Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

[Fuchs]

"Build up" is an erroneous expression. They tend to go dormant, like a bear in hibernation, to some extent. The proverbial school of fish that they swim amongst starts to swim slower in the winter as well, so everyone is idling a little. They lie a little low during portions of the summer as well.

They come back every year at greater force 8at least greater quantity of incidents and casualties) after sustaining casualties in the previous year.
This increase does likely not happen in the "dormant" phase, so I conclude that they increase (build up) their strength mostly in spring.

[jcustis]

They come back every year at greater force 8at least greater quantity of incidents and casualties) after sustaining casualties in the previous year.
This increase does likely not happen in the "dormant" phase, so I conclude that they increase (build up) their strength mostly in spring.

I don't know what to say then. Sound like you've already drawn your conclusions and have your answer.

[Fuchs]

Well, all my conclusions are preliminary. It takes some new argument to push them of course, though.

[82redleg]

They come back every year at greater force 8at least greater quantity of incidents and casualties) after sustaining casualties in the previous year.
This increase does likely not happen in the "dormant" phase, so I conclude that they increase (build up) their strength mostly in spring.

Why don't you think that the Taliban leadership isn't recruiting during the "dormant" winter months? Just because the weather is not conducive to fighting doesn't mean that the mullahs aren't preaching sermons and that jihadis aren't circulating among the villages.

[Fuchs]

It wouldn't change the basic statement much; the TB appear to recruit and ready up many fighters in a matter of months, not years.

I've read only a few days ago about how some General asserted that we would need another six years to finish training the ANA. That would be 16 years to build an army. That's certainly a record.

[JarodParker]

I think the distinction is that the insurgents are recruiting fighters while the coalition is building a professional army. One can just shove an AK into the hands of a teenager and turn him into a fighter fairly quickly. But building a professional army which respects the law and civilian authority as well as handle it's own logistics, etc is something different.

Also every Taliban is not some super bad ass warrior. The fighters featured in the "Frontline: Inside the Taliban" documentary were more like keystone cops.
...Just my two cents

[Fuchs]

The ANA troops are no super fighters either, they do not need to handle more logistics than the Taliban (unless luxury requirements are added), they're not particularly lawful or loyal and rather less than more professional in the original meaning of the word.

Still, their recruitment and training appears to be much, much slower.

[Bob's World]

Taliban fight to remove an unwanted presence and influence from their homeland. The cause is more important to them than life. The ANA are recruited from among the Northern Alliance and then deployed far from home to fight for a cause that many do not believe in.

This is an important metric regarding the validity of US strategy in the region.

Another metric of the validity and legitimacy of the government of a country is how large of a centralized security force is necessary to suppress those elements of the populace who are willing to fight to challenge the same?

Is the answer to make the ANA and ANP bigger, or to make GiROA less offensive to the vast segment of the Afghan populace that the Taliban emerge from? Good COIN addresses both of those factors at the same time. Critical to this is appreciating that we are not talking about development projects (there has never been development in Afghanistan), but the very nature of the government itself. A few simple fixes would have more impact than throwing another 2-3 US divisions into the fight, let alone Afghan divisions.

Equally curious, is that in a land where the threat faced today is one that frustrated both the Soviet and the US military, that we would attempt to build a mini-me version of that force among the Afghans to deal with the same threat. How is that supposed to be more successful????

[jcustis]

Sir, you've worked the upper echelons of the "action guys" and I think some policy-makers responsible for our efforts.

Why does it seem like they can't buy a clue?