotly debated (mainly for political gain) I think the President was right to set a dead line for starting the withdraw of troops, it actually compelled the Afghan government to take their responsibility more seriously. The status quo (U.S. in the lead) will only further alienate us from the Afghan people and continue to inhibit the growth of the needed Afghan institutions. The change in posture from us leading the COIN effort to FID will not be easy, and there will be some bloodshed (regardless if we do it now or later). In the long run though, I suspect the sooner we start the better it will be for the Afghan people.

[Infanteer]

The answer to this question reminds me of an anecdote from my tour.

The ANA Platoon Commander I shared my AO and base with was a young Pashtun man named U. A Sergeant, he took command when the officer was killed in an insurgent ambush. U spoke Pashtun, Dari and fairly good English and was the son of a mid-to-high level bureaucrat in the Defence Ministry in Kabul. He may not have been a full elite, but the fact that he was smart, fluent and literate in the key languages and knew and worked within the Pashtun socio-political system meant locals respected and listed to him.

U quickly impressed me with his abilities. Despite being conditioned to believe the ANA were like children that you had tagging along to legitimize your mission, the partnership between him and I was 50/50. We planned all our patrols together, I got the resources he needed for him and his men and he quickly developed a rapport with the locals to get us the intelligence needed to understand the environment we were operating in (and the enemy who was trying to kill us). We made much progress in a month. I called him the “godfather” because of the way he worked his cellphone and I called myself his consigliere.

Unfortunately, U dissapeared for reasons I will not go into here. As a replacement, I received Sgt H. Sgt H was a Hazara. Also a veteran of many years of combat in the ANA, he despised the locals and said that all Kanadaharis were insurgents. He refused to make contact with the locals and would go on patrols only when prompted by myself. Although I got him into a busy and aggressive patrolling rhythm, he wouldn't provide any input at all – he only went along because his company commander (who was really good) ordered him to support the Canadians. At one point, Sgt H sent his subordinates to deal with a neighbouring farmer who he was having issues with; the soldiers started to beat the man with their rifles until one of my sentries intervened by firing a flare into the air. This is simply not something that would have happened with Sgt U.

The good news was that at the end of my tour, U ended up back with us and I saw him one last time before I left the country. When I left him, he was leading his platoon on patrols in a dusty corner of Panjwayi district as he had for the previous few years. A true veteran, my "tour" was his "life".

This experience convinced me that the line between success and failure is more U's and less H's. When I read Mark Moyar's A Question of Command I felt drawn to his incomplete, but (I believe), correct theory on COIN. We are still leading operations because we don't have enough Sgt U's.

[Bill Moore]

Infanteer, that is a great story and I am glad you shared it. I agree life will be easier if there are more Sgt U's and less Sgt H's, but I still argue that isn't the reason we are in the lead. I can't think of any country that I conducted FID where there weren't the equivalent of SGT U's and H's in their ranks. There are also SGT U's and SGT H's in our ranks. If the Sgt H's fail, and they will if we're not in the lead to protect them they'll disappear over time due to their failure or death. Sgt U's will perpetuate if the Afghan Gov is serious, if they're not then we're in a guagmire and staying longer (only talking COIN, not CT) will not solve the underlying issues. Right now we are the underlying the issue that is preventing self corrective actions. We need to step back and let the SGT U's and SGT H's determine the course of Afghanistan. Just because SGT H is corrupt and more doesn't mean we should lead the fight.

[carl]

Infanteer & Bill M.:

As Bill said there are SGT Hs in our ranks. If instead of Infanteer having been there, a Canadian equivalent of SGT H had been there then it would not have made any difference if the Afghan SGT U was good. His proficiency would not have come to fore because the Canadian equivalent of SGT H would have vitiated it.

Not only the Afghan gov has to be serious about developing SGT U's, our side has to be also. I have no idea what the social dynamics of the respective groups in the Frontline report were, but if the 101st contingent was led by a SGT H, the Afghans would have been repressed even if they had been led by SGT U.

And so an obvious point is elaborated upon by me the civilian.