Future Naval Air contribution to "small wars"

[pvebber]

The CV is once again obsolete, "long live the CV!".

Or should it?

Aircraft were going to make surface ships obsolete, or so Billy Mitchell argued. Tac nukes made fleets obsolete in the late 60s and early 70s. Backfire bombers and conventional cruise missiles killed them off again in the late 70s early 80s. In the late 80s, and 90s wake homing torpedoes did them in. Now its antiship ballistic missiles.

We have been through multiple periods when ships, CVs in particular were "sitting ducks" - yet we have dropped a whole lot of warheads on foreheads with a perrenially obsolete platform.

Gazing into your crystal balls, is this "it" and finally the stake is about to be put into the heart of supercarriers? To surface ships in general? Is the risk to them to great for the role they have played delievering ordnance from 5 acres of soverign US territory placed where we want it?

If we slashed our CV force, would that significantly affect our success in future small wars? Would any of you pointy end of the spear types know they were gone? Can we provide striking power in support of land operations with missiles from small ships and intercontinental land-based air?

[Ken White]

No. No.

Yes. Yes. Not nearly as effectively (and, in this era of excessive compassion and concern, as accurately and / or measured).

Suggested added questions:

Can anything else 'show the flag' as effectively? Can we get by with two or three fewer CVNs?

No. Probably, accepting slight risk.

[Steve Blair]

Simple answer to your last two points (intercontinental air and sea-based missiles) is that they can't replace the capability provided by CVs. Neither option is especially responsive to immediate demands or requirements, and both lack the visible deterrent factor that naval air can provide (although the B-52 has a similar capability, you still have the response time issue).

There has always been talk of the "risk to surface ships," but I've yet to seriously see it appear outside of the writings of theorists and those with various axes to grind. And as overseas bases continue to disappear, the CV gives us a capability that can't easily be replaced or replicated.

Just my $.02.

[Sergeant T]

Good piece along these lines in the May issue of Proceedings. Also a good analysis, as always, by Galrahn. From a sheer dollar standpoint, the price tag per unit doesn't look sustainable.

[Entropy]

As a guy who cut his teeth supporting naval air, I do have a fondness for carriers. The reality is, though, that we don't know how they'd perform in a real war. They were never tested against tac nukes, wake homers, Backfires, etc. It may be that they will be proved obsolete in a real naval war. I hope we don't find out.

That said, I think they are extremely useful and flexible platform. I don't think, though, they have much utility for small wars so I don't think cuts to the CV force would affect those wars much.

[pvebber]

Thanks for the replies!

Effectiveness vs efficiency is one of the issues with our current fleet design - and the CVs in particular as Ken points out. Supercarriers are very efficient, and have demonstrated effectiveness, but at a potential catastrophic risk that leads to questioning their ultimate effectiveness.

The question one is left with after the proceeedings article (as galrahn points out) is if big carriers are sitting ducks, then small ones are - and what does that mean for the vulnerability of airbases ashore?

The problem comes down to risk - is a lot eggs efficiently placed in a few baskets - at high risk, but with a low probability of that risk materializing better than a few more baskets? a LOT more baskets?

Is the even higher cost of moving some capability undersea in SSGNs worth the expense agianst the liklihood of that risk?

Or do you pay to increase range and speed so you can stand off farther?

Our current plans seem to be a desire to hedge all bets, but the result will be a VERY limited capacity for each.

The submarine force is lobbying for two additional VA Class subs, and starting in about 2020 putting a 4 SSGN tube "plug" in them to help recoup the payload space lost when the SSGNs end their service life in the middle 2020s.

Capt Wayne Hughes proposed a bimodal "high-low" fleet mix in this paper:

New Navy Fighting machine

Others have proposed a trimodal Navy adding a "Stealthy, highly survivable" piece.

Given what we have seen in Libya, the realty of the political limits on the decisive use of airpower in the Warden model may require "low end" sources of airpower (like the opening use of Harriers from an LHD). I think its argueable that Libya isn't a true "small war".

While CV strike aircraft may not be as important to more tradtional COIN-based small wars, will the need for airborne ISR-T assets (some with reaper like strike capability) potentially require naval air assets to perform those functions, or will those tend to be more organic to ground units in the future?

[Steve Blair]

Obviously airbases on shore are outstanding targets, if for no other reason than they're fixed. They can be defended, but how many people do you tie up in that operation? And there's always the question of overflight rights or being able to launch missions from locations outside the US into other areas. Add in being able to supply overseas bases and the picture gets even more complex.