Nor should they.
If we could park our egos and our control fetish -- both overweening -- they'd probably get on with it. Our 'interests' there are for the most part fantasies in any event.
Imitation is flattery and that is a form of pandering -- it does no one any favors. We're making precisely the same mistakes we made with the Koreans and with the Viet Namese. Dumbbb. Of course, a cynic might say "but we don't know any better..."
We diligently ignore the fact our 'experience' shows us that trying to change other nations to our models of anything just simply does not work. This cynic says we know better but are afraid to embrace the changes required because that might be seen as an acknowledgement that we've, collectively, gotten a lot of things wrong and given the added fact that change is hard work, it's just easier to do what we've been doing.
No matter how wrong it is.
"One of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine is
that the Americans do not read their manuals nor do they feel any
obligations to follow their doctrine."
- Soviet LT
"One of the advantages in planning against the American doctrine is
that the American planners not only read their manuals, but feel a
strong anti-intellectual obligation to follow them no matter what."
- sarcastic ISAF planner
Posted by Ken,
I used to think we knew better, at least many of the older SF vets did in the late 70s and early 80s, but then we were coerced to start training foreign armies using U.S. Army Infantry doctrine, and it didn't work in most cases, because most of these foreign armies didn't have an effective NCO Corp. Being a life long iconoclast I asked why we were teaching inappropriate tactics based on the host nation's capabilities, and the response was what else can we teach other than U.S. doctrine? I suggested we study the way they do their operations now, and then recommend tweaks and improve their basic combat skills (primarily marksmenship), combat medicine, comms, etc. That was frowned upon, because obviously some bored U.S. General would show up in the middle of no where and ask why were teaching non-standard tactics, and that would destroy everyone's career from the team leader to the Bn Cdr, so just shut up and teach U.S. doctrine.We diligently ignore the fact our 'experience' shows us that trying to change other nations to our models of anything just simply does not work. This cynic says we know better but are afraid to embrace the changes required because that might be seen as an acknowledgement that we've, collectively, gotten a lot of things wrong and given the added fact that change is hard work, it's just easier to do what we've been doing.
The answer really wouldn't have been that hard, based on their culture, they don't operate the way we do, so we conducted studies prior to coming on how their Army was organized, how they fight, and where their shortfalls were (especially if they were in a conflict and we could analyze their combat performance) and then suggest some changes for improving that were easy for them to adapt (and to internalize, so they would use them after we left), instead of trying to reform their Army into a mirror image of the U.S.. What General wouldn't understand that? Too many I suspect , but if SF leaders don't get this (hopefully there are still some who do, especially after a decade of pounding our heads against the wall), I sure as heck don't expect the GPF to get it. The good news is SF has produced some very capable SF and commando counter parts that are very capable in their niche missions, but we need an equally effective effort with their non-specialized security forces.
Conformity kills...Sadly soThe answer really wouldn't have been that hard, based on their culture, ... What General wouldn't understand that? Too many I suspectNot so. They get it -- in my observation usually as well as and often better than nearby SOF elements who can also be hidebound or far less than superbly competent.I sure as heck don't expect the GPF to get it.
As you know, "getting it" and competence are 'people' things and good people are in both types of units -- as are less than good people. I've known people in SF, Ranger, CAG, SEAL and other elements that had no business being in those jobs -- so have you. The selection process helps winnow out some and the independent duty bit gets a few more but some will always slip through. The GPF just must be less selective, they don't have the RTU hammer...
In any event, the issue is not the type of unit or even the people aspect, it is the culture. Conformity, uniformity and risk aversion are the culprits. That culture applies to both SOF and to the GPF. The latter just has more visibility to more Generals and marginal but loyal CSMs who are the supreme conformists and who want no deviation from the party line. The SF guys just get less direct 'supervision.'
I'll also point out that such interpolation was far less an issue in either force before the McNamara introduced military as management fetish and the slightly later terribly debilitating BTMS Task, Conditions and Standard straitjacket. We've simply lost our way due to those two factors. We better get our head out of our second point of contact (or fourth if one is a conformist...) and dump both those things or someone is going to go in and slice that head out to hand it to us on a plate...
When ISAF Generals start taking orders from Afghan Generals we will know we have turned the corner. I worked for a Brit General who I admire and respect tremendously, but many a time sitting in a Command and Staff meeting getting the stern lecture about the need for more effective partnering I would have to think "don't say it" as I looked around the room absent of a single Afghan.
I was less successful at biting my tongue when lectured routinely by the US 1-star about how the SOTF was not partnering properly by having only a single ODA working with an Afghan Battalion, with the Afghans planning, rehearsing and leading their own operations because we were not achieving the 1-1 standard of US to Afghan partnering being adopted by the conventional forces (hold my hand and follow me). I don't know, he got his second star so maybe he was right...
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
"Partnering" was the crack cocaine of ISAF for a few years, even though it pushed things in the absolutely wrong direction. Whereas before, Afghan units could only rely on small, 10-20 man mentoring teams (meaning they had to do a lot themselves) partnering allowed them to fall under the care and supervision of an entire battalion. I saw this first hand when we an OMLT disengaged and I became a de facto LO to a Kandak CO for a short spell.
Bookmarks